Wong v. Unifi Aviation, LLC

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
CONNIE WONG, 	Case No. 	1:25-cv-00363
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Robert J. Jonker
U.S. District Judge
v.
UNIFI AVIATION, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendant’s motion to
compel arbitration. 	(ECF No. 7.)
Plaintiff Connie Wong, a former employee of Defendant Unifi Aviation, LLC,
(Unifi), asserts claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate and
retaliation, all in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (MPDCRA), as well as and
intentional infliction of emotional distress and constructive discharge in violation of
state law.
Wong says that in August of 2022, she applied for a Passenger Services Agent
position with Unifi. 	Wong says that she was told that a “flexible schedule would not
be a problem. 	(ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) 	Wong says that she was told that she would
receive discounted flights and possibly first-class seating. 	(Id., PageID.5.) 	Wong
says that she was hired on the spot and she began the onboarding process. 	(Id.)
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 1
of 10

2
She was placed on the 4:00 AM Shift twice a week. 	(Id.) 	After several shifts, she
began to experience migraines at work due to her disrupted sleep schedule. 	(Id.)
Wong attempted to trade her shifts with fellow co-workers. 	Wong says because she
had posted all her shifts for trade, her supervisor sent her an email “reneging on what
was agreed upon when Plaintiff was first hired,” and creating additional rules “such
as waiting 90 days before being eligible to trade shifts.” 	(Id., PageID.6.) 	Wong says
that she asked for reasonable accommodation, but her request was declined, and
“they illegally retaliated against her and double-downed on giving her only 0400AM
shifts.” 	(Id.) 	Wongs says that she suffered through migraines and continued to
work until January 2023, when she was constructively discharged after missing work
for four days due to debilitating migraines. 	(Id., PageID.7.) 	Wong says when she
later applied for the same job in 2024, she saw on a company computer screen that
she had been “flagged” as not being eligible for rehire. 	(Id.)
Defendant Unifi moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims
pursuant to Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., and to dismiss the
complaint, or alternatively to stay the complaint while Plaintiff’s claims are being
arbitrated. 	(ECF No. 7.)
Plaintiff Wong argues that the Court should deny the motion to compel
arbitration because she was unaware of what she had signed due to being rushed
during the onboarding process at Unifi. 	Wong says she was never provided any
“explanation, negotiation, or meaningful review.” 	(ECF No. 13, PageID.102.) 	She
further asserts that the arbitration clause is an adhesion contract, with no opt-out
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 2
of 10

3
mechanism, and arbitration prevents a jury trial and limits discovery. 	She asserts
that the arbitration agreement contains a confidentiality clause, limits attorney fees
(although she is acting pro se), shortens deadlines, may limit her remedies, is one-
sided, and violates federal and public laws. 	(Id., PageID.103-106.)
In the opinion of the undersigned, the parties signed a valid and binding
arbitration agreement. 	Therefore, it is respectfully recommended, first, that the
Court grant Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and, second, that the Court
stay this case while the parties go to arbitration.
III. 	Analysis
Unifi moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 	However, a motion to compel
arbitration is properly brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), especially
where the Court considers evidence presented by the parties. 	Boykin v. Family
Dollar Stores of Michigan, LL.C., 3 F.4th 832, 838 (6th Cir 2021). 	Here, both parties
have presented evidence beyond the allegations in the complaint. 	Therefore, the
question for the Court is whether Defendant has established that no genuine issue of
material fact exists. 	Id.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that a party to an arbitration
agreement may petition a federal court for enforcement by filing a motion to compel
arbitration. 	9 U.S.C. § 4. 	Before granting a motion to compel arbitration, the Court
must determine that (1) the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate; (2) the
asserted claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement; and (3) Congress
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 3
of 10

4
did not intend for those claims to be non-arbitrable. 	Memmer v. United Wholesale
Mortgage, LL.C., 135 F.4th 398, 404 (6th Cir. 2025).
Generally, Courts recognize a strong presumption in favor of arbitration.
Huffman v. Hilltop Companies, LL.C., 747 F.3d 391, 394-395 (6th Cir. 2014). 	A
plaintiff must rebut the presumption “by clear implication” and with “positive
assurance.” 	Id. at 395. 	The Court should resolve “any doubts as to the parties’
intentions in favor of arbitration.” 	Id. (italics in original). 	However, a party is not
required to submit to arbitration where there was no agreement to arbitrate.
Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz, 281 Fed. Appx. 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2008).
1. 	Agreement to Arbitrate
Plaintiff Wong entered into an employment agreement with Defendant Unifi.
Wong signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement which provided that “[f]inal and
binding arbitration before a single, neutral arbitrator shall be the exclusive remedy
for 	any 	‘Covered 	Claim.’” 	(ECF 	No. 	7-2, 	PageID.66 	(Mutual 	Arbitration
Agreement).)
Michigan state contract law determines whether the parties entered into a
valid and binding arbitration agreement. 	Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386,
393 (6th Cir. 2003). 	First, Unifi has met its initial burden of showing that Wong
entered into the Mutual Arbitration Agreement by e-signing the document. 	(See
ECF No. 7-2 (Declaration of Gregory O’Donoghue, describing the on-boarding process
through a third-party digital portal)). 	See Memmer, 135 F.4th at 405 (holding that
defendant met its burden on first element by submitting an e-signed employment
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 4
of 10

