Fessia et al v. HMSHOST Corporation

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
AILEEN FESSIA, et al., 	*
Plaintiffs, 	*
v. 	* 	Civ. No. DLB-25-1970
HMSHOST CORPORATION, 	*
Defendant. 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Five months after this negligence action was filed, and with the end of discovery nigh,
the defendant HMSHost Corporation (“HMS”) sought to transfer this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), to the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, where the events giving rise to the
claims occurred. Upon consideration of the § 1404(a) factors, the Court finds that HMS has not
met its burden to show that the plaintiffs’ chosen forum should be disturbed. The motion to transfer
is denied.
I. 	Background
HMS operates restaurants and provides food services at airports nationwide, including
Kahului Airport in Maui, Hawaii. ECF 1, ¶ 7. Aileen and Daniel Fessia, Utah residents, visited
Hawaii in July 2023 and traveled through Kahului Airport. Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 6. While making a purchase
from an airport vending machine, Aileen Fessia was struck by a food services cart operated by
HMS employee Baron Ladia. Id. ¶ 8. Ladia later said he had been unable to see Aileen Fessia
because the cart was “stacked so full of goods that [his] view . . . was obstructed.” Id. ¶ 9. An
airport security officer, Brian West, prepared a report after the incident. ECF 18, ¶ 7; see also ECF
19-14 (Incident Report). As a result of being struck by the HMS-operated food services cart, Aileen
Fessia has “suffered serious and permanent injuries,” has “undergone multiple surgeries,” and
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“remains unable to work” due to the extent of her injuries. ECF 1, ¶ 10. Two months after the
accident, in September 2023, the Fessias’ counsel contacted Marvin Moniz, a Hawaiian
Department of Transportation employee, to request any public records associated with the incident.
ECF 18, ¶ 8; ECF 19-15 (Moniz response to public information act request).
On June 20, 2025, the Fessias filed this personal injury lawsuit in this district, asserting
claims of negligence and loss of consortium. ECF 1, ¶¶ 10, 12. A month later, HMS answered.
ECF 6. On August 27, 2025, after a Rule 16 conference with counsel, the Court issued a scheduling
order, ECF 11, and referred this case to a magistrate judge for a settlement conference, ECF 12.
While the parties engaged in discovery, they communicated with Magistrate Judge Gina L. Simms
about scheduling a settlement conference. ECF 15, 16, 17.
Then, on November 17, while discovery was well underway and set to close in less than
two months, HMS filed a motion to transfer this case to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Hawaii. ECF 18. The Fessias opposed the motion, ECF 19, and HMS filed a reply, ECF 20. On
December 11, the Court held a status conference to discuss the motion to transfer, the status of
settlement talks, and the status of discovery. During the call, the parties indicated they might be
willing to resume settlement negotiations. Then, on January 8, 2026, they jointly requested a 90-
day extension of the discovery deadline to April 7, 2026, ECF 22, which the Court granted, ECF
26. In their January 8 status report, the parties stated they are waiting for the Court to rule on this
motion to transfer before they retain additional experts. ECF 23, at 1 n.1. No hearing on the motion
to transfer is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025).
II. 	Standard of Review
HMS moves to transfer this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a)
provides, in relevant part, that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
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justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought[.]” A party requesting a change of venue under this statute “bears the burden
of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that transfer to another venue is proper.” Menk v.
MITRE Corp., 713 F. Supp. 3d 113, 132 (D. Md. 2024) (quoting Kimber v. Plus3 IT Sys., LLC,
No. ELH-18-3046, 2019 WL 1518970, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 2019)). To meet its burden, the
movant must rely on more than “[m]ere assertions of inconvenience or hardship” that it will suffer
in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. Versus Evil LLC v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 613 F. Supp. 3d 916,
923 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Meissner, 604 F. Supp. 2d 757, 770 (D.
Md. 2009)). The movant may and should “submit affidavits from witnesses and parties involved
that explain the inconvenience and hardship[.]” Id. (quoting CoStar, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 770).
In analyzing a motion to transfer under § 1404(a), the court first must satisfy itself that
“the action could have been brought in the transferee district.” D2L Ltd. v. Blackboard, Inc., 671
F. Supp. 2d 768, 777 (D. Md. 2009). The parties do not dispute that this action could have been
brought in the District of Hawaii.
The court then considers four factors: “(1) the weight accorded to plaintiff’s choice of
venue; (2) witness convenience and access; (3) convenience of the parties; and (4) the interest of
justice.” Trs. of the Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d
436, 444 (4th Cir. 2015). Section 1404(a) “provides no guidance as to the weight” the court should
give each of these factors. D2L, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 777–78 (quoting Byerson v. Equifax Info.
Servs., LLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (E.D. Va. 2006)). “[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor
of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Collins v. Straight,
Inc., 748 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
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(1946)). Ultimately, “[t]he decision whether to transfer venue is committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court.” Mamani v. Bustamante, 547 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469 (D. Md. 2008).
