Sandberg v. Noem

8:24-cv-03257Mdd11 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
JEROME SANDBERG
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 24-3257
:
KRISTI NOEM, in her official
capacity as U.S. Secretary of 	:
Homeland Security
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this Title VII
religious 	accommodation 	case 	is 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	or, 	in 	the
alternative, 	for 	summary 	judgment 	filed 	by 	Kristi 	Noem
(“Defendant”).1 	(ECF No. 15). 	The issues have been briefed, and
the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed 	necessary. 	Local
Rule 105.6. 	For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will
be granted.
1 The amended complaint names “Kristy Noem” as the defendant.
The 	U.S. 	Secretary 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	spells 	her 	first 	name
“Kristi” rather than “Kristy.” 	Kristi Noem, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 	https://www.dhs.gov/kristi-noem. 	Secretary 	Noem 	is 	the
proper defendant as the head of the relevant agency. 	42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(c).
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I. 	Background
A. 	Factual Background
Since 	2006, 	Jerome 	Sandberg 	(“Mr. 	Sandberg” 	or 	“Plaintiff”)
has 	worked 	as 	a 	Transportation 	Security 	Officer 	at 	the 	Baltimore
Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (“BWI”). 	(ECF
No. 	14 	¶ 	2). 	He 	is 	an 	employee 	of 	the 	Transportation 	Security
Administration 	(“TSA”), 	an 	agency 	housed 	within 	the 	U.S.
Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security 	(“DHS”). 	(Id. 	¶¶ 	2–3). 	Mr.
Sandberg is Jewish and “observes the Sabbath from sundown on Friday
to 	sundown 	on 	Saturday, 	during 	which 	time 	he 	cannot 	work.” 	(Id.
¶ 15). 	“Upon employment in 2006, [Mr. Sandberg] notified [DHS] of
his religious observance[.]” 	(Id. ¶ 16). 	For fifteen years, DHS
accommodated 	Mr. 	Sandberg’s 	inability 	to 	work 	on 	the 	Sabbath 	by
not 	assigning 	him 	shifts 	that 	fell 	on 	the 	Sabbath. 	(Id. 	¶¶ 	17–
19).
In 	fall 	2022, 	Mr. 	Sandberg’s 	request 	for 	religious
accommodation was denied.2 	(Id. ¶ 21). 	His new schedule provided
2 	It 	is 	not 	clear 	when 	the 	official 	denial 	occurred. 	In
paragraph 20 of the amended complaint, he alleges that the denial
occurred in September 2022, (ECF No. 14 ¶ 20), but in paragraph 23
he suggests the denial came from Cynthia Rahmani in November 2022,
(Id. 	¶ 	23), 	and 	the 	memorandum 	from 	Chris 	Murgia 	that 	Plaintiff
calls 	the 	“decision 	letter” 	likewise 	came 	in 	November 	2022, 	(Id.
¶ 35; ECF No. 15-2, at 2). 	At this stage, the precise date of the
denial is not important.
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him 	Thursday 	and 	Friday 	off, 	but 	not 	Saturday. 	(Id. 	¶ 	26). 	He
alleges 	that 	“new 	management 	assumed 	control 	and 	informed 	[him]
that 	they 	could 	no 	longer 	accommodate 	his 	religious 	observance”
because 	such 	accommodation 	would 	violate 	the 	seniority-based
bidding 	system 	enshrined 	in 	the 	Collective 	Bargaining 	Agreement
(“CBA”). 	(Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 33). 	Chris Murgia, the Federal Security
Director 	at 	BWI, 	instead 	offered 	in 	a 	letter 	to 	Mr. 	Sandberg
(“Murgia 	letter”) 	several 	other 	options 	“to 	secure 	the 	time 	off
that [he] need[s] for [his] religious observances.” 	(ECF No. 15-
2, 	at 	2). 	Mr. 	Murgia 	informed 	Mr. 	Sandberg 	that 	he 	could 	pursue
shift 	or 	schedule 	trades 	with 	his 	co-workers 	or 	request 	leave.
(Id.). 	DHS 	had 	“created 	electronic 	shift 	and 	schedule 	trade
boards” to facilitate voluntary shift and schedule swaps. 	(Id.).
