Crawford et al v. Ford Motor Company

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
SHEILA CRAWFORD, et al.
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 26-3479
:
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant 	Ford 	Motor 	Company 	(“Ford”) 	removed 	this 	product
liability 	action 	from 	the 	Circuit 	Court 	for 	Charles 	County,
Maryland 	on 	September 	2, 	2026, 	asserting 	diversity 	jurisdiction.
(ECF 	No. 	1). 	A 	motion 	to 	remand 	filed 	by 	Plaintiffs 	Timothy 	W.
Crawford 	and 	Sheila 	M. 	Crawford 	(“Plaintiffs”) 	was 	denied 	on
September 	10, 	2026. 	(ECF 	No. 	7). 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	a 	renewed
motion to remand on September 14, 2026, and Ford filed a response
in 	opposition 	on 	September 	16, 	2026. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	11, 	12).
Plaintiffs 	have 	not 	filed 	a 	reply 	and 	the 	time 	to 	do 	so 	is 	now
expired. 	For the following reasons, the renewed motion to remand
will be granted.
“The 	removability 	of 	a 	case 	‘depends 	upon 	the 	state 	of 	the
pleadings 	and 	the 	record 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	application 	for
removal . . . .’” Francis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 709 F.3d 362, 367
(4th 	Cir. 	2013) 	(quoting 	Ala. 	Great 	S. 	Ry. 	Co. 	v. 	Thompson, 	200
U.S. 	206, 	216 	(1906)). 	Where, 	as 	here, 	removal 	jurisdiction 	is
premised 	on 	diversity 	of 	citizenship, 	the 	sum 	demanded 	“in 	good
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faith 	in 	the 	initial 	pleading” 	is 	generally 	“deemed 	to 	be 	the
amount in controversy.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2). 	If the complaint
does not demand a specific sum, the defendant may allege the amount
in controversy in its notice of removal. 	See Francis, 709 F.3d at
367.
If the plaintiff challenges removal, however,
the 	defendant 	“bears 	the 	burden 	of
demonstrating 	that 	removal 	jurisdiction 	is
proper.” 	[Strawn 	v. 	AT&T 	Mobility 	LLC, 	530
F.3d 	293, 	297 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2008)]. 	When 	a
plaintiff’s 	complaint 	leaves 	the 	amount 	of
damages 	unspecified, 	the 	defendant 	must
provide 	evidence 	to 	“show . . . 	what 	the
stakes 	of 	litigation . . . 	are 	given 	the
plaintiff’s 	actual 	demands.” 	Brill 	v.
Countrywide 	Home 	Loans, 	Inc., 	427 	F.3d 	446,
449 	(7th 	Cir. 	2005) 	(emphasis 	omitted). 	To
resolve 	doubts 	regarding 	a 	defendant’s
asserted 	amount 	in 	controversy, 	“both 	sides
submit 	proof 	and 	the 	court 	decides, 	by 	a
preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence, 	whether 	the
amount-in-controversy 	requirement 	has 	been
satisfied.” 	[Dart 	Cherokee 	Basin 	Operating
Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014)].
Scott 	v. 	Cricket Commc’ns, 	LLC, 865 	F.3d 	189, 	194 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2017)
(CAFA removal). 	Furthermore,
“Because 	removal 	jurisdiction 	raises
significant 	federalism 	concerns, 	we 	must
strictly 	construe 	removal 	jurisdiction.”
Mulcahey 	v. 	Columbia 	Organic 	Chems. 	Co., 	29
F.3d 	148, 	151 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1994). 	“If 	federal
jurisdiction 	is 	doubtful, 	a 	remand 	is
necessary.” 	Id.; 	see 	Palisades 	Collections
LLC 	v. 	Shorts, 	552 	F.3d 	327, 	336 	(4 th 	Cir.
2008) 	(recognizing 	the 	“duty 	to 	construe
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removal 	jurisdiction 	strictly 	and 	resolve
doubts in favor of remand”).
Common Cause v. Lewis, 956 F.3d 246, 252 (4 th Cir. 2020).
Here, as noted in the court’s earlier denial of the motion to
remand, 	the 	complaint 	did 	not 	comply 	with 	Maryland 	practice 	to
specify the amount in controversy if under $75,000, and there were
somewhat 	inconsistent 	statements 	concerning 	the 	damages 	sought.1
Inasmuch 	as 	the 	parties 	had 	not 	correctly 	and 	thoroughly 	framed
the issue, the motion was denied. 	Now, the parties take opposing
views of the situation and the implication of post-removal events.
Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	they 	are 	clarifying 	the 	amount 	in
controversy, 	not 	amending 	the 	complaint, 	and 	that 	the 	amount 	in
controversy was always below the federal threshold. 	(See ECF Nos.
