Santana v. Bisignano

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
(S OUTHERN D IVISION )
CHAMBERS OF
THE HONORABLE GINA L. SIMMS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
6500 CHERRYWOOD LANE
GREENBELT, MARYLAND 20770
March 2, 2026
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE: 	Cynthia S. v. Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration1
Civil No. GLS-25-00876
Dear Counsel:
Pending before this Court are briefs filed by Plaintiff Cynthia S. and the Social Security
Administration and Plaintiff’s Reply Brief. (ECF Nos. 10, 12, 13). Upon review of the pleadings
and the record, the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025).
The Court must uphold the decision of the Social Security Administration (“SSA” or the
“Agency”) if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal
standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
The substantial-evidence rule “consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be
somewhat less than a preponderance.” 	Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. 	This Court shall not “re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment” for that of the
SSA. Id. For the reasons set forth below, I will reverse the Commissioner’s decision in part and
remand the case back to the SSA for further consideration.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits on August 31, 2020. (Tr. 19, 92-93, 185-86). In the application, the Plaintiff alleges that
disability began on January 5, 2020 (later amended to April 1, 2020). (Tr. 19). The claim was
initially denied on November 5, 2021, and upon reconsideration, denied again on December 27,
2022. (Tr. 19, 72, 95-99). On February 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing,
which was granted. (Tr. 19, 113-14). An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a telephonic
hearing on January 17, 2024. 	(Tr. 19, 38-68). 	On February 26, 2024, the ALJ found that the
Plaintiff was disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act beginning on
1 On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed her case against Leland Dudek, the then Acting Commissioner of Social
Security. (ECF No. 1). On May 7, 2025, Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration. Accordingly, consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Commissioner Bisignano has been
substituted as the Defendant in this case.
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Cynthia S. v. Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
Civil No. GLS-25-00876
March 2, 2026
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September 12, 2022. 	(Tr. 19-29). 	As the ALJ expected that the Plaintiff would improve with
appropriate medical treatment, she recommended a “continuing disability review” in 36 months.
(Id. at 29). On January 30, 2025, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, and
the ALJ’s decision dated February 26, 2024, became the final and reviewable decision of the SSA.
(Tr. 1-6). See 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a).
II. 	THE LAW
The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” 	42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 	An individual is deemed to have a
disability if his “physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work . . . which exists in significant
numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” Id.
§ 423(d)(2)(A).
To determine whether a person has a disability, the ALJ engages in the five-step sequential
evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). 	See, e.g., Barnhart v.
Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2015).
The steps used by the ALJ are as follows: step one, assess whether a claimant has engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date; step two, determine whether a
claimant’s impairments meet the severity and durations requirements found in the regulations; step
three, ascertain whether a claimant’s medical impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in
the regulations (the “Listings”). 	If the first three steps are not conclusive, i.e., a claimant’s
impairment is severe but does not meet one or more of the Listings, the ALJ proceeds to step four.
At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). A claimant’s
RFC is the most that a claimant could do despite her/his limitations, through consideration of
claimant’s “‘medically determinable impairments of which [the ALJ is] aware,’ including those
not labeled severe at step two.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.945(a)(2)). Also at step four, the ALJ analyzes whether a claimant could perform past work,
given the limitations caused by her/his impairments. 	Finally, at step five, the ALJ analyzes
whether a claimant could perform jobs other than what the claimant performed in the past, and
whether such jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy. 	See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).
At steps one through four, it is the claimant’s burden to show that he is disabled. Bowen
v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2016).