Mr. Sandberg alleges that these “alternative accommodations” were
“no[t] feasible.” 	(ECF No. 14 ¶ 39).
Thereafter, 	despite 	his 	continued 	request 	for 	religious
accommodation, 	Mr. 	Sandberg 	“was 	scheduled 	to 	work 	every
Saturday.” 	(Id. 	¶ 	22). 	Over 	a 	six-month 	period, 	Mr. 	Sandberg
successfully traded his Saturday shift on only two occasions. 	(Id.
¶ 27). 	Consequently, Mr. Sandberg “was required to use his accrued
leave to avoid working on Saturdays” during that six-month period,
resulting 	in 	his 	use 	of 	leave 	on 	92% 	of 	Saturdays. 	(Id. 	¶ 	28).
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Once 	he 	depleted 	his 	accrued 	leave, 	“he 	was 	unable 	to 	take
Saturdays off, resulting in a loss of 20% of his pay during those
weeks.” 	(Id. ¶ 29). 	On these days, presumably, Mr. Sandberg took
unpaid leave. 	He contends that “be[ing] forced to use annual and
sick leave” has “plac[ed] his employment at risk.” 	(Id. ¶ 40).
It is not clear on the face of the complaint how long the TSA
scheduled 	Mr. 	Sandberg 	to 	work 	on 	Saturday. 	Defendant 	reports
that, 	at 	least 	as 	of 	May 	5, 	2024, 	Mr. 	Sandberg 	was 	no 	longer
scheduled to work on Saturdays. 	(ECF No. 20, at 3 n.4).
B. 	Procedural Background
On December 13, 2022, Mr. Sandberg initiated contact with an
Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity 	Counselor, 	before 	filing 	a 	formal
complaint 	of 	religious 	discrimination 	with 	the 	Equal 	Employment
Opportunity 	Commission 	(“EEOC”) 	on 	March 	19, 	2023. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	14
¶¶ 	9–10; 	15-6, 	at 	3). 	The 	EEOC 	denied 	Mr. 	Sandberg’s 	claim 	on
September 20, 2024, concluding that DHS “made a good faith effort
to reasonably accommodate [Mr. Sandberg’s] religious beliefs,” and
that Mr. Sandberg’s requested accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on DHS. 	(ECF No. 15-5, at 4). 	Mr. Sandberg then received
a final order denying his claim from DHS’s Office of Civil Rights
and 	Civil 	Liberties 	on 	October 	21, 	2024. 	(ECF 	Nos. 	14 	¶ 	12; 	15-
6, at 2, 4).
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Plaintiff 	filed 	the 	operative 	complaint 	on 	April 	10, 	2025,3
alleging 	a 	single 	count 	of 	religious 	discrimination 	under 	Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17. 	(ECF 	No. 	14). 	He 	seeks 	declaratory, 	injunctive, 	and
compensatory 	relief. 	(Id.). 	On 	April 	21, 	2025, 	Defendant 	filed
a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	or 	for 	summary
judgment. 	(ECF 	No. 	15). 	On 	May 	2, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	his
opposition. 	(ECF No. 17). 	After receiving an extension of time,
Defendant filed her reply on June 5, 2025. 	(ECF No. 20).
II. 	Standard of Review
A 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(b)(6) 	tests 	the
sufficiency of the complaint. 	Presley v. City of Charlottesville,
464 	F.3d 	480, 	483 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2006). 	The 	court 	“must 	accept 	the
complaint’s factual allegations as true and construe the facts in
the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff.” 	Barnett 	v. 	Inova
Health 	Care 	Servs., 	125 	F.4th 	465, 	469 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2025) 	(citing
Barbour 	v. 	Garland, 	105 	F.4th 	579, 	589 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2024)). 	A
plaintiff’s 	complaint 	must 	only 	satisfy 	the 	standard 	of 	Rule
3 Plaintiff filed his original complaint on November 11, 2024.
(ECF No. 1). 	Therefore, his complaint was timely under Title VII.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (requiring a federal employee to file suit
in 	federal 	court 	within 	ninety 	days 	of 	receiving 	notice 	of 	final
agency 	action 	on 	his 	complaint 	of 	discrimination). 	His 	amended
complaint is the operative complaint.
