Rozengard #946220 v. Burgess

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
BRYAN ROZENGARD,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL BURGESS,
Respondent.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-848
Honorable Maarten Vermaat
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The
Court will grant Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.1 (ECF No. 4.) The
Court will also grant Petitioner’s motion (ECF No. 12) for expedited review of his recent
supplemental brief (ECF No. 11).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Petitioner consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States
magistrate judge. (ECF No. 3.) Section 636(c) provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a
full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury
civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253
and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the petition. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
1 Petitioner has recently paid the filing feel. However, resolution of Petitioner’s in forma pauperis
motion might impact later proceedings in the case. Accordingly, the Court will still address and
grant his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 1 of 17

2
Service of the petition on the respondent is of particular significance in defining a putative
respondent’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not
obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority,
by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999).
“Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any
procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and
is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-
asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id.
(citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons
continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil
action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351.
Rule 4, by requiring courts to review and even resolve the petition before service, creates
a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the petitioner. Because
Respondent has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that Respondent is not presently a
party whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review of the
petition. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).2 Petitioner’s consent is sufficient to
permit the undersigned to conduct the Rule 4 review.
2 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 2 of 17

3
The Court conducts a preliminary review of the petition under Rule 4 to determine whether
“it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134,
141 (6th Cir. 1970) (discussing that a district court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack
merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous
claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson
v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434, 436–37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4,
the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious
federal claim.
Discussion
I. Factual Allegations
Petitioner is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the
Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. Respondent Michael
Burgess is the Warden at ECF and Petitioner’s immediate custodian.
United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 3 of 17

4
Petitioner is serving six concurrent sentences of 8 years, 4 months to 15 years, imposed on
December 21, 2015, following his Bay County Circuit Court jury conviction for six counts of third-
degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520d. People
v. Rozengard, No. 331140, 2017 WL 1683650 (Mich. Ct. App. May 2, 2017). The Michigan Court
of Appeals described the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions as follows:
Defendant, then aged nineteen, and the victim, then aged fifteen, engaged in a
sexual relationship that the victim contended was consensual; the relationship was
discovered when the victim’s mother walked in on them in the victim’s bed.
Evidence collected during the subsequent police investigation, and admitted at trial,
included messages defendant and the victim had exchanged on Facebook and by
cell phone text messages. Defendant contends that he was prejudiced by a lack of
adequate notice of the charges against him, improper admission of Facebook
messages from before any of the charged offenses were alleged to have occurred,
and trial counsel’s failure to request a hearing to determine defendant’s eligibility
to avoid registering as a sex offender. In a Standard 4 brief, defendant also argues
that he was prejudiced by the delay between his arrest and his arraignment.
Id. at *1 (footnote omitted). Specifically with regard to the delay between arrest and arraignment,
the court stated:
[D]efendant finally argues that he was prejudiced by the four-month delay between
his arrest and his arraignment. Defendant was arrested the day he was discovered
in bed with the victim, on October 5, 2014. He was arraigned in district court on
February 10, 2015; this was 128 days later according to the time calculation formula
under MCR 1.108(1). Defendant unclearly implies in his brief, but testimony in the
trial court expressly confirms, that his arrest was not made pursuant to a warrant,
but rather because his presence with the victim was a violation of a condition of his
bond for another criminal matter that was ongoing at the time. Police retrieved a
cell phone belonging to defendant, and some other items of his property, from the
victim’s residence; defendant did not have a cell phone on his person when he was
arrested later in the day. The phone was searched pursuant to a search warrant. It
appears that the gravamen of defendant’s argument is that the evidence from the
phone should be suppressed because he was allegedly not immediately brought
before a magistrate regarding the basis for his arrest.
Id. at *3.
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 4 of 17

