Lark v. Thomas et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
TUNISIA LARK, 	Case No. 1:24-cv-144
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
U.S. District Judge
v.
SHARNE THOMAS, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation addresses:
 	A motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Kendrick
Foster, Selina Hunter, County of Muskegon, Gebriel Nevins,
and Justin Wall (collectively the “Muskegon Defendants”), ECF
No. 97;
 	A motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Cynthis Blair,
Zachary Defouw, Health West LLC, Sharne Thomas, and Jessica
Varao (collectively the “Health West Defendants”), ECF No. 99;
and
 	A motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Dr. David Van
Winkle, ECF No. 101. 1
1 	Defendants’ motion to preclude opinion testimony of Plaintiff’s Experts Ryan
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Plaintiff, acting as the personal representative of the estate of Marleon
Johnson, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 14, 2024. 	ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated Johnson’s Fourteenth Amendment right by
deliberately denying him medical care while he was a pre-trial detainee in the
Muskegon County Jail. 	Plaintiff also asserts state law claims under the Michigan
Wrongful Death Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2922. 	Id., PageID.2.
Plaintiff’s claims are summarized in the following table:
Number 	Claim 	Defendant(s)
I 	Fourteenth Amendment
Deliberate Indifference
All Individual
Defendants
II 	Monell Claim 	Muskegon County and
HealthWest
III 	Gross Negligence, Intentional,
Willful, and Wanton Conduct
(Michigan Wrongful Death
Act, MCL § 600.2922)
All Defendants
Defendants make several arguments in their various motions for summary
judgment. 	In ECF No. 97, the Muskegon Defendants argue that they are entitled to
summary judgment because: (1) Plaintiff failed to establish either the objective or
subjective component of a Fourteenth Amendment claim against any deputy; (2)
Defendant deputies are entitled to qualified immunity; (3) Plaintiff failed to establish
a 	municipal 	liability 	claim 	against 	Muskegon 	County; 	and 	(4) 	the 	Muskegon
Defendants are entitled to governmental immunity from Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Herrington, M.D. and Hayden Smith, Ph.D. is also pending before this Court. ECF
No. 	100. 	The 	Court 	will 	consider 	this 	motion 	in 	a 	subsequent 	order. 	The
undersigned’s analysis below does not consider the opinions of Dr. Herrington and
Dr. Smith.
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ECF No. 97-1, PageID.1292-1315.
In ECF No. 99, the Health West Defendants argue that they are entitled to
summary judgment because: (1) all of the Health West employees are entitled to
qualified immunity; (2) Plaintiff failed to establish a municipal liability claim against
Health West; (3) governmental immunity bars Plaintiff’s state law claims; and (4)
Plaintiff failed to create a question of fact regarding economic damages.
Finally, in ECF No. 101, Dr. Van Winkle argues that he is entitled to summary
judgment because: (1) Lark cannot establish that Dr. Van Winkle was aware of a
“serious medical need”; (2) Dr. Van Winkle did not act recklessly in response to
Johnson’s medical needs; (3) Lark has not established supervisor liability; (4) Dr. Van
Winkle was not grossly negligent; and (5) Dr. Van Winkle was not the proximate
cause of Johnson’s death. 	ECF No. 102, PageID. 1803-21.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the critical issue across all three motions for
summary judgment is: which Defendants knew about Johnson’s serious medical need.
Accordingly, the undersigned focuses the analysis below on this throughline issue.
The undersigned provides additional specific analysis of the Monell claims regarding
Muskegon County and Health West.
For the reasons set forth below, in the opinion of the undersigned, there is a
genuine issue of material fact regarding which of the on-site Muskegon Defendants
and Health West Defendants knew the extent of Johnson’s serious medical needs.
The undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court deny the Muskegon
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment and
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state law claims and grant the motion on Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Muskegon
County. 	ECF No. 97.
Additionally, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant
the Health West Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as it pertains to Cynthia
Blair, and deny the motion as to EMT Defouw and Medical Assistants Varao and
Thomas. 	ECF No. 99.
Finally, in the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine issues of
material 	fact 	regarding 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	Dr. 	Van 	Winkle; 	thus, 	the
undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant his motion for summary
judgment. 	ECF No. 101.
II. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that on December 10, 2021, Marleon Johnson was arrested on
a warrant obtained by the City of Muskegon Police Department and brought to the
Muskegon County Jail. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.6. 	EMT DeFouw performed vitals on
Johnson at 3:00PM. 	Id., PageID. 11. 	At that time, Johnson had a blood pressure
of 160/120. 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges that Johnson told Deputies Foster and Wall that
he had swallowed crack cocaine. 	Id., PageID.6. 	Plaintiff says that Johnson told
Deputy Foster that he needed to go to the hospital. 	Id., PageID.21. 	Plaintiff
further asserts that Deputy Hunter overheard that Johnson had swallowed crack.
Id., PageID.6.
Plaintiff says Deputy Foster told Medical Assistant Varao that Johnson
swallowed crack and Varao passed that information on to EMT DeFouw. 	Id.
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Plaintiff alleges that EMT DeFouw called Dr. VanWinkle at 11:04PM and told him
that Johnson “ingested crack cocaine, had been sweating profusely and vomiting.”
Id. 	Medical Assistant Thomas gave Johnson 8mg of Zofran for dizziness and
vomiting at 11:30PM. 	Id., PageID.8. 	At that time, his blood pressure was 140/100.
Id. 	Plaintiff says Thomas then watched Johnson vomit and reported the incident to
Dr. VanWinkle. 	Id.
Additionally, Plaintiff says that other inmates told guards that Johnson did
not look well and needed to go to the hospital. 	Id., PageID.6. 	Plaintiff asserts that
at 1:00AM, Medical Assistant Thomas checked on Johnson with Deputy Nevins. 	Id.,
PageID.7. 	At that point, Johnson was unconscious but still breathing with a blood
pressure reading of 138/98. 	Id., PageID.9.
Plaintiff states Defendant Nevins checked on Johnson again at 2:15AM by
looking into his cell. 	Id., PageID.17. 	Plaintiff says Thomas called the jail front
desk at 3:00AM to check on Johnson again, but Deputy Wall said they were too busy
at the time. 	Id., PageID.7. Plaintiff says Thomas refused to check on Johnson at
4AM but entered Johnson’s cell again at 4:31AM. 	Id., PageID.10. 	Plaintiff says
that Deputy Wall called his supervisor at 4:32AM and reported that Johnson was not
breathing. 	Id., PageID.7. 	Johnson was pronounced dead at 5:18AM. 	Id.
Plaintiff asserts that an autopsy by the Western Michigan Department of
Pathology determined Johnson’s cause of death was the “combined toxic effects of
fentanyl, acetyl fentanyl, hydrocodone, diphenhydramine, and chlorpheniramine.”
Id.
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IV. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). 	The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251−52 (1986)). 	The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. 	Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
IV. 	Analysis
A. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
The 	Eighth 	Amendment 	prohibits 	the 	infliction 	of 	cruel 	and 	unusual
punishment against those convicted of crimes and requires prison authorities to
provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care
would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. 	Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). 	The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison
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official is deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. 	Id. at
104-05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Eighth Amendment protections extend to pre-trial detainees through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327
(1986). 	Until recently, the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference subjective
standards applied to pre-trial detainees bringing medical care claims through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 	In Richmond v. Huq et al., 885 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2018),
the Sixth Circuit reserved deciding whether, in the context of a failure to provide
medical 	care, 	Kingsley 	v. 	Hendrickson, 	576 	U.S. 	389 	(2015) 	eliminated 	the
requirement of proving the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test for pre-
trial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment. 	In Brawner v. Scott Cnty.,
Tennessee, 14 F.4th at 585, 597 (6th Cir. 2021), the Sixth Circuit found that under
the subjective component of the deliberate indifference analysis, a pre-trial detainee
only needed to show recklessness – “more than negligence but less than subjective
intent – something akin to reckless disregard.” 	Id. (citation omitted).
