Jordan v. Pfizer Inc.

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
WILLIAM JORDAN, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-01079
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Judge
v.
PFIZER, INC.,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendant’s motion to
dismiss and to compel arbitration. 	ECF No. 2. 	The R. & R. further addresses
Plaintiff’s motion to compel exhibit production on arbitrability. 	ECF No. 14.
Plaintiff William Jordan filed this lawsuit in the Kalamazoo County Circuit
Court against his former employer – Pfizer, Inc. 	ECF No. 1. 	On September 12,
2025, Pfizer filed a Notice of Removal based upon diversity jurisdiction. 	Id.
Jordan alleges that he was employed in a critical engineering role beginning
in 2023 and continuing until his termination in May of 2025. 	ECF No. 1-1,
PageID.10. 	Jordan alleges he reported several safety issues and concerns, and
proposals 	for 	“major 	innovation 	efforts.” 	Id. 	Thereafter, 	Plaintiff 	began
experiencing retaliation in the form of disciplinary write-ups, removal from projects,
and the exclusion from safety conversations. 	Id., PageID.11. 	Jordan says that one
of 	his 	co-workers 	stated 	to 	him: 	“you 	little 	cocksucker” 	and 	further 	made
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 1
of 11

2
inappropriate sexual remarks to a female employee. 	Id. 	Another co-worker
allegedly spread false gossip and threatened him with use of the Ombudsman. 	Id.
Despite Jordan’s request for intervention, no action was taken by management. 	Id.
Soon after Plaintiff applied for a promotion, he was terminated from his employment.
Jordan asserts ten counts in his complaint including: 	Count I – retaliation
for safety, ethics, and innovation advocacy (Whistleblower Protection Act-aligned);
Count II – abuse of process; Count III – conflict of interest and ethics misconduct;
Count IV – negligent supervision and retention; Count V – failure to investigate,
discipline, or document; Count VI – breach of implied good faith; Count VII –
retaliation for executive innovation advocacy; Count VIII – wrongful termination;
Count 	IX 	– 	defamation 	and 	credibility 	damage; 	and 	Count 	X 	– 	hostile 	work
environment. 	Id., PageID.12.
Plaintiff asserted in his complaint that he opposes arbitration and asserts that
enforcing the arbitration clause in his employment contract would result in an
injustice. 	He 	asserts 	that 	the 	Court should 	strike 	the 	arbitration 	clause 	as
“unconscionable, inapplicable to the facts, and contrary to public health and safety.”
Id., PageID.15.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the parties signed a valid and binding
arbitration agreement. 	Therefore, it is respectfully recommended, first, that the
Court grant Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and, second, that the Court
deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss this case, and instead stay this case while the
parties go to arbitration.
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 2
of 11

3
II. 	Analysis
Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and
to compel arbitration. 	The Federal Rules provide that a claim may be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“Although the Federal Arbitration Act requires a court to summarily compel
arbitration upon a party’s request, the court may do so only if the opposing side has
not put the making of the arbitration contract ‘in issue.”’ Boykin v. Fam. Dollar Stores
of Michigan, LLC, 3 F.4th 832, 835 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4). 	The Sixth
Circuit has held that a motion to compel arbitration is properly brought under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), especially where the Court considers evidence
presented by the parties. 	Id. at 838.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that a party to an arbitration
agreement may petition a federal court for enforcement by filing a motion to compel
arbitration. 	9 U.S.C. § 4. 	Before granting a motion to compel arbitration, the Court
must determine that (1) the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate; (2) the
asserted claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement; and (3) Congress
did not intend for those claims to be non-arbitrable. 	Memmer v. United Wholesale
Mortgage, LL.C., 135 F.4th 398, 404 (6th Cir. 2025).
Generally, Courts recognize a strong presumption in favor of arbitration.
Huffman v. Hilltop Companies, LL.C., 747 F.3d 391, 394-395 (6th Cir. 2014). 	A
plaintiff must rebut the presumption “by clear implication” and with “positive
assurance.” 	Id. at 395. 	The Court should resolve “any doubts as to the parties’
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 3
of 11

4
intentions in favor of arbitration.” 	Id. (italics in original). 	However, a party is not
required to submit to arbitration where there was no agreement to arbitrate.
Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz, 281 Fed. Appx. 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2008).
1. 	Agreement to Arbitrate
On 	September 	23, 	2022, 	Plaintiff 	Jordan 	signed 	a 	Mutual 	Arbitration
Agreement and agreed to arbitrate all disputes that he may have with Defendant
Pfizer. 	ECF No. 2-1, PageID.844. 	The agreement broadly covers most claims that
Plaintiff could assert against Pfizer:
Id., PageID.839.
One exception to arbitration under the agreement includes any claim that is
precluded from arbitration by a federal statute. 	Id., PageID.841. 	Again, this
provision is consistent with the law. 	The Sixth Circuit held that:
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 4
of 11