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8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 	“[W]here 	the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere 	possibility 	of 	misconduct, 	the 	complaint 	has 	alleged—but 	it
has 	not 	‘show[n]’—that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)). 	A Rule 8(a)(2) “showing” requires “stat[ing] a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 	U.S. 	544, 	570 	(2007). 	“A 	claim 	has 	facial 	plausibility 	when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the 	reasonable 	inference 	that 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the
misconduct alleged.” 	Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 299–300 (4 th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
III. Analysis
A. 	Exhibits
As 	a 	threshold 	matter, 	the 	court 	must 	determine 	which
extrinsic documents may be considered on a motion to dismiss. 	“As
a general rule, the court does not consider extrinsic evidence at
the 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	stage[.]” 	Faulkenberry 	v. 	U.S. 	Dep’t 	of
Def., 670 F.Supp.3d 234, 249 (D.Md. 2023) (quoting Reamer v. State
Auto. 	Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	556 	F.Supp.3d 	544, 	549 	(D.Md. 	2021), 	aff’d,
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No. 21-2432, 2022 WL 17985700 (4 th Cir. Dec. 29, 2022)). 	“However,
‘the court may consider, without converting the motion to dismiss
into one for summary judgment, documents attached to the complaint
as exhibits, and documents attached to a motion to dismiss if the
document is integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about
the document’s authenticity.’” 	Id. (quoting Reamer, 556 F.Supp.3d
at 	549). 	“[F]or 	an 	extrinsic 	document 	to 	be 	integral 	to 	a
complaint the document must either give rise to a claim or be the
basis of an element of a claim.” 	Defs. of Wildlife v. Boyles, 608
F.Supp.3d 336, 345 (D.S.C. 2022); see also Goines v. Valley Cmty.
Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4 th Cir. 2016).
The only extrinsic document necessary to decide this case is
the 	Murgia 	letter 	denying 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	for 	religious
accommodation in the form of Saturdays off, which is referenced in
the 	Amended 	Complaint 	and 	attached 	to 	Defendant’s 	motion 	to
dismiss. 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	dispute 	the 	authenticity 	of 	the
document. 	Moreover, 	the 	Murgia 	letter 	is 	integral 	to 	the
complaint. 	The 	denial 	and 	accommodations 	letter 	reaffirmed 	that
Plaintiff 	was 	scheduled 	to 	work 	on 	the 	Sabbath 	and 	informed 	him
that 	he 	could 	use 	leave 	to 	avoid 	that 	consequence, 	which 	is 	the
basis 	of 	the 	discipline 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	he 	suffered.
Accordingly, 	the 	court 	will 	consider 	the 	Murgia 	letter 	without
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converting Defendant’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment.4 	As will be explained, the accommodations offered were
reasonable.
B. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Failure-to-Accommodate
Claim
Title 	VII 	mandates 	that 	“[a]ll 	personnel 	actions 	affecting
employees 	[of 	federal 	executive 	departments] 	. 	. 	. 	shall 	be 	made
4 	Even 	if 	it 	were 	more 	appropriate 	to 	convert 	Defendant’s
motion 	into 	one 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	12(d),
Defendant would be entitled to summary judgment. 	Two requirements
must 	be 	met 	before 	converting 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	into 	one 	for
summary 	judgment: 	(1) 	actual 	notice 	to 	the 	nonmovant 	that 	the
conversion 	may 	occur, 	and 	(2) 	reasonable 	opportunity 	for
discovery. 	See 	Gay 	v. 	Wall, 	761 	F.2d 	175, 	177 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1985).
The first requirement is met when the movant styles his motion to
dismiss as one for summary judgment in the alternative. 	Laughlin
v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260 (4 th Cir. 1998).
Here, 	Defendant 	styled 	her 	motion 	as 	a 	“Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	the
Amended 	Complaint 	or, 	in 	the 	Alternative, 	for 	Summary 	Judgment.”
