Williams v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. et al

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Case 2:24-cv-12908-MFL-KGA ECF No. 45, PageID .< pageID> Filed 10/22/25 Page 1 of 26
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
LINDA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 24-cv-12908 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman
V. EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION (ECF No. 23); (2) STAYING CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC .; AND (3) TERMINATING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A STAY OF DISCOVERY AS MOOT (ECF No. 24)
In this action, Plaintiff Linda Williams alleges, among other things, that Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian") violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (the "FCRA"), by reporting inaccurate information on her credit report. Now before the Court is Experian's motion to compel Williams to arbitrate the claims she has asserted against Experian and to stay the action as to those claims pending the completion of arbitration. (See Mot., ECF No. 23.) For the reasons explained below, Experian's motion is GRANTED.
1
AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

2
Experian has also filed a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the
motion to compel arbitration. (See Mot. to Stay Discovery, ECF No. 24.) 	That
motion is TERMINATED AS MOOT in light of the Court’s ruling on the motion
to compel arbitration and stay of the action as to the claims against Experian.
I
A
Williams is a resident of Oak Park, Michigan. (See Compl. at ¶ 38, ECF No.
1, PageID.12.) In March 2024, the Michigan Department of Treasury notified her
that her 2023 income tax refund of $721.00 was being withheld due to a debt she
purportedly owed to Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc. (“Midland”).
(See id. at ¶¶ 79-80, PageID.20.) 	Prior to receiving that notice, Williams was
“completely unaware” of any accounts or debts with Midland. (Id. at ¶ 82.)
Accordingly, she began investigating how the debt came to be associated with her.
(See id. at ¶¶ 84-87, PageID.20-21.) 	After receiving little clarity from Midland,
Williams “then called Identity Force, an identity protection service she had signed
up for, and talked to a representative who reviewed her Trans Union credit report
with her.” (Id. at ¶ 88, PageID.21.) The representative “informed [Williams] that
the Midland Account was appearing on her Trans Union credit report” and
“instructed [her] to review her Equifax and Experian credit reports to see if the
Midland account was appearing on them as well.” (Id. at ¶ 89-90.)
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Williams then requested and “viewed a copy of her credit file from
Experian.” (Id. at ¶ 102, PageID.24.) Williams “was dismayed by the appearance
of several pieces of information that did not belong to [her] at all.” (Id. at ¶ 104.)
For instance, the file reflected ten accounts and two addresses that “do not belong
to [Williams],” a name she “has never utilized,” a birth year that “is not the year in
which [she] was born,” a past employer for whom she “has never worked,” and four
account inquiries “relating to entities with whom [she] does not have an account
relationship.” (Id. at ¶¶ 105-111, PageID.24-27.)
Believing that Experian had mixed her credit file with “an unrelated
consumer[’s],” Williams called Experian to dispute the contents of her credit report
and to request that Experian investigate and correct the credit report. (Id. at ¶¶ 114-
118, PageID.27-28.) 	“Sometime before July 22, 2024, Experian removed all the
accounts [Williams] disputed,” as well as the “inaccurate name, addresses, and [one
credit] inquiry.” (Id. at ¶ 120-121, PageID.28.) But “Experian did not remove” the
other three disputed inquiries. (Id. at ¶ 122.)
Williams alleges that Experian’s erroneous credit file “made it difficult for
[her] to obtain credit.” (Id. at ¶ 251, PageID.45.) She states that from February 19,
2023, to May 15, 2024, she was denied one line of credit due to a creditor’s reliance
on Experian’s faulty report and “was approved less favorable terms” for at least
three other lines of credit. (Id., PageID.33-45.) 	She further claims that she has
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experienced “emotional distress including the mental and emotional pain, anguish,
humiliation, and embarrassment of credit denials,” that Experian’s “conduct caused
[her] to be financial[ly] insecure” and “afraid to utilize her credit,” and that
Experian’s handling of her credit report caused her to be “concerned that her
identity was stolen and her privacy invaded.” (Id. at ¶¶ 257, 261-265, PageID.46-
48.)
