Townsend #201112 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LORENZO TOWNSEND,
Case No. 1:23-cv-1023
Plaintiff,
Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a pro se civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Lorenzo
Townsend, a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). This
matter is now before the Court on defendant RN Rosemary Villasan’s motion for summary
judgment on the basis of exhaustion (ECF No. 51).
I. 	Background
The Court summarized plaintiff’s complaint as follows:
Plaintiff is a Buddhist and a strict vegan and has been recognized as an
adherent by the MDOC since December 11, 2007. Plaintiff also asserts that he was
ordained on October 24, 2000, and was granted the title of Buddhist Monk on
March 27, 2014. [Compl. at PageID.3.]
On January 19, 2023, Plaintiff asked Defendant Groff to note in his medical
records that he was a practicing Buddhist and a strict vegan who could not take a
T.B. test because it contains human or animal derivatives and byproducts. Plaintiff
sought to be provided with a chest x-ray as an alternative test. Defendant Groff
assured Plaintiff that the information would be placed in his record, and Plaintiff
told her that he believed he would be called out later that day for a T.B. test. (Id.)
Later that day, Plaintiff was called out to healthcare where Defendant
Bowerman told Plaintiff that he had to submit to a T.B. test. Plaintiff objected to
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the test on religious grounds but was told that his file did not contain that
information. Defendant Bowerman consulted with Defendant Villasan, who
indicated that Plaintiff would be placed in segregation if he did not take the test.
Plaintiff states that he agreed to take the test as a direct result of the threat. (Id.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Eighth,
and 	Fourteenth 	Amendments, 	as 	well 	as 	the 	Religious 	Land 	Use 	and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
(Id. at PageID.4-5.)
Opinion (ECF No. 11, PageID.37-38).
The Court dismissed a number of claims and concluded that,
Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claims against Defendants Groff,
Villasan, and Bowerman, and his RLUIPA claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief against these Defendants will remain in the case.
Id. at PageID.44. As discussed, defendant RN Villasan has moved for summary judgment on the
basis of exhaustion (ECF No. 51).
II. 	Summary Judgment
A. 	Legal standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further provides that a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, 	electronically 	stored 	information, 	affidavits 	or 	declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
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In Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 1995), the court set forth the parties’
burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment:
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party’s case. Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of the complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Copeland, 57 F.3d at 478-79 (citations omitted). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment,
the court views the factual evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
B. 	Lack of Exhaustion
1. 	Exhaustion requirement
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner bringing an
action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must first exhaust available
administrative remedies. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731 (2001). A prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner may
not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative process. See
Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. 	One reason for creating prisoner grievance
procedures under the PLRA was to create an administrative record for the court.
Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes
concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court. This
has the potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to improve the
quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful administrative record.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007).
In order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must complete the
administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable procedural
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rules. Id. at 218; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). “Compliance with prison grievance
procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Jones, 549 U.S.
at 218.
2. 	MDOC Grievance process
The MDOC requires prisoners to follow a three-step process to exhaust grievances.
See MDOC Policy Directive (“PD”) 03.02.130 (effective March 18, 2019). A prisoner must first
attempt to resolve a problem with the staff member within two business days of becoming aware
of the grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. Id. at ¶ Q. If
the issue is not resolved, then the grievant may file a Step I grievance on the prescribed form within
five business days after the grievant attempted to resolve the issue with appropriate staff. Id. at ¶¶
Q and S. The Policy Directive provides the following directions for completing grievance forms:
The issues should be stated briefly but concisely. 	Information provided is to be
limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where,
why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being
grieved are to be included.
Id. at ¶ S (emphasis in original). The prisoner must send the Step I grievance to the appropriate
grievance coordinator. Id. at ¶ W. If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does
not receive a timely response, he must request the appropriate form and send it to the Step II
Grievance Coordinator. Id. at ¶ DD. Finally, if a prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step II response,
or does not receive a timely response, he must send a completed Step III grievance, using the
appropriate form, to the Grievance and Appeals Section. Id. at ¶ HH.
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3. 	Discussion
RN Villasan points out that when plaintiff filed this complaint1 , he had filed one
Step III grievance related to the allegations in this lawsuit, LCF-23-01-0131-27b (“131”). That
grievance involved an incident date of January 19, 2023, and was directed at the MDOC, Wellpath,
defendant NP S. Groff and RN Bowerman, with plaintiff stating:
This grievance is against the MDOC and its Medical Provider, Wellpath, and its
agents and employees, Nurse Practitioner (NP) S, Groff, and Registered Nurse
Bowerman, for forcing me to take a TB test under the threat of being confined to
segregation in violation of my religious beliefs and practices.
