USA v. MULLER et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANDRE MULLER and
ROBERT HOLLAND,
Defendants.
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Docket No. 1:19-cr-00109-NT
ORDER ON THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
THE INDICTMENT WITH PREJUDICE
Before me is Defendant Andre Muller’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment with
Prejudice (the “Motion”) (ECF No. 407), which is joined by Defendant Robert
Holland. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Muller and Defendant Holland were charged with conspiracy to
interfere with commerce by robbery, a violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
See Indictment (ECF No. 3). Jury selection for the trial began in the morning on
August 2, 2022 and lasted the full day. Minute Entry (ECF No. 283). The selection
process included both a case-specific written juror questionnaire (ECF No. 285) and
oral voir dire. At the conclusion of the selection process, I seated a jury of twelve
members with four alternates. The trial began the next day, on August 3, 2022, and
the evidence concluded on August 9, 2022. Minute Entry (“Aug. 9 Minute Entry”) 1
(ECF No. 288). At the close of evidence, I dismissed the remaining alternate jurors.
At 2:00 p.m. on August 9, 2022, following a brief break during which the alternate
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jurors left the courthouse, I committed the case to the jury for deliberation. Aug. 9
Minute Entry.
Just 	a 	few 	minutes 	after 	deliberation 	began, 	at 	2:10 	p.m., 	the 	jury
administrator received a text message from one of the alternate jurors who had been
dismissed. The sender was later identified as Juror 13,1 who had been the only Black
member of the jury. The message said:
Just wanted to let you know that if the jury comes back really quick with
a guilty verdict then they stuck to the plan they said they were going to
do. I was really one of the only ones who was going to fight it and try to
make it fair but since my voice won’t be heard then I thought I would let
you know there were a couple who was still a little undecided but if I
was in those boys shoes I would feel ultimately screwed[.]
Sealed Additional Attachs. Suppl. Mot. for New Trial Ct. Ex. 1—Text (“Juror 13
Text”) (ECF No. 316-2). Juror 13 then sent a follow-up message: “Not saying that’s
what’s going to happen!! but it was suggested!!” Juror 13 Text.
Upon learning from the jury administrator what had occurred, I immediately
called a conference of counsel at which I shared Juror 13’s messages. Sealed Tr. of
Proceedings (“Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel”) 2:1–3:14 (ECF No. 335). I told
counsel that “[m]y gut is to bring [Juror 13] back” to the courthouse to interview her
immediately. Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 5:22–5:23. At the request of the
Government, I then called a brief, fifteen-minute recess to allow counsel—and
myself—to research the issue and think about next steps. Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of
Counsel 5:20–5:22.
1 	To protect their privacy, I refer to all jurors by the juror number assigned to them at trial.
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We reconvened and the Government spoke first, voicing the opinion that the
jury should “be allowed to continue deliberating” and that the Court “could even
conduct an examination of the jurors in the event of a guilty verdict.” Tr. of Aug. 9
Conf. of Counsel 8:4–8:5, 8:8–8:9. The Government cited United States v. Zimny, 846
F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2017),2 “for the proposition that the Court has broad discretion in
conducting juror misconduct investigations.” Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 6:21–6:24.
Counsel for Defendant Muller replied that he “could not disagree with government
more.” Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 9:14–9:15. Citing both Zimny and a Second
Circuit case, United States v. Rosario, 111 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1997),3 Defendant
Muller’s counsel stated, “I think the Court is duty-bound . . . upon having evidence of
misconduct to investigate.” Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 9:18–9:20. Although
Defendant Muller’s counsel agreed that the Court has “very, very broad discretion”
to “get to the bottom of what’s going on[,]” he maintained that, “waiting, to me, . . . is
prejudicial.” Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 9:21–9:23, 11:12. I responded that my
understanding was that “inquiry can be made at any time after[ a verdict] and that
I’m not sure it makes a whole lot of sense to race forward given that anything that
happens here can be undone.” Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 14:2–14:5.
2 	In Zimny, the First Circuit held that trial courts are “required to conduct some further inquiry
once it [is] apprised of” a colorable claim of juror misconduct. United States v. Zimny, 846 F.3d 458,
470 (1st Cir. 2017). As is relevant here, however, Zimny did not address whether that further inquiry
must be conducted immediately when the claim of juror misconduct is raised during deliberations.
