Schuitema v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SARAH SCHUITEMA,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-693
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides
that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be
conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing United States
Magistrate Judges to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
disposition of Social Security appeals, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner’s decision
and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. Tucker v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 775 Fed. Appx. 220, 225 (6th Cir., June 10, 2019).
The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether
the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and
whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. Id.
at 224-25. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance, and constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Livingston v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 776 Fed. Appx. 897, 898 (6th Cir., June 19, 2019).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. Biestek v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017). The substantial evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. Moruzzi v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 759 Fed. Appx. 396, 402 (6th Cir., Dec. 21, 2018). This standard affords to
the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence
would have supported a contrary decision. Luukkonen v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 653 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (6th Cir., June 22, 2016).
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 44 years of age on her alleged disability onset date. (PageID.33).
She successfully completed high school but has no past relevant work experience.
(PageID.33). Plaintiff applied for benefits on March 27, 2023, alleging that she had
been disabled since January 15, 2020, due to an impaired immune system,
depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a suicide attempt.
(PageID.23, 305).
Plaintiff’s application was denied, after which time she requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following an administrative hearing,
ALJ Kevin Himebaugh, in an opinion March 29, 2024, determined that Plaintiff did
not qualify for disability benefits. The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s
determination, rendering it the Commissioner’s final decision in the matter.
Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
Plaintiff’s insured status expired on March 31, 2021. (PageID.25); see also,
42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1). Accordingly, to be eligible for Disability Insurance Benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish that she became
disabled prior to the expiration of her insured status. See 42 U.S.C. § 423; Moon v.
Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1182 (6th Cir. 1990).
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ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for
evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further
finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also
provide that if a claimant suffers from a non-exertional impairment as well as an
exertional impairment, both are considered in determining her residual functional
capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate she is entitled to disability benefits
and she satisfies her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe
that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age,
education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A). While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the
sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of
the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is
determined. O’Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 799 Fed. Appx. 313, 315 (6th
Cir., Jan. 7, 2020).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from (1) major depressive disorder;
(2) generalized anxiety disorder; and (3) post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other
impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the
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Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
(PageID.26-28).
With respect to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform work at all exertional levels subject to
the following limitations: (1) she can concentrate, persist, and maintain pace to
perform simple, routine tasks and make simple work-related decisions and (2) she
can adapt to and tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting. (PageID.28).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work experience at which
point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial
evidence that there exists in the national economy a significant number of specific
jobs which Plaintiff can perform, her limitations notwithstanding. O’Neal, 799 Fed.
Appx. at 316. In satisfying this burden, the ALJ may rely on a vocational expert’s
testimony. Ibid.
In this case, a vocational expert testified that there existed approximately
590,000 jobs in the national economy which an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could
perform. (PageID.34). This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g.,
Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix
thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others
have deemed ‘significant’”). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
entitled to benefits.
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Plaintiff first argues that she is entitled to relief because the ALJ failed to
order a consultive examination. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that because the
record contained conflicting evidence, the ALJ was obligated to order that Plaintiff
participate in a consultive examination.
Plaintiff bears “the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is
entitled to disability benefits.” Trandafir v. Commissioner of Social Security, 58
Fed. Appx. 113, 115 (6th Cir., Jan. 31, 2003). As the relevant Social Security
regulations make clear, it is the claimant’s responsibility to provide the evidence
necessary to evaluate her claim for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512 and
404.1514. As the Supreme Court has observed, “[i]t is not unreasonable to require
the claimant, who is in a better position to provide information about his own
medical condition, to do so.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5.
Only under “special circumstances, i.e., when a claimant is without counsel,
is not capable of presenting an effective case, and is unfamiliar with hearing
procedures, does an ALJ have a special, heightened duty to develop the record.”