(ECF 	No. 	15, 	at 	1). 	The 	second 	requirement 	is 	met 	when 	the
nonmovant 	fails 	“to 	oppose 	the 	motion 	on 	the 	grounds 	that 	more
time 	was 	needed 	for 	discovery,” 	generally 	through 	a 	Rule 	56(d)
affidavit or declaration. 	Sager v. Housing Comm’n of Anne Arundel
Cnty., 	855 	F.Supp.2d 	524, 	542 	(D.Md. 	2012) 	(quoting 	Harrods 	Ltd.
v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4 th Cir. 2002)).
Here, 	Plaintiff 	failed 	to 	request 	time 	for 	discovery 	through 	a
Rule 	56(d) 	filing 	or 	otherwise. 	The 	only 	evidence 	Plaintiff
puts 	forward 	is 	his 	verified 	complaint 	(which 	includes 	a 	page 	of
the 	CBA). 	See 	Williams 	v. 	Griffin, 	952 	F.2d 	820, 	823 	(4 th 	Cir.
1991) 	(“[A] 	verified 	complaint 	is 	the 	equivalent 	of 	an 	opposing
affidavit 	for 	summary 	judgment 	purposes[.]”). 	Nothing 	in
Plaintiff’s verified complaint raises a dispute of material fact.
As a matter of law, the accommodations Defendant provided Plaintiff
were 	reasonable. 	Therefore, 	the 	result 	would 	be 	the 	same 	if 	the
issue were resolved on summary judgment.
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free from any discrimination based on . . . religion.” 	42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(a). 	When interpreting this provision of Title VII, the
Fourth Circuit has incorporated the private employment standard in
42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2000e-2(a)(1). 	Baqir 	v. 	Principi, 	434 	F.3d 	733, 	742
(4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he standards governing private-sector illegal
claims 	[are] 	applied 	to 	claims 	brought 	by 	federal 	employees.”
(citing 	Page 	v. 	Bolger, 	645 	F.2d 	227, 	233 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1981) 	(en
banc))), abrogated on other grounds by, E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie &
Fitch 	Stores, 	Inc., 	575 	U.S. 	768 	(2015). 	The 	private 	employment
standard 	for 	religious 	accommodation 	claims 	makes 	it 	“unlawful 	.
. 	. 	for 	an 	employer 	. 	. 	. 	to 	discriminate 	against 	any 	individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of 	employment, 	because 	of 	such 	individual’s 	. 	. 	. 	religion.” 	42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 	Ordinarily, “[t]o prove a claim under the
disparate treatment theory, an employee must demonstrate that the
employer 	treated 	her 	differently 	than 	other 	employees 	because 	of
her 	religious 	beliefs.” 	Chalmers 	v. 	Tulon 	Co. 	of 	Richmond, 	101
F.3d 	1012, 	1017 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1996). 	Congress, 	however, 	defines
religion 	in 	Title 	VII 	to 	encompass 	“all 	aspects 	of 	religious
observance 	and 	practice, 	as 	well 	as 	belief, 	unless 	an 	employer
demonstrates 	that 	he 	is 	unable 	to 	reasonably 	accommodate 	to 	an
employee’s 	. 	. 	. 	religious 	observance 	or 	practice 	without 	undue
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hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 	42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j). 	Accordingly, 	Title 	VII 	requires 	that 	an 	employer
reasonably 	accommodate 	an 	employee’s 	religious 	observance 	or
practice unless doing so would cause the employer undue hardship.
See E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 312
(4th Cir. 2008) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 75 (1977)).
Under Title VII, employers have a duty to
“make 	reasonable 	accommodation 	for 	the
religious observances of its employees, short
of 	incurring 	an 	undue 	hardship.” 	EEOC 	v.
Consol 	Energy, 	Inc., 	860 	F.3d 	131, 	141 	(4 th
Cir. 	2017) 	(quotation 	and 	citation 	omitted).