If the ALJ’s evaluation moves to step five, the burden then shifts to the SSA to prove that a
claimant has the ability to perform work and, therefore, is not disabled. Hunter v. Sullivan, 993
F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
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Cynthia S. v. Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
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III. 	ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
The ALJ first evaluated Plaintiff’s claim by following the sequential evaluation process
outlined above. 	(Tr. 21-29). 	At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since April 1, 2020, the amended alleged onset date of Plaintiff’s
disability. (Tr. 21). At step two, the ALJ found that since April 1, 2020, Plaintiff suffered from
the following severe impairments: lumbar spine stenosis, disorders of the muscle, migraines,
diffuse disease of corrective tissue, and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 21-22). The ALJ found that these
impairments were severe because these impairments significantly limit the Plaintiff’s ability to
perform basic work activities as required by SSR 85-28. (Id. at 22). However, at step three the
ALJ also determined that none of Plaintiff’s impairments or combination of impairments met or
medically equaled one or more of the Listings. (Tr. 22-23). Taking into account Plaintiff’s severe
impairments, the ALJ next assessed Plaintiff’s RFC. Despite Plaintiff’s severe impairments, the
ALJ determined that, since April 1, 2020, Plaintiff had the RFC
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except
[Plaintiff] can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. 	[Plaintiff]
can tolerate no more than occasional exposure to extreme cold
temperatures. 	[Plaintiff] can occasionally climb ramps and stairs,
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. 	[Plaintiff] is capable of
working in an environment rated moderate for noise. [Plaintiff] can
tolerate occasional interaction with the public. [Plaintiff] can reach
frequently overhead with her right upper extremity.
(Tr. 23). At step four, the ALJ found that, since April 1, 2020, Plaintiff was unable to perform any
past relevant work. (Tr. 26-27).
In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ “considered all symptoms and the extent to which
these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and
other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 CFR 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p.” (Tr. 23). The
ALJ “also considered the medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s) in
accordance with the requirements of 20 CFR 404.1520c.” (Id.).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not fully supported for the reasons
explained in this decision.” (Tr. 24). The ALJ found that “the objective medical evidence supports
a finding that [Plaintiff] is capable of work within the confines of” the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
(Tr. 24). 	The ALJ ultimately “considered [Plaintiff’s] lumbar spine stenosis, disorders of the
muscle, migraines, diffuse disease of corrective tissue, anxiety disorder, treatment history, medical
imaging, and corresponding symptoms when finding she is capable of a reduced range of sedentary
work with additional postural, environmental, reaching, and interactive limitations.” (Tr. 25).
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When evaluating the medical opinion evidence that the ALJ found most persuasive, she
cited to a state agency consultant’s prior administrative medical finding as persuasively concluding
that Plaintiff could only perform sedentary work. (Tr. 25, 78-81).
Before making a finding regarding step five, the ALJ conducted a hearing on January 17,
2024. 	(Tr. 38-68). 	At the hearing, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified, relying upon the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles and her own experience in the field of vocational rehabilitation.
The VE identified the Plaintiff’s past relevant work: a specialist, an EEG technologist/head
technologist. (Id. at 62). The ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical person with the same age,
education, and work experience as the Plaintiff, with her RFC, would be able to perform Plaintiff’s
past relevant work. 	(Id.). 	The VE opined that the hypothetical individual would not be able to
perform the past work. (Id.).
The ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical person with the same age, education, and
work experience as the Plaintiff, with her RFC, could perform any work. (Tr. 62). The VE opined
that the hypothetical individual could perform sedentary work such as a document preparer, an
assembler, and a semiconductor bonder. (Tr. 63). Upon further inquiry by the ALJ, the VE opined
that, if the individual could frequently reach overhead with the right upper extremity, their work
would not be affected. 	(Id.). 	The ALJ further asked whether the same hypothetical individual,
including the limitation as it relates to reaching overhead, could perform any work in the national
economy were they to be absent, miss deadlines, or otherwise be off-task for 15% of the workday.
(Id.). 	The VE opined that the hypothetical individual would not be able to perform any work.
(Id.). The VE further opined that the same hypothetical individual would not be able to transfer
any skills gained from past work to any sedentary work. (Tr. 63-64).
Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE about an employer’s tolerance for absenteeism.
(Tr. 64-65). The VE opined that any absences beyond two days a month, regardless of the cause,
would preclude the hypothetical individual from gainful employment. (Id. at 65).
