Broughton v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SCOTT BROUGHTON,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-117
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of
the Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the
administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),
the undersigned recommends that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner’s decision
and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. Tucker v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 775 Fed. Appx. 220, 225 (6th Cir., June 10, 2019).
The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether
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the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and
whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. Id.
at 224-25. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance, and constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Livingston v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 776 Fed. Appx. 897, 898 (6th Cir., June 19, 2019).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. Biestek v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017). The substantial evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. Moruzzi v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 759 Fed. Appx. 396, 402 (6th Cir., Dec. 21, 2018). This standard affords to
the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence
would have supported a contrary decision. Luukkonen v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 653 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (6th Cir., June 22, 2016).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 48 years of age on his alleged disability onset date. (PageID.73).
He successfully completed high school and worked previously as a kitchen helper and
cleaner/plumber’s helper. (PageID.73). Plaintiff applied for benefits on April 16,
2021, alleging that he had been disabled since February 10, 2021, due to vertigo,
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migraine, bipolar, anxiety, depression, heart problem, breathing problem, sleep
apnea, insomnia, and stroke. (PageID.59, 408).
Plaintiff’s application was denied, after which time he requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following an administrative hearing,
ALJ Dennis Raterink, in an opinion dated December 14, 2023, determined that
Plaintiff did not qualify for disability benefits. (PageID.59-121). The Appeals
Council declined to review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it the Commissioner’s
final decision in the matter. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for
evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further
finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also
provide that if a claimant suffers from a non-exertional impairment as well as an
exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional
capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate he is entitled to disability benefits
and he satisfies his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that
he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education,
and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in
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significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). While
the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential
evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the
procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined.
O’Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 799 Fed. Appx. 313, 315 (6th Cir., Jan. 7,
2020).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from vascular insult to the brain,
vertigo, anxiety, and depression/bipolar disorder, severe impairments that whether
considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the
requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in
20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.62-65).
With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform light work subject to the following
limitations: (1) he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs but can never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (2) he can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl;
(3) he cannot work at unprotected heights or with moving mechanical parts; (4) he
can understand, remember, and carry out very short and simple instructions, but not
at a production rate pace; (5) he can have occasional interaction with the public and
co-workers; and (6) he can tolerate occasional workplace changes. (PageID.65).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work at
which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by
substantial evidence that there exists in the national economy a significant number
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of specific jobs which Plaintiff can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. O’Neal,
799 Fed. Appx. at 316. In satisfying this burden, the ALJ may rely on a vocational
expert’s testimony. Ibid.
In this case, a vocational expert testified that there are approximately 363,000
jobs in the national economy that an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC can perform.
(PageID.73-74). This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix thousand
jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others have
deemed ‘significant’”). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
entitled to benefits.
I. 	Medical Source Opinion
As part of his disability application, Plaintiff submitted a Medical Source
Statement, dated October 6, 2023, from Dr. Janet Hur. (PageID.1106-09). As
detailed below, the doctor reported that Plaintiff was far more limited than the ALJ
concluded. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ’s
assessment of Dr. Hur’s statements is not supported by substantial evidence.
Because Plaintiff filed his application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluated
the opinions in question pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. This regulation provides
that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s),” even an opinion from a treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a).
Instead, the ALJ is required to articulate his determination of the persuasiveness of
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a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” Id. § 416.920c(b)(1).
These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with
the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support or
contradict the opinion. Id. § 416.920c(1)-(5). The ALJ must explain his
consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, but absent circumstances
not present here, is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2), (3). The regulations define “supportability” and
“consistency” as follows:
(1) 	Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to
support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.
(2) 	Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to “properly consider the mandatory
factors of supportability and consistency.” The Court is not persuaded.
With respect to Plaintiff’s physical limitations, Dr. Hur reported the following.
During an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff can sit and stand/walk for “less than 2 hours”
each. (PageID.1107). During the workday, Plaintiff needs to take 8-10
unscheduled breaks of 30 minutes duration each. Id. Plaintiff cannot lift more
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than 10 pounds and can “never” twist, stoop, crouch/squat, or climb stairs.
(PageID.1108). Plaintiff is incapable of even low stress work and would be off-task
“25% or more” of the workday due to his symptoms. (PageID.1109).
The ALJ found Dr. Hur’s statements “not persuasive.” (PageID.70). In
support of this conclusion, the ALJ noted that Dr. Hur’s statements were not
supported by the results of examination or testing. (PageID.70-71). The ALJ also
noted that Dr. Hur’s statements were inconsistent with the observations of at least
one other medical professional who examined Plaintiff. (PageID.70-71, 1052-62).
