Gray v. Chrisman et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Nijyal Gray,
Plaintiff,
v.
Troy Crisman, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________/
Case No. 24-10857
Judith E. Levy
United States District Judge
Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti
OPINION AND ORDER SEVERING LEAD PLAINTIFF GRAY’S
CASE FROM THE REMAINING PLAINTIFFS, SUMMARILY
DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE THE COMPLAINT WITH
RESPECT TO THE REMAINING PLAINTIFFS, DENYING THE
MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION, AND SUMMARILY
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF GRAY’S COMPLAINT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE [1]
Nijyal Gray is a prisoner incarcerated at the Charles Egeler
Guidance and Reception Center Annex in Jackson, Michigan. (ECF No.
1.) Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Within the body of the complaint he has named thirty-five
additional prisoners whom he wishes to include as plaintiffs in a class
action lawsuit. (Id. at PageID.11–12.) One of those inmates, a person
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identified as Williams, Inmate # 701371, is also named as a co-Plaintiff.
(Id. at PageID.1, 4.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court severs lead Plaintiff
Nijyal Gray’s case from the remaining Plaintiffs. The complaint is
dismissed without prejudice with respect to the remaining Plaintiffs. The
Court denies Gray’s motion for class certification. Gray’s complaint is
dismissed without prejudice because the Defendants named by him
cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I. Factual Background
The complaint is difficult to understand. Plaintiff Gray alleges that
he and other inmates in the Michigan Department of Corrections have
been subjected to experiments conducted by Wayne State University
working with the Michigan Department of Corrections. (ECF No. 1,
PageID.7.) According to Plaintiff, these experiments involved exposing
inmates to the COVID-19 virus through testing and various forms of
contamination and cross-contamination. (Id. at PageID.7–8.) Plaintiff
claims that cotton swabs with the active COVID-19 virus were inserted
into the nostrils of unwitting inmates, often causing them to become
infected with the disease, and that Wayne State University paid
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$2,000.00 to the Michigan Department of Corrections for every inmate
who tested positive for COVID-19. (Id. at PageID.7–10.) Plaintiff Gray
claims he was forced to take the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine in April and
May of 2021, and that the shots affected his mental health. (Id. at
PageID.8.) Gray further alleges that the Michigan Department of
Corrections has not followed the proper protocol, outlined by the Center
for Disease Control, to prevent the transmission of the COVID-19 virus
in prison. (Id. at PageID.8–9.) He claims he became ill with the COVID-
19 virus and has been placed on breathing treatments. (Id. at PageID.9.)
Plaintiff Gray names Warden Troy Crisman, the Michigan
Department of Corrections, Wayne State University, the Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services, the State of Michigan, and
possibly the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections Heidi
Washington as Defendants. (Id. at PageID.2.) He seeks monetary
damages of $400,000,000.00 for himself and the other Plaintiffs. (Id. at
PageID.4, 12.)
II. Standard of Review
Plaintiff Gray proceeds without prepayment of fees. See 28 § U.S.C.
1915(a); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997);
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(ECF No. 6.) 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) states that the Court “shall dismiss
the case at any time if the court determines that[ ] the action or appeal[
] is frivolous or malicious; [ ] fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or [ ] seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.”
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Sua sponte dismissal is
appropriate if the complaint lacks an arguable basis when filed. McGore,
114 F.3d at 612.
While a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” the
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal footnote and citations
omitted). Stated differently, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
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that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights
plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law;
and (2) the offending conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by
federal law. Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). “If a plaintiff fails to make a
showing on any essential element of a § 1983 claim, it must fail.” Redding
v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001).
III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff Gray’s case is severed from the other
Plaintiffs’ cases. The complaint is dismissed without
prejudice regarding the non-lead Plaintiffs. The
motion for class certification is denied.
The Court severs lead Plaintiff Nijyal Gray’s case from the
remaining Plaintiffs’ cases and dismisses the complaint without
prejudice regarding the remaining Plaintiffs for several reasons.