5
agreement).) 	Wong argues that the agreement is invalid for several reasons,
including that she was rushed and did not know what she was signing, that she was
not provided with an explanation or meaningful review of the document, and that the
contract was an adhesion contract and unconscionable. 	(ECF No. 13.)
Ultimately, it is Wong’s burden to establish that she did not mutually assent
to the terms of the arbitration agreement by offering “evidence that she did not sign
the agreement or otherwise accept its terms.” 	Id. 	In Meemer, the Sixth Circuit
rejected similar claims regarding lack of knowledge of the agreement:
The declaration states that she “do[es] not recall signing,” but as we
have noted, “[c]onvenient memory lapses do not create factual disputes
that are genuine,” Boykin, 3 F.4th at 839. The declaration further
contains 	statements 	suggesting 	that 	she 	did 	not 	understand 	the
agreement and that she was under time pressure to sign. She claims
that she “was never told what [she] was signing,” “would not have signed
an arbitration agreement without further explanation,” and “was told to
return [the agreement] as soon as possible.” However, these statements
do not amount to a denial that she saw and signed the agreement. See
Tucker, 2025 WL 1082316, at *2–3; see also Mazera v. Varsity Ford
Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 565 F.3d 997, 1002 (6th Cir. 2009). Michigan courts
presume that people who sign contracts have read and understood them,
and “one who signs a contract will not be heard to say, when enforcement
is sought, that he did not read it, or that he supposed it was different in
its terms.” Komraus Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Cadillac Sands Motel,
Inc., 387 Mich. 285, 195 N.W.2d 865, 868 (1972).
Id. at 405–06 (internal citations omitted). 	Similarly, Wong’s assertions that she did
not recall signing the document, that she was under time pressure to sign the
document, and that she did not understand what she had signed fail to meet her
burden of showing a lack of mutual assent.
Wong asserts that the agreement that she signed is void under Michigan law
as unconscionable because the arbitration agreement is a contract of adhesion.
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 5
of 10

6
Wong asserts that she had no opportunity to negotiate or reject the terms of the
arbitration agreement and asserts that “Michigan law closely scrutinizes such
contracts for unfairness, especially where the employee lacks bargaining power.”
(ECF No. 13, PageID.103.)
In determining whether a provision is an unenforceable contract of adhesion,
Michigan applies a two-prong test of procedural and substantive unconscionability.
The test evaluates: (1) the relative bargaining power of the parties including the
options available; and (2) whether the challenged term is substantively reasonable.
Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 323 (6th Cir. 1998).
Even if the contract is adhesive under the first prong, the challenged
term is still enforceable if substantively reasonable and not oppressive
or unconscionable. “Thus, merely because the parties have different
options or bargaining power, unequal or wholly out of proportion to each
other, does not mean that the agreement of one of the parties to a term
of a contract will not be enforced against him; if the term is substantively
reasonable, 	it 	will 	be 	enforced. 	By 	like token, 	if 	the 	provision 	is
substantively unreasonable, it may not be enforced without regard to
the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties.”
Id. (citations omitted).
“Procedural unconscionability exists when a weaker party has no ‘realistic
alternative’ but to accept the term.” 	Rayford v. Am. House Roseville I, LLC, No.
163989, 2025 WL 2177754, at *16 (Mich. July 31, 2025) (citation omitted). 	First,
Wong has failed to assert facts establishing that she could not negotiate the terms of
the arbitration clause or that she tried to negotiate the terms of the arbitration clause
and Unifi refused her demands. 	The ability to negotiate terms of the arbitration
clause is a factor in determining procedural unconscionability. 	Andersons, Inc., 166
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 6
of 10