Trandafir, 58 Fed. Appx. at 115 (emphasis added); Nabours v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 50 Fed. Appx. 272, 275 (6th Cir., Nov. 4, 2002). Moreover, an ALJ
is not obligated to supplement the record with additional evidence unless the record
as it then exists is insufficient to assess Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity or
otherwise resolve her claims. See, e.g., Allison v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1276950 at *5 (6th
Cir., Aug. 30, 2000); Lamb v. Barnhart, 85 Fed. Appx. 52, 57 (10th Cir., Dec. 11,
2003); Haney v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3859778 at *3 (E.D. Okla., Sept. 15, 2010); Brown
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v. Commissioner of Social Security, 709 F.Supp.2d 248, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). As is
recognized, “how much evidence to gather is a subject on which district courts must
respect the Secretary’s reasoned judgment.” Simpson v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 344 Fed. Appx. 181, 189 (6th Cir., Aug. 27, 2009). As the court further
observed, to obligate the Commissioner to obtain an absolute “complete record” in
each case “literally would be a formula for paralysis.” Ibid.
The record contains approximately 500 pages of Plaintiff’s medical records as
well as more than 300 pages of additional information pertaining to Plaintiff’s claim
for benefits. Plaintiff was represented before the ALJ at the administrative hearing
and there is no suggestion that Plaintiff’s attorney was unfamiliar with the Social
Security disability application process or was prevented from submitting to the
Commissioner any relevant evidence. Moreover, Plaintiff has not demonstrated
that the record before the ALJ was insufficient to assess her RFC or otherwise
resolve her claims. Plaintiff has likewise failed to even suggest what a consultive
examination might reveal or how such might advance her position. Instead,
Plaintiff merely argues that the ALJ should have weighed the evidence differently.
Such is not a basis for relief, however. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred because he “did not accommodate
limitations described in evidence that he agrees is persuasive.” Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was obligated to include in his RFC “all of the
limitations described in the State Agency administrative findings he found
persuasive without qualification.”
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A State agency psychological consultant determined that Plaintiff experienced
moderate limitation in her ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace and mild
limitation in her ability to (1) understand, remember, or apply information;
(2) interact with others; and (3) adapt or manage herself. (PageID.89). The
consultant also observed that Plaintiff “may struggle with high levels or
unpredictable levels of work stress or frequent changes in work routine,” but that
she “retains the capacity to perform simple, routine tasks on a sustained basis.”
(PageID.92). Finding the consultant’s conclusions “partially persuasive,” the ALJ
largely adopted such, (PageID.33), and Plaintiff has failed to identify any specific
functional limitations identified by the consultant which are inconsistent with the
ALJ’s RFC assessment.
The ALJ also discussed at length the evidence of record and how such
supported his RFC assessment. (PageID.28-33). Plaintiff has articulated no error
with the ALJ’s assessment of the medical evidence but, again, simply implores this
Court to re-weigh the evidence and reach a different result than the ALJ. Moreover,
to the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment fails because it is not
directly supported by a physician’s opinion, such is rejected. See, e.g., Mokbel-
Aljahmi v. Commissioner of Social Security, 732 Fed. Appx. 395, 401-02 (6th Cir.,
Apr. 30, 2018) (“[w]e have previously rejected the argument that a residual
functional capacity determination cannot be supported by substantial evidence
unless a physician offers an opinion consistent with that of the ALJ”).
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The ALJ is tasked with determining a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1546(c), 416.946(c). While the ALJ may not “play doctor” and substitute his
own opinion for that of a medical professional, the ALJ is not required to tailor his
RFC assessment to any particular opinion or item of medical evidence. See, e.g.,
Poe v. Commissioner of Social Security, 342 Fed. Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir., Aug. 18,
2009). Instead, the ALJ is “charged with the responsibility of evaluating the
medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony to form an assessment of her residual
functional capacity.” Webb v. Commissioner of Social Security, 368 F.3d 629, 633
(6th Cir. 2004). This is precisely what the ALJ did and the ALJ’s RFC assessment
is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should
have weighed and evaluated the evidence differently not grounds for relief, however.
Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the
Clerk of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States
v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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Respectfully submitted,
Date: December 17, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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