III. Analysis
The balance of the § 1404(a) factors do not favor transfer.
A. Plaintiffs’ Choice of Venue
“[P]laintiffs are ordinarily allowed to select whatever forum they consider most
advantageous (consistent with jurisdictional and venue limitations)[.]” Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v.
U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013). “[T]he [c]ourt ordinarily accords
substantial weight to the plaintiff’s choice of forum,” but this deference “is lessened when the
forum is not the plaintiff’s home forum and when the complained-of conduct did not occur in that
forum.” Bell v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 3d 390, 394 (D. Md. 2024).
The Fessias, residents of Utah, chose to file suit in the District of Maryland, where HMS
has its principal place of business. The only other jurisdictions where they could have filed suit
were the District of Hawaii, where the events occurred, and the District of Delaware, where HMS
is incorporated. The Fessias understandably chose to file in this district because Maryland is closer
to their home than Hawaii; this district is served by three major airports; and litigating in Maryland
is less expensive than litigating in Hawaii. See ECF 19, at 3–4.
HMS argues that the plaintiffs’ choice of venue is entitled to little weight because none
of the negligent acts occurred in Maryland and “this case has no factual connection to the State of
Maryland.” ECF 18-1, at 5. HMS is correct. See, e.g., Manne v. Jaddou, No. CV 21-1092 PJM,
2022 WL 102853, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 11, 2022) (noting that, when “‘none of the conduct
complained of occurred in the forum selected by the plaintiff and said forum has no connection
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with the matter in controversy,’ deference is less appropriate” (quoting United States ex rel.
Salomon v. Wolff, 268 F. Supp. 3d 770, 774–75 (D. Md. 2017))).
Because the complained of conduct did not occur in Maryland and the plaintiffs do not
live in Maryland, their chosen forum is entitled to less deference. This factor is neutral.
B. Convenience of Witnesses
HMS claims that “all of the crucial fact witnesses (Baron Ladia, Brian West, and Marvin
Moniz) work and reside in the State of Hawaii.” ECF 18-1, at 5. Yet HMS has not submitted any
affidavits from these witnesses explaining the inconvenience or hardship; “[m]ere assertions of
inconvenience” will not suffice. See Versus Evil, 613 F. Supp. 3d at 923. Moreover, not all of these
witnesses are “crucial.”
Baron Ladia, the HMS employee who was operating the cart that struck Aileen Fessia, is
indeed a crucial fact witness. According to HMS, Ladia “continues to work and reside” in Hawaii.
ECF 20, at 2. Nevertheless, the Fessias have agreed that Ladia’s deposition may be conducted
virtually, eliminating any purported inconvenience to Ladia during discovery. ECF 19, at 9. If this
matter goes to trial and HMS does not stipulate to liability, Ladia may have to travel to Maryland
to testify. The Court will not assume the travel will inconvenience Ladia because HMS has not
submitted an affidavit from Ladia indicating how travel to Maryland would be inconvenient or a
hardship.
Brian West, the airport security officer who prepared the incident report, may or may not
live in Hawaii. HMS has not confirmed where West currently lives, nor has it submitted an
affidavit from West. And West’s importance to this case is debatable: He did not witness the
accident, but he did take contemporaneous statements of Aileen Fessia and Ladia. As the Fessias
see it, West is not a crucial witness because it is undisputed that Ladia struck Aileen Fessia with
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the food services cart and that Ladia was acting within the scope of his employment with HMS.
HMS does not explain why West is a crucial witness who would have to testify at trial.
Finally, Marvin Moniz, an employee with the Hawaiian Department of Transportation
who responded to the Fessias’ public records request two months after the accident, is not a crucial
fact witness. It is unclear why Moniz would need to be deposed, let alone testify at trial. If the
documents Moniz produced will be used at trial, the business records exception and a stipulation
about the custodian of records will obviate the need for him to appear in person.
For their part, the Fessias identify three witnesses who would be inconvenienced if this
case were transferred to Hawaii. Aileen Fessia’s treating physician, who resides in Utah, is
expected to testify about his treatment of her injuries stemming from the accident. Traveling to
Maryland for trial is more convenient for him than traveling to Hawaii. Compare ECF 19-9, at 2
(flight time of 5 hours, 44 minutes from Las Vegas, Nevada to Honolulu, Hawaii), with ECF 19-
10, at 2 (flight time of 3 hours, 58 minutes from Las Vegas, Nevada to Dulles International
Airport). And the Fessias have retained two expert witnesses who live in Maryland.
Only one key fact witness—the HMS employee who struck Fessia with the cart—might
arguably be inconvenienced by litigating this case in Maryland, whereas three other important
witnesses—Aileen Fessia’s treating physician and the Fessias’ two retained experts—would be
inconvenienced if this case were transferred to Hawaii. This factor weighs against transfer.
