Sviezikas v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TINA SVIEZIKAS,
Plaintiff, Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v. Case No. 1:25-cv-467
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before me on Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney’s Fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C § 2412. (ECF No. 19.) Defendant has filed a response and
does not oppose the amount requested. (ECF No. 21.) On December 1, 2025, the Court entered a
Stipulation and Order and Judgment remanding the matter to the Commissioner pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings. (ECF Nos. 17 and 18.) As set forth in her
application, Plaintiff seeks an EAJA fee award of $5,675.25 representing 23 hours of attorney time
at an hourly rate of $246.75. Plaintiff also requests $42.30 in PACER fees. (ECF No. 19 at
PageID.1014, 1022.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court grant the
fee request to an extent but deny the PACER fee request.
Under the EAJA, the prevailing party in an action seeking judicial review of a decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security may apply for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. See 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). While a prevailing party is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the EAJA
as a matter of course, see United States v. 0.376 Acres of Land, 838 F.2d 819, 825 (6th Cir. 1988),
fees and costs are to be awarded unless the Court finds that the Commissioner’s position was
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“substantially justified” or that “special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(A). As noted, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court remanded this matter to the
Commissioner for further administrative action pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
There is no indication here that the Commissioner’s position was substantially justified, or that
special circumstances weighing against an award are present.
Hourly Rate
Pursuant to the EAJA, an hourly rate shall be “based upon prevailing market rates for the kind
and quality of the services furnished,” subject to a presumptive cap of $125 per hour. 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(A). A court may award a higher amount if it “determines that an increase in the cost of
living or a special factor . . . justifies a higher fee.” Id. A fee applicant “bear[s] the burden of producing
appropriate evidence to support [a] requested increase.” Bryant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d 443,
450 (6th Cir. 2009).
For several years, judges in this district have agreed that $204.75 is an appropriate EAJA
hourly rate. See Belanger v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 2:20-cv-009, Opinion and Order, ECF No.
28 (W.D. Mich.) (finding that inflation and cost-of-living increases supported increasing the hourly
EAJA rate from $175 to $204.75); see also Rinheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:24-cv-1141, 2026
WL 545093, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2026), adopted by 2026 WL 542570 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26,
2026); Coy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:24-cv-414, 2024 WL 6975220, at *1 (Dec. 12, 2024). In her
present application, Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $246.75. Plaintiff justifies this rate based on
the rate of inflation between 2012 and 2025 which, according to usinflationcalculator.com, was 39.4%.
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This means that $1.00 in 2012 would equal $1.41 in 2025, which is how Plaintiff arrives at the rate of
$246.75 (2012 EAJA rate of $175 x. 1.41).1 (ECF No. 19 at PageID.1015.)
Plaintiff buttresses her proposed rate with rates from the USAO Attorney’s Fee Matrix for
2015–2021 and the Laffey Matrix, see https://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html, which indicate rates
of $665.00 and $914 per hour, respectively, for an attorney with 31 or more years of experience, such
as Plaintiff’s counsel. (Id. at PageID.1017.) Notably, these sources provide rates for attorneys
practicing, or for litigation occurring, in the District of Columbia and the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area, not West Michigan. She also mentions “multiple affidavits [from other attorneys]
which accompany this Motion” (id.), but has neither attached nor separately filed any affidavit in
support of her motion. Finally, Plaintiff cites the State Bar of Michigan Economics of Law Practice
survey for 2020 and 2023. The 2023 survey reports rates of $250 for the 25th percentile and $650 for
the 95th percentile for attorneys with more than 35 years of practice experience and rates of $275 for
the 25th percentile and $625 for the 95th percentile for attorneys practicing in the Grand Rapids area.
See https://www.michbr.org/file/pmrc/pdfs/EoL_Report23.pdf.
Although the Sixth Circuit has cautioned district courts not to give controlling weight to prior
fee awards when presented with other credible evidence of the current market for legal services,
Doucette v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 484, 491 (6th Cir. 2021), rates that counsel have requested
from this Court in recent similar cases provide solid evidence of the prevailing rate that attorneys in
the community charge for similar services. See Clark v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 849 F.3d 647, 652 (6th
Cir. 2016) (citing Sprinkle v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 421, 429 (7th Cir. 2015)). Recently, in Reginald V. v.
Comm’r of Social Security, No. 1:25-cv-62, 2026 WL 705206 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2026), adopted
1 According to the same calculator, the rate of inflation between 2021 and 2025 was 18.8 percent,
yielding a rate of $243.24. By comparison, over the same period of time, federal employee pay under
the General Schedule increased by just 12.7%. See https://www.federalpay.org/gs/raises.
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by 2026 WL 703354 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2026), Magistrate Judge Vermaat approved a requested
rate of $244.37 based on cost-of-living increases supported by the Consumer Price Index, as well as
an affidavit of counsel who, like Plaintiff’s counsel here, practiced almost exclusively Social Security
Disability law. Id. at *1. In light of Reginald V. and Plaintiff’s supporting materials, I recommend that
the Court award Plaintiff fees at an hourly rate of $244.37.
Number of Hours
Plaintiff seeks an award based on 23 hours of work, for which she presents a table describing
each task performed and the number of hours spent on each task. (Id. at PageID.1023–24.) Defendant
does not object to the number of hours, and having reviewed Plaintiff’s submission, I find the number
of hours claimed to be reasonable. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court award Plaintiff fees of
$5,620.51 based on the above-recommended hourly rate.
PACER Fees
Plaintiff seeks to recover PACER fees in the amount of $42.30 but has not identified a
source of authority supporting her request. Courts have held that PACER fees are not taxable as
costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Madison Capital Co., LLC v. S&S Salvage, LLC, No. 4:08-CV-
134, 2011 WL 3667673, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 22, 2011) (“PACER charges are not costs that are
recoverable under § 1920.”) (citing Thompson v. Quorum Health Res., LLC, No. 1:06-CV-168,
2010 WL 2044542, at *7 (W.D. Ky. May 21, 2010)); Vistein v. American Registry of Radiologic
Technologists, No. 1:05 CV 2441, 2010 WL 918081, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2010) (“Not one
of these expenses [including PACER fees] is authorized as a taxable cost under Section 1920.”)
(citing, among others, Doria v. Class Action Servs., LLC, 261 F.R.D. 678 (S.D. Fla. 2009)). Given
Plaintiff’s failure to provide support for her request, I recommend that the Court deny it.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court grant Plaintiff’s application for EAJAs
in the amount of $5,620.51 and deny her request for PACER fees.
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010), an order
awarding EAJA fees must be entered directing payment to Plaintiff, not counsel. Id. at 591–93;
see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (the EAJA awards fees “to a prevailing party”); Kerr v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 874 F.3d 926, 934–35 (6th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming that Astrue requires EAJA
fees to be paid to the claimant). Therefore, I recommend that the Court order that payment be made
directly to Plaintiff.
Dated: April 6, 2026 /s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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