11, 	at 	2; 	11-2, 	at 	2). 	Ford, 	on 	the 	other 	hand, 	claims 	that 	the
post-removal 	stipulation 	is 	a 	reduction 	in 	the 	amount 	sought 	and
does not defeat proper removal jurisdiction. 	(See ECF No. 12, at
3).
1 	Maryland 	Rule 	2-305 	provides 	that 	“a 	demand 	for 	a 	money
judgment that does not exceed $75,000 shall include the amount of
damages sought” while “a demand for a money judgment that exceeds
$75,000 	shall 	not 	specify 	the 	amount 	sought, 	but 	shall 	include 	a
general 	statement 	that 	the 	amount 	sought 	exceeds 	$75,000.”
Plaintiffs’ 	complaint 	fails 	to 	provide 	a 	monetary 	value 	for 	all
damages 	sought. 	It 	states 	that 	the 	amount 	exceeds 	$30,000 	but
does 	not 	state 	that 	the 	amount 	sought 	exceeds 	$75,000. 	(ECF 	No.
1-2, at 8).
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The 	[United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the]
Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	adopted 	a 	general 	rule
regarding 	the 	effect 	of 	post-removal
stipulations on the propriety of removal where
the amount in controversy is plainly stated in
the complaint. 	In situations where the amount
in 	controversy 	is 	plainly 	and 	unambiguously
stated in the complaint, “‘[e]vents occurring
subsequent’ 	to 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	complaint
‘which reduce the amount recoverable below the
statutory 	limit 	do 	not 	oust 	jurisdiction.’”
JTH 	Tax, 	Inc. 	v. 	Frashier, 	624 	F.3d 	635, 	638
(4 th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(quoting 	St. 	Paul 	Mercury
Indem. 	Co. 	v. 	Red 	Cab 	Co., 	303 	U.S. 	283, 	292
(1938)). 	In 	other 	words, 	under 	St. 	Paul
Mercury, a plaintiff may not reduce or change
his 	or 	her 	demand 	for 	damages 	by 	way 	of
stipulation 	to 	defeat 	diversity 	jurisdiction
once 	an 	amount 	has 	been 	stated. 	See 	Porsche
Cars 	N. 	Am., 	Inc. 	v. 	Porsche.net, 	302 	F.3d
248, 	255–56 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2002) 	(“[A] 	court
determines 	the 	existence 	of 	diversity
jurisdiction at the time the action is filed,
regardless 	of 	later 	changes 	in 	originally
crucial facts such as the parties’ citizenship
or 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy.” 	(citation 	and
internal 	quotations 	marks 	omitted)); 	Griffin
v. Holmes, 843 F.Supp. 81, 87 (E.D.N.C. 1993)
(“[T]he 	plaintiff . . . 	may 	not 	defeat
diversity 	jurisdiction 	by 	filing 	a 	post-
removal 	amendment 	of 	the 	complaint 	which
reduces the amount of damages requested by the
complaint 	below 	the 	amount 	in 	controversy
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”)[.]
However, 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	not
opined 	on 	the 	effect 	of 	a 	post-removal
stipulation, 	as 	is 	the 	case 	here, 	where 	the
initial complaint does not specify an amount.
There 	is 	guidance 	on 	this 	issue 	from 	the
[United States] Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit 	and 	other 	federal 	district 	courts
within the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits.
Various jurisdictions have found that “a post-
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removal 	stipulation 	that 	damages 	will 	not
exceed 	the 	jurisdictional 	minimum 	can 	be
considered as a clarification of an ambiguous
complaint, 	rather 	than 	a 	post-removal
amendment 	of 	the 	plaintiff’s 	complaint.”
Carter v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc., 2013 WL
3946233, 	at 	*1–2 	(D.S.C. 	July 	31, 	2013); 	see
also Gebbia v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d
880, 883 (5 th Cir. 2000) (asserting that post-
removal 	affidavits 	and 	stipulations 	may 	be
considered 	in 	determining 	the 	amount 	in
controversy 	only 	if 	the 	jurisdictional 	basis
was 	ambiguous 	at 	the 	time 	of 	removal); 	see
also 	Ferguson 	v. 	Wal–Mart 	Stores, 	Inc., 	1994
WL 	653479, 	at 	*2 	(D.S.C. 	Nov. 	15, 	1994)
(remanding case when the plaintiff alleged an
unspecified 	amount 	of 	damages 	and 	then 	filed
a post-removal stipulation clarifying that the
amount 	of 	damages 	sought 	was 	below 	the
jurisdictional 	amount); 	Gwyn 	v. 	Wal–Mart
Stores, 	Inc., 	955 	F.Supp. 	44, 	46 	(M.D.N.C.
