Henderson #810508 v. Borowicz et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TYRELL HENDERSON #810508,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:24-cv-166
MATTHEW BOROWICZ, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before me on Defendant Borowicz’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 40), which is fully briefed and ready for decision. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I
recommend that the motion be GRANTED and the complaint be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff Tyrell Henderson, a prisoner currently incarcerated with the Michigan Department
of Corrections (MDOC) at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility, filed this action on February
20, 2024, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against MDOC Corrections Officers (CO) Matthew
Borowicz and Gabriel Wilhelm based on an incident that occurred on March 13, 2023, during
Henderson’s incarceration at Muskegon Correctional Facility (MCF). Wilhelm was previously
dismissed from this action. (ECF No. 34.) Henderson’s remaining claims are his First Amendment
retaliation and Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against CO Borowicz.
On March 13, 2023, CO Borowicz was working in Unit 1 of MCF conducting rounds on
the ground floor. At that time, Henderson was housed on the second level of Unit 1 in cell 218.
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page 1
of 13

2
(ECF No. 41-2 at PageID.232.) At approximately 10:50 a.m., a formal prisoner count was
announced, requiring all prisoners to return to their cells. (Id.; ECF No. 41-4 at PageID.246.) As
CO Borowicz walked through the unit to ensure that prisoners were returning to their cells, he saw
Henderson standing on the walkway on the second level outside of another prisoner’s cell. (ECF
No. 41-2 at PageID.232.) Borowicz ordered Henderson to return to his cell but Henderson failed
to do so. Instead, he began arguing with Borowicz. (Id.) Henderson took issue with the tone of the
order because Borowicz did not give it “in a respectful manner.” (ECF No. 41-3 at PageID.239.)
CO Borowicz determined that Henderson’s response amounted to insolence, a Class III offense,
and asked Henderson for his prisoner ID card in order to confirm his identity for a misconduct
report. (ECF No. 41-2 at PageID.232.) Henderson refused to take his ID card to Borowicz, stating
that it was count time, and if Borowicz wanted the card he would have to come up to Henderson’s
cell to get it. (ECF No. 1-3 at PageID.239.)
Given Henderson’s refusal to comply, CO Borowicz proceeded to Henderson’s cell to
collect the ID card. (ECF No. 41-2 at PageID.232; ECF No. 41-3 at PageID.240.) CO Wilhelm,
who was also working in Unit 1 that day, observed the “heated verbal exchange” between
Borowicz and Henderson and followed closely behind CO Borowicz as he proceeded up the stairs
to provide backup. (ECF No. 41-4 at PageID.246.)
According to CO Borowicz, he entered or reached into the cell to retrieve the ID card from
Henderson. After Borowicz left the cell and began to close the cell door for formal count,
Henderson grabbed the door and tried to pull it open, countering Borowicz’s efforts to close it and
pulling him closer towards Henderson’s cell. (ECF No. 41-2 at PageID.233.) When CO Borowicz
released the door, he saw Henderson advancing toward him with his fists balled and his teeth bared.
Based on Henderson’s facial expression, body language, and physical aggression he had displayed
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page 2
of 13

3
in attempting to prevent Borowicz from closing the cell door, Borowicz believed that Henderson
intended to attack him. Due to the short distance between himself and Henderson, Borowicz lacked
adequate time to attempt de-escalation techniques and did not have enough time to call for backup.
The tight confines at the entrance of the cell made it impossible for other officers to intervene in
the situation. (Id. at PageID.232–33.) Faced with what he perceived to be an immediate threat,
Borowicz protected himself from attack by administering a single double-palm-heel strike to
Henderson’s brachial plexus tie-in to stop Henderson’s advance. Borowicz used this technique to
create sufficient distance between himself and Henderson and to clear the doorway to allow CO
Wilhelm to enter the cell. (Id. at PageID.234.) The push stopped Henderson’s advance, allowing
CO Wilhelm to enter the cell and employ verbal de-escalation tactics until additional backup
arrived. Henderson calmed down and Resident Unit Manager West and other staff arrived shortly
thereafter. CO Wilhelm and other staff then restrained Henderson without the need for additional
force, and Henderson was escorted to segregation without incident. Borowicz does not recall
Henderson stating that he intended to file a grievance. (Id.)
CO Wilhelm’s version of the incident generally tracks Borowicz’s version. He states that,
after CO Borowicz retrieved the ID card, he attempted to close the cell door, but Henderson
impeded his efforts by pulling the door open. CO Wilhelm states that he was unable to intervene
due to Borowicz’s location in the doorway, and Borowicz thereafter administered the heel strike
to Henderson. CO Wilhelm then entered the cell, began verbal de-escalation tactics, and was able
to apply restraints to Henderson without issue. Henderson was then taken to segregation. Wilhelm
did not see CO Borowicz apply any force to Henderson other than the single heel strike, nor did
Borowicz shove Henderson against Henderson’s bunk or any other furniture in the cell. CO
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page 3
of 13