“[A]n employee must prove that: (1) he or she
has 	a 	bona 	fide 	religious 	belief 	that
conflicts with an employment requirement; (2)
he 	or 	she 	informed 	the 	employer 	of 	this
belief; and (3) he or she was disciplined for
failure 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	conflicting
employment 	requirement.” 	Id. 	(citation 	and
quotation 	omitted). 	The 	Fourth 	Circuit
“employ[s] 	a 	burden 	shifting 	scheme 	akin 	to
the one articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. 	Green, 	411 	U.S. 	792 	(1973).” 	Johnson 	v.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 279 F. App’x
200, 	207 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2008). 	Once 	a 	plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of a failure to
accommodate, 	“the 	burden 	then 	shifts 	to 	the
employer to show that it could not reasonably
accommodate 	the 	plaintiff’s 	religious 	needs
without 	undue 	hardship.” 	Id. 	The 	employer
“must demonstrate either (1) that it provided
the plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation
for 	his 	or 	her 	religious 	observances 	or 	(2)
that 	such 	accommodation 	was 	not 	provided
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because it would have caused undue hardship.”
Id.
Niederberger 	v. 	Wegmans 	Food 	Markets, 	Inc., 	No. 	23-cv-2759-JKB,
2024 WL 2866609, at *3 (D. Md. June 6, 2024). 	Stated otherwise:
[P]roving 	the 	reasonableness 	of 	the 	proposed
accommodation or undue burden is sufficient to
escape 	liability. 	If 	an 	employer 	persuades
the court that its proposed accommodation was
reasonable, 	the 	court 	“need 	not 	examine” 	the
undue 	burden 	claim. 	Firestone, 	515 	F.3d 	at
312.
U.S. 	Equal 	Emp. 	Opportunity 	Comm'n 	v. 	Greyhound 	Lines, 	Inc., 	554
F.Supp.3d 739, 752 (D. Md. 2021).
1. 	Plaintiff’s Plausible Prima Facie Case
To 	survive 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	a
plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII. 	Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); see
also 	Bing 	v. 	Brivo 	Sys., 	LLC, 	959 	F.3d 	605,
616 	(4th 	Cir. 	2020). 	Instead, 	the 	plaintiff
must 	“allege[] 	facts 	that 	plausibly 	state 	a
violation 	of 	Title 	VII 	‘above 	a 	speculative
level.’” 	Bing, 	959 	F.3d 	at 	617 	(quoting
Coleman 	v. 	Md. 	Ct. 	of 	Appeals, 	626 	F.3d 	187,
190 (4 th Cir. 2010)).
Polk 	v. 	Montgomery 	Cnty. 	Pub. 	Schs., 	No. 	24-cv-1487-DLB, 	2025 	WL
240996, 	at 	*18 	(D. 	Md. 	Jan. 	17, 	2025). 	To 	do 	so, 	the 	plaintiff
must “present[] allegations sufficient to reasonably infer a prima
facie 	case 	of 	discrimination 	under 	the 	McDonnell 	Douglas
framework.” 	Niederberger, 2024 WL 2866609, at *3 (quoting Walton
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v. Greensville Corr. Ctr., No. 12-cv-628, 2015 WL 2452451, at *10
(E.D.Va. May 21, 2015)); see Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190–91 (assessing
whether the plaintiff plausibly alleged elements of a prima facie
case); accord Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54
(1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he elements of a prima facie case may be used
as 	a 	prism 	to 	shed 	light 	upon 	the 	plausibility 	of 	the 	claim.”);
Littlejohn 	v. 	City 	of 	New 	York, 	795 	F.3d 	297, 	311 	(2 d 	Cir. 	2015)
(“The facts alleged [in a Title VII complaint] must give plausible
support 	to 	the 	reduced 	requirements 	that 	arise 	under 	McDonnell
Douglas in the initial phase of a Title VII litigation.”).
Defendant 	does 	not 	dispute 	that 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	facts
sufficient 	for 	the 	first 	two 	elements 	of 	his 	prima 	facie 	case.
Plaintiff has a bona fide religious belief that prohibits him from
working on the Sabbath, which conflicts with the work requirement
that he work on the Sabbath. 	(ECF Nos. 14 ¶¶ 15, 22; 15-2, at 1).
Plaintiff 	informed 	his 	employer 	of 	his 	religious 	belief. 	(ECF
Nos. 14 ¶¶ 16, 20; 15-2, at 1).