For example, Dr. Uchebike Nwankwo examined Plaintiff and concluded that
Plaintiff could frequently lift 25 pounds and experienced “no limitations” with
balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling. (PageID.1061-62). The
doctor also observed that Plaintiff did not require an assistive device and was
capable of standing/walking for as much as 6 hours daily. (PageID.1061). Plaintiff
was also observed to experience “no limitations to reaching, handling, fingering or
feeling.” (PageID.1062).
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff, at the time of his administrative hearing,
was employed as a maintenance worker. (PageID.71, 91-92). Specifically, Plaintiff
testified that he worked “around 20” hours weekly performing various cleaning
activities as well as “a lot of plumbing.” (PageID.91-92). As Defendant notes,
Plaintiff worked consistently after his alleged disability onset date. (PageID.387-
401). Finally, the ALJ observed that Dr. Hur’s extreme statements are not
supported by her own contemporaneous treatment notes. (PageID.71, 774-94,
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1025-44). Plaintiff has not articulated any error in the ALJ’s analysis but rather
merely implores the Court to re-weigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion.
The ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Hur’s statements is consistent with the standard
articulated above and is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this
argument is rejected.
II. 	Legal Standard
Citing to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v.
Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), Plaintiff next argues that “the doctrine known as
Chevron Deference is dead,” presumably altering the standard of review in Social
Security appeals such as this. Plaintiff fails, however, to identify how the standard
of review has changed. Instead, Plaintiff offers to “make a suggestion” that the
standard of review be revised more to his liking. This is not a legal argument, but
rather, irrelevant commentary.
Plaintiff’s argument is poorly developed and, accordingly, is deemed waived.
See, e.g., Zizzo v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2013 WL 5291663 at *8 (E.D.
Mich., Sept. 19, 2013) (courts do not engage in a self-directed inquiry into the facts
because “judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in” the record); United
States v. Stewart, 628 F.3d 246, 256 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Issues adverted to in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are
deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in
the most skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh on its bones”); Moore v.
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Commissioner of Social Security, 573 Fed. Appx. 540, 543 (6th Cir., Aug. 5, 2014)
(citing Stewart with approval to find an undeveloped argument waived).
Moreover, as this Court has observed, “the analytical framework [applicable
to Social Security appeals] has not changed since Loper Bright.” Frey v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 1:23-cv-1291, ECF No. 22 at PageID.1160 n.1 (W.D.
Mich.). Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
III. Sentence Six Remand
Finally, the administrative record contains evidence that was not presented
to the ALJ, but instead was first presented to the Appeals Council. (PageID.28-48).
The Appeals Council received the evidence into the record and considered it before
declining to review the ALJ’s determination. This Court, however, is precluded
from considering such material. In Cline v. Commissioner of Social Security, 96
F.3d 146 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth Circuit indicated that where the Appeals Council
considers new evidence that was not before the ALJ, but nonetheless declines to
review the ALJ’s determination, the district court cannot consider such evidence
when adjudicating the claimant’s appeal of the ALJ’s determination. Id. at 148; see
also, Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cline, 96 F.3d
at 148).
If Plaintiff can demonstrate, however, that this evidence is new and material,
and that good cause existed for not presenting it in the prior proceeding, the Court
can remand the case for further proceedings during which this new evidence can be
considered. Cline, 96 F.3d at 148. To satisfy the materiality requirement, Plaintiff
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must show that there exists a reasonable probability that the Commissioner would
have reached a different result if presented with the new evidence. Sizemore v.
Secretary of Health and Human Serv’s, 865 F.2d 709, 711 (6th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff
bears the burden of making these showings. See Hollon ex rel. Hollon v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 447 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2006).
Even if the Court assumes that the evidence in question is new and that good
cause exists for not presenting it to the ALJ, Plaintiff makes no effort to articulate
why this evidence should be considered material. Rather than engage with the
evidence in any way, Plaintiff merely asserts that “the post-hearing records leave no
doubt as to the legitimacy of his impairments and his credibility.” (ECF No. 13,
PageID.1137-38). It is Plaintiff’s obligation to clearly articulate the basis for his
claims of error. See, e.g., Zizzo v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2013 WL
5291663 at *8. The undersigned finds, therefore, that Plaintiff has waived this
claim. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 628 F.3d at 256. Accordingly, this
argument is rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
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OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: December 22, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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