In Greene v. Crawford County, 22 F.4th 593 (6th Cir. 2022), the Sixth Circuit
clarified that a pre-trial detainee establishes the subjective standard by showing a
defendant either intentionally ignored a serious medical need or recklessly failed to
act reasonably to mitigate the risk posed by a serious medical need. 	Id. at 607. 	To
satisfy 	the 	objective 	component 	of 	a 	deliberate 	indifference 	claim, 	the 	Eighth
Amendment standard still applies. 	A pre-trial detainee must establish that the
medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. 	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
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(1994). 	In other words, the pre-trial detainee must show that he is incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. 	Id. 	“Accordingly,
plaintiff must show (1) that [he] had a sufficiently serious medical need and (2) that
each defendant “acted deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also recklessly ‘in the face
of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should
be known.’” 	Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Kentucky, 60 F.4th 305, 317 (6th Cir.
2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 692, 217 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2024), (citing Brawner, at 596,
quoting Farmer, at 836).
“[A]n inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a
constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to
establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment to succeed.”
Napier v. Madison Cty., Ky., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added,
citations omitted). 	The Court of Appeals elaborated on the holding in Napier in its
2004 ruling in Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2004), where the
Court stated the following:
Napier does not apply to medical care claims where facts show an
obvious need for medical care that laymen would readily discern as
requiring prompt medical attention by competent health care providers.
Napier applies where the plaintiff's “deliberate indifference” claim is
based on the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or
where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious. In
such circumstances, medical proof is necessary to assess whether the
delay caused a serious medical injury.
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898 (emphasis added). 	Thus, Napier and Blackmore provide
a framework for assessing a claim of delayed or inadequate care for a non-obvious
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condition: a plaintiff making this type of claim must place verifying medical evidence
in the record to show the detrimental effect of the delayed or inadequate treatment.
However, the objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied
“[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[ ] for medical care is obvious even to a
lay person.” 	Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899. 	“A sufficiently serious medical need is
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” 	Helphenstine, at 318.
Moreover, The Sixth Circuit has established that “prison officials do not act
with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs when they ‘rely on medical
judgment made by medical professionals responsible for prisoner care.’” 	Machelle
Pearson v. MDOC, Case No. 24-1528 at *12 (6th Cir. March 26, 2026) (quoting
Graham v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2004)). 	“Lay staff” do
not have a duty to “veto” a medical professional – but allowable deference is not
limitless. Hehrer v. Cnty, of Clinton, 161 F. 4th 955, 964 (6th Cir. 2025). 	“An officer
might act recklessly, for example, if the officer does not seek medical help after an
inmate suffers from new and alarming symptoms since last seeing a medical
professional.” 	Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
1. 	On-Site Jail Staff
Defendants include several videos as exhibits. 	The undersigned’s analysis
below relies extensively on the video footage. 	Exhibit Q to ECF No. 97 is Deputy
Foster’s body camera footage, which was recorded when the medical team examined
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Johnson. 	Deputy Foster’s bodycam footage shows Johnson sweating, holding a
plastic bag for potential vomit, and shaking his head. 	ECF No. 97, Ex. Q at 16:37.2
Johnson then turns to Deputy Foster and says, “I swallowed some dope.” 	Id. at
17:01. 	Deputy Foster responds, “You did? You got to tell them then, that was wrong.
That’s got you feeling like that…They got to take you to the hospital.” 	Id. at 17:04-
17:18. 	Deputy Foster then yells to Deputy Hall to call medical. 	Deputy Foster asks
Johnson, “What did you swallow?,” Johnson mumbles and Deputy Foster announces,
“hard, crack cocaine.” 	Id. at 17:48-17:54. 	A few minutes later, Deputy Foster tells
Deputy Nevins that Johnson “swallowed something” while Deputy Hunter is in the
background assisting with transferring another inmate into a new cell. 	Id. at 27:46-
27:52.
Exhibit R contains Deputy Nevin’s body camera footage from the early hours
of December 11, 2021. 	Deputy Nevin’s bodycam shows Thomas and Nevins checking
on Johnson in his cell. 	ECF No. 97, Ex. R at 2:18. 	Johnson is unconscious and does
not respond to Deputy Nevins’s calls or taps on his arm. 	Deputy Nevins notes that
Johnson is breathing irregularly in his sleep. 	Thomas takes Johnson’s blood
pressure and the two leave Johnson unconscious in his cell. 	Id. at 4:36. 	Later on,
Deputy Nevins finds Johnson unconscious and not breathing in his cell. 	ECF No.