B
On November 1, 2024, Williams filed this action against Experian, Midland,
and Trans Union, LLC. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) Williams’ Complaint
alleges: (1) violations of the FCRA by all three Defendants; and (2) violations of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., by Midland. (See
id., PageID.1-2.) All three Defendants filed Answers, and the Court later entered a
stipulated order dismissing Williams’ FCRA claim against Trans Union, LLC. (See
Order, ECF No. 38.)
On February 7, 2025, Experian filed a motion to compel arbitration under
Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (the “FAA”), and to stay
the proceedings against it under Section 3 of the FAA until the arbitration was
completed. (See Mot., ECF No. 23, PageID.323.) Experian contends that Williams
is obligated to arbitrate her claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement that
Williams executed when she signed up for an online Experian account and, as part
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of that process, enrolled in a service called “CreditWorks” (the name of Experian’s
credit monitoring service). More specifically, Experian says that “when [Williams]
enrolled in CreditWorks, she [] agreed to the Terms of Use Agreement governing
that service.” (Id., PageID.338.) 	And Experian highlights that the Terms of Use
Agreement included an agreement to arbitrate all claims against Experian, including
claims under the FCRA.1 (See Terms of Use Agmt., ECF No. 23-4, PageID.376-
383.)
In support of its motion, Experian provided an affidavit from Dan Smith, the
Director of Product Operations for ConsumerInfo.com, an Experian affiliate also
known as Experian Consumer Services (the “Smith Declaration”). (See Smith Decl.
at ¶ 1, ECF No. 23-1, PageID.354.) In his affidavit, Smith described his duties in
that role as follows:
These duties require that I be familiar with, among other
things, how consumers enroll [in Creditworks], the forms
they must complete to enroll, as well as the Terms of Use
governing such services. My duties also require that I am
familiar with [Experian Consumer Service’s] electronic
databases that store consumer enrollment information,
including 	the 	webpages 	a 	consumer 	would 	have
encountered 	to 	complete 	their 	enrollment 	into
CreditWorks, 	the 	personally 	identifiable 	information
entered when enrolling, which buttons the consumer
would have clicked on in the enrollment process, and date
1 The arbitration agreement also specifically applies to disputes with “affiliates” of
Experian Consumer Services, including the named Defendant here, Experian
Information Solutions, Inc. (See Mot., ECF No. 23, PageID.338-339.)
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and time of the consumer’s acceptance of the Terms of
Use.
(Id., PageID.354-355.)
Smith declared that he had reviewed Experian’s “membership enrollment
data” and determined that Williams “enrolled in CreditWorks” on July 2, 2024. (Id.
at ¶ 3, PageID.356.) 	Smith then attested that he was familiar with the CreditWorks
enrollment process. (See id. at ¶ 1, PageID.354.) 	He outlined that process and
explained that Williams could not have completed it without agreeing to Experian’s
Terms of Use, including the arbitration provision therein. (See id. at ¶¶ 3-5,
PageID.356-357.)
Smith explained that “[i]n order to successfully enroll [in CreditWorks],”
Williams “had to complete a single webform.” (Id. at ¶ 3, PageID.356.) 	That
webform, which Smith attached to his declaration, looked like this:
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(Id., PageID.362.) 	As the text in the box at the upper right corner of the form
indicates, a person completing the form agreed to receive Experian’s “Credit
Monitoring” services – i.e., the suite of services that is “called CreditWorks.”
Oatway v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-00523, 2024 WL 4879822, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2024).
Smith highlighted that the form disclosed, in bold text, that “[b]y clicking
‘Create Your Account’: I accept and agree to your Terms of Use Agreement, as well
as acknowledge receipt of your Privacy Policy.” (Smith Decl. at ¶ 3, ECF No. 23-
1, PageID.356.) 	Smith further noted that the words “Terms of Use Agreement”
were offset in “bold blue text,” and he explained that Williams could have
“view[ed] the entire text of the Terms of Use Agreement” by clicking on that blue
text (which was a hyperlink to the Terms of Use Agreement). (Id. 	at ¶ 4,
PageID.356-357.) He then explained that the Terms of Use Agreement “contain[s]
an Arbitration Agreement, which requires” a CreditWorks member to arbitrate all
claims that “relate to” or “arise out of” the member’s enrollment in CreditWorks.
