Crall v. Michigan, State of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JORDAN MICHAEL CRALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MICHIGAN et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1051
Honorable Maarten Vermaat
OPINION
This is an action brought by a county jail inmate. Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 9.) He has also filed a motion for order for entry statement.
(ECF No. 7.) However, Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). Where a plaintiff is ineligible for in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “he
must make full payment of the filing fee before his action may proceed.” In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378,
380 (6th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff has filed at least three lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for
failure to state a claim, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is in imminent danger of serious
physical injury to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. Further, Plaintiff has not
paid the $405.00 civil action filing fees applicable to those not permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis.1 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, this action will be dismissed without
1 The filing fee for a civil action is $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The Clerk is also directed to
collect a miscellaneous administrative fee of $55.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(b); https://www.uscourts.
gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule. However, the miscellaneous
administrative fee “does not apply to applications for a writ of habeas corpus or to persons granted
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prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and his motion for order for entry statement will be
denied as moot.
Discussion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996),
amended the procedural rules governing a prisoner’s request for the privilege of proceeding in
forma pauperis. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the PLRA was “aimed at the skyrocketing numbers
of claims filed by prisoners–many of which are meritless–and the corresponding burden those
filings have placed on the federal courts.” Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997).
For that reason, Congress created economic incentives to prompt a prisoner to “stop and think”
before filing a complaint. Id. For example, a prisoner is liable for the civil action filing fee, and if
the prisoner qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis, the prisoner may pay the fee through partial
payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The constitutionality of the fee requirements of the
PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 1288.
In addition, another provision reinforces the “stop and think” aspect of the PLRA by
preventing a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis when the prisoner repeatedly files
meritless lawsuits. Known as the “three-strikes” rule, the provision states:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action
or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings in forma pauperis] if the
prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.
in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/
district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule.
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statutory restriction “[i]n no event,” found in § 1915(g), is express and
unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is “under imminent danger of
serious physical injury.” The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the three-strikes rule
against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process,
and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is ex post facto legislation. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d
596, 604–06 (6th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff has been an active litigant in the Michigan federal courts. In at least three of
Plaintiff’s lawsuits, the Court entered dismissals on the grounds that the cases were frivolous,
malicious, and/or failed to state a claim. See See Crall v. State of Michigan, Case No. 1:18-cv-518
(W.D. Mich., July 6, 2018); Crall v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, Case No. 1:18-cv-517 (W.D.
Mich., June 28, 2018); Crall v. United States of America, Case No. 1:17-cv-1071 (W.D. Mich.,
Dec. 21, 2017). All of Plaintiff’s dismissals were entered after enactment of the PLRA on April
26, 1996.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations do not fall within the “imminent danger” exception to the
three-strikes rule. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit set forth the following general
requirements for a claim of imminent danger:
In order to allege sufficiently imminent danger, we have held that “the threat or
prison condition must be real and proximate and the danger of serious physical
injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed.” Rittner v. Kinder, 290 F. App’x
796, 797 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus a prisoner’s
assertion that he or she faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the
exception.” Id. at 797–98; see also [Taylor v. First Med. Mgmt., 508 F. App’x 488,
492 (6th Cir. 2012)] (“Allegations of past dangers are insufficient to invoke the
exception.”); Percival v. Gerth, 443 F. App’x 944, 946 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Assertions
of past danger will not satisfy the ‘imminent danger’ exception.”); cf. [Pointer v.
Wilkinson, 502 F.3d 369, 371 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007)] (implying that past danger is
insufficient for the imminent-danger exception).
In addition to a temporal requirement, we have explained that the allegations must
be sufficient to allow a court to draw reasonable inferences that the danger exists.
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To that end, “district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant to
§ 1915(g) when the prisoner’s claims of imminent danger are conclusory or
ridiculous, or are clearly baseless (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level
of irrational or wholly incredible).” Rittner, 290 F. App’x at 798 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also Taylor, 508 F. App’x at 492 (“Allegations
that are conclusory, ridiculous, or clearly baseless are also insufficient for purposes
of the imminent-danger exception.”).
Vandiver v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner’s claim of
imminent danger is subject to the same notice pleading requirement as that which applies to
prisoner complaints. Id. Consequently, a prisoner must allege facts in the complaint from which
the Court could reasonably conclude that the prisoner was under an existing danger at the time he
filed his complaint, but the prisoner need not affirmatively prove those allegations. Id.
Plaintiff reports that he is housed at the Branch County Jail. The focus of his complaint and
supplements, however, appears to be a significant cache of evidence in a storage unit. It appears
that Plaintiff seeks the Court’s assistance in securing this evidence. Plaintiff names dozens of
entities as Defendants, but it is not entirely clear why. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that support
the inference that he was under an imminent threat of serious physical injury when he filed his
complaint.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under § 1915(g).
Plaintiff also has not paid the $405.00 civil action filing fees applicable to those not permitted to
proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will therefore dismiss this action without prejudice. See
Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he proper procedure is for the district
court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in
forma pauperis pursuant to the three strikes provision of § 1915(g).”). Plaintiff is free to refile his
complaint as a new action in this Court if he submits the filing fees at the time that he initiates the
new action.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
The Court will dismiss this action without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to refile his complaint as a
new action in this Court with the full civil action filing fees.2 The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion
for order for entry statement (ECF No. 7), as moot.
For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith
basis for an appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th
Cir. 1997). Further, should Plaintiff appeal this decision, he must pay the full appellate filing fee
with his notice of appeal, because he is prohibited from proceeding in forma pauperis on appeal
by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
An order and judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: January 22, 2026 /s/Maarten Vermaat
Maarten Vermaat
United States Magistrate Judge
2 Because Plaintiff has the opportunity to refile his complaint as a new action in this Court by
paying the full civil action filing fees at the time of filing the new action, the Court will not assess
the district court filing fees in the present action.
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