7
F.3d at 325. 	In other words, Wong has failed to establish that the arbitration clause
was a “take it or leave it” agreement. 	Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc.,
400 F.3d 370, 384 (6th Cir. 2005). 	Additionally, Wong has failed to present evidence
that the arbitration clause was adhesive by asserting or showing that she was unable
to find suitable employment if she refused to sign the agreement. 	Id.
“Substantive unconscionability requires courts to analyze the reasonableness
of the challenged term. A contract provision is substantively unreasonable if the
inequity 	‘shock[s] 	the 	conscience.’” 	Rayford, 	at 	*17. 	In 	the 	opinion 	of 	the
undersigned, the arbitration agreement that Wong signed does not “shock the
conscience” and Wong has failed to show otherwise.
2. 	Scope of the Agreement
Under the agreement Wong signed with Unifi, a covered claim is one that
arises out of hiring, employment, and/or severance of employment. 	(ECF No. 7-2,
PageID.66.) 	The agreement provides that:
Covered Claims include, but are not limited to, any claim for breach of
contract (express or implied, written or oral), for any violation of any
provision of state equal employment law or state labor code or regulation
or a wage order, for unpaid fees, expenses, wages, or overtime, for
unpaid compensation or penalties for missed meal or rest breaks, for
wrongful 	termination, 	for 	unfair 	competition, 	for 	discrimination,
harassment, or unlawful retaliation, for claims for statutory damages,
for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, federal or state Equal Pay
Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Workers Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or any other applicable
federal, state, or local laws, to the full extent permitted by applicable
law.
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 7
of 10

8
(Id.) 	As shown above, “Covered Claims” under the agreement include claims under
the ADA, retaliation claims, and other state law claims. 	Wong’s federal claims arise
under the ADA and clearly fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
3. 	Arbitration of the Claims is appropriate
Wong argues that her ADA claims involving retaliation and constructive
discharge 	favor 	a 	public 	forum 	and 	not 	private 	arbitration. 	(ECF 	No. 	13,
PageID.105.) 	Wong’s claims are exactly the types of claims that are routinely
arbitrated. 	Arbitration of ADA claims is encouraged. 	Memmer, 135 F.4th at 406.
“Courts have consistently referred ADA claims to arbitration.” 	Joseph v. Phresia,
Inc., 764 F.Supp.3d 612, 619 (E.D. Mich. 2025). 	The Sixth Circuit has indicated that
Congress has not foreclosed arbitration of discrimination claims arising under state
and federal statutes:
Quite the opposite, in fact. The ADA itself recognizes that “the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under th[e ADA].” 42 U.S.C. §
12212. We likewise “see nothing in the [FAA] indicating that the broad
principle of enforceability [of arbitration] is subject to any additional
limitations under state law.” By and large, those antidiscrimination
statutes operate in tandem with the FAA. “[A]rbitration agreements can
be 	enforced 	under 	the 	FAA 	without 	contravening 	the 	policies 	of
congressional enactments giving employees specific protection against
discrimination prohibited by federal law ....”
Gavette v. United Wholesale Mortg., LLC, No. 24-1557, 2025 WL 318224, at *2 (6th
Cir. Jan. 28, 2025) (citations omitted), cert. denied, No. 25-220, 2025 WL 3131825
(U.S. Nov. 10, 2025). 	In the opinion of the undersigned, Unifi has shown that Wong’s
claims are arbitrable.
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 8
of 10

9
Defendant moves to dismiss but seems to suggest that a stay of this action is
more appropriate. 	Defendant concludes that “[a] stay is appropriate.” 	(ECF No. 7,
PageID.57.) 	In the reply brief, Defendant asserts that “dismissing Plaintiff’s
Complaint in its entirety” is appropriate. 	(ECF No. 18, PageID.171.) 	Defendant
recognizes that where arbitration is appropriate, the Court shall “stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. 	However, authority exists for the Court to dismiss the
action “when all issues raised in the complaint are arbitrable.” 	Moore v. Ferrellgas,
Inc., 533 F.Supp.2d 740, 751 (W.D. Mich. 2008). 	In Moore, the Court explained that
it serves no purpose to stay the case and retain jurisdiction where all the issues in a
case must be submitted to arbitration. 	Id. 	Defendant has failed to present any
analysis as to why dismissal, rather than a stay, is appropriate. 	At best, Defendant
has asserted a weak argument for dismissal and seems to instead focus on the
appropriateness of a stay.
Wong requests that the Court should stay the case “to preserve judicial
oversight.” 	(ECF No. 13, PageID.106.) 	Defendant cites to Arabian Motors Group
W.L.L. v. Ford Motor Co., 19 F.4th 938, 941 (6th Cir. 2021) for the proposition that
the Court “has no discretion to deny a stay.” 	(ECF No. 7, PageID.57.) 	In that case,
the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the case after ordering
arbitration but refused to decide whether dismissal remains an option for district
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 9
of 10

10
courts after compelling arbitration. 1 	It appears that the parties agree that if the
Court compels arbitration, a stay is appropriate.
IV. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court
(1) grant Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and (2) stay the case.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	December 10, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1 	The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that dismissal may be appropriate when the
dispute is moot or suffers from a pleading or procedural defect, or when dismissal is
requested by both parties, or where neither party requests a stay. 	Arabian Motors
Group, W.L.L., 19 F.4th at 942.
Case 1:25-cv-00363-RJJ-MV ECF No. 19, PageID.<pageID> Filed 12/10/25 Page 10
of 10