Hopewell v. Hopewell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ARTHUR W. HOPEWELL, as
Trustee of The James L. Hopewell
Trust u/a/d 12/12/14 and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
James L. Hopewell (Deceased),
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-1132
EARL HOPEWELL,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Arthur W. Hopewell (Arthur), as Trustee of the James L. Hopewell Trust and
Personal Representative of the Estate of James L. Hopewell, filed this action in the Kent County
Circuit Court on August 28, 2024, against Defendant Earl Hopewell (Earl) pursuant to the
Michigan Limited Liability Company Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.4101 et seq., seeking a decree
of dissolution for Syracuse Enterprises, LLC, a Michigan limited liability company. (ECF No. 5-
1.) On September 22, 2025—almost 13 months later—Earl, proceeding pro se, filed a Notice of
Removal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 alleging both federal question jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) as bases
for removal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.1.) On October 7, 2025, the Court referred this
matter to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B).
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Presently before me is Arthur’s Motion to Remand Case to the Kent County Circuit Court
(ECF No. 5), which is fully briefed and ready for decision.1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),
I recommend that Arthur’s motion be GRANTED and this action be remanded to the Kent County
Circuit Court. I further recommend that the Court award Arthur his actual expenses, including
attorney fees, that he has incurred as a result of Earl’s removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
I. 	Background
Arthur and Earl are brothers. They had another brother, James, who died on September 16,
2016. Sometime prior to February 2003, James and Earl inherited a single-family home located at
3669 Alden Nash Ave., S.E., Lowell, Michigan (the Property) from their father, who had resided
at the Property. (ECF. No. 5-1 at PageID.41.) On February 13, 2003, James filed articles of
organization for a Michigan domestic limited liability company called Syracuse Enterprises, LLC
(Syracuse). (ECF No. 5-1.) Subsequently, James and Earl conveyed their respective interests in
the Property to Syracuse by quit-claim deeds dated July 3, 2003, and May 28, 2003. (Id. at
PageID.53 and 56.) The Property was Syracuse’s only asset and apparently was maintained as a
rental property prior to, and for a period of time following, James’s death.
On August 25, 2017, Earl filed a lawsuit against the Estate of James Hopewell and Artis
Hopewell alleging issues concerning the operation of Syracuse. (ECF No. 5-1 at PageID.41; ECF
5-2.) The parties resolved the matter pursuant to a Settlement Agreement dated October 12, 2017.
(ECF No. 5-1 at PageID.61–62.) Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed that
1 The Sixth Circuit has held that motions to remand are dispositive matters. Vogel v. U.S. Office
Prods. Co., 258 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to Western District of Michigan Local
Civil Rule 7.2(b) and (c) governing dispositive motions, authorized briefs include an opening or
supporting brief, a response, and a reply. Additional briefing may be filed only with leave of Court.
Earl’s supplement and surreply (ECF Nos. 18 and 19) are not authorized by the Rule 7.2, and Earl
did not file a motion for leave to file them. Accordingly, I have disregarded them in my review of
the motion to remand.
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Earl would dismiss all of his claims against the Estate with prejudice, that the parties would hire
an attorney to evict the current tenants, and they would obtain an appraisal of the Property for the
purpose of listing it for sale. (Id. at PageID.61.) Upon the sale of the Property, the proceeds were
to be used to pay commissions and associated taxes and costs. In addition, $10,000.00 of the
proceeds was to be used to reimburse the Estate for defending Earl’s lawsuit. (Id. at PageID.62.)
The balance of the proceeds was to be divided equally between Earl and James’s estate, but would
not be distributed until Syracuse was dissolved and its final tax returns were filed. (Id.)
As required by the Settlement Agreement, the tenants of the Property were evicted (id. at
PageID.59), and the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss Earl’s action with prejudice. (ECF. No.
5-4.) Because the parties were unable to locate an operating/membership agreement for Syracuse,
they signed an Operating Agreement in October 2018 to allow Syracuse to list and sell the
Property, as well as to enable the eventual dissolution of Syracuse and distribution of its assets.
(ECF No. 5-1 at PageID.72–75.) The Property was appraised, listed, and eventually sold in October
2018, yielding net sale proceeds of $82,524.32. (Id. at PageID.64–69.) The funds were deposited
in Arthur’s counsel’s trust account on October 11, 2018. (ECF No. 5-1 at PageID.42.) The funds
have remained in the trust account since that time. The dissolution and distribution of funds has
not occurred because Earl refuses to consent to retaining a Certified Public Accountant to prepare
tax returns for Syracuse. Arthur has filed previous actions to wind up the affairs of Syracuse, but
he was unable to obtain service on Earl .