(Id. at ¶ 6, PageID.357; see also Terms of Use Agmt., ECF No. 23-4, PageID.376-
383.) Finally, Smith noted that Williams “had to click the ‘Create Your Account’
button on the webform in order to enroll [in CreditWorks].” (Smith Decl. at ¶ 3,
ECF No. 23-1, PageID.356.) Indeed, he said that Williams “would not have been
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able to successfully enroll in CreditWorks unless she clicked that button.” (Id. at ¶
5, PageID.357.)
Simply put, Smith explained that Williams could not have enrolled in
CreditWorks without agreeing to the arbitration agreement contained in the Terms
of Use Agreement. Based upon Smith’s declaration, Experian argues that Williams
must arbitrate her claim against Experian because she (1) “had clear notice of the
Terms of Use [Agreement and the arbitration provision included in that agreement]
at the time she enrolled” in CreditWorks; (2) “was admonished that, by clicking an
adjacent button, she was agreeing to be bound by the Terms of Use [Agreement];”
and (3) “clicked the button, thereby manifesting her assent to the Terms of Use
[Agreement].” (Mot., ECF No. 23, PageID.344-345.)2
In response to Experian’s motion, Williams admits that she “signed up for an
online Experian account.” (Williams Decl. at ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2, PageID.538.) But
she nonetheless contends that she should not be compelled to arbitrate her claims
against Experian for several reasons. First, she argues that Experian has failed to
show that she agreed to the arbitration provision in the Terms of Use Agreement
2 Experian also argues that it may properly enforce the arbitration agreement as a
party or third-party beneficiary, and that an arbitrator should decide the scope and
enforceability of the arbitration agreement. (See Mot., ECF No. 23, PageID.345-
350.) Williams does not dispute these issues in her response. (See generally Resp.
to Mot., ECF No. 25, PageID.514-531.) 	Therefore, the Court addresses the only
disputed issue: the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.
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because the Smith Declaration – which Experian uses to show how she accepted
that agreement – is inadmissible due to Smith’s lack of personal knowledge. (See
Resp. to Mot., ECF No. 25, PageID.514-526.) 	Second, she asserts that even if
Smith’s declaration is admissible, there is still a question of fact as to whether a
valid arbitration agreement exists because she does not recall signing up for
CreditWorks or clicking anything giving her assent to arbitration. (See Williams
Decl. at ¶¶ 2-5, ECF No. 25-2, PageID.537-538.) 	Finally, she contends the
arbitration agreement Experian seeks to enforce is not supported by “mutual
assent,” as required “under the laws of Michigan.” (Resp. to Mot., ECF No. 25,
PageID.527.)
For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Experian has met
its burden to demonstrate the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate and has
shown mutual assent to that agreement.
II
The FAA provides that “[a] written agreement to arbitrate disputes arising
out of a transaction in interstate commerce ‘shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.’” 	Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir.
2003) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). This language “[m]anifest[s] a liberal federal policy
favoring 	arbitration 	agreements.” Id. (internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation
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omitted). Indeed, the FAA “was designed to override judicial reluctance to enforce
arbitration agreements, to relieve court congestion, and to provide parties with a
speedier and less costly alternative to litigation.” Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d
709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000).
“Section 4 of the FAA [(9 U.S.C. § 4)] sets forth the procedure to be followed
by [a] district court when presented with a petition to compel arbitration.” Great
Earth Cos., Inc. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 888 (6th Cir. 2002). 	That section
provides, in relevant part, that:
[a] party aggrieved by the . . . refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may
petition any United States district court . . . for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in such agreement. . . . The court shall hear
the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order
directing 	the 	parties 	to 	proceed 	to 	arbitration 	in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. . . . If the
making of the arbitration agreement . . . be in issue, the
court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
9 U.S.C. § 4.
Where, as in this case, the parties seeking and opposing arbitration ask the
Court to consider “documents beyond the [C]omplaint,” the Court must resolve the
motion to compel arbitration under “the framework of Rule 56.” Memmer v. United
Wholesale Mortg., LLC, 135 F.4th 398, 404 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Boykin v. Fam.