3 	Rosario mainly concerned a defendant’s right to be present during a post-verdict interview of
a juror in an investigation of potential juror misconduct. See United States v. Rosario, 111 F.3d 293,
297–99 (2d Cir. 1997). The court did note that “a trial judge is vested with very broad discretion to
deal with problems that arise in connection with jury deliberations or a juror’s fitness to deliberate,”
but it did not address the question of timing. Id. at 299.
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Counsel for Defendant Muller asked for another conference later that day,
while deliberations were still ongoing, and stated his objection to “the timing” of the
Court’s intended investigation. Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 18:20–18:24, 20:14–
20:16. Specifically, Defendant Muller’s counsel raised the concern that a post-verdict
investigation would be hindered by Federal Rule of Evidence 606, which prohibits
certain types of juror testimony after a verdict. Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 14:9–
14:21. Defendant Muller’s counsel stated his belief that Juror 13’s text messages
called for a mistrial and that, if I did not do so prior to a verdict and the Defendants
were found guilty, that the Defendants would then have to move for a new trial under
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which “is a different standard
and a completely different exercise.” See Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 20:16–20:23.
If I did not agree to call a mistrial immediately, then Defendant Muller’s counsel
suggested that I should, “at the very least,” suspend deliberations and question the
jurors. Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 20:24–21:9. I explained that I had misgivings
about suspending deliberations—“I don’t want [the jurors] to, you know, have an
opportunity to be influenced by anything else.” Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 26:2–
26:3.
Counsel for Defendant Holland stated that he was “in agreement with the
Court . . . that at some point we need to explore this in the event of guilty verdicts.”
Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 26:17–26:19. But, he continued, “I’ve talked to my client
about it” and “he does not want me to ask for a mistrial at this point.” Tr. of Aug. 9
Conf. of Counsel 27:10–27:11. At that, I told all present that I was “going to stay the
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course”—that is, allow the jury to continue deliberating and investigate Juror 13’s
text messages in the event of guilty verdicts—and I denied Defendant Muller’s motion
for a mistrial. Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 27:12, 28:16–28:20. The jury returned a
guilty verdict as to both Defendants later that evening, after over four hours of
deliberations. Jury Verdict Form (ECF No. 291); Aug. 9 Minute Entry (stating that
the jury returned a verdict at 6:20 p.m.).
Upon my instruction, the jury administrator sought to get in touch with Juror
13 through various channels—including phone calls, text messages, and an email—
throughout the evening of August 9th and the morning of August 10th, but all such
attempts were unsuccessful. See Sealed Tr. of Proceedings (“Tr. of Aug. 10 Tel.
Conf. of Counsel”) 4:2–5:12 (ECF No. 336). Unable to contact Juror 13 through any
other means, the jury administrator drove with a Deputy United States Marshal to
Juror 13’s house to notify her of the Court’s desire to meet with her. Sealed Tr. of
Proceedings (“Tr. of Aug. 11 Tel. Conf. of Counsel”) 2:23–3:5 (ECF No. 337). Juror
13 was at her home when the jury administrator and Deputy United States Marshal
arrived, and she indicated that she had not received the calls or messages from the
jury administrator and agreed to come back to the courthouse to speak with me. Tr.
of Aug. 11 Tel. Conf. of Counsel 3:2–3:21.
The parties had previously agreed that I should speak to the juror outside the
presence of counsel and the Defendants,4 Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 9:21–10:11,
4 	Counsel for Defendant Muller suggested that, because Juror 13 might be “less . . . [a]nxious”
and thus more forthcoming speaking “one-on-one with the Court and the court reporter,” that I should
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12:1–12:6, 12:15–12:16, Tr. of Aug. 10 Tel. Conf. of Counsel 13:10, 13:20–14:19, and
so I conducted an interview with Juror 13 in camera but on the record on August 10,
2022.5 During the interview, I asked Juror 13 to describe the things she saw or heard
that led her to text the jury administrator. Sealed Additional Attachs. Suppl. Mot. for
New Trial Attach. No. 1 8/10/2022 Sealed Hearing Tr. (“Tr. of Juror 13 Interview”)
3:14–3:16 (ECF No. 316-1). Juror 13 related a number of remarks by fellow jurors
made during the trial, prior to deliberation. As is relevant here, Juror 13 stated that
she remembered that a juror—later identified as Juror 22—turned to Juror 13 in the
jury room and said, “No offense by what I’m about to say, but the [Defendants] just
look guilty.” Tr. of Juror 13 Interview 6:23–6:25.