5
The 128-day delay referenced above also forms the basis for Petitioner’s habeas challenge
to his convictions. In Petitioner’s petition (ECF No. 1), brief (ECF No. 5), supplemental brief (ECF
No. 6), motion to produce evidence (ECF No. 7), brief in support of that motion (ECF No. 8), letter
memorandum of law (ECF No. 9), judicial notice (ECF No. 10), and second supplemental brief
(ECF No. 11), he argues that the government’s failure to promptly arraign him ultimately deprived
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute him for the CSC-III charges.
Petitioner’s description of the constitutional wrongs at issue changes somewhat from one
filing in this case to the next. He also argues that the 22 days he was detained after his October 5,
2014, warrantless arrest, without any demonstration of probable cause, violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. He claims that the prolonged detention preceding his trial violated his
Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights in that it created a radical
jurisdictional defect. And, finally, Petitioner contends that his prolonged unlawful detention and
repeated postponements resulted in a violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights.
II. AEDPA Standard
The AEDPA “prevent[s] federal habeas ‘retrials’” and ensures that state court convictions
are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693–94 (2002).
An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a
state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in
state court unless the adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 5 of 17

6
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
state court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “Under these rules, [a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit
precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of
the state court’s decision.” Stermer v. Warren, 959 F.3d 704, 721 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)); Yarborough
v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). This standard is “intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v.
Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not
consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381–82 (2000);
Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 578–79 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “clearly established Federal
law” does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the
merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to
an examination of the legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in
light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Miller
v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 565 U.S. at 38).
A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to” clause if the state court
applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases, or if it
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06). “To satisfy this high bar, a
habeas petitioner is required to ‘show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 6 of 17

7
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Woods, 575
U.S. at 316 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103).
Determining whether a rule application was unreasonable depends on the rule’s specificity.
Stermer, 959 F.3d at 721. “The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching
outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664. “[W]here the precise
contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in their adjudication of a
prisoner’s claims.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 424 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160
F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is
presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011)
(en banc); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2003); Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d
652, 656 (6th Cir. 2001). This presumption of correctness is accorded to findings of state appellate
courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546–547 (1981); Smith v.
Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989).
Section 2254(d) limits the facts a court may consider on habeas review. The federal court
is not free to consider any possible factual source. The reviewing court “is limited to the record
that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 180 (2011). “If a review of the state court record shows that additional fact-finding was
required under clearly established federal law or that the state court’s factual determination was
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 7 of 17

8
unreasonable, the requirements of § 2254(d) are satisfied and the federal court can review the
underlying claim on its merits. Stermer, 959 F.3d at 721 (citing, inter alia, Brumfield v. Cain, 576
U.S. 305 (2015), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954 (2007)).
If the petitioner “satisfies the heightened requirements of § 2254(d), or if the petitioner’s
claim was never ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by a state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),”—for example,
if he procedurally defaulted the claim—“AEDPA deference no longer applies.” Stermer, 959 F.3d
at 721. Then, the petitioner’s claim is reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d
433, 436 (6th Cir. 2003)).
III. Analysis
Petitioner’s claim for relief depends entirely on the premise that he was either illegally
arrested or illegally detained after his arrest. Essentially, Petitioner claims that failing to make a
probable cause determination after a warrantless arrest taints any subsequent conviction and, he
claims further, that the failure creates a radical jurisdictional defect. Petitioner is simply wrong.
A. Lack of a Timely Probable Cause Determination
Petitioner bases his claims on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In Gerstein, the Court held that “the Fourth Amendment requires a
judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following
arrest.” 420 U.S. at 114. Petitioner contends that the State’s failure to provide him with the
protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause determination before detaining
him for an extended period invalidates the CSC-III convictions.
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 8 of 17