5
While we note that this presumption in favor of arbitration can cover a
broad array of employment contracts, Congress still has the power to
exclude 	what 	it 	feels 	appropriate 	from 	the 	scope 	of 	arbitration
agreements. Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S.
79, 90, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000). In order to determine
whether a statutory claim should be arbitrated, two issues must be
considered. Id. at 90, 121 S.Ct. 513. First, a court must examine whether
the parties agreed to submit their claims to arbitration. Id. Second, a
court must consider whether Congress “evinced an intention to preclude
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights.” Id. (citing Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114
L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth,
Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)).
Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 312 F.3d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 2002).
First, as set forth above, it is undisputed that Jordan and Pfizer agreed to
arbitrate 	employment 	disputes. 	However, 	Jordan 	asserts 	that 	because 	he 	is
asserting retaliation and a whistleblower claims, arbitration may not be compelled
under the FAA. 	ECF No. 10. 	He asserts that arbitration is precluded by three
statutes including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. §1514A, the Dodd-Frank Act,
15 U.S.C. §78u-6(h)(1), and whistle blower provisions under the FDA, 21 U.S.C.
§399d.
Title 	18 	United 	States 	Code 	§ 	1514A 	protects 	whistleblowers 	reporting
financial fraud at publicly traded companies that violates the fraud sections of the
U.S. Code at “1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders.” 	18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). 	Similarly, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) involves
whistleblower protection for the reporting of securities fraud. 	In the opinion of the
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 5
of 11

6
undesigned, Plaintiff has not alleged facts in his complaint that could invoke these
statutes.
Jordan does assert in his complaint that his whistleblower claim involves
allegations of violations of 21 U.S.C. § 399d. 	ECF No. 1-1, PageID.10. 	That section
provides:
(a) IN GENERAL
No 	entity 	engaged 	in 	the 	manufacture, 	processing, 	packing,
transporting, distribution, reception, holding, or importation of food
may discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate against an
employee 	with 	respect 	to 	compensation, 	terms, 	conditions, 	or
privileges of employment because the employee, whether at the
employee’s initiative or in the ordinary course of the employee’s duties
(or any person acting pursuant to a request of the employee)—
(1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide or cause to be
provided to the employer, the Federal Government, or the attorney
general of a State information relating to any violation of, or any act
or omission the employee reasonably believes to be a violation of any
provision of this chapter or any order, rule, regulation, standard, or
ban under this chapter, or any order, rule, regulation, standard, or
ban under this chapter;
(2) testified or is about to testify in a proceeding concerning such
violation;
(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in such a
proceeding; or
(4) objected to, or refused to participate in, any activity, policy, practice,
or assigned task that the employee (or other such person) reasonably
believed to be in violation of any provision of this chapter, or any
order, rule, regulation, standard, or ban under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 399d. 	First, Jordan does not explain how this statute is applicable to the
factual allegations that he made in his complaint. 	Most importantly, however, he
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 6
of 11

7
points 	to 	nothing 	in 	the 	statute 	that 	prohibits 	arbitration. 	In 	addition, 	the
arbitration agreement expressly does not prohibit an employee from communicating,
filing a charge, complaint, or claim with a federal or state agency. 	ECF No. 2-1.
PageID.840.
Moreover, not all whistleblower claims are excluded from arbitration. 	Bruce
v. Adams & Reese, LLP, No. 25-5210, 2026 WL 523180, at *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026).
Rather, whistleblower and retaliation claims arising out of employment disputes are
the types of claims that are routinely arbitrated. 	Samaan v. Gen. Dynamics Land
Sys., Inc., No. 11-13869, 2014 WL 4829536, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2014)
(Michigan Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and retaliation claims arising out of
employment subject to arbitration); United States ex rel. Grober v. Summit Med. Grp.,
Inc., No. CV 02-177-C, 2005 WL 8168970, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 2005) (“Congress
did not exempt FCA whistleblower-retaliation claims from the FAA, and there is no
recognized basis for refusing to compel their arbitration”); Barkai v. VHS of Michigan,
Inc., No. 354587, 2021 WL 3574106, at *8-9 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2021) (Michigan
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act covered by arbitration clause).
Jordan argues that the arbitration agreement, particularly the delegation
clause1 , is unconscionable and adhesive because he had no bargaining power with no
1 	A 	delegation 	provision 	is 	an 	agreement 	to 	arbitrate 	threshold 	issues
concerning the arbitration agreement. 	Becker v. Delek US Energy, Inc., 39 F.4th
351, 355 (6th Cir. 2022). 	“[A] respondent does not challenge the delegation provision
while attacking the enforceability of the arbitration agreement as a whole unless the
attack is specific to language in the delegation provision.” Id.
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 7
of 11