First, the non-lead Plaintiffs did not file individual applications to
proceed in forma pauperis, nor did any of them pay any portion of the
$350.00 filing fee or the $55.00 administrative fee.
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The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) states, “if a
prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the
prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). Although the PLRA does not specify how fees are to be
assessed when multiple prisoners file a joint complaint, the Sixth Circuit
suggested in an Administrative Order that fees and costs should be
divided equally in such cases between the plaintiffs. In Re Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1137–38 (6th Cir. 1997).1
1 Courts in the Eastern District of Michigan have relied on the Sixth Circuit’s
Administrative Order, In Re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, for the rule
that the filing fee should be apportioned between multiple prisoner plaintiffs. See,
e.g., Williams v. Lafler, No. 08-13821, 2009 WL 87004, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 12,
2009); Coleman v. Granholm, No. 06-12485, 2007 WL 1011662, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
29, 2007). However, other district courts within the Sixth Circuit have concluded that
In Re Prison Litigation Reform Act “did not consider the impact of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20
on implementation of the PLRA [or that] [i]mplementation of the PLRA was designed
to make prisoners feel the deterrent effect of the filing fee,” and, as such, each plaintiff
should be “individually responsible for a full filing fee.” Jones v. Fletcher, No.
A.05CV07-JMH, 2005 WL 1175960, at *6 (E.D. Ky. May 5, 2005); see also Lawson v.
Sizemore, No. A.05-CV-108-KKC, 2005 WL 1514310, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Ky. June 24,
2005).
Other circuits have held that each prisoner in a multiple-plaintiff action is
required to pay the entire filing fee, rather than have the fee apportioned among the
different plaintiffs. See, e.g. Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 155–56 (3rd Cir. 2009);
Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2004); Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d
1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2001).
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Under the PLRA, a prisoner may bring a civil action in forma
pauperis if they file an affidavit of indigency and a certified copy of the
trust fund account statement for the six-month period immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). If the
prisoner does not pay the full filing fee and fails to provide the required
documents, the district court generally must notify them of the deficiency
and grant them thirty days to correct it or pay the full fee. See McGore,
114 F.3d at 605. If the prisoner does not comply, “the district court must
presume that the prisoner is not a pauper, [ ] assess the inmate the full
fee . . . [and] order the case dismissed for want of prosecution.” Id. Here,
none of the Plaintiffs other than Gray filed an application to proceed in
forma pauperis or the required supporting documentation.
An additional problem with the complaint is that it has only been
signed by a little over half of the thirty-six Plaintiffs. (See ECF No. 1,
PageID.11–12.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) states, “[e]very
pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney’s name—or by a party personally if the
party is unrepresented.” Rule 11 further indicates that “the court must
strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after
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being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.” Id. Moreover, a
prisoner cannot sign a pleading on behalf of another prisoner in a legal
proceeding in federal court. See Rubinstein v. United States, No. 23-
12685, 2024 WL 37931, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2024).
Finally, there are “pervasive impracticalities associated with
multiple-plaintiff prisoner litigation, which militates against permissive
joinder even if it were otherwise allowed by [Federal] Rule [of Civil
Procedure] 20(a).” Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 780 (E.D.
Mich. 2009) (Borman, J.) (adopting magistrate judge’s report) (citing
Boretsky v. Corzine, No. 08-2265, 2008 WL 2512916, at *5 (D.N.J. June
23, 2008)). Several of the problems that arise from multiple plaintiff
prisoner litigation include the “need for each plaintiff to sign every
pleading, and the consequent possibilities that documents may be
changed as they are circulated, or that prisoners may seek to compel
prison authorities to permit them to gather to discuss the joint litigation.”
Id. (quoting Boretsky, 2008 WL 2512916, at *5). Allowing multiple
prisoner-plaintiffs to proceed in a single action “invites violations of Rule
11(a), which requires every pleading to be signed by all pro se plaintiffs.”