9
The Gerstein Court, however, concluded that the failure to provide a timely probable cause
determination did not invalidate a subsequent conviction:
In holding that the prosecutor’s assessment of probable cause is not sufficient alone
to justify restraint of liberty pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is
entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute. Instead, we
adhere to the Court’s prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to
prosecution by information. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962); Lem
Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule
that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Thus, as the
Court of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is presently detained may
challenge the probable cause for that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated
on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination
of probable cause. 483 F.2d, at 786–787. Compare Scarbrough v. Dutton, 393 F.2d
6 (CA5 1968), with Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (1971), and Cooley v. Stone,
414 F.2d 1213 (1969).
Id. at 119–120 (parallel citations omitted). Therefore, if Petitioner had been detained for 22 days
or even 128 days without a probable cause determination, the unlawful detention would not
provide a ground for habeas relief.3 Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s
rejection of his unlawful detention claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law. Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas relief.
3 The Michigan Court of Appeals, on Petitioner’s direct appeal, determined that Petitioner’s
October 5, 2014, arrest was not for the CSC-III crimes; rather, he was arrested because his presence
in bed with the victim, a 15-year-old girl, was a violation of the terms of a bond issued in
connection with another earlier-filed but still pending criminal prosecution. Rozengard, 2017 WL
1683650, at *3–4. The trial court revoked Petitioner’s bond on October 6, 2014. Case Details,
People v. Rozengard, No. 2014-10108-FH (Bay Cnty. Cir. Ct.). Petitioner was arrested for the
CSC-III violations in early February of 2015. (See Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.6–7; Warrant
Authorization Requests and Complaints, ECF No. 9-5, PageID.54–59.) He was arraigned on those
charges on February 10, 2015. Rozengard, 2017 WL 1683650, at *3.
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 9 of 17

10
B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Petitioner further claims that holding him without a probable cause determination created
a radical jurisdictional defect such that holding him in custody on the subsequent convictions
violates his Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights. That claim is
also meritless.
The phrase “radical jurisdictional defect” does not derive from federal constitutional
jurisprudence. Rather, it is a prerequisite to obtaining state habeas corpus relief. In Moses v. Dep’t
of Corr., 736 N.W.2d 269 (Mich. App. 2007), the court explained:
The [state] writ of habeas corpus deals with radical defects that render a judgment
or proceeding absolutely void. Hinton v. Parole Bd., 148 Mich. App. 235, 244–245,
383 N.W.2d 626 (1986). In general, MCL 600.4310(3) prohibits habeas corpus
relief to “[p]ersons convicted, or in execution, upon legal process, civil or
criminal.” But relief “is open to a convicted person in one narrow instance, . . .
where the convicting court was without jurisdiction to try the defendant for the
crime in question.” People v. Price, 23 Mich. App. 663, 669–670, 179 N.W.2d 177
(1970). Moreover, to qualify for habeas corpus relief, the jurisdictional defect must
be radical, rendering the conviction absolutely void. Id. at 670, 179 N.W.2d 177.
“A radical defect in jurisdiction contemplates . . . an act or omission by state
authorities that clearly contravenes an express legal requirement in existence at the
time of the act or omission.” Id. at 671, 179 N.W.2d 177. Nevertheless, habeas
relief may be denied in the exercise of a court’s discretion where full relief may be
obtained in other more appropriate proceedings. See Phillips, supra at 566, 396
N.W.2d 482; see also Jones, supra at 658, 664 N.W.2d 717 (order of mandamus,
rather than writ of habeas corpus, was the proper remedy for the DOC’s failure to
conduct a timely fact-finding hearing on parole violation charges). Thus, while
plaintiff may not use a habeas proceeding as a substitute for an appeal or to review
the merits of his criminal conviction, plaintiff may assert a radical defect in the
jurisdiction of the court in which his conviction was obtained. MCL 600.4310(3);
Price, supra at 669–670, 179 N.W.2d 177.
Moses, 736 N.W.2d at 273.
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 10 of
17

11
In Hornsby v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 368860, 2025 WL 1121102 (Mich. App. Apr. 15, 2025),
the court explained the type of jurisdictional defect that might be considered radical:
“It is a longstanding rule that defects in a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction render
a judgment void ab initio.” People v Washington, 508 Mich. 107, 129; 972 N.W.2d
767 (2021). “Subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal term of art[ ] that concerns a
court’s authority to hear and determine a case.” Id. at 121. “This authority is not
dependent on the particular facts of the case but, instead, is dependent on the
character or class of the case pending.” Id. (cleaned up). “[W]e have recognized
that circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.” Id. at 122-
123.
“Once a preliminary examination is held and the defendant is bound over on any
charge, the circuit court obtains jurisdiction over the defendant.” People v Unger,
278 Mich. App. 210, 221; 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008). “Subject matter jurisdiction is
presumed unless expressly denied by constitution or statute . . . .” People v Goecke,
457 Mich. 442, 458; 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998).
Hornsby, 2025 WL 1121102, at *3–4. Arrest or detention without probable cause does not deprive
a court of jurisdiction. See People v. Nawrocki, 150 N.W.2d 516, 520–21 (Mich. App. 1967) (“That
a defendant’s arrest was without a warrant or was illegal, cannot be considered at the trial, where
it was followed by a complaint and warrant on which the defendant was held for trial, or, where
the defendant was regularly bound over to the circuit court for trial. Even though an arrest is
irregular, the defendant is not thereby given the right to say that he shall not be tried at all.”
(citations omitted)); Ortiz-Kehoe v. Chippewa Corr. Fac. Warden, No. 361179, 2022 WL
17724460, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2022) (noting that detention without a valid probable
cause determination is rendered harmless by a subsequent valid circuit court conviction).
The determination of whether a state court is vested with jurisdiction under state law over
a criminal case is a function of the state courts, not the federal courts. Wills v. Egeler, 532 F. 2d
1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1976). It is well-settled that a purported violation of state law does not provide
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 11 of
17