4
Wilhelm also states that he did not hear Henderson state that he intended to file a grievance against
Borowicz prior to his entry into the cell. (ECF No. 41-4 at PageID.246–47.)
In contrast, Henderson alleges after he provided his ID card to CO Borowicz, Borowicz
stepped inside Henderson’s cell and grabbed him, shoved him against the steel ladder on
Henderson’s bunk and the bunk itself, and also grabbed his hair during the encounter. (ECF No.
41-3 at PageID.241.) Henderson denies pulling on the cell door while CO Borowicz tried to close
it. (Id. at PageID.240.) Henderson claims that he suffered injuries to his back as a result of
Borowicz’s use of force. (ECF No. 45 at PageID.287.)
After Henderson was taken to segregation, a nurse went to his cell to examine him based
on his complaints of neck and back pain. (ECF No. 415 at PageID.262.) The nurse noted that
Henderson exhibited no gait abnormalities, visible injury, or misalignment of his back or neck.
She advised him that he may be experiencing muscle strain due to the COs restraining him earlier
in the day. (Id. at PageID.262–63.) Henderson was evaluated again on March 17 and 27, 2023, for
continued complaints of neck and back pain from being pushed, but neither exam found any injury
to his back or neck. (Id. at PageID.252–54, 257–59.) He was also evaluated about a week later, on
April 6, 2023, in connection with a transfer from MCF to another facility, during which he denied
any complaints or symptoms and had no physical deformities. (Id. at PageID.249–50.)
Based on Henderson’s conduct at the cell, CO Borowicz issued him a misconduct report
for the Class I charge of Threatening Behavior. (ECF No. 41-2 at PageID.234.) An Assault and
Battery of Staff charge was subsequently added to the misconduct report. (ECF No. 1-14 at
PageID.40.) Henderson pled not guilty to both charges. On April 7, 2023, an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) held a hearing and, after considering the evidence of record, found Henderson guilty
on both charges. (ECF No. 1-16 at PageID.44–46.)
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page 4
of 13

5
II. 	Motion Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return
judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
III. 	Discussion
A. 	Eighth Amendment Excessive Force
Henderson alleges that Borowicz violated his Eighth Amendment rights by maliciously
employing unnecessary force against him.1
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies not
only to punishment imposed by the state, but also to deprivations that occur during imprisonment
and are not part of the sentence imposed. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1976). Punishment that is without penological justification or
involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain also violates the Eighth Amendment’s
1 In his response, Henderson continues to focus on Wilhelm’s conduct as if he remains a Defendant
in the case. (ECF No. 45 at PageID.278 (“Furthermore, the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard
applies to Defendant Wilhelm who stood by and did not intervene in the illegal use of force used
by Defendant Borowicz.”) As noted above, Wilhelm was previously dismissed from the case on
exhaustion grounds. (ECF No. 34.) Thus, the lawfulness of his actions or inactions is irrelevant to
the instant motion.
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page 5
of 13

