Broom #691462 v. Hallacy et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
QUENTIN JAMES BROOM, JR., #691462, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00820
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
JOHN A. HALLACY, et al.,
Defendants
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
Pro se Plaintiff state prisoner Quentin James Broom, Jr.1 filed his initial civil
complaint in the Eastern District of Michigan on May 13, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) On July
23, 2025, this case was transferred to the Western District of Michigan. (ECF No. 5.)
After 	transfer 	to 	this 	Court, 	the 	undersigned 	issued 	a 	Report 	and
Recommendation (R. & R.) recommending that Broom’s complaint be dismissed based
on the Court’s screening authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (ECF No. 10.) Broom
then filed two motions to amend his complaint. (ECF Nos. 11 and 12.) U.S. District
Judge Beckering then issued an order dismissing ECF No. 10 as moot and directing
the undersigned “to consider whether Plaintiff’s motions to correct or amend should
be granted and to determine whether those motions affect the Magistrate Judge’s
prior recommendations.” (ECF No. 15.)
1 	Broom also asserts that he is suing in the names Quentin James Broom, Jr.,
Inc.; Ambassador Quentin James Broom; Jr., Quentin James Broom, Jr., Plan
Administrator; Quentin James Broom, Jr., Administrator; and Broom Jr Quentin
James. (ECF No. 12-1, PageID.126-127.)
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Also pending before the Court are the following: (1) Broom’s motion for
permission to proceed in litigation, and for a show cause proceeding and order (ECF
No. 16), (2) Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9), and (3) Plaintiff’s motion to
overrule Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion and for an order directing the prosecutor
to “certify charge on the record” (ECF No. 17).
On July 25, 2025, Broom was granted in forma pauperis status.2 (ECF No. 8.)
Broom attached two different proposed complaints to his two motions to
amend. 	(See ECF Nos. 11-1 and 12-1.) 	Broom asserts in his amended complaints
that 	this 	Court 	has 	jurisdiction 	under 	both 	federal 	question 	and 	diversity
jurisdiction. 3 	(ECF No. 	12-1, PageID.123.) 	Defendants named in the proposed
complaints are 37th Circuit Court Judge Hallacy; the Michigan Parole Board and its
members; the law firm of Podolsky and Wickham, PLLC; Attorney Wickham; and
Parole Agent Tracie Portillo. (ECF No. 12-1.)
In his first claim, Broom asserts that he entered into a plea agreement on a
felony firearm charge to a 24-month sentence. 	(ECF No. 11-1, PageID.78-79.) 	He
asserts that there were errors in the Presentence Investigation Report that were
never corrected by his attorney Wickham or by Judge Hallacy before sentencing. (Id.,
PageID.79-80.) Broom asserts that he filed a motion for relief from judgment in the
2 	The Court did not direct the U.S. Marshals service to serve the summons and
complaint on any Defendant. Despite that fact, Defendants Podolsky and Wickham
entered appearances by counsel and filed a motion to dismiss. 	(ECF No. 9.) 	If the
Court accepts Plaintiff’s amended complaints, attorney Podolsky, who was named in
the original complaint, will no longer be individually named as a Defendant.
3 	Broom has not shown that diversity jurisdiction applies. 	Broom has failed to
allege that the parties are from different states. 	It appears that all the parties are
residents of Michigan.
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state court, but Judge Hallacy would not correct his “wrongful, unlawful or dishonest
act.” (Id.) After his motion was denied, he filed this lawsuit. (Id., PageID.80.)
In his second claim, Broom asserts that the Presentence Investigation Report
was inaccurate and his counsel failed to correct it. 	He asserts that a credit card
number issued to him was used as a “DLN/State Identification card number.” 	(Id.,
PageID.82.) 	Plaintiff says that he should not have been identified by his social
security number or birth certificate. (Id., PageID.83.) 	Broom asserts that his counsel
erred by not correcting these issues before his sentencing. 	Broom says that his
counsel failed to file a motion for relief from judgment on these issues, and his motion
to alter or to amend judgment was denied.
In his third claim, Broom asserts that he was on parole at the time he was
arrested for the most recent crime and sentenced to 24 months imprisonment. 	(Id.,
PageID.89.) 	He 	alleges 	that 	the 	parole 	board 	is 	treating 	“this 	‘New 	Court
Commitment” as if it is only a ‘parole violation’, which in term, it is not.” (Id.) Broom
says that as a prisoner he is being “kidnaped” and forced to work in the state
employment prison system by the Michigan Parole Board. 	(Id., PageID.90.) 	He
asserts a Fifth Amendment violation under the Takings Clause. (Id.)
Broom requests injunctive relief and damages.
The Michigan Department of Corrections Offender Tracking Information
System (OTIS) website shows that Broom was sentenced on January 22, 2024, to 2
years for a Weapons-Felony Firearm offense.4 	This is the sentence that Broom
4 	https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=691462.
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appears to challenge.
Broom was also previously sentenced for several other convictions. 	On April
29, 2016, Broom was sentenced to 5 years to 22 years and 6 months on two separate
criminal sexual conduct offenses. 	On October 8, 2014, he was sentenced to five
months to 2 years and 6 months for a prisoner possessing weapons. 	Finally, on
November 3, 2011, Broom was sentenced to 3 years to 20 years on assault with intent
to commit great bodily harm less than murder. 	These convictions make Broom’s
earliest release date January 21, 2026, and his maximum release date June 14, 2058.