Dollar Stores of Mich., LLC, 3 F.4th 832, 838 (6th Cir. 2021)). 	“Under this
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framework, [the party seeking to compel arbitration] bears the initial burden to
produce evidence sufficient to allow a trier of fact to conclude that the parties
entered a contract to arbitrate.” Id. “If [the party moving for arbitration] does that,
the burden shifts to [the party opposing arbitration] to place the validity of the
agreement at issue.” Id. 	In order to carry that burden, “the party opposing
arbitration must show a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the
agreement to arbitrate.” Great Earth Cos., 288 F.3d at 889 (citation omitted). “If
[this Court] is satisfied that the agreement to arbitrate is not ‘in issue,’ it must
compel arbitration.” Id. However, “[i]f the validity of the agreement to arbitrate is
‘in issue,’ the [C]ourt must proceed to a trial to resolve the question.” Id.
“Because arbitration agreements 	are 	fundamentally 	contracts, 	[courts]
review 	the 	enforceability 	of 	an arbitration agreement 	according 	to 	the
applicable state law of 	contract 	formation” 	– 	in 	this 	case, 	the 	law 	of
Michigan. Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., LLC, 656 F.3d 411, 416
(6th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). The Sixth Circuit has summarized the relevant
Michigan contract law as follows:
Under 	Michigan 	law, 	“Before 	a 	contract 	can 	be
completed, there must be an offer and acceptance.”
Pakideh v. Franklin Commercial Mortg. Grp., Inc., 213
Mich.App. 636, 540 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1995); see also
Kamalnath v. Mercy Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 194 Mich.App.
543, 487 N.W.2d 499, 503 (1992) (“A contract is made
when both parties have executed or accepted it, and not
before.”). “An offer is defined as the manifestation of
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willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify
another person in understanding that his assent to that
bargain 	is 	invited 	and 	will 	conclude 	it.” 	Kloian 	v.
Domino's Pizza L.L. C., 273 Mich.App. 449, 733 N.W.2d
766, 	770 	(2006) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted).
Similarly, “an acceptance sufficient to create a contract
arises where the individual to whom an offer is extended
manifests an intent to be bound by the offer, and all legal
consequences flowing from the offer, through voluntarily
undertaking some unequivocal act sufficient for that
purpose.” Id. at 771 (quotation marks omitted; alteration
removed).
Beyond these requirements, the elements of a valid
contract 	in 	Michigan 	are: 	“(1) 	parties 	competent 	to
contract, 	(2) 	a 	proper 	subject 	matter, 	(3) 	a 	legal
consideration, 	(4) 	mutuality 	of 	agreement, 	and 	(5)
mutuality of obligation.” 	Hess v. Cannon Twp., 	265
Mich.App. 582, 696 N.W.2d 742, 748 (2005) (quotation
marks 	omitted). 	Whether 	the 	parties 	have 	mutually
agreed to be bound “is judged by an objective standard,
looking to the express words of the parties and their
visible acts, not their subjective states of mind.” Kloian,
733 N.W.2d at 771 (quotation marks omitted); see also
Breitenbeck v. Merillat Indus., L.L.C., No. 258135, 2006
WL 	859421, 	at 	*2 	(Mich.Ct.App. 	Apr. 	4, 	2006)
(unpublished opinion) (stating that Michigan courts look
to whether the parties “manifested an intent to be bound
by [a contract's] terms”). The party seeking to enforce a
contract 	has 	the 	burden 	of 	showing 	that 	it 	exists.
Kamalnath, 487 N.W.2d at 504 (quoting Hammel v. Foor,
359 Mich. 392, 102 N.W.2d 196, 200 (1960)).
Id. at 417.
III
Experian has presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
parties entered into a binding agreement to arbitrate, and Williams has failed to call
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that evidence into question and/or to present sufficient countervailing evidence to
create a material dispute of fact as to whether she agreed to arbitrate. 	The Court
will therefore compel the parties to arbitrate Williams’ claims.
A
Experian has carried its “initial burden to produce evidence sufficient to
allow a trier of fact to conclude that the parties entered a contract to arbitrate.”
Memmer, 135 F.4th at 404. That evidence is found in the Smith Declaration. As
set forth above, Smith explained that (1) Experian’s membership enrollment data
reflects that Williams signed up for CreditWorks on July 2, 2024, and (2) she could
not have done so without agreeing to Experian’s Terms of Use, including the
agreement to arbitrate contained therein. 	As numerous courts across the country
have concluded, that evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the parties
entered into a binding arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Acorin v. Experian Info.