6
proscriptions. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). In other words, the Eighth
Amendment prohibits “the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183
(1976).
The Supreme Court has held that “whenever guards use force to keep order,” the standards
set forth in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), should be applied. Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 6 (1992). Under Whitley, the core judicial inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7. In determining whether the use of force is wanton and unnecessary, a
court should evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the
amount of force used, the threat “reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,” and any effort
made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). In
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010), the Supreme Court affirmed that the “core judicial inquiry”
is “not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather ‘whether force was applied
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.’” Id. at 37 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). The Court noted that the degree of injury is still
relevant to the inquiry, as it may shed some light on the amount of force used, but “[a]n inmate
who complains of a ‘push or shove’ that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state
a valid excessive force claim.” Id. at 38 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). Certain uses of force,
however, lie outside the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s protections. “The Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition 	of 	‘cruel 	and 	unusual’ 	punishments 	necessarily 	excludes 	from 	constitutional
recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort
‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S.
at 327).
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page 6
of 13

7
An Eighth Amendment claim has both an objective and a subjective component. Cordell
v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th
Cir. 2013)). The objective component requires the “pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious’” to
offend “contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 580 (quoting Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380,
383 (6th Cir. 2011); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8). The subjective component asks “whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Id. (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).
I find it unnecessary to resolve the objective component because Henderson’s excessive
force claim fails on the subjective component.2 To set the table for the analysis, the Court has
previously concluded that, pursuant to Peterson v. Johnson, 714 F.3d 905 (6th Cir. 2013), and
Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2018), the ALJ’s findings in his misconduct hearing report
regarding the Threatening Behavior and Assault and Battery charges are entitled to preclusive
effect. (ECF No. 5 at PageID.75.) While the Court tempered this conclusion by noting that the
2 Although CO Borowicz argues that Henderson fails to establish the objective component of his
claim, I find the question close. Borowicz contends that Henderson cannot establish this
component because the medical records discussed above show that, although medical staff
evaluated Henderson on several occasions after the event, including on the day of the event, no
objective signs of injury were observed. (ECF No. 41 at PageID.218.) As for the medical records
Henderson submitted to supplement his response showing that he received treatment for lower
back pain from August through November 2024, about a year and a half after the event in question,
Borowicz argues that they have little relevance to the events in March of 2023. (ECF No. 59 at
PageID.376–77.) The circumstances here are analogous to those at issue in Johnson v. Sootsman,
79 F.4th 608 (6th Cir. 2023), which Borowicz cites in his brief. There, the defendant pushed the
plaintiff against a wall by his neck and then pulled the plaintiff to the ground. Id. at 617. The court
suggested, but did not hold, that the plaintiff’s evidence—similar to Henderson’s evidence here—
that he sought medical treatment right after the encounter and received treatment for neck pain
more than a year after the event at issue might have permitted a jury to find that the objective
component of the claim was satisfied. Id. at 618. Like the Sixth Circuit in Sootsman, however, I
find no need to definitively resolve the issue because Henderson fails to establish the subjective
component.
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page 7
of 13

8
ALJ’s factual findings did not foreclose Henderson’s retaliation claim and that the ALJ did not
make any findings about what occurred after Borowicz stepped inside the cell (Id. at PageID.75),
those findings are still relevant to the excessive force analysis.
The Whitley factors set forth above, applied to the present evidentiary record, establish that
Henderson cannot show that Borowicz applied force with sadistic or malicious intent in order to
inflict pain. First, a court examines the need for force. Here, there is no issue that CO Borowicz
had ample basis to believe that Henderson intended to physically assault him and that he needed
to use force to defend himself. At the outset, Henderson engaged in a “strong conversation” with
Borowicz during which he exhibited body language indicating that he was upset and excited. (ECF
No. 1-16 at PageID.45.) In fact, Henderson admitted that he was not happy with the tone of
Borowicz’s order. (ECF No. 41-3 at PageID.289.) Next, at the cell, Henderson grabbed the door
as Borowicz tried to shut it and continued to advance towards Borowicz, demonstrating a defiant
and aggressive mindset. Last, Henderson stepped toward Borowicz with fists balled at his waist
level and teeth bared, suggesting that he intended to harm Borowicz. (ECF No. 1-16 at PageID.45.)
Under these circumstances, Borowicz was justified in believing that force was necessary to prevent
what appeared to be an imminent attack.
Second, the absence of any physical injury findings during the medical examinations of
Henderson following the event indicates that CO Borowicz did not act with a culpable state of
mind. “[A]lthough the Eighth Amendment does not require a prisoner to suffer a ‘serious injury,’
the ‘absence’ of such an injury goes a long way to disprove any claim that an officer used force
with the required intent to harm.” Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608, 618–19 (6th Cir. 2023)
(citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7–8). While Henderson reported some neck and back pain during these
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page 8
of 13