97, Ex. S at 1:02. 	The deputies go back to medical to report the incident. 	A brown
liquid streams from Johnson’s mouth and he does not respond to repeated sternal
2 	The bodycam footage does not include time stamps to indicate when specific
events occurred. 	Plaintiff provides a timeline in the Complaint that the undersigned
considers below.
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rubs. 	Id. at 2:25. 	The deputies pull Johnson out of his cell and Deputy Nevins
begins CPR. 	Id. at 3:34. 	Medical assistant Thomas appears with the AED nearly
three minutes after Deputy Nevins finds Johnson unconscious and not breathing.
Id. at 3:56. 	The AED provides a low battery message but advises against a shock.
Id. at 5:54-6:12. 	The deputies continue CPR for several minutes, then EMTs arrive
and take over CPR. 	Id. at 8:40.
In the opinion of the undersigned, the record before the Court presents a
genuine issue of material fact regarding what information the deputies relayed to
medical staff. 	In the bodycam footage, Deputy Foster announces to the other
deputies that Johnson reported he swallowed crack cocaine. 	ECF No. 97, Exhibit Q
at 27:46-27:52. 	In Deputy Walls’s deposition, he states that he told medical staff the
following:
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ECF No. 97-10, PageID.1386-87.4
Yet, the depositions of medical staff differ in a small but important way. 	In
Jessica Varao’s deposition, she asserts that a deputy, whom she can’t identify by
name, told her the following:
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ECF No. 96-12, PageID.1107. 	In EMT Defouw’s deposition, he states a different
understanding of Johnson’s condition:
ECF No. 102-8, PageID.1883. 	Dr. Van Winkle’s deposition provides no further
clarity:
ECF No. 102-3, PageID.1841.
The issue here is more than mere semantics. The seriousness of medical needs
for someone who swallows cocaine differs substantially from a patient who snorts the
same substance. 	See ECF No. 96-15, PageID.1215 (Dr. Van Winkle Dep.) (“if I had
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known that he had swallowed drugs at the time, should he have been transported,
and the answer to that is yes”); see also ECF No 97-12, PageID.1433 (Deputy Hunter
Dep.) (“If he ingested drugs, that is something we would contact for ProMed or
transport out to a hospital…Because it’s very easy for drugs that are ingested to cause
an overdose and that’s not something that we want to happen in the jail”). 	Thus, to
determine whether the various on-site staff acted recklessly, it matters what
statement was passed on to medical staff. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, there
is a genuine issue of material fact regarding this statement.
In addition, as explained above, medical staff checked Johnson’s vitals at 3PM
during intake. 	Later that night, around 11:04PM, EMT DeFouw called Dr. Van
Winkle to relay the message about reported drug use. 	Medical Assistant Thomas
checked on Johnson at 1:00AM, and again at 2:15AM. 	During the 2:15AM visit, CO
Nevins and Medical Assistant Thomas observed Johnson laying down unconscious
and he was not responsive to multiple attempts to wake him. 	The record indicates
that no one checked on Johnson again until 4:31AM. 	By that time, he was
unconscious 	and 	no 	longer 	breathing. 	Thus, 	the 	records 	before 	the 	Court
demonstrate that Johnson first appeared ill and vomited, then he told CO Foster he
had swallowed drugs, and then he appeared to be unconscious when jail staff checked
on him. 	Thereafter, jail staff did not check on Johnson again for over two hours.
When they returned, he was no longer breathing. 	At that juncture, Johnson could
not be revived and was soon declared dead. 	Accordingly, the undersigned concludes
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that the record before the Court establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether jail staff were deliberately indifferent to Johnson’s serious medical needs.
Deputies Nevins, Foster, Walls, and Hunter, EMT Defouw, and Medical
Assistants Varao and Thomas were all on-site during the various events at issue.
Each of these Defendants was either informed of, or personally observed, Johnson the
night of his death. 	None of these Defendants attempted to transfer Johnson to the
hospital. 	Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court
deny summary judgment for the on-site jail Defendants.