Sols., Inc., No. 24-cv-00036, 2024 WL 5011950, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2024)
(holding that a declaration much like Smith’s warranted a finding that the plaintiff
had agreed to arbitrate claims against Experian); Oatway, 2024 WL 4879822, at *4-
5 (same); George v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., No. 23-cv-02303, 2024 WL 3013146,
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at *7-8 (D. Md. June 14, 2024) (same); Hanson v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., No.
1:23-CV-4564, 2024 WL 2974160, at *4-11 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2024) (same).3
Williams resists that conclusion. She contends that the Smith Declaration is
not sufficient to satisfy Experian’s burden because it is “inadmissible.” (Resp. to
Mot., ECF No. 25, PageID.514.) More specifically, she says that the Court may not
consider the Smith Declaration because Smith lacks “personal knowledge” as to
what 	Williams 	actually 	“accessed, 	saw, 	or 	clicked 	on 	July 	2, 	2024.” 	(Id.,
PageID.518-519.) 	Williams insists that Smith could not possibly have first-hand
knowledge of what she did during the enrollment process because he “was not
present when [she] allegedly agreed to the terms and conditions with which
Experian seeks to bind [her].” (Id., PageID.520.) Williams further faults Smith for
not specifically identifying in his declaration the documents that he reviewed and
relied upon. (See id., PageID.518.)
As support for her position, Williams cites three out-of-circuit district court
decisions in which courts have adopted her view that a declaration much like the
Smith Declaration is insufficient to establish an agreement to arbitrate: Austin v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 3:22cv707, 2023 WL 8646275 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14,
2023); Newton v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. CV 623-059, 2024 WL 3451895
3 Experian cites myriad other cases in which courts have reached the same
conclusion. (See Mot., ECF No. 23, PageID.335-338.)
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(S.D. Ga. July 18, 2024); Lamonaco v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 6:23-cv-1326,
2024 WL 1703112 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2024). However, after Williams filed her
response to Experian’s motion, all three of these decisions were reversed. See Austin
v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 184 F.4th 194 (4th Cir. 2025); Newton v. Experian Info
Sols., Inc., No. 24-12398, 2025 WL 2102084 (11th Cir. July 28, 2025); Lamonaco
v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 141 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2025).
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Austin explains why Williams’ attack on the
Smith Declaration (which essentially mirrors the declaration in Austin) falls short
and why such a declaration is sufficient to establish an agreement to arbitrate:
Second, we disagree that Williams failed to demonstrate
personal 	knowledge. 	The 	information 	Experian 	was
required to demonstrate (and for which it submitted
Williams’s declaration) was the existence of a binding
contract to submit disputes to arbitration. To do so, it
needed to show that Austin agreed to the terms of use, i.e.,
that he enrolled in CreditWorks, and the content of those
terms of use when he did so. So, the Williams testimony
was in turn offered to confirm that Austin had indeed
enrolled and the appearance of the website.
Williams averred 	that 	in his 	role of “VP, Business
Governance” 	of 	ECS 	— 	the 	Experian 	affiliate 	that
operates CreditWorks — he is familiar with “marketing,
advertising and sales of [ECS] consumer credit products,
including 	services 	that 	consumer 	enroll 	[sic] 	in 	at
Experian websites, as well as the Terms of Use governing
such services.” J.A. 120. Williams has been employed by
ECS since 2001. He explained he had gained the personal
knowledge asserted in his declaration through his day-to-
day 	work 	responsibilities, 	and 	from 	the 	“review 	of
pertinent documents maintained as business records by
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[ECS] in the course and scope of” its business. 	Id.
Williams then, in further detail, describes the appearance
of the CreditWorks enrollment page, what a user does on
that page — such as entering their personal information
and links that they click. He also averred that Austin had
enrolled in CreditWorks on May 3, 2020.
On this record, Williams has “properly demonstrated his
own knowledge.” Melo v. Zumper, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 3d
683, 694 (E.D. Va. 2020). Our read of the district court's
order suggests that it would have required Williams to
demonstrate 	that 	he 	possessed 	a 	more 	technical
understanding of the software used by the company to
record customer information. But Williams’s declaration
“does 	not 	include discussion 	of 	any 	hyper-technical
aspects or functions” of the CreditWorks enrollment page
“that would require significant technical expertise not
normally possessed” by a Business Governance officer.