12
a basis for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). “In conducting
habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id.
Moreover, the state court here determined that there were no jurisdictional defects. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.3 (noting that the Manistee County Circuit Court denied habeas relief because
Petitioner was improperly using habeas corpus as an appeal)); Order, Rozengard v. Chlebowski,
No. 373929 (Mich. Ct. App. June 23, 2025) (denying leave to appeal the habeas corpus denial “for
lack of merit in the grounds presented”). It is not the province of a federal habeas court to re-
examine state-law determinations on state-law questions. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76
(2005); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. The decision of the state courts on a state-law issue is binding on
a federal court. See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983). The Sixth Circuit repeatedly
has recognized “that a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct
appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Stumpf v.
Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 746 n.6 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76). Specifically
with regard to jurisdictional issues, the Sixth Circuit has stated that “a state court’s interpretation
of state jurisdictional issues conclusively establishes jurisdiction for purposes of federal habeas
review.” Strunk v. Martin, 27 F. App’x 473, 475 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, this Court is bound
by the state court’s determination that jurisdiction over Petitioner was established.
For all of the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
is meritless. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of his jurisdiction
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 12 of
17

13
argument was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas relief.
C. Speedy Trial Violation
Petitioner also makes passing reference to a claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial was violated. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1, PageID.6–7; Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 5, PageID.19.) In
Brown v. Romanowski, 845 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2017), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
the clearly established federal law with respect to the constitutional requirement for a speedy trial:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S.
Const. amend. VI. These rights apply to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Klopfler v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). The purpose
of the speedy-trial guarantee is to protect the accused against oppressive pre-trial
incarceration, the anxiety and concern due to unresolved criminal charges, and the
risk that evidence will be lost or memories diminished. Doggett v. United States,
505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992); United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986);
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1982); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 532–33 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). The sole remedy for a violation of the
speedy-trial right is dismissal of the charges. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S.
434, 439–40 (1973); United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1999).
In Barker, the Supreme Court established a four-factor test for determining whether
a defendant has been denied the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial.
Barker held that a court must consider (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for
the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the
defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. No one factor is dispositive. Rather, they are
related factors that must be considered together with any other relevant
circumstances. Id. at 533.
Id. at 712. The Barker Court acknowledged that its test was a flexible balancing test and, thus,
“necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.” Barker, 407 U.S.
at 529–530. The flexibility of the test has significant implications for this Court’s review under the
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 13 of
17