I spoke with counsel by phone the next day, on August 11, 2022, after counsel
had time to review the transcript of my interview with Juror 13. See Tr. of Aug. 11
Tel. Conf. of Counsel. All agreed that Juror 13’s allegations raised the possibility of
juror misconduct and warranted further investigation. Tr. of Aug. 11 Tel. Conf. of
Counsel 5:24–6:3, 7:13–8:13, 9:20–11:4. After consulting with counsel, I asked the
jury administrator to arrange interviews with the jurors who might have said and/or
overheard the comments alleged by Juror 13. Tr. of Aug. 11 Tel. Conf. of Counsel
13:14–20:4. Over the course of the next week, I interviewed eight jurors who had
“meet one-on-one, in camera, with the alternate on the record.” Tr. of Proceedings (“Tr. of Aug. 9
Conf. of Counsel”) 10:4–10:11, 12:2–12:3 (ECF No. 335).
5 	I arranged for Juror 13 to speak with a public defender before our interview so she could
understand the process. Sealed Tr. of Proceedings (“Tr. of Aug. 11 Tel. Conf. of Counsel”) 4:1–4:8
(ECF No. 337); Sealed Additional Attachs. Suppl. Mot. for New Trial Attach. No. 1 8/10/2022 Sealed
Hearing Tr. (“Tr. of Juror 13 Interview”) 2:25–3:10 (ECF No. 316-1).
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served alongside Juror 13. Once again, as agreed to by the parties, the interviews
were conducted in camera and on the record and without counsel present. I asked the
interviewees an assortment of questions submitted by counsel as well as additional
questions I believed to be appropriate based on the direction of conversation. In these
interviews, almost every one of Juror 13’s allegations were corroborated, at least in
part, although many of the jurors offered credible benign explanations for most of the
comments.
After the conclusion of these interviews, the Defendants filed a motion styled
as a motion for a new trial and to dismiss the indictment. Def. Andre Muller’s Mot.
for a New Trial Pursuant to Fed. R. Cr. P. 33 (ECF No. 315); Def. Andre Muller’s Mot.
for a New Trial Pursuant to Fed. R. Cr. P. Rule 33 (Suppl.) and Mot. to Dismiss
Indictment (ECF No. 326). In early November of 2022, I granted the motion for a new
trial, finding that the Defendants had been denied their Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury. See Am. Order on Defs.’ Mot. for New Trial 1, 13–17 (ECF No. 350).
Insofar as the motion was labeled as a motion to dismiss the indictment, however, I
denied it for a failure to develop the argument. See Am. Order on Defs.’ Mot. for New
Trial 1 n.2. The Defendants then appealed my denial of the motion to dismiss the
indictment, 	and 	the 	First 	Circuit 	dismissed 	the 	appeal 	for 	lack 	of 	appellate
jurisdiction. J. of USCA as to Andre Muller, Robert Holland (“J. of First Cir.”) 2
(ECF No. 395).
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Now, with jury selection for the new trial set to begin on April 4, 2023, the
Defendants seek to dismiss the indictment. Def. Andre Muller’s Mot. to Dismiss the
Indictment with Prejudice (“Mot. to Dismiss Indictment”) 1 (ECF No. 407).
DISCUSSION
The 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	my 	failure, 	upon 	receipt 	of 	Juror 	13’s 	text
messages, to immediately suspend jury deliberations, initiate an investigation, and
attempt to remediate any potential jury taint constituted a violation their Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury6 and their Fifth Amendment right to be tried
by a particular tribunal. Mot. to Dismiss Indictment 27, 30, 33. Below, I address each
of these arguments in turn.
I. 	Sixth Amendment
The Defendants assert that my decision to delay an investigation into potential
jury taint until after a verdict was handed down violated their Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury. Mot. to Dismiss Indictment 24. Specifically, according to
the Defendants, the law of the First Circuit establishes that I had “the duty to launch
an immediate investigation into Juror No. 13’s claims of jury misconduct.” Mot. to
Dismiss 	Indictment 	22. 	The 	Government 	concedes 	that, 	under 	First 	Circuit
precedent, an investigation into an allegation of juror misconduct that arises during
6 	The Defendants’ Motion is styled as a motion to dismiss the indictment on Fifth Amendment
grounds, but I read it as making both Fifth and Sixth Amendment-based arguments for dismissal. See,
e.g., Def. Andre Muller’s Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment with Prejudice (“Mot. to Dismiss
Indictment”) 24 (ECF No. 407) (“The court’s decision to delay the investigation into Juror No. 13’s
allegations of jury bias deprived the defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an
impartial jury—the jury that they [ ] helped select.”).