At step five, the ALJ ultimately determined that the Plaintiff was not disabled prior to
September 12, 2022. However, as her “age category changed to an individual closely approaching
advanced age,” she became disabled on September 12, 2022, and continues to be disabled. (Tr.
27-28).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously assessed her RFC by
failing to perform a function-by-function assessment of her ability to perform all of the physical
tasks required in sedentary work, namely, her ability to sit for a prolonged period of time. (ECF
No. 10, pp. 7-15). 	In response, the SSA contends that the ALJ’s narrative discussion contains
sufficient information to allow meaningful review. (ECF No. 12, pp. 5-10).
I have carefully reviewed the arguments and the record. 	I find persuasive Plaintiff’s
argument that the ALJ failed to perform a function-by-function assessment of her ability to
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Cynthia S. v. Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
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perform the physical demands of sedentary work by not addressing her capacity for prolonged
sitting. Accordingly, I find remand appropriate, for the reasons set forth below.
As a preliminary matter, the SSA has created a system through which it defines the physical
exertional requirements for jobs in the national economy. 	Within this system, there are five
categories in which a job may fall: (1) sedentary; (2) light; (3) medium (4) heavy; and (5) very
heavy. Sedentary work is defined as work that “involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time
and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” In addition,
this category includes jobs that allow for sitting and only require “occasional” walking and
standing. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a); SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5 (Jan 1,
1983) (“‘Occasionally’ means occurring from very little up to one-third of the time. Since being
on one’s feet is required ‘occasionally’ at the sedentary level of exertion, periods of standing or
walking should generally total no more than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday, and sitting should
generally total approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” (emphasis added)).
A claimant’s RFC is the most that a claimant could do despite her/his limitations, through
consideration of claimant’s “‘medically determinable impairments of which [the ALJ is] aware,’
including those not labeled severe at step two.” 	Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635 (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.945(a)). Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1) and 416.945(a)(1), an ALJ must devise
an RFC that captures a claimant’s ability to do physical and/or mental work activities for a
sustained period of time (i.e., sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work), given the
claimant’s limitations. 	An ALJ must “consider all of the claimant’s ‘physical and mental
impairments, severe and otherwise, and determine, on a function-by-function basis, how they
affect [her] ability to work.’” 	Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Monroe, 826 F.3d at 188). In addition, the Fourth Circuit requires an ALJ’s findings pertaining to
a claimant’s RFC to be “accompanied by ‘a narrative discussion describing’ the evidence
supporting” each conclusion. Dowling v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 388 (4th Cir.
2021) (quoting Thomas, 916 F.3d at 311); see SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (July 2, 1996).
A proper RFC narrative consists of: “(1) evidence; (2) [a] logical explanation; and (3) [a]
conclusion.” Dowling, 986 F.3d at 388 (quoting Thomas, 916 F.3d at 311). In addition, an ALJ’s
narrative discussion must “[contain] an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [a]
conclusion.” 	Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189. 	Moreover, an ALJ’s logical explanation is just as
important as the other two components of the RFC analysis. Thomas, 916 F.3d at 311.
Here, the ALJ found at step two of the sequential evaluation process that Plaintiff had
several severe impairments. (Tr. 21). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform sedentary
work with the following limitations relevant to this analysis: never climb ladders, ropes, and
scaffolds; and occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Tr.
23). Thus, the RFC is silent on Plaintiff’s ability/inability to sit.
In coming to this conclusion, the ALJ referenced the Plaintiff’s testimony and summarized
the medical records related to her symptoms and treatment history. (Tr. 24-25). When evaluating
the medical opinion evidence that she found most persuasive, the ALJ cited to a state agency
consultant’s prior administrative medical finding as persuasively concluding that Plaintiff could
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Cynthia S. v. Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
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only perform sedentary work. (Tr. 25, 78-81).
Sedentary work includes jobs that allow for sitting and jobs that only occasionally require
walking or standing. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a). However, the RFC is silent on the
Plaintiff’s ability/inability to perform those functions. Plaintiff testified that she suffers from back
pain that is made worse by prolonged sitting, standing, bending, and twisting at the waist. 	(Tr.