14
AEDPA standard. “The more general the rule at issue’—and thus the greater the potential for
reasoned disagreement among fair-minded judges—the more leeway [state] courts have in
reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 776 (2010)
(quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664).
In the Michigan state courts, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United States
constitution, U.S. Const. amend VI; the Michigan constitution, Mich. Const. 1963 art.1, § 20; state
statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.1; and court rule, Mich. Ct. R. 6.004(D). People v. Cain, 605
N.W.2d 28, 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); People v. McLaughlin, 672 N.W.2d 860, 867 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003). The Michigan state courts apply the Barker four-factor test “to determine if a pretrial
delay violated a defendant’s right to a speedy trial[,]” whether the speedy trial right at issue arises
from federal or state law. Cain, 605 N.W.2d at 39 (citing People v. Collins, 202 N.W.2d 769 (Mich.
1972)).4
Petitioner reports that he raised his speedy trial claim in his state habeas petition. The
Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave for lack of merit in the grounds presented. That merits
determination is entitled to AEDPA deference by this Court. See Werth v. Bell, 692 F.3d 486, 493
(6th Cir. 2012) (applying AEDPA deference to a Michigan Court of Appeals order stating only
4 Although the state courts apply clearly established federal law, the Barker test, to evaluate
“speedy trial” claims, they apply it a little differently than the federal courts. The state courts shift
the burden of proof with respect to prejudice based on the length of the delay, drawing the line at
18 months. Cain, 238 Mich. App. at 112. The federal courts, however, eschew such a “bright-line
rule.” Brown, 845 F.3d at 717. Instead, the federal “courts must conduct a functional analysis of
the right in the particular context of the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2011)); see Barker, 407 U.S. at 522. This is
a difference between the federal and state applications of the test, but the difference does not render
the state court’s application unreasonable or contrary to Barker. See, e.g., Brown v. Bobby, 656
F.3d 325, 329–330 (6th Cir. 2011) (concluding that Ohio’s use of a 270-day rule was not “contrary
to” Barker).
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 14 of
17

15
that leave to appeal was denied “for lack of merit in the grounds presented” (citing Harrington,
562 U.S. at 99–100)); see also Smith v. Cook, 956 F.3d 377, 386 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that the
Harrington presumption of a merits adjudication “prevails even when the state court’s opinion
wholly omits discussion of the federal claim”).
Petitioner was arrested and arraigned for the CSC-III charges in early February 2015. His
trial began on November 3, 2015, and the jury returned its verdict on November 5, 2015.
Petitioner’s trial began less than nine months after the complaint was filed against him. “A delay
approaching one year is presumptively prejudicial and triggers application of the remaining three
factors.” Maples, 427 F.3d at 1026 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1). In United States v.
Gardner, 488 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the Barker
factors when the delay was only nine months:
The length of the delay is a threshold issue. That is, if there is no delay that is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors.
Schreane, 331 F.3d at 553 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182). A delay
is presumptively prejudicial if it is “uncommonly long” or “extraordinary.” Id.
(citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L. Ed.
2d 520 (1992)). The Sixth Circuit has found that a delay is presumptively
prejudicial when it approaches one year. Id.
In this case, the delay between the filing of Gardner’s indictment and his trial was
265 days, or approximately nine months. Delays several months short of one year
are not “uncommonly long,” especially in cases involving multiple defendants and
pre-trial motions. Accordingly, our examination of this claim “ceases” and we do
not consider the other Barker factors. Id. We reject Gardner’s Sixth Amendment
speedy-trial claim.
Gardner, 488 F.3d at 719.
The delay of nine months at issue here also falls short of the threshold. Therfore, the Court
concludes that Petitioner has failed to show a Sixth Amendment “speedy trial” violation, or that
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 15 of
17

16
the state court’s denial of his speedy-trial claim is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law. Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas relief.
IV. Petitioner’s Motion to Produce Evidence
Petitioner asks the Court to order Respondent to produce evidence establishing lawful
jurisdiction over Petitioner. (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons stated above, the Bay County Circuit
Court’s lawful jurisdiction over Petitioner and his felony prosecution has been conclusively
established. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion to produce evidence will be denied.
V. Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a
certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine
whether a certificate is warranted. Id. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth
by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467.
Consequently, this Court has examined Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack,
529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable
or wrong.” Id. “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists of reason could
conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-
El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 16 of
17

17
full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit
of Petitioner’s claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal of
Petitioner’s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate
of appealability. Moreover, for the same reasons the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution and has failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, the Court also concludes that any issue
Petitioner might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962).
Conclusion
The Court will enter a judgment dismissing the petition and an order granting Petitioner
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, denying Petitioner’s motion to produce evidence, and denying
a certificate of appealability.
Dated: December 23, 2025 /s/Maarten Vermaat
Maarten Vermaat
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:25-cv-00848-MV ECF No. 13, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/23/25 Page 17 of
17