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deliberations should “ideally[ ] take place prior to verdict,” but it argues that my
approach was nonetheless reasonable given the lack of consensus among the two
Defendants about whether to immediately suspend deliberations or investigate the
misconduct only in the event of any conviction. Government’s Resp. in Opp’n to Andre
Muller’s Mot. to Dismiss the Indictment with Prejudice 13–14 (ECF No. 413).
The First Circuit has apparently never directly addressed whether a pre-
verdict allegation of jury misconduct requires the immediate suspension of jury
deliberations, though it has held that, “[w]here . . . a colorable claim of jury taint
surfaces during jury deliberations, the trial court has a duty to investigate the
allegation promptly.” United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 289 (1st Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added). “The purpose of that inquiry is twofold: to ascertain whether some
taint-producing event actually occurred, and if so, to assess the magnitude of the
event and the extent of any resultant prejudice.” Id. “If such an event is present and
the potential for prejudice exists, ‘the court must then consider the extent to which
prophylactic 	measures 	(such 	as 	the 	discharge 	of 	particular 	jurors 	or 	the
pronouncement of curative instructions) will suffice to alleviate that prejudice.’ ”
United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29, 42 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Bradshaw,
281 F.3d at 289).
The First Circuit has not had the opportunity to define the term “promptly,”
but the fact that the process is meant to take into consideration “prophylactic
measures” suggests that the investigation should be done at a point when such
measures could cure any prejudice resulting from the taint—that is, before the
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verdict.7 But see J. of First Cir. 2 (“When the jury returned guilty verdicts against
both defendants, the district court promptly investigated . . . .” (emphasis added)). On
the other hand, the First Circuit also emphasizes that the trial court has “wide
discretion to fashion an appropriate procedure” in the face of a claim of juror
misconduct, Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d at 42, and that, “[b]ecause claims of jury taint
are 	almost 	always 	case-specific, 	the 	district 	court 	takes 	responsibility 	for
appropriately calibrating its inquiry to the circumstances presented.” United States
v. French, 977 F.3d 114, 122 (1st Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In this case I did not initiate the investigation until after the jury had returned
a verdict, and thus after the point at which I could have cured any taint. I also note
however, 	that 	my decision 	was 	complicated by 	the 	circumstances 	presented—
including my concern that suspending jury deliberations and immediately conducting
an investigation would create its own set of problems, such as an increased risk of the
7 	The Defendants make this argument coherently now, but they did not do so at the time it could
have influenced my decision. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of Juror 13’s text messages, even as
he argued for a mistrial or immediate investigation, counsel for Defendant Muller did not raise the
possibility that a pre-verdict investigation might be able to cure any jury taint. Counsel for Defendant
Muller did state his objection to “the timing” of a post-verdict investigation, but his concern was that
it was easier to get a mistrial before the verdict than win a motion for a new trial in the event of guilty
verdicts, not that delaying the investigation was in and of itself procedurally inappropriate. See Tr. of
Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 20:15–21:9. And counsel for Mr. Holland actually stated that he did not want
to suspend deliberations and/or call a mistrial, though “at some point we need to explore [Juror 13’s
allegations] in the event of guilty verdicts.” Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 26:17–26:19 (emphasis added).
No party called my attention to United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2002), or United
States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2009). Of course, I do not fault the parties for that
oversight—given the timing of Juror 13’s text messages, all parties, including myself, had to approach
these tough questions with just minutes of research and preparation. Hindsight is, as always, 20/20.
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jurors being exposed to outside influences. See Tr. of Aug. 9 Conf. of Counsel 26:2–
26:3.
Ultimately, I need not determine whether my investigation was marred by
procedural shortcomings. Even if my decision not to suspend jury deliberations
violated the Defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, “[t]he remedy
for such a violation is a retrial.” J. of First Cir. 2 (citing Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d at
45); see also, e.g., United States v. Casellas-Toro, 807 F.3d 380, 390, 392 (1st Cir. 2015)
(noting that “retrial” was an appropriate next step after it found the district court
abused its discretion, and violated the defendant’s right to an impartial jury, in
denying a motion for change of venue); United States v. Gaston-Brito, 64 F.3d 11, 13–
14 (1st Cir. 1995) (remanding case for a new trial after district court failed to conduct
a sufficient inquiry into juror misconduct); United States v. Perrotta, 553 F.2d 247,
251 (1st Cir. 1977) (remanding for new trial where district court failed to inquire into
prejudicial publicity). The Defendants have already obtained a new trial, which is
scheduled to begin next week, and they cite no cases to support the proposition that
dismissal of the indictment is an appropriate remedy in the face of this type of Sixth
Amendment violation. As such, the Defendants’ request to dismiss the indictment on
Sixth Amendment grounds is denied.