Arthur filed the present action to dissolve Syracuse and to obtain authorization to hire an
accountant to prepare and file tax returns on August 28, 2024. He served Earl by alternate service
on October 11, 2024. Earl filed his answer and counterclaim on November 4, 2024. On January
27, 2025, Earl filed a notice of his intention to remove the matter to federal district court (ECF No.
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1-1), but he did not file a notice of removal with this Court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
Earl did not file his notice of removal in this Court until September 22, 2025. (ECF No. 1.)
Arthur filed his instant motion to remand on October 15, 2025. He asserts that remand is
warranted because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action based on either
federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. Arther further contends that remand is
warranted because Earl failed to file a timely notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
II. 	Discussion
As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal court[s] must proceed with caution in deciding
that [they have] subject matter jurisdiction.” Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89
F.3d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir. 1996). Removal statutes are thus strictly construed to promote comity
and preserve jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal courts. Alexander v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1994). “The removing party bears the burden of
demonstrating federal jurisdiction, and all doubts should be resolved against removal.” Harnden
v. Jayco, Inc., 496 F.3d 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d
544, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2006)).
A. 	The Court Lacks Federal Question Jurisdiction
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” The existence
of federal question jurisdiction is determined by examining the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.
Federal question jurisdiction arises where a “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal
law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution
of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983). Under this rule, the plaintiff is the master of his claim and can avoid
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federal court jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386, 392 (1987). Where the plaintiff relies exclusively on state law to establish his claim, removal
is not permitted even where the claim is subject to a federal defense. City of Warren v. City of
Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 2007).
Applying the foregoing principles, federal question jurisdiction does not provide a basis
for removal of this action. Arthur’s complaint relies entirely on state law—the Michigan Limited
Liability Company Act. The complaint merely seeks a decree of dissolution under that Act and an
order authorizing Arthur to take all actions necessary to wind down the affairs of Syracuse and
distribute its assets. No federal question appears on the face of the complaint, nor is there any
indication that the resolution of Arthur’s request for dissolution and authority to retain an
accountant for preparation of tax returns depends upon a substantial question of federal law.
Earl’s arguments to the contrary are meritless. Arthur’s complaint does not present a
federal income tax issue on its face, and to the extent Earl contends that he has a defense or
counterclaim raising a federal income tax issue, his argument must be rejected as “it is well settled
that federal counterclaims and defenses are inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction[.]” Chase
Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 507 F.3d 910, 914–15 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 784, 787 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (“A
corollary to the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule is that a defendant may not remove a case to federal
court on the basis of an affirmative defense or counterclaim raising a federal question.”) (citing,
among others, Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998); Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at
393). Earl’s attempt to insert federal tax questions into the complaint fails to create a basis for
removal jurisdiction.
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Contrary to Earl’s argument, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Littriello v. United States, 484
F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), is immaterial to the removal at issue in this case. In Littriello, the plaintiff
sued the United States and the Department of the Treasury in federal court challenging the
Treasury Department’s “check-the-box” regulations pertaining to classification of business entities
for tax purposes. Id. at 374. Littriello has no possible application here as Arthur did not sue the
United States or the Treasury Department in federal court challenging the validity of a tax
regulation. Moreover, since the plaintiff in that case invoked the federal district court’s
jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction was not at issue. Likewise, Pacific National Company v. Welch,
304 U.S. 191 (1938), which Earl also cites, was a suit for refund of federal income taxes which
had nothing to do with removal jurisdiction.
B. 	The Jurisdictional Threshold Is Not Satisfied for Purposes of Section
1332(a)
Diversity jurisdiction exists if the suit is “between . . . citizens of different States,” and “the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs[.]” 28
U.S.C. § 1332. There is no issue that diversity of citizenship exists. The issue concerns the
jurisdictional threshold.
As the removing party, Earl has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement where the complaint does
not specify the amount sought by the plaintiff. Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158
(6th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). He
must show that it is “more likely than not” that Arthur’s claim meets the amount in controversy
requirement. Id. A defendant’s mere conclusory statement on information and belief at the time of
filing the notice of removal is not sufficient to establish this Court’s removal jurisdiction. See Gaus
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v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992); Garza v. Bettcher Indus., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 753, 763
(E.D. Mich. 1990); Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1994).