8
meaningful opportunity to review or to negotiate. 	He further says that he was
required to sign the agreement as a condition of employment.
Michigan contract law determines whether the parties entered into a valid and
binding arbitration agreement. 	Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 393 (6th
Cir. 2003); Boykin, 3 F.4th at 839 (citing Hall v. Pac. Sunwear Stores Corp., 2016 WL
1366413, at *5-*6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2016)); Martyn v. J.W. Korth & Co., No. 1:11-
CV-407, 2011 WL 2144618, at *2 (W.D. Mich. June 1, 2011). 	In determining whether
a provision is an unenforceable contract of adhesion, Michigan applies a two-prong
test of procedural and substantive unconscionability. 	The test evaluates: (1) the
relative bargaining power of the parties including the options available; and (2)
whether the challenged term is substantively reasonable. 	Andersons, Inc. v. Horton
Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 323 (6th Cir. 1998).
Even if the contract is adhesive under the first prong, the challenged
term is still enforceable if substantively reasonable and not oppressive
or unconscionable. “Thus, merely because the parties have different
options or bargaining power, unequal or wholly out of proportion to each
other, does not mean that the agreement of one of the parties to a term
of a contract will not be enforced against him; if the term is substantively
reasonable, 	it 	will 	be 	enforced. 	By 	like token, 	if 	the 	provision 	is
substantively unreasonable, it may not be enforced without regard to
the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties.”
Id. (citations omitted).
“Procedural unconscionability exists when a weaker party has no ‘realistic
alternative’ but to accept the term.” 	Rayford v. Am. House Roseville I, LLC, No.
163989, 2025 WL 2177754, at *16 (Mich. July 31, 2025) (citation omitted). 	First,
Jordan has failed to assert facts establishing that he could not negotiate the terms of
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 8
of 11

9
the arbitration clause or that he tried to negotiate the terms of the arbitration clause
and Pfizer refused his demands. 	The ability to negotiate terms of the arbitration
clause is a factor in determining procedural unconscionability. 	Andersons, Inc., 166
F.3d at 325. 	In other words, Jordan has failed to establish that the arbitration
clause was a “take it or leave it” agreement. 	Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses,
Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 384 (6th Cir. 2005). 	Additionally, Jordan has failed to present
evidence that the arbitration clause was adhesive by asserting or showing that he
was unable to find suitable employment if he refused to sign the agreement. 	Id.
“Substantive unconscionability requires courts to analyze the reasonableness
of the challenged term. A contract provision is substantively unreasonable if the
inequity 	‘shock[s] 	the 	conscience.’” 	Rayford, 	at 	*17. 	In 	the 	opinion 	of 	the
undersigned, the arbitration agreement that Jordan signed does not “shock the
conscience” and Jordan has failed to show otherwise.
2. 	Dismissal or Stay
Defendant moves to compel arbitration and for the Court to dismiss the case.
Where arbitration is appropriate, the Court shall “stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9
U.S.C. § 3. 	However, authority exists for the Court to dismiss the action “when all
issues raised in the complaint are arbitrable.” 	Moore v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 533
F.Supp.2d 740, 751 (W.D. Mich. 2008). 	In Moore, the Court explained that it serves
no purpose to stay the case and retain jurisdiction where all the issues in a case must
be submitted to arbitration. 	Id. 	Defendant has failed to present any meaningful
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 9
of 11

10
analysis as to why dismissal, rather than a stay, is appropriate. 	The Sixth Circuit
more recently stated that the Court “has no discretion to deny a stay.” 	Arabian
Motors Group W.L.L. v. Ford Motor Co., 19 F.4th 938, 941 (6th Cir. 2021). 	In that
case, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case after ordering
arbitration but refused to decide whether dismissal remains an option for district
courts after compelling arbitration. 2 	In the opinion of the undersigned, a stay of the
case is appropriate while the matter is in arbitration.
III. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court
(1) grant Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and (2) stay the case.3
It is further recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion to compel
exhibits on the issue of arbitrability.4
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
2 	The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that dismissal may be appropriate when the
dispute is moot or suffers from a pleading or procedural defect, or when dismissal is
requested by both parties, or where neither party requests a stay. 	Arabian Motors
Group, W.L.L., 19 F.4th at 942.
3 	It is further recommended that Court require the parties to file periodic status
reports with the Court, and upon completion of the arbitration process.
4 	Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to provide all the exhibits filed in the
state courts and other documents from Pfizer. 	Further, Plaintiff requests that the
Court allow him to conduct limited depositions. 	First, there is no indication that
Pfizer failed to attach the complete state court complaint to the notice of removal.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not provided any reason as to why further exhibits and
discovery are necessary for the Court to decide whether this dispute is subject to the
arbitration agreement entered by the parties.
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 10
of 11

11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	March 25, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-01079-PLM-MV ECF No. 25, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/25/26 Page 11
of 11