Id. And perhaps our reasoning would differ if that were
the case. It would be a stretch in logic to conclude that
Williams has demonstrated personal knowledge of, say,
the contents of computer code developed to support the
ECS website. But instead here, the operative finding is
whether and when Austin enrolled in CreditWorks, and if
so, what terms of use, if any, did he agree to. And nothing
in the record before us suggests that Wil[l]iams, VP of
Business Governance at ECS, lacked personal knowledge
of whether someone signed up for a free product offered
by the company, the date that they did so, and the terms
of use in effect at that time. See Fed. R. Evid. 602
(“Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of
the witness’s own testimony.”).
Finally, our observations above are underlined by a
presumption 	we 	have 	recognized 	that 	“ordinarily,
officers would have personal knowledge of the acts of
their corporations.” Catawba, 978 F.2d at 1342 (emphasis
added). In 	Bryant, we declined to exclude affidavits
where 	they 	contained 	“sufficient 	information” 	to
establish personal knowledge in the absence of evidence
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that the affiant was not competent to testify. See 288 F.3d
at 135 n.9. And we have also noted the same regarding
the president of a small business for 30 years with respect
to billing practices of that business. See In re Apex, 190
F.3d at 635.
Here, 	a 	corporate 	officer 	overseeing 	Business
Governance — which, based upon evidence in opposition
submitted by Austin includes responsibility for “risk and
regulatory management” as well as those duties described
by Williams himself — would presumably be competent
to 	testify 	regarding 	the 	registration 	of 	a 	user 	on 	a
particular date and the terms of use in force at the time.
J.A. 533. And against Williams's assertions of his own
personal knowledge in his sworn statement, Austin does
not offer evidence that shows he lacked that knowledge
or was required to possess “hyper-technical” information
regarding the enrollment process. Melo, 439 F. Supp. 3d
at 694. So although some showing of personal knowledge
must be made in the admission of any testimony, “the
proponent's burden is a minimal one.” 1 McCormick on
Evid. § 10 (9th ed. 2025). In light of the straightforward
factual showings Experian sought to make through the
Williams declaration and the contents of the Williams
declaration, we conclude that burden was met here.
Austin, 148 F.4th at 204–05 (4th Cir. 2025).
The Eleventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in Lamonaco, 141 F.4th
at 1348. That court rejected an attack like that brought by Williams here against a
declaration much like the Smith Declaration. It concluded that the “declaration and
supporting exhibits [i.e., the Terms of Use Agreement] made it ‘more likely than
not’ that [the plaintiff] agreed to the Terms of Use [Agreement],” which included
an agreement to arbitrate. Id.
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In sum, the overwhelming weight of authority holds that a declaration like
the Smith Declaration is sufficient to establish the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate. 	Williams has not cited any still-viable authority to the contrary. 	The
Court finds the clear majority approach to be persuasive and follows it here.
Consistent with that approach, the Court concludes that Experian satisfied its initial
burden to establish the existence of an agreement to arbitrate when it submitted the
Smith Declaration.
B
Williams has failed to present sufficient opposing evidence to create a factual
dispute as to whether she agreed to arbitrate her claims against Experian. 	She
presents her own declaration, but her sworn statements therein fall short. 	In her
declaration, Williams does not categorically deny that she enrolled in CreditWorks
and agreed to the Terms of Use Agreement containing the arbitration provision.
Instead, she says that she “do[es] not recall signing up for an account with
CreditWorks” and that “to the best of her knowledge,” she “ha[s] not ever
personally signed up for any account with CreditWorks.” (Williams Decl., ECF No.
25-2, PageID.537.) 	These statements are insufficient to create a factual dispute
because they are not “unequivocal denial[s]” that she signed up for CreditWorks
and assented to the Terms of Use Agreement. Boykin v. Fam. Dollar Stores of
Mich., LLC, 3 F.4th 832, 840 (6th Cir. 2021) (identifying the type of denial that is
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sufficient to create a factual dispute as to whether a party agreed to arbitrate its
claims).4 Moreover, 	irrespective 	of 	whether 	Williams 	recalls 	enrolling 	in
CreditWorks specifically, she admits that she signed up for an Experian account
(see Williams Decl. at ¶ 3, ECF No. 25-2, PageID.538), and, as further explained
above, she could not have done so without clicking the “Create My Account” tab
and thereby accepting the Terms of Use Agreement – including, of course, the
arbitration provision. 	On this record, there is simply no factual dispute as to
whether Williams agreed to arbitrate her claims – she did.