C. Convenience of the Parties
The District of Maryland is extremely convenient for HMS whose principal place of
business is in Maryland. And, for the Fessias, this district is more convenient than the District of
Hawaii. The District of Utah would be even more convenient for them because they live there, but
they could not file suit in their home state because the events did not occur in Utah and HMS
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would not be subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction there. As a result, the Fessias chose
to file suit in this district because Maryland is more convenient for them than Hawaii or Delaware.
Because litigating this case in the District of Maryland is more convenient for all parties,
this factor weighs heavily against transfer.
D. Interest of Justice
“[T]he interest of justice is a factor (albeit an amorphous and somewhat subjective one)
to be considered on its own and . . . it is very important.” 15 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3854 (4th ed. Sept. 2025 update) (“Wright & Miller”). This factor
“encompasses all relevant considerations apart from witness and party convenience.” Smellie v.
Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. PX-23-2121, 2023 WL 7487183, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2023). These
considerations include “the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home,” Atl.
City Assocs. No. Two (S-1), LLC v. Reale, No. CCB-11-78, 2011 WL 1769842, at *3 (D. Md. May
9, 2011), and the relative familiarity of the transferor and transferee courts with the facts and claims
at issue, see Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., No. PWG-14-111, 2014 WL 979198,
at *5–6 (D. Md. Mar. 12, 2014).
HMS’s primary interest-of-justice argument is that “to the extent Plaintiffs contend that
Hawaii substantive law applies to their claims, a judge from Hawaii would undoubtedly be more
familiar with such law for purposes of properly applying it to various aspects of this lawsuit.” ECF
18-1, at 6; see also ECF 20, at 7 (“[A] Hawaiian judge would be better situated to oversee a lawsuit
in which Hawaiian law allegedly applies.”). Whatever law governs the Fessias’ negligence and
loss of consortium claims—Hawaii or Maryland—this Court is certainly capable of applying it to
this straightforward negligence case. No special experience with Hawaii tort law is necessary for
this Maryland judge to fairly and ably preside over this case. And if HMS is correct that Maryland,
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not Hawaii, law governs, then by HMS’s own logic, this case should be overseen by a judge from
Maryland, not Hawaii.
The interest of justice weighs against transfer for another reason: HMS’s significant delay
in requesting transfer. HMS filed its motion to transfer nearly five months after the complaint was
filed and a mere seven weeks before the close of discovery. While there is no deadline by which a
motion to transfer must be filed, transfer motions should be brought reasonably promptly after suit
is filed. See 15 Wright & Miller § 3844. HMS knew at the outset of this case that the events took
place in Hawaii and that some witnesses are in Hawaii. See ECF 1, ¶¶ 6–9, 14 (describing events
occurring in Hawaii). Yet, HMS was content to litigate this case in its home forum for several
months.1 Why, then, did HMS file the motion to transfer so late? There are two apparent and
related reasons: (1) HMS found the plaintiffs’ settlement demand unreasonable and, in retaliation
for the unreasonable demand, filed the motion to transfer five days later, see ECF 20-4, at 2
(November 12 email from HMS counsel referring to “Plaintiffs’ eight-figure settlement demand”
and advising that “it appears that Defendant will be seeking [ ] a transfer”); and (2) HMS is trying
to strongarm the plaintiffs into stipulating that Maryland, not Hawaii, law applies (apparently
because Hawaii law favors the plaintiffs and presumably drove the settlement demand), see ECF
18, at 2 n.1 (HMS offering to withdraw its transfer motion if “Plaintiffs will stipulate that Maryland
substantive law applies to this matter”). Clearly, HMS is less concerned with where this case is
litigated than it is with which state’s law applies to the plaintiffs’ claims. The Court will not
countenance HMS’s gamesmanship and dilatory tactics by granting its motion to transfer.
1 To be sure, HMS’s counsel emailed the Fessias’ counsel on June 30, 2025, asking if counsel
would be “amenable to transferring this lawsuit to the USDC for the District of Hawaii.” ECF 19-
13, at 3. Counsel said no. Id. at 2. HMS proceeded to litigate this case in Maryland.
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HMS may object to the Court’s findings of gamesmanship. Regardless of whether HMS’s
motion to transfer was a retributive litigation tactic, the fact remains that HMS knew at the
beginning of this lawsuit that the events giving rise to the Fessias’ claims occurred in Hawaii and
that some of the witnesses are in Hawaii, yet it chose not to file the motion until five months after
the case commenced. HMS has not justified the delay. HMS’s calculated decision not to
reasonably promptly seek a transfer is yet another reason why its bid to transfer this case to Hawaii
is doomed.
The interest of justice factor weighs heavily against transfer.
IV. 	Conclusion
Though this case could have been brought in the District of Hawaii, HMS has not met its
burden to show that the balance of the § 1404(a) factors tips strongly enough in its favor to justify
disturbing the plaintiffs’ choice of forum. HMS’s motion to transfer is denied. A separate Order
follows.
Date:________________ 	___________________________
Deborah L. Boardman
United States District Judge
February 10, 2026
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