II. 	Fifth Amendment
In addition to their Sixth Amendment argument, the Defendants assert, for
the 	first 	time, 	that 	my 	failure, 	upon 	receipt 	of 	Juror 	13’s 	text 	messages, 	to
immediately suspend jury deliberations, initiate an investigation, and attempt to
remediate any potential jury taint constituted a violation of their Fifth Amendment
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right to be tried by a particular tribunal, thus barring reprosecution on double
jeopardy grounds.8 Mot. to Dismiss Indictment 30, 34.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment ensures that no person
shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S.
Const. amend. V. This provision “provides ‘a triumvirate of safeguards: It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against
a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” United States v. Garske, 939 F.3d 321,
328 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Ortiz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d 651, 653 (1st Cir.
1990)). “[T]he policy underlying th[e double jeopardy] provision ‘is that the State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict 	an 	individual 	for 	an 	alleged 	offense, 	thereby 	subjecting 	him 	to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.’ ” United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)
(quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957)). “As a part of this
protection against multiple prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause affords a
criminal defendant a ‘valued right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal.’ ” Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671 (1982) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684, 689 (1949)); see also Garske, 939 F.3d at 328 (noting that the Double
8 	The Defendants also argue that their claims against reprosecution are not waived. Mot. to
Dismiss Indictment 15. I presume, without actually deciding, that the Defendants’ claims are not
waived.
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Jeopardy Clause reflects “the defendant’s prized right to have his trial, once under
way, completed by a particular trier” (quoting United States v. Toribio-Lugo, 376 F.3d
33, 37 (1st Cir. 2004))).
The Defendants argue that my decision not to suspend deliberations resulted
in a deprivation of their Fifth Amendment right to be tried by a particular tribunal.
Mot. to Dismiss Indictment 30. The cases cited by the Defendants for this premise,
however, 	concern 	manifestly 	different 	situations—those 	where 	a 	mistrial 	was
granted over a defendant’s objection and prior to the jury reaching a verdict. In United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), for example, the Supreme Court held that “where
the 	judge, 	acting 	without 	the 	defendant’s 	consent, 	aborts 	the 	proceeding, 	the
defendant has been deprived of his valued right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal.” 400 U.S. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
United States v. Lara-Ramirez, 519 F.3d 76, 89 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to trial by a particular tribunal was violated
when court prematurely declared mistrial over objection of defendant). Similarly, in
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a defendant
who successfully moves for a mistrial prior to a verdict, but who is “goad[ed]” into
doing so, does not lose the right to “raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial.”
456 U.S. at 676.
Here, by contrast, I did not grant a mistrial against the Defendants’ wishes.
Instead, I decided, against the wishes of Defendant Muller, not to call an immediate
mistrial and to wait until after a verdict to carry out my investigation of alleged jury
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misconduct.9 Even if this decision was procedurally deficient, the Defendants point
to no case, nor am I aware of one, where a trial court’s decision not to suspend
deliberations is found to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Rather, as noted
above, the cases that do resemble this one have held that similar procedural
deficiencies implicate the Sixth Amendment, and that a new trial, not dismissal of
the indictment, is the appropriate remedy where a trial court’s investigation of juror
misconduct falls short. See Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d at 45; Casellas-Toro, 807 F.3d at
392; Gaston-Brito, 64 F.3d at 13–14; Perrotta, 553 F.2d at 251. As such, I do not
believe that dismissal of the indictment is appropriate here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Defendants’ Motion (ECF
No. 407).
The 	Court 	intends 	to 	unseal 	this 	order, 	the 	Defendants’ 	Motion, 	the
Government’s response (ECF No. 413), and the Defendants’ reply (ECF No. 418). The
Court intends to leave any exhibits to those filings sealed. Any objections to the
unsealing of any of these documents should be filed within 7 days. If no objection is
filed within 7 days, this order, the Motion, and related briefing will all be unsealed.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nancy Torresen
9 	Further, in deciding not to suspend deliberations in this case, I considered Defendant Holland’s
wish to proceed to a verdict with “the first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an
acquittal.” United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1971).
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United States District Judge
Dated this 27th day of March, 2023.
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