Grievance 131 (ECF No. 23-3, PageID.108). RN Villasan was mentioned later in the grievance
as a person who spoke to RN Bowerman (in plaintiff’s words):
FACTS: On 1-19-2023, I was seen in healthcare by NP Groff and advised her that
I couldn’t take a TB test because it contains animal byproducts. I am practicing
Buddhist and strict vegetarian. NP Groff indicted that she was going to place this
information in my medical chart, but failed to do so. I inform NP Groff that I was
on call at 17:20 on the same day at 17:20 for the shot. That is, on 1-19-2023, I was
again on callout to Healthcare and was seen by RN Bowerman, who advised me
that she was going to administer a TB test, When I advised her that NP Groff had
charted my sincerely held religious beliefs and practices in my medical file, RN
Bowerman checked and discovered that no information regarding my beliefs had
been charted by NP Groff. RN Bowerman had me sit out in the hallway, so she can
ask another RN about it. Which it was RN Villasan. 	RN Villasan stated to RN
Bowerman, if he (Townsend) never had any allerge reaction before, then he can
take the regular T.B. shot again. Than RN Bowerman threatened that if I refused
the TB test I would have to be placed in segregation. As a direct result of this threat,
I took the test.
I therefore contend that forcing me to take a TB test that contains animal
byproducts under threat of duress, in violation of my sincerely held religious
beliefs, violates my rights under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Michigan Constitution, and the Religious Freedom Restoration
1 Under the prison mailbox rule, a prisoner’s court papers are deemed filed at the time he “delivered it to the prison
authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). “Under this relaxed filing
standard, a pro se prisoner’s complaint is deemed filed when it is handed over to prison officials for mailing to the
court. Cases expand the understanding of this handing-over rule with an assumption that, absent contrary evidence, a
prisoner does so on the date he or she signed the complaint.” Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008)
(internal citations omitted). Under the prison mailbox rule, plaintiff’s complaint was filed on September 25, 2023
(when plaintiff signed and dated the complaint) (PageID.5).
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Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. Because there is clearly an alternative test that can be
conducted to determine if I have TB: an X-ray, that does not violate my religious
beliefs and practices. I further saith not.
Id. The grievance was “Rejected per PD 03.02.130 – Policy, Procedure & DOM’s are Non
Grievable” and referred plaintiff to PD 04.01.150 to address facility procedures. Id. The rejection
was upheld at Steps II and III. PageID.106-107.
In her motion, RN Villasan concedes that the rejection was improper (i.e.,
“Townsend was attempting to grieve the specific conduct of NP Groff (i.e., her negligence) and
RN Bowerman (i.e., her failure to accommodate and threats), and not the specific contents of
policy”). 	Defendant’s Brief (ECF No. 52, PageID.265). 	However, RN Villasan contends that
plaintiff did not exhaust any claims against her, because Grievance 131 was filed against
defendants NP Groff and RN Bowerman:
Although Townsend was aware of RN Villasan and described her actions at Step I,
he chose not to name he as a subject of the grievance but named only NP Groff and
RN Bowerman. It is thus apparent that Townsend wrote LCF-131 to contest the
conduct of only NP Groff and RN Bowerman.
Id.
“[W]here a prisoner names specific individuals at Step I of the grievance process,
prison officials would naturally assume that the prisoner complied with exhaustion requirements
for those named at Step I.” Hall v. Cole, No. 2:23-cv-28, 2024 WL 4884613 at *4 (Oct. 25, 2024),
R&R adopted, 2024 WL 4880598 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2024) (citing Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller,
603 F.3d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010) and Brown v. McCullick, No. 18-2226, 2019 WL 5436159 at *3
(6th Cir. April 23, 2019)). 	“Thus, when specific individuals are named at Step I, exhaustion is
limited to the named individuals.” Id. 	See also, Bickham v. Vanderschaegen, No. 2:22-cv-182,
2024 WL 3541545 at *5 (June 25, 2024), R&R adopted, 2024 WL 3540243 (W.D. Mich. July 25,
2024) (“By naming specific individuals, [the plaintiff prisoner] limited the exhaustion of the claims
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within his grievance to those individuals.”). As discussed, plaintiff explicitly directed Grievance
131 against the MDOC, Wellpath, NP Groff and RN Bowerman. Accordingly, plaintiff did not
exhaust a grievance against RN Villasan.
After the briefing was closed, plaintiff filed an “Addendum to Plaintiff’s Reply to
Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment on failure to exhaust” (ECF No. 60), in which he
contends that defendant’s motion is moot because in Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025),
“[t]he United States Supreme Court has ruled that the issue of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a matter for the jury under the Seventh Amendment.”
In Perttu, 605 U.S. 460 at 479, the Supreme Court held “that parties are entitled to
a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim protected
by the Seventh Amendment.” 	However, Perttu does not apply here. First, the factual issues of
exhaustion are not intertwined with the merits of plaintiff’s free-exercise claims and RLUIPA
claims. Second, plaintiff has not identified a genuine issue of material fact related to exhaustion
which a jury could decide at trial.
Based on this record, plaintiff did not properly exhaust a grievance to support his
claim against defendant RN Villasan. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93.
Accordingly, defendant Villasan’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.
IV. 	Recommendation
For these reasons, I respectfully recommend that defendant Rosemary Villasan’s
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 51) be GRANTED and that she be DISMISSED.
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Dated: December 8, 2025 	/s/ Ray Kent
RAY KENT
United States Magistrate Judge
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed with the Clerk
of the Court within fourteen (14) days after service of the report. All objections and responses to
objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to serve and file written objections
within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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