2. 	Dr. Van Winkle
On the day Johnson tragically passed away, Dr. Van Winkle was consulting
remotely with medical staff. 	While it is unclear whether the on-site medical staff
knew that Johnson reported he swallowed crack cocaine, the inconsistency stops with
Dr. Van Winkle. 	Once medical staff heard about the alleged drug use, EMT Defouw
called Dr. Van Winkle with the updated information. 	In his deposition, EMT
Defouw states:
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ECF No. 102-8, PageID.1883-84. 	In Dr. Van Winkle’s deposition, he states that he
responded to the phone call as follows:
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ECF No. 102-3, PageID.1853-54.
The record before the Court supports that Dr. Van Winkle was not told that
Johnson reported swallowing cocaine. 	Further on in Dr. Van Winkle’s deposition,
he states that “if I had known that he had swallowed drugs at the time, should he
have been transported, and the answer to that is yes.” 	ECF No. 96-15, PageID.1215.
Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, there are no genuine issues of material
fact regarding Dr. Van Winkle’s knowledge of Johnson’s serious medical need.
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3. 	Cynthia Blair
Finally, one of the Health West Defendants, Cynthia Blair, was not at the jail
on December 11th and 12th, 2021. 	In her deposition, Blair stated that she was Health
West’s chief clinical officer and worked at an office off the site of the jail. 	ECF No.
96-14, PageID.1164. 	Blair oversaw medical staffing at the Muskegon County Jail.
On the night of Johnson’s death, two medical employees called off work. 	Id.,
PgeID.1171. 	Blair asserts that Medical Assistant Jessica Varao and EMT Zachary
DeFouw stayed past their shift end times to provide additional coverage. 	Id.
Plaintiff maintains that Blair’s liability is based on her awareness of short staffing
issues. 	ECF No. 110, PageID.2118.
In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue
of material fact regarding whether Cynthia Blair acted with a reckless disregard to
Johnson’s serious medical needs. 	Blair testified that she was aware of a Health
West staffing shortage due to an automobile accident. 	ECF No. 96-14, PageID.1171.
But she said that other staff members stayed extra time to make up for the shortage.
Id. 	Thus, there is no indication in the record that Blair caused the staffing shortage,
recklessly ignored the shortage, or intended to cause harm to Johnson.
In summary, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court deny
summary judgment for Deputies Nevins, Foster, Walls, and Hunter, EMT Defouw,
and Medical Assistants Varao and Thomas because genuine issues of material fact
remain regarding their on-site involvement in the medical care leading up to
Johnson’s death. 	However, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Court
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grant summary judgment for Dr. Van Winkle and Cynthia Blair because there are
no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether they acted with a reckless
disregard to Johnson’s serious medical needs.
B. Municipal Liability
Lark sues Muskegon County and Health West under Monnell v. Dep’t. of Soc.
Servs. Of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 	A municipality is not subject to
§ 1983 liability “for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” 	Kovalchuk
v. City of Decherd, 95 F.4th 1035, 1038 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 	Instead, the municipality can only be held liable
“for 	[its] 	own 	illegal 	acts.” 	Id. 	(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Connick 	v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)). 	Where a municipal employee harms a private
party, that party must show that the employee’s unconstitutional conduct stems from
a municipal “policy or custom.” 	Coleman v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs,
130 F.4th 593, 599 (6th Cir. 2025).
There are four recognized avenues for a plaintiff to establish a municipality’s
unconstitutional policy or custom: “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or
legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified
illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or
(4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.”
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of
Chattanooga, 	398 	F.3d 	426, 	429 	(6th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	Additionally, 	courts 	have
explained:
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Even after showing an unlawful policy or custom, a plaintiff must also
demonstrate a direct causal link between the policy and the alleged
constitutional 	violation 	in 	order 	to 	show 	that 	the 	municipality’s
deliberate 	conduct 	can 	be 	deemed 	the 	‘moving 	force’ 	behind 	the
violation.
Jones v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 482 F. Supp. 3d 584, 597 (W.D. Ky.
2020) (quoting Spears, 589 F.3d 249 at 256 (cleaned up)).
In Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth
Circuit held that if “no constitutional violation by the individual defendants is
established, 	the 	municipal 	defendants 	cannot 	be 	held 	liable 	under 	§ 	1983.”
Generally, if no constitutional violation can be attributed to an individual municipal
actor, it is unlikely that the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right at all.
North v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 754 F. App’x 380, 390 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2018). 	More
recently, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “in certain unusual circumstances, a
municipality might be liable for a constitutional violation even in the absence of a
liable individual.” 	Hart v. Hillsdale Cnty., Michigan, 973 F.3d 627, 645 (6th Cir.
2020); Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 900 (6th Cir. 2018). 	A Monell claim
against a municipality may proceed without a claim against an offending officer, so
long as it remains consistent with a finding of a constitutional violation. 	Stucker v.
Louisville Metro Gov’t, No. 23-5214, 2024 WL 2135407, at *6 (6th Cir. May 13, 2024).
There exists “scenarios when no officer may have acted unconstitutionally, but the
municipality has nonetheless inflicted constitutional harm of a victim – such as a lack
of action due to the failure to train, or where there are systematic problems with the
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health care system in the County jail.” 	Grote v. Kenton Cnty., 85 F. 4th 397, 414 (6th
Cir. 2023).
To defeat a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must show: (1)
the existence of a clear and persistent pattern that violates individual rights; (2)
notice or constructive notice; (3) tacit approval amounting to deliberate indifference
evidencing an official policy of inaction; and (4) that custom resulted in the alleged
constitutional deprivation. 	Wallace v. Coffee Cnty, 852 F. App’x. 871, 876 (6th Cir.
2021).
1. 	Muskegon County
Lark has not identified a specific Muskegon County policy or procedure that
violated Johnson’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. 	Instead, Lark focuses on the
alleged “customs” of not following detox procedures, understaffing, and inadequate
training on overdose symptoms.
First, Plaintiff asserts that the cell Johnson was placed into had an inoperable
surveillance camera that County leadership did know about, and did not fix, for three
months. 	ECF No. 112, PageID.2369. 	However, in Deputy Nevins’s testimony, he
states that the camera did allow control room monitoring without recording. 	Thus,
the record supports that the deputies were still able to observe Johnson in the cell
from the camera system.
Next, Plaintiff asserts that Muskegon County Jail maintained a custom and
policy of improper training and supervision of jail employees, including inadequate
training on overdose symptoms. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.29-30.
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Failure-to-train under Monell is broader than an individual-capacity claim; it
“implicate[s] the conduct of a defendant supervisor insofar as he acted with deliberate
indifference in his official capacity as a policymaker.” 	Essex v. Cnty. of Livingston,
518 F. App’x 351, at 355 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 	“There are two ways to
support a claim that a failure to train or supervise is the result of a municipality's
deliberate indifference. 	Plaintiff may prove (1) a ‘pattern of similar constitutional
violations 	by 	untrained 	employees’ 	or 	(2) ‘a 	single 	violation 	of 	federal 	rights,
accompanied by a showing that [the municipality] has failed to train its employees to
handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for a constitutional
violation.’” 	Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 323 (quoting Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty., 805
F.3d 	724, 	738-39 	(6th 	Cir. 	2015)). 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	identified 	any 	other
constitutional violations, so she may impose liability by showing that a single
violation – Johnson’s death – was caused by the failure to train Muskegon County
employees on recurring situations involving drug overdose symptoms. 	Id.
Therefore, Plaintiff must show three elements to establish her claim that the
failure to train employees to handle issues amounts to deliberate indifference: “(1)
that the County’s ‘training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed;
(2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and
(3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.’” Id., (quoting
Winkler, 893 F.3d at 902).
In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff has failed to establish these
elements, and the record demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists
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on this issue. 	Plaintiff asserts that Muskegon County failed to adequately train the
deputies on overdose symptoms. 	Muskegon County does not dispute this point.
