Hoffman v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TERESA HOFFMAN,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-1196
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides
that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be
conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner’s decision
and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. Tucker v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 775 Fed. Appx. 220, 225 (6th Cir., June 10, 2019).
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The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether
the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and
whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. Id.
at 224-25. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance, and constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Livingston v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 776 Fed. Appx. 897, 898 (6th Cir., June 19, 2019).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. Biestek v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017). The substantial evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. Moruzzi v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 759 Fed. Appx. 396, 402 (6th Cir., Dec. 21, 2018). This standard affords to
the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence
would have supported a contrary decision. Luukkonen v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 653 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (6th Cir., June 22, 2016).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 44 years of age on her alleged disability onset date.
(PageID.145). She successfully completed high school and worked previously as a
bartender/server. (PageID.144-45). Plaintiff applied for benefits on February 9,
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2022, alleging that she had been disabled since January 24, 2022, due to fibromyalgia,
bulging discs in her back, degenerative disc disease, heart issues, diabetes, and
osteopenia. (PageID.132, 339).
Plaintiff’s application was denied, after which time she requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following an administrative hearing,
ALJ Cynthia Harmon, in an opinion dated September 18, 2023, determined that
Plaintiff did not qualify for disability benefits. The Appeals Council declined to
review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it the Commissioner’s final decision in the
matter. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for
evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further
finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also
provide that if a claimant suffers from a non-exertional impairment as well as an
exertional impairment, both are considered in determining her residual functional
capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate she is entitled to disability benefits
and she satisfies her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe
that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age,
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education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 	See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A). While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of
the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step
four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is
determined. O’Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 799 Fed. Appx. 313, 315 (6th
Cir., Jan. 7, 2020).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from fibromyalgia, cyclical vomiting
syndrome, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, supraventricular
tachycardia, migraine headache, right thyroid isthmus, substance use disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), generalized anxiety disorder, and major depressive
disorder, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with
other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in
the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
(PageID.134-38).
With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform light work subject to the following
limitations: (1) she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs but can never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (2) she can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl;
(3) she must avoid vibration and concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat, and
humidity; (4) she must avoid dangerous work place hazards such as unprotected
heights or dangerous moving machinery; (5) she is able to carry out simple
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instructions that do not involve detailed or complex decision making or judgment; (6)
she can tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting; and (7) she can have no
more than moderate exposure to noise levels as defined by the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT). (PageID.138-39).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work, at
which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by
substantial evidence that there exist in the national economy a significant number of
specific jobs which Plaintiff can perform, her limitations notwithstanding. O’Neal,
799 Fed. Appx. at 316. In satisfying this burden, the ALJ may rely on a vocational
expert’s testimony. Ibid.
In this case, a vocational expert testified that there are approximately 289,000
jobs in the national economy that an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform.
(PageID.145). This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix thousand
jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others have
deemed ‘significant’”). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
entitled to benefits.
I. 	Medical Source Opinion
As part of her disability application, Plaintiff submitted a medical source
statement from Dr. Anthony Izokaitis. (PageID.1481-82). Dr. Izokaitis reported
that Plaintiff was limited to a greater extent than the ALJ recognized in her RFC
assessment. The ALJ, however, found the doctor’s observations to be “not
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persuasive.” (PageID.143-44). Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief
because the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Izokaitis’ statements is not supported by
substantial evidence.
Because Plaintiff filed her application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ
evaluated the opinions in question pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. This
regulation provides that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s),” even an opinion from a treating source. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ is required to articulate her determination
of the persuasiveness of a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors
listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” Id.
§ 416.920c(b)(1).
These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with
the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support or
contradict the opinion. Id. § 416.920c(1)-(5). The ALJ must explain his
consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, but absent circumstances
not present here, is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2), (3). The regulations define “supportability” and
“consistency” as follows:
(1) 	Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),
the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.
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(2) 	Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
With respect to Plaintiff’s physical abilities, Dr. Izokaitis reported the
following. Plaintiff can lift/carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds
frequently. (PageID.1481). During an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff requires a
sit/stand option and can stand/walk and sit for less than 2 hours each. Id. Plaintiff
must be able to lie down, recline, and/or elevate her legs every 10-15 minutes. Id.
Plaintiff must also be permitted to walk during her work shift for 45 minutes at a
time.1 Id. Plaintiff can only rarely twist or climb stairs and can never bend or
crouch. (PageID.1482).
The ALJ found that Dr. Izokaitis’ opinion was “not persuasive.”
(PageID.144). In support of this conclusion, the ALJ noted the internal
inconsistencies in the doctor’s conclusions. For example, as the ALJ observed, “Dr.
Izokaitis indicated that [Plaintiff] must walk for 45 minutes at a time but then
indicated the frequency of walking was zero minutes.” Id. The ALJ further
observed that the doctor reported that Plaintiff “must lie down, recline, and/or
elevate her legs every 10-15 minutes but then indicated she could sit for 30 minutes
1 The doctor did not specify how frequently Plaintiff must undertake these lengthy
walks. Instead, the doctor reported that Plaintiff must undertake such walks every
“0” minutes. (PageID.1481).
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at a time and stand for 45 minutes at a time without changing positions.” Id.
Moreover, as the ALJ noted, these postural limitations were not based upon any
examination or medical testing but were instead based on “patient report.”
(PageID.144, 1482).
The ALJ also observed that the medical record simply failed to support the
doctor’s opinions. X-rays of Plaintiff’s hip revealed no abnormality. (PageID.441).