9
examinations, the normal objective examination findings and absence of any significant physical
injury undercuts any claim that Borowicz acted with malevolent intent.
Third, even accepting Henderson’s version of events in the cell—Borowicz pushed him up
against the steel ladder on Henderson’s bunk and against the bunk itself and grabbed his
(admittedly long) hair—the force applied was proportional to Borowicz’s need to protect himself
from assault and to control Henderson. As the Sixth Circuit has observed, “[o]ur caselaw has found
a similar level of force proportional when it involved, for example, shoving or grabbing a prisoner
to gain control of him, pushing and holding a prisoner against a wall to handcuff him, or using a
leg-sweep maneuver to take a prisoner to the ground so that she could be handcuffed and returned
to her cell[.]” Johnson, 79 F.4th at 620 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).
Last, there is no indication in the record that CO Borowicz applied more force than
necessary or held Henderson against the bunkbed or ladder longer than necessary to allow CO
Wilhelm to enter the cell, de-escalate the situation, and place Henderson in restraints, which
weighs against any finding that Borowicz applied force maliciously for the purpose of causing
harm to Henderson. In sum, the evidence shows that Borowicz applied force against Henderson in
a good-faith effort to protect himself from a perceived attack by Henderson. No reasonable jury
could find otherwise.
Henderson fails to submit any evidence to rebut CO Borowicz’s declaration and the other
evidence of record showing that Borowicz applied force in a good-faith manner and not for
malicious or sadistic purposes. Instead, he offers only unsupported and conclusory argument that
Borowicz acted “with ‘malicious and sadistic’ intent.” (ECF No. 45 at 281.) But this does not
suffice to rebut Borowicz’s summary judgment evidence. See Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585
F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The court’s duty to view the facts in the light most favorable to
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page 9
of 13

10
the nonmovant does not require or permit the court to accept mere allegations that are not supported
by factual evidence.”).
Henderson also points out that he never attacked Borowicz, so Borowicz “logically . . .
could not ha[ve] defended himself.” (Id. at PageID.276.) But prison officials are not required to
wait for an actual attack before using force if they perceive a risk of physical harm. Officers “must
make quick decisions in the heat of the moment[,] [s]o [courts] defer to their decisions and avoid
‘unreasonable post hoc judicial second-guessing of their conduct.’” Johnson, 79 F.4th at 618
(quoting Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866, 875 (6th Cir. 2008)). Here, even if Borowicz
misinterpreted Henderson’s physical presentation or was mistaken about his intent, Borowicz still
had a valid justification to use force.
Henderson also asserts that Borowicz’s failure to comply with rules and requirements in
the MDOC Employee Handbook or MDOC Policy Directives creates a genuine issue of material
fact precluding summary judgment. (Id. at 281–82.) However, this is not the law, as a failure to
comply with state law, administrative rule or policy does not itself rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 581 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2007); Smith v. Freland,
954 F.2d 343, 347–48 (6th Cir. 1992); Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, CO Borowicz is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
B. 	Retaliation Claims
Henderson alleges that Borowicz retaliated against him for threatening to file a grievance
by assaulting him.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Henderson must prove the following
elements: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) the defendant took an adverse action against
him “that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct;”
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page
10 of 13