Here, Earl alleges in his notice of removal that the “amount [in] controversy . . . far exceeds
$75,000.00[], possibly hundreds of thousands[.].” (ECF No. 1 at PageID.4.) This is nothing more
than a conclusory statement that the amount in controversy is satisfied.
The complaint asks for relief akin to equitable relief and does not seek monetary relief. In
fact, this action is similar to one seeking specific performance of a settlement agreement. In such
situations, “‘it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the
object of the litigation.’” Cleveland Hous. Renewal Project v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 621 F.3d
554, 560 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347
(1977)). “While absolute certainty is neither attainable nor required, the value of [equitable] relief
must be ‘sufficiently measurable and certain’ to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.”
South Fla. Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 745 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted); see also Chrysler Grp. LLC v. South Holland Dodge, Inc., No. 10-12984, 2015 WL
4429456, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2015) (the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s motion to enforce settlement agreement because “any benefit that would be obtained
from the requested injunction [was] not sufficiently measurable to satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement and [was] far too speculative to sustain diversity jurisdiction”).
I conclude that the value of the requested relief is not sufficiently measurable to satisfy the
jurisdictional threshold. To the extent that it is measurable, Earl fails to satisfy his burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional threshold is satisfied. Arthur
has shown that to the extent the relief can be valued, it is more likely than not less than $75,000.00.
Although the sale proceeds are $82,524.30 plus any interest that has accrued since October 2018,
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pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, $10,000.00 still must be deducted from that amount for
attorney’s fees Arthur and the Estate incurred in defending Earl’s prior action. In addition, the
amount available for distribution will likely be further reduced by the cost of hiring accountants to
prepare Syracuse’s tax return, and any incidental expenses that may be incurred in winding up its
affairs. Thus, the net amount for distribution is likely be less than $75,000.00.
C. 	The Removal Was Untimely
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), “[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding
shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding
is based[.]” As set forth above, Earl was served with the complaint on October 11, 2024, and filed
his answer and counterclaim on November 4, 2014. The September 22, 2025, notice of removal
was thus untimely. Moreover, Arthur’s motion to remand asserting this defect in removal was
timely, having been filed within 30 days of Earl’s filing of the notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c).
Although Earl suggests in his notice of removal that he is timely under the one-year
limitation set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c), nothing suggests that Arthur acted in bad faith in order
to prevent Earl from removing the action, and Earl fails to demonstrate that he subsequently
learned from “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper” showing that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. In short, upon receipt of the complaint and
attached exhibits, Earl had all of the information he needed to determine whether more than
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$75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, was at issue. Accordingly, in addition to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, remand is warranted because Earl’s notice of removal was untimely.2
D. 	Costs and Attorney’s Fees
Arthur requests that the court award him Rule 11 sanctions for the improper removal
pursuant to a forthcoming motion that Arthur intends to file. I find that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)
provides a more appropriate basis for such an award under these circumstances. The statute
provides, in part: “An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.”
An award under Section 1447(c) is a matter committed to the district court’s discretion.
Bartholomew v. Town of Collierville, 409 F.3d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard governing
this discretion is set forth in Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132 (2005): “Absent
unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing
party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively
reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Id. at 141. A court need not find that the improper
removal was motivated by bad faith or an improper purpose in order to award fees under section
1447(c). Morris v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 985 F.2d 238, 240 (6th Cir. 1993).
The circumstances here show that Earl lacked an objectively reasonable basis to remove
the case to this Court. As set forth above, remand is appropriate not only because the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over this action, but also because the notice of removal was untimely
by many months. Moreover, although not required for an award of expenses and fees, the
circumstances suggest that Earl acted in bad faith or with an improper purpose because he filed
2 Earl complains in his notice of removal about the state court’s failure to timely address his various
motions. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.3–4.) This is not a proper basis for removal of a case to this Court.
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the notice of removal only weeks before Arthur’s motion for summary disposition was set to be
heard by the state court. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID.6.) Accordingly, I recommend that the Court
award Arthur “just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of
the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). I further recommend that the Court direct Arthur to submit an
affidavit setting forth the fees and expenses incurred in filing his motion to remand, including the
hourly rate and number of hours his counsel spent on the motion to remand, and that Earl be
afforded an opportunity to respond to the reasonableness of such fees.
III. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court grant Arthur’s motion to remand
(ECF No. 5) and award Arthur attorney’s fees and expenses incurred because of the improper
removal.
Dated: December 8, 2025 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of
Court within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to
file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.
1981).
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