48). 	But the record is devoid of specific findings related to Plaintiff’s ability to sit. 	The ALJ
ultimately relied “on the objective medical evidence of record, the medical opinion evidence, and
[Plaintiff’s] activities of daily living, which lends to a finding that she is capable of work within
the confines of the” RFC assessment. 	(Tr. 26). 	This assertion falls short of the explanation
necessary to support the ALJ’s RFC determination. See Donell F. v. Kijakazi, Civ. No. GLS 21-
2399, 2023 WL 203351, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 17, 2023) (“[A] conclusory assertion falls short of a
narrative discussion and fails to create an ‘accurate and logical bridge’ between the evidence and
the ALJ’s RFC determination.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, remand is required because the
“ALJ fail[ed] to assess a claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory
evidence in the record.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636 (citation omitted).
The Court finds instructive Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2018). In Woods,
the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff could perform “medium” work. 	In reviewing the ALJ’s
decision, the court stated that the ALJ “summarized evidence that he found credible, useful, and
consistent.” Id. at 694. However, the court found the ALJ’s decision lacking as it did not describe
how the cited evidence supported the various limitations contained within the RFC. Id. The court
found that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence because “the ALJ never
explained how he concluded—based on this evidence—that [the plaintiff] could actually perform
the tasks required by ‘medium work,’ such as . . . standing or walking for six hours. 	The ALJ
therefore failed to build an ‘accurate and logical bridge’ from the evidence he recounted to his
conclusion about [the plaintiff’s RFC].” 	Id. (internal citation omitted). 	In the absence of a
narrative discussion, the court found that remand was appropriate. 	Id. at 695; see Monroe, 826
F.3d at 189 (an ALJ’s decision must include a discussion connecting the evidence to each
conclusion); accord Dowling, 986 F.3d at 388 (determining that “the ALJ did not properly assess
the extent to which [the plaintiff’s] sitting problems impacted her ability to work. [The plaintiff]
has argued throughout her administrative and judicial proceedings that her [inflammatory bowel
disease] and anal fissure cause her to experience discomfort when she sits for a prolonged period
of time. But the ALJ apparently concluded that [the plaintiff] was not restricted in her ability to
sit, as he did not indicate that her RFC was limited because of those problems. This conclusion
should have been the result of an analysis that was separate from the ALJ’s appraisal of [the
plaintiff’s] ability to perform other functions, and should have been accompanied by ‘a narrative
discussion describing’ the evidence supporting it. The ALJ’s evaluation of [the Plaintiff’s] ability
to sit was lacking in both respects. The ALJ never specifically discussed the extent to which [the
plaintiff’s] alleged sitting problems impacted her ability to perform sedentary work. 	The ALJ
could not have supported a conclusion in this regard through a narrative discussion concerning the
relevant evidence because he reached no such express conclusion in the first instance. In fact, the
ALJ barely mentioned [the plaintiff’s] sitting problems in his decision, and discussed them only
when rattling off a laundry list of her many impairments and functional restrictions. This grouping
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of [the plaintiff’s] sitting limitations with her other impairments and restrictions is a far cry from
the ‘function-by-function analysis’ the ALJ was required to conduct.” (internal citation omitted)).
In sum, because the ALJ failed to build an “accurate and logical bridge” between the
evidence and her RFC assessment, this Court cannot find that her decision is supported by
substantial evidence. On remand, the ALJ should provide a proper function-by-function analysis
that builds “an accurate and logical bridge” between the evidence and the Plaintiff’s RFC.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, consistent with sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the
Agency’s judgment is REVERSED IN PART due to inadequate analysis. 	The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. I express no opinion as to
whether the ALJ’s ultimate finding that Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to
benefits, is correct. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as such. A separate Order follows.
Sincerely,
/s/
The Honorable Gina L. Simms
United States Magistrate Judge
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