1996) 	(when 	presented 	with 	indeterminate
claims, “the court may consider a stipulation
filed by the plaintiff that the claim does not
exceed” the jurisdictional amount). 	This use
of 	clarification 	is 	permitted, 	rather 	than
forbidden, under St. Paul Mercury. 	See Walker
v. 	Poland, 	2009 	WL 	5195762, 	at 	*1–2 	(D.S.C.
Dec. 22, 2009); Tommie v. Orkin, Inc., 2009 WL
2148101, at *1–2 (D.S.C. July 15, 2009).
Joyner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 25-cv-3609-RMG, 2025
WL 1617235, at *1–2 (D.S.C. June 5, 2025).
Plaintiffs 	seek 	to 	“clarify” 	their 	demand 	by 	itemizing 	the
total of their actual damages in Exhibit B to their renewed motion,
(ECF 	No. 	11-2, 	at 	2), 	and 	stating 	that 	even 	aggregated, 	their
damages 	remain 	substantially 	below 	$75,000. 	They 	reiterate 	that
they inadvertently and erroneously checked two boxes (both $30,000
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- 	$100,000, 	and 	over 	$100,000) 	on 	the 	state 	court 	form 	titled
“Information Report.” 	(See ECF No. 11, at 2). 	Also in support of
their 	renewed 	motion, 	Plaintiffs 	submitted 	Exhibit 	A, 	a 	sworn
declaration to affirm that (1) they did not seek damages in excess
of 	$75,000, 	(2) 	that 	at 	the 	time 	of 	filing, 	actual 	damages 	were
approximately 	$14,000, 	and 	(3) 	that 	the 	state 	form 	“Information
Report” was inadvertently checked. 	(ECF No. 11-1, at 2).
Ford 	filed 	a 	response 	opposing 	the 	renewed 	motion 	to 	remand
on September 16, 2026. 	(ECF No. 12). 	Ford argues that the amount
in 	controversy 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	complaint 	and 	at
removal 	exceeded 	$75,000. 	(Id. 	at 	3). 	Ford 	justifies 	this
contention 	by 	explaining 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	complaint 	sought
unspecified damages for rescission of the purchase contract of the
vehicle, replacement value of the vehicle, diminution value of the
vehicle, payoff of the remaining vehicle loan balance, loss of use
damages, 	diagnostic 	expenses, 	rental 	vehicle 	expenses, 	and
consequential damages. 	(Id. at 2–3). 	If Plaintiffs were seeking
both rescission and replacement cost of the vehicle, Ford argues,
that 	combined 	figure 	may 	be 	$58,000 	or 	more. 	(Id. 	at 	2).
Furthermore, 	Ford 	contends 	that 	with 	the 	addition 	of 	specified
damages 	in 	the 	complaint, 	namely 	payoff 	of 	their 	vehicle 	loan
($6,227.45), 	Uber 	reimbursement 	($3,803.11), 	and 	rental
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reimbursement 	of 	($6,940.08), 	Plaintiffs’ 	demand 	amounts 	to
approximately 	$74,970.64 	before 	adding 	diminution 	of 	value, 	loss
of 	use, 	diagnostic 	expenses, 	and 	consequential 	damages. 	(Id. 	at
2-3). 	Moreover, 	Ford 	asserts 	that 	information 	provided 	in 	the
“Information 	Report” 	indicated 	that 	Plaintiffs 	intended 	to 	seek
damages 	over 	$100,000. 	(Id. 	at 	2). 	Overall, 	Ford 	contends 	that
when claims and possible damages are added together, the aggregate
exceeds the $75,000 threshold. 	(Id. at 3).
Ford’s 	position 	depends 	on 	whether 	the 	complaint 	seeks
rescission 	and 	the 	other 	items 	identified 	in 	paragraph 	16, 	in
addition 	to 	the 	concrete 	out-of-pocket 	expenses 	specified 	in
paragraphs 	10 	and 	11 	(loan 	payoff, 	Uber 	and 	rental 	car 	costs,
diagnostic 	fees). 	(ECF 	No. 	1-2 	¶¶ 	10, 	11, 	16). 	Paragraph 	16 	is
a 	reservation 	of 	rights, 	and 	not 	a 	direct 	assertion 	of 	damages.
Whether 	rescission 	is 	a 	viable 	claim 	has 	not 	been 	shown, 	nor 	is
Ford’s speculation on what that remedy would be worth sufficient.
See Senior Ride Connection v. ITNAMerica, 225 F.Supp.3d 528, 531-
34 	(D.S.C. 	2016) 	(discussing 	rescission 	and 	remanding 	case 	for
insufficient amount in controversy). Thus, those asserted damages
are speculative. 	Ford has failed to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the actual amount in controversy at the time of
removal was above $75,000.
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For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Plaintiffs’ 	renewed 	motion 	to
remand will be granted. 	A separate Order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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