Id. (citing Ghashiyah v. Frank, No. 05-C-0766, 2008 WL 680203, at *1
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(E.D. Wis. March 10, 2008)). Multiple plaintiff-prisoner cases like these
can also often lead to pleadings being filed on behalf of other plaintiffs
without their consent. Id. An additional problem with multi-plaintiff
litigation in the prison context is that “jail populations are notably
transitory, making joint litigation difficult.” Id. (quoting Boretsky, 2008
WL 2512916, at *5).
Misjoinder of parties is not normally a basis to dismiss an action in
its entirety, although misjoined parties can be dismissed from the action
by the Court. Id. at 781. The Court concludes that the best option is to
sever Mr. Gray’s case from the other Plaintiffs’ cases. The Court
dismisses the other thirty-five Plaintiffs from the case without prejudice,
which would permit each Plaintiff to file their own separate complaint.
One additional problem with the complaint is that it appears that
Plaintiff Gray seeks to represent the other Plaintiffs as part of a class
action suit. The Court will deny this request by Gray or other Plaintiffs
because they are self-represented and the Court has concerns that they
are not able to adequately protect the interests of the class as required
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and for the reasons set forth below
in the next section of this opinion. See Heard v. Caruso, 351 F. App’x 1,
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15 (6th Cir. 2009). In short, the Court denies the motion for class
certification.
B. Plaintiff Gray’s complaint is dismissed
i. State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of
Corrections, Wayne State University, and the Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services are immune
from suit.
Plaintiff’s lawsuit against the State of Michigan, the Michigan
Department of Corrections, Wayne State University, and the Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services must be dismissed because
neither a state nor its agencies is a “person” within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). In addition, the Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against a
state unless the state has waived its immunity or unless Congress has
exercised its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override
that immunity. Id. at 66.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would support a
finding that the State of Michigan waived its immunity to his lawsuit,
and § 1983 “does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Boler v.
Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017). Therefore, any lawsuit against
the State of Michigan is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
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The complaint must be dismissed against the Michigan
Department of Corrections because it is also not a “person” subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a suit against the Michigan Department of
Corrections, as a state agency, is akin to a suit against the state itself.
Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s action against the
Michigan Department of Corrections. Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d
768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013).
Wayne State University as a public university is an arm of the state
and, as such, is also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See
Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2015).
Lastly, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services
also is immune from suit because it is a state agency. See Kanuszewski v.
Mich. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 927 F.3d 396, 416–17 (6th
Cir. 2019).
ii. Defendants Washington and Crisman
Plaintiff names Warden Crisman as a Defendant. Although unclear
from the first page of the complaint, Plaintiff also appears to sue Heidi
Washington, the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
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A supervisory official like Washington or Crisman cannot be held
liable under § 1983 for the misconduct of officials that the person
supervises unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that “the supervisor
encouraged the specific instance of misconduct or in some other way
directly participated in it.” Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 558 (6th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)).
A plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that the supervisory official “at
least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Id. (quoting Hays v.
Jefferson Cnty., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)). “Supervisory liability
under § 1983 cannot be based upon a mere failure to act but must be
based upon active unconstitutional behavior.” Id. (citing to Bass v.
Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)).
The complaint must be dismissed against Defendants Washington
and Crisman because Plaintiff Gray failed to allege any personal
involvement on the part of either Defendant with the alleged
unconstitutional deprivation. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–
76 (6th Cir. 2008).
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V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Niyjal Gray’s case is
severed from the other thirty-five Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint
is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE regarding the remaining
Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Gray’s motion for class certification is DENIED. The
complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Plaintiff Gray
for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 20, 2025 	s/Judith E. Levy
Ann Arbor, Michigan 	JUDITH E. LEVY
United States District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s
ECF System to their respective email or first-class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on October 20, 2025.
s/William Barkholz
WILLIAM BARKHOLZ
Case Manager
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