Williams counters that her statements in her declaration are sufficient to
create material factual dispute as to whether she assented to the arbitration provision
in the Terms of Use Agreement. 	In support, Williams relies on the unpublished
decision in Tu v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 24-cv-1221, 2025 WL 1134612
(S.D. Cal., April 16, 2025) (denying Experian’s motion to compel arbitration on the
basis that there was a factual dispute as to whether the plaintiff agreed to arbitrate).5
4 See also Memmer, 135 F.4th at 405 (explaining that a party’s sworn statement that
she “do[es] not recall signing” an agreement containing an arbitration provision is
insufficient to create a factual dispute as to whether the party entered into the
agreement); Gavette v. United Wholesale Mortg., LLC, No. 24-1557, 2025 WL
318224, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025) (holding that a party’s sworn statement that
he “does not remember signing an arbitration clause” was insufficient to create a
factual dispute as to the existence of the agreement); Tucker v. United Wholesale
Mortg., Inc., No. 24-1595, 2025 WL 1082316, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) (same).
5 While the court in Tu found a factual dispute as to whether the plaintiff agreed to
arbitrate, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that a declaration from Dan Smith
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But there is a critical difference between the declaration deemed sufficient to create
a factual dispute in Tu and Williams’ declaration here. 	In the Tu declaration, the
plaintiff contended that, to the best of her knowledge, she had never signed up for
CreditWorks or for an Experian account. See Tu, 2025 WL 1134612, at *7
(“Plaintiff 	also 	states: 	‘I 	do 	not 	recall 	signing 	up 	for 	an 	account 	with
Experian.com.’”) She claimed that she had merely requested a copy of her credit
report. See id. The court ultimately concluded that compelling arbitration would be
premature because “Plaintiff disputes the creation of the underlying account with
Experian and CreditWorks.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 	Here, in sharp contrast,
Williams admits that she created an Experian account – something she could not
have done without agreeing to the arbitration provision in the Terms of Use
Agreement. The decision in Tu thus does not support Williams’ contention that the
Court should deny Experian’s motion to compel arbitration.
C
Finally, Williams argues that even if the Smith Declaration is admissible and
even if that declaration establishes the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the
agreement is unenforceable “under the laws of Michigan” due to a lack of “mutual
assent.” (Resp. to Mot., ECF No. 25, PageID.527.) The Court disagrees.
– that mirrored the Smith Declaration in this case – was inadmissible for lack of
personal knowledge. See Tu, 2025 WL 1134612, at *4–7.
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Williams argues that she could not have validly assented to the Terms of Use
Agreement – including the arbitration provision therein – because the contracting
process Experian utilized is misleading as to the scope of the agreement that is being
formed. 	She says that Experian uses a hybrid “clickwrap” and “browsewrap”
agreement that confuses consumers in the same manner as the agreement that the
Seventh Circuit held unenforceable in Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp, 817 F.3d 1029
(7th Cir. 2016). (See Resp. to Mot., ECF No. 25, PageID.526-531.) 	But the
agreement in Sgouros was materially different from the agreement that Williams
entered into with Experian.
Sgouros involved an arbitration agreement with Trans Union – another credit
reporting entity – that was “buried” in a “small scroll box” that appeared during the
second step of a three-step online sign-up process. See Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1032–
33. Further down the page from the scroll box, users had to click a button that said
“I Accept & Continue to Step 3,” but the text immediately preceding that button did
not “require [users] to first click on the scroll box or to scroll down to view its
complete contents, nor did it in any other way call [their] attention to any arbitration
agreement.” Id. at 1033. Instead, “[t]he block of bold text below the scroll box told
the user that clicking on the box constituted his authorization for TransUnion to
obtain his personal information.” Id. at 1035. The Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois
contract law, held that Trans Union’s sign-up process did not establish mutual
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assent. 	The court noted that Trans Union’s process “actively misleads the
customer” because the block of text below the scroll box “says nothing about
contractual terms.” Id. 	For support, the court cited with approval cases in which
other courts had upheld hyperlinked agreements that were accompanied by “a clear
prompt directing the user to read” their terms. Id. (collecting cases).