11
and (3) the adverse action was taken (at least in part) because of the protected conduct. Thaddeus-
X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). To satisfy the causal connection
requirement, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s retaliatory motive was “a ‘but-for’ cause,
meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the
retaliatory motive.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 399 (2019). Once the plaintiff has met this
burden, if the defendant can show that he would have taken the same action in the absence of
protected activity, the defendant is entitled to prevail on summary judgment. Thaddeus–X, 175
F.3d at 399; see Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 2001).
The retaliation claim fails on the first and third elements.3 In addition, Henderson fails to
rebut Borowicz’s evidence that he would have taken the same action regardless of whether
Henderson threatened to file a grievance.4
1. 	Protected Conduct
It is well established that an inmate has a First Amendment right to file “non-frivolous”
grievances against prison officials on his own behalf, whether written or oral. Maben v. Thelen,
887 F.3d 252, 265 (6th Cir. 2018). But this rule is further limited by a prisoner’s status. “A prisoner
retains First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Smith, 250 F.3d at 1036 (citing Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). For this reason, conduct that violates a legitimate prison
3 Contrary to Henderson’s assertion (ECF No. 45 at PageID.284), Borowicz does not concede that
Henderson engaged in protected conduct expressing his intent to file a grievance for Borowicz’s
harassment.
4 In his brief, Henderson argues that the filing of a false misconduct report can be the basis for a
First Amendment retaliation claim. (ECF No 45 at PageID.284.) The analysis as to the first and
third factors of the claim herein also applies to the extent Henderson relies on CO Borowicz’s
misconduct report as an adverse action.
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page
11 of 13

12
regulation is not protected under the First Amendment—or any other amendment. See Thaddeus-
X, 175 F.3d at 395; Lockett, 526 F.3d at 874 (insolence is not protected conduct). For example,
“‘Inmates cannot be permitted to decide which orders they will obey, and when they will obey
them. Someone must exercise authority and control.’” Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 601 (6th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1267 (7th Cir. 1984)).
Here, it is undisputed that CO Borowicz ordered Henderson to return to his cell for count
time, but instead of following the order, Henderson engaged in a “strong conversation” with
Borowicz because he did not like the tone of Borowicz’s order. Henderson’s response prompted
Borowicz to order Henderson to bring him his ID card, which Henderson also refused to do and
instead told Borowicz that he would have to come to Henderson’s cell and get it. None of these
acts was protected conduct, and to the extent Henderson contends that his threat to file a grievance
for any of Borowicz’s conduct during this incident was protected under the First Amendment, he
is mistaken. Any such grievance would have been frivolous because, as a prisoner, Henderson had
no right to question the order to return to his cell, argue about the manner in which it was given,
or refuse to take his ID card to CO Borowicz. Thus, Henderson’s claim fails at the first element.
2. 	Causal Connection
Even assuming for the sake of argument that Henderson engaged in protected conduct, he
wholly fails to present evidence establishing a causal connection. Henderson’s reliance on the
close temporal proximity between his alleged threat to file a grievance and adverse action is not
enough to demonstrate that CO Borowicz acted with unlawful retaliatory animus. Even if the
temporal proximity here is “very close,” see Briggs v. Westcomb, 801 F. App’x 956, 961 (6th Cir.
2020) (“A day between events presents a very different situation than a week between events, as
two days between events has been found to be “‘very close’ temporal proximity.”) (quoting
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page
12 of 13

13
Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 419 (6th Cir. 2009)), Henderson fails to confront the evidence set
forth above showing that Borowicz used force against Henderson and issued the misconduct as a
result of Henderson’s threatening and aggressive conduct, not because of any threat Henderson
may have made to file a grievance. (ECF No. 41-2 at PageID.234.) Simply put, in light of the
evidence of record, Henderson fails to create a genuine issue of material fact that Borowicz was
motivated by unlawful retaliation.
Finally, as noted, Henderson fails to rebut Borowicz’s assertion that he would have taken
the same action against Henderson regardless of any threat to file a grievance. 5 (Id. at
PageID.235.) This is an additional ground for granting Borowicz summary judgment.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that the Court grant CO Borowicz’s motion
for summary judgment (ECF No. 40) and dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
Dated: January 9, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
5 In light of the foregoing conclusions that Henderson fails to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to both of his claims at issue, I find it unnecessary to address Borowicz’s argument
regarding qualified immunity.
Case 1:24-cv-00166-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 60, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/09/26 Page
13 of 13