It appears that Broom committed his most recent crime, a 2023 felony firearms
conviction, while he was on parole from his numerous other convictions. As a result,
he was given an additional 2-year sentence for the felony firearms conviction.
II. Standard of Law
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any action brought in
forma pauperis if the action is (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id. The court
must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 	Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
“probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In addition, the Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 33 (1992).
III. 	Analysis
First, 	any 	issues 	that 	Broom 	asserts 	regarding 	his 	state 	law 	criminal
proceedings and convictions are matters that need to be directed to the state courts.
In this lawsuit, Broom is challenging his felony firearm conviction and 2-year
sentence. He must first overturn his conviction before he can sue for money damages.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a state
prisoner 	cannot 	make 	a 	cognizable 	claim 	under 	§ 	1983 	for 	an 	allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless a prisoner shows that the conviction
or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 	512 U.S. at
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486–87 	(footnote 	omitted). 	Accordingly, 	Broom 	must 	successfully 	appeal 	his
convictions and sentences in the Michigan courts before he can file a claim for
monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that his conviction or sentence
violated his federal rights. Broom has not done so. For this reason, it is recommended
that the Court dismiss this case.
There are additional reasons to dismiss this case against Defendants.
Broom sues Michigan Circuit Court Judge Hallacy because he denied Broom’s
motion for relief from judgment. 	Judges are absolutely immune from a suit for
monetary damages. 	Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991) (“[I]t is a general
principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his
own 	convictions, 	without 	apprehension 	of 	personal 	consequences 	to 	himself.”)
(internal quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir.
1997); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). 	Absolute judicial
immunity may be overcome in only two instances. First, a judge is not immune from
liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (noting that
immunity is grounded in “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of
the actor who performed it”). 	Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though
judicial in nature, that are taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. 	Id. at 12;
Bright v. Gallia Cnty., 753 F.3d 639, 649 (6th Cir. 2014) (recognizing the difference
between an “excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the
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subject matter[,]” and noting that only the latter deprives a judge of judicial
immunity).
Plaintiff’s factual allegations clearly fail to implicate any exceptions to judicial
immunity. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Hallacy denied his motion for relief from
judgment. 	The act of ruling on motions is clearly judicial and Plaintiff may not sue
Judge Hallacy on the basis that he denied a motion.
Plaintiff does not fully explain why he is suing the Michigan Parole Board or
its members. 	Nor has Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendant parole agent
Tracie Portillo. The Michigan Parole Board is part of the Michigan Department of
Corrections. 	Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.231a(1). 	Regardless of the form of relief
requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh
Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity
or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826
(6th Cir. 1994). 	Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of
Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan,
803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). Therefore, the Michigan Parole Board, as part of
the Michigan Department of Corrections, is immune from injunctive and monetary
relief. 	See Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that
both the MDOC and the parole board are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh
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Amendment); Horton v. Martin, 137 F. App’x 773, 775 (6th Cir. 2005) (Michigan
Parole Board entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Lee v. Mich. Parole Bd.,
104 F. App’x 490, 492 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Fleming v. Martin, 24 F. App’x 258,
259 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). In addition, the Michigan Parole Board is not a “person”
who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771.
To the extent that Broom may be alleging that his parole was wrongfully
revoked, his claim is not cognizable. Claims which challenge the revocation of parole
are not cognizable under § 1983 until the parole revocation “has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
The principles espoused in Heck have been applied to § 1983 actions challenging
state parole revocation proceedings in the absence of a previous decision by a state
or federal tribunal declaring the parole revocation invalid. Littles v. Board of
Pardons & Paroles Div., 68 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam); Lovett v.
Kinkela, No. 98-3894, 1999 WL 644323, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999); Corsetti v.
McGinnis, No. 95-2061, 1996 WL 543684, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 1996). 	Here,
assuming that Broom is making such a claim, he has not demonstrated the
invalidity of his parole revocation by either a state or federal habeas corpus decision.
Therefore, Broom fails to present a cognizable federal claim against the Michigan
Parole Board or its members.
Nor may Broom assert a federal cause of action against attorney Wickham or
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her law firm. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that
the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549
(6th Cir. 2009); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). “[T]he
Fourteenth 	Amendment, 	which 	prohibits 	the 	states 	from 	denying 	federal
constitutional rights and which guarantees due process, applies to acts of the states,
not to acts of private persons or entities.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837,
1982).
In order for a private party’s conduct to be under color of state law, it must be
fairly attributable to the State. 	Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982). 	There must be a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the defendant so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself. 	Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th
Cir. 1991) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). 	Broom
has failed to meet this standard. 	Broom has asserted no factual allegations that
would indicate that attorney Podolsky is a state actor. 	Nor has Broom alleged
sufficient facts that could establish that Defendant Wickham violated his rights
during her representation of Broom.
Finally, to the extent that Broom has asserted state law claims against
Defendants, it is recommended that the Court decline supplemental jurisdiction
over those claims. In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, “[a]
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district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of
multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding
state law issues.” 	Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th
Cir. 1993). Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state-
law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are
dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. Id.
Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio,
Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch
Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). It is respectfully recommended
that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims.
IV. Recommendation
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant
Broom’s motions for leave to amend his complaint (ECF No. 11 and 12), strike
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9), deny Broom’s motions to proceed and to
order the prosecutor to certify (ECF No. 16 and 17), and dismiss the complaint
because Broom has failed to state an actionable federal claim upon which relief may
be granted.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
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constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	December 16, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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