X-rays of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine revealed only “mild to moderate” degenerative
changes. (PageID.457). An MRI examination of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine revealed
only “mild” stenosis at L3-4 and L4-5. (PageID.556). Physical examinations
consistently revealed normal range of motion, normal muscle tone, and normal gait.
(PageID.487-88, 687, 874, 1077, 1083, 1089, 1094, 1122, 1251, 1357).
The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff suffers from severe physical impairments
and, accordingly, limited Plaintiff to a limited range of light work. The ALJ
articulated reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for affording little credence
to the extreme, and inconsistent, opinions authored by Dr. Izokaitis. Accordingly,
this argument is rejected.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess the opinions offered
by two non-examining consultants who concluded that Plaintiff could perform a
limited range of light work. (PageID.191-223). The ALJ found these opinions
“somewhat persuasive” but nonetheless concluded that Plaintiff experienced slightly
greater functional limitations than the consultants determined. (PageID.142-43).
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s assessment of these opinions is faulty because
the results of examinations performed subsequent to the consultants’ review of the
record reveals that Plaintiff’s condition worsened. As discussed above, however, the
record does not support greater limitations than the ALJ recognized in her RFC
assessment. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Subjective Allegations
At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff reported that she was unable to work
because two to three days each week she “can’t even get out of bed because [she is]
in so much pain.” (PageID.164-65). Plaintiff reported that if she sits for too long
her right leg becomes numb. (PageID.168). Plaintiff reported that she was unable
to work because she would have to lay down during the workday. (PageID.173).
Plaintiff also reported that she suffers work-preclusive migraine headaches “at least
a couple times a month.” (PageID.175). The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony
as “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
record. (PageID.139-44). Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because the
ALJ improperly discounted her subjective allegations.
While “pain alone, if the result of a medical impairment, may be severe enough
to constitute disability,” King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984), a
claimant’s “statements about [her] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish
that [she is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also, Hash v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 309 Fed. Appx. 981, 989 (6th Cir., Feb. 10, 2009).
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Instead, a claimant’s assertions of disabling pain and limitation are evaluated
pursuant to the following standard. First, it must be determined whether the
claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be
expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. See Titles II and XVI:
Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, Social Security Ruling 16-3p, 2016
WL 1119029 at *3-4 (S.S.A., Mar. 16, 2016). Next, the intensity and persistence of
the claimant’s symptoms are evaluated to determine the extent to which such limit
her ability to perform work-related activities. Id. at *4-9.2
As is also well recognized, “subjective complaints may support a finding of
disability only where objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged
symptoms.” Workman v. Commissioner of Social Security, 105 Fed. Appx. 794, 801
(6th Cir., July 29, 2004). However, where the objective medical evidence fails to
confirm the severity of a claimant’s subjective allegations, the ALJ “has the power
and discretion to weigh all of the evidence and to resolve the significant conflicts in
the administrative record.” In this respect, it is recognized that the ALJ’s
credibility assessment “must be accorded great weight and deference.” Ibid. It is
2 Social Security Ruling 16-3p rescinded Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Id. at *1.
However, the adoption of this new Social Security Ruling did not alter the analysis
for evaluating a claimant’s subjective statements. Instead, as the Social Security
Administration stated, it was simply “eliminating the use of the term ‘credibility’ [so
as to] clarify that that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an
individual’s character.” Ibid. As courts recognize, aside from this linguistic
clarification, “[t]he analysis under SSR 16-3p otherwise is identical to that
performed under SSR 96-7p.” Young v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1914732 at *6 (W.D.
Ky., Apr. 23, 2018).
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not for this Court to reevaluate such evidence anew, and so long as the ALJ’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence, it must stand. See, e.g., Ritchie
v. Commissioner of Social Security, 540 Fed. Appx. 508, 511 (6th Cir., Oct. 4, 2013)
(“[w]e have held that an administrative law judge’s credibility findings are virtually
unchallengeable”).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff experiences significant limitations resulting
from her various impairments. As noted above, however, the evidence does not
support Plaintiff’s testimony that she is limited to the extent alleged. The Court is
not permitted to re-weigh the evidence. The ALJ articulated a clear rationale in
support of her decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and the ALJ’s
conclusions and rationale are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this
argument is rejected.
III. Plaintiff’s Substance Abuse Disorder
As noted above, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from substance
abuse disorder. Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ did not
assess this impairment as required by Social Security Ruling 13-2p.
Federal law provides that an individual “shall not be considered to be disabled.
. .if alcoholism or drug addiction would. . .be a contributing factor material to the
Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(C). Accordingly, if an ALJ finds that a claimant suffers from alcoholism
or drug addiction and is disabled, the ALJ must determine whether the individual’s
substance addiction is material to the finding of disability or, stated differently,
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whether the individual would be disabled in the absence of her substance addiction.
See Social Security Ruling 13-2p - Titles II and XVI: Evaluating Cases Involving Drug
and Alcohol Addiction (DAA), 2013 WL 621536 at *1-7 (S.S.A., Feb. 20, 2013).
As Defendant correctly observes, however, assessment of a claimant’s drug and
alcohol addiction must be undertaken only where the ALJ concludes that the
claimant is disabled. See Id. at *5. Because the ALJ in this case concluded that
Plaintiff was not disabled, no further assessment of Plaintiff’s substance addiction
was necessary or required. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the
Clerk of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States
v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: December 26, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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