Here, unlike the agreement hidden in the scroll box in Sgouros, Experian’s
enrollment process conspicuously presented the Terms of Use Agreement to
Williams in a bolded, blue hyperlink, and notified Williams in the text above the
“Create Your Account” button that she was assenting to the Terms of Use
Agreement by clicking that button. And when Williams signed up for her Experian
account, she received the following disclosure in bolded text immediately above the
“Create Your Account” button: “By clicking ‘Create Your Account’: I accept and
agree to your Terms of Use Agreement, as well as acknowledge receipt of your
Privacy Policy.” (See Smith Decl., ECF No. 23-1, PageID.356, 362.) 	The phrase
“Terms of Use Agreement” was a blue hyperlink that linked to the full text of the
Terms of Use Agreement, including the arbitration provision. (See id. PageID.356-
357, 362, 376.) Courts in this circuit have routinely held that this type of notice is
not misleading. 	See Anderson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 490 F.Supp.3d 1265 (M.D.
Tenn. 2020) (compelling arbitration for plaintiff who clicked “Place Order” button
below the statement: “By clicking Place Order, you agree to Walmart’s Updated
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[(linked)] Privacy Policy and Terms of Use”); Lee v. Panera Bread Co., No. 1:22-
cv-11958, 2023 WL 2606611 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2023) (compelling arbitration for
plaintiff who clicked “Start My Subscription” button below the statement: “By
clicking the ‘Start My Subscription’ button below, you . . . further agree to Panera’s
[(linked)] Terms and Conditions, Terms of Use, and Privacy Policy . . .”). 	Here,
the conspicuous Terms of Use Agreement and clear statement indicating that
clicking the “Create Your Account” button constituted an agreement with that
Terms of Use Agreement put Williams on reasonable notice that creating an
Experian account would manifest assent to the linked terms.
In Austin, the Fourth Circuit similarly rejected a comparison to Sgouros and
upheld Experian’s arbitration agreement. There, the court explained:
The CreditWorks enrollment page that a user like Austin
would have seen is much different than TransUnion’s,
making this case readily distinguishable from Sgouros. . .
. The CreditWorks enrollment page stated, in bold text,
that “[b]y clicking ‘Create Your Account”: I accept and
agree to your Terms of Use Agreement.” J.A. 125. And
as 	previously 	indicated, 	the 	words 	“Terms 	of 	Use
Agreement” were set off in blue text “on an uncluttered
background,” Dhruva, 131 F.4th at 152, close to the
portions of the form that a customer had to fill out and
click. We conclude here, as we did in Dhruva, that
“[n]othing about the website design or layout obscure[d]
the conspicuous location of the Terms of Use hyperlink.”
Id. Indeed, Austin “did not need to ‘scroll[] down’ or ‘go
exploring’ to find out there were terms of use in the first
place.” 	Id. at 153 (quoting Marshall, 112 F.4th at 219–
20).
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Austin, 148 F.4th at 207. Under those circumstances, the court found that Austin
had assented to Experian’s Terms of Use. See id. at 208–09. The same is true here.
And because Williams assented to the Terms of Use Agreement, Experian may
enforce against her the arbitration provision included in that agreement.
IV
For all of the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS Experian’s
motion to compel arbitration (ECF No. 23) and STAYS Williams’ claims against
Experian pending completion of the arbitration.6 See Arabian Motors Grp., W.L.L.
v. Ford Motor Co., 19 F.4th 938, 941–43 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that district court
should 	ordinarily 	stay 	claims 	after 	compelling 	arbitration 	under 	the 	FAA).
Experian’s motion to stay discovery (ECF No. 24) is TERMINATED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 22, 2025
6 Williams’ claims against Midland are not subject to arbitration, and Williams and
Midland shall continue to litigate those claims in this Court pursuant to the schedule
that the Court set on October 9, 2025. (See Order, ECF No. 44.)
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on October 22, 2025, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Ryan
Case Manager
(313) 234-5126
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