Rather, the County maintains that overdose training was provided by the state-
required corrections academy. 	ECF No. 116, PageID.2463. 	Additionally, the
record supports that Muskegon County Jail had 24/7 medical coverage during the
events in this case. 	See Winkler, 893 F. 3d at 903 (“Healthcare's medical staff was
available to jail personnel, either in person or by phone, for consultation about an
inmate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 	We therefore see no basis to conclude that
the County exhibited deliberate indifference by failing to provide additional medical
training to jail personnel.”). 	Therefore, it is recommended that the Court grant
Muskegon County’s motion for summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s Monell claim
because no genuine issue of material fact exists.
2. 	Monell Claim Against Health West 3
Plaintiff further alleges that Health West failed to adequately staff the medical
personnel on site on the night of Johnson’s death and that Health West did not
adequately train its employees. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.27-29.
First, 	regarding 	the 	staffing 	shortage, 	the 	record 	before 	the 	Court
demonstrates that there was not a custom of understaffing but rather a one-off
3 	Health West acted as a governmental entity when the organization contracted
with Muskegon County jail as a medical services provider. 	Lark brings a Monell
claim against Health West as a governmental entity. 	“A private entity . . . that
contracts to provide medical services at a jail can be held liable under § 1983 because
it is carrying out a traditional state function.” 	Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d
877, 904 (6th Cir. 2018).
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situation on the night of Johnson’s death. 	The record shows that another staff
member was in a car accident and Health West could not find additional medical staff
to report to the jail. 	ECF No. 96-14, PageID.1172-73 (Blair Dep.). 	Therefore, EMT
Defouw and Medical Assistant Varao stayed for part of Medical Assistant Thomas’s
shift. 	Id. 	When Medical Assistant Thomas was the only medical personnel on
staff, she had access to Dr. Van Winkle and Cyndi Blair, RN by telephone. 	Id.
Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff has not established a genuine
issue of material fact regarding a custom of Health West understaffing Muskegon
County Jail.
Next, Plaintiff asserts that Health West did not adequately train Medical
Assistant Thomas. 	In Blair’s deposition, she explains that Medical Assistant
Thomas had the qualifications needed for the Medical Assistant position and Thomas
completed online training and one-on-one training. 	Id., PageID.1166. 	In the
opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff has not established the Winkler elements to
support a failure to train Monell claim against Health West.
C. State Law Claims
In Count III, Plaintiff asserts Michigan state law claims against all Defendants
for Gross Negligence, Intentional, Willful, and Wanton Conduct. 	ECF No. 1,
PageID.31-32.
Claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 	Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 924 (1982). 	Plaintiff, however, seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental
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jurisdiction over state-law claims. 	In determining whether to retain supplemental
jurisdiction, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and
the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against
needlessly deciding state law issues.” 	Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d
1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). 	Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised
jurisdiction over a state-law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and
the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining
state-law 	claims. 	Id. 	Dismissal, 	however, 	remains 	“purely 	discretionary.”
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)); Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012).
Here, 	the 	undersigned 	recommends 	dismissal 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Dr. Van Winkle and Cyndi Blair. 	Accordingly, it is
respectfully 	recommended 	that 	the 	Court 	decline 	to 	exercise 	supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims against these Defendants only.
VI. 	Recommendation
For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully recommended that the Court:
1. 	In ECF No. 97, deny the Muskegon Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment and state law claims and
grant the motion on Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Muskegon County;
2. 	In ECF No. 99, grant Cyndi Blair’s motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment and state claims, deny EMT Defouw’s
and 	Medical 	Assistants 	Varao 	and 	Thomas’s 	motion 	for 	summary
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judgment, 	and grant the motion on Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Health
West; and
3. 	In ECF No. 101, grant Dr. Van Winkle’s motion for summary judgment.
If the Court accepts these recommendations, the following claims will remain:
Number 	Claim 	Defendant(s)
I 	Fourteenth Amendment
Deliberate Indifference
Deputies Nevins,
Foster, Walls, and
Hunter, EMT Defouw,
Medical Assistants
Varao and Thomas
III 	Gross Negligence, Intentional,
Willful, and Wanton Conduct
(Michigan Wrongful Death
Act, MCL § 600.2922)
Deputies Nevins,
Foster, Wall, and
Hunter, EMT Defouw,
Medical Assistants
Varao and Thomas
Dated: 	April 20, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served on opposing parties
and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of any further
right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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