The 	parties 	do 	dispute, 	however, 	whether 	Plaintiff 	alleges
sufficient 	facts 	for 	the 	third 	element 	of 	discipline 	for 	failure
to comply with the requirement that he work on the Sabbath. 	Title
VII prohibits discipline on the basis of religion that affects the
employee’s 	“compensation, 	terms, 	conditions, 	or 	privileges 	of
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13
employment.” 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2000e-2(a)(1). 	In 	a 	failure-to-
accommodate case, “the discipline at issue is usually ‘discharge,
demotion, 	decrease 	in 	pay 	or 	benefits, 	loss 	of 	job 	title 	or
supervisory 	responsibility, 	or 	reduced 	opportunities.’”
Abdelkader v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 780 F.Supp.2d 389, 395 (D.Md.
2011) (quoting Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255 (4 th Cir. 1999),
abrogated 	on 	other 	grounds 	by, 	Muldrow 	v. 	City 	of 	St. 	Louis, 	601
U.S. 346 (2024)).
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	he 	“faced 	an 	adverse 	action 	of 	lost
leave,” 	(ECF 	No. 	14 	¶ 	55), 	because 	he 	was 	unable 	to 	trade 	his
Saturday shift on all but two occasions and had to use leave—that
he otherwise would have retained—to avoid working on the Sabbath,
(Id. 	¶¶ 	27–28). 	He 	further 	alleges 	that 	when 	he 	depleted 	his
accrued leave, he was forced to take unpaid leave to avoid working
on the Sabbath, resulting in a loss of pay for those weeks. 	(Id.
¶ 29). 	In other words, he contends that he suffered a decrease in
pay 	and 	benefits. 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	“being 	required 	to 	use
leave 	to 	avoid 	working 	on 	religious 	holidays 	is 	not 	a 	form 	of
discipline 	or 	adverse 	action.” 	(ECF 	No. 	15-1, 	at 	8). 	Plaintiff
responds 	in 	his 	opposition 	that 	he 	only 	needs 	to 	show 	that 	his
employer “enforced its requirement against [him],” and that it is
“undisputed” that his employer did enforce the requirement that he
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work 	on 	the 	Sabbath. 	(ECF 	No. 	17, 	at 	4–5 	(citing 	EEOC 	Decision
No. 22-1272, 2023 WL 5623796, at *2 (Aug. 14, 2023))).
As 	a 	threshold 	matter, 	Plaintiff 	elides 	a 	critical
distinction 	in 	his 	recitation 	of 	the 	law 	governing 	the 	third
element. 	Whether 	the 	employer 	enforced 	its 	requirement 	is 	a
separate 	matter 	from 	whether 	such 	enforcement 	constitutes
cognizable 	discipline. 	Enforcement 	is 	too 	broad 	a 	term 	and 	does
not 	itself 	directly 	address 	the 	effect 	on 	the 	employee’s
“compensation, 	terms, 	conditions, 	or 	privileges 	of 	employment.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 	Although it is undisputed that DHS did
not change Plaintiff’s schedule to give him Saturdays off and, in
that sense, enforced its requirement, Defendant does dispute that
requiring Plaintiff to take leave to avoid working on the Sabbath
constitutes 	discipline. 	Plaintiff 	erroneously 	characterizes 	the
third element and its nature as undisputed in his briefing, but he
does argue briefly in his opposition that the requirement that he
use 	leave 	“constituted 	an 	adverse 	action.” 	(ECF 	No. 	17, 	at 	11).
The 	remaining 	question 	is 	whether 	being 	required 	to 	take 	leave
constitutes discipline.5
5 Both parties appear to proceed on the logic that Plaintiff
alleges that he was effectively required to take leave because he
was unable to trade shifts on all but two occasions.
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The 	purported 	adverse 	actions 	can 	be 	divided 	into 	required
paid leave, which Plaintiff took first, and required unpaid leave,
to which Plaintiff ultimately resorted.
To 	require 	that 	an 	employee 	use 	paid 	leave 	for 	religious
observance does not satisfy the discipline element. 	St. Juste v.
Metro 	Plus 	Health 	Plan, 	8 	F.Supp.3d 	287, 	316 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Mar. 	28,
2014) 	(“The 	case 	law 	is 	clear 	that 	requiring 	an 	employee 	to 	use
paid 	leave 	to 	attend 	religious 	services 	does 	not 	constitute 	an
adverse 	employment 	action.” 	(collecting 	cases)), 	abrogated 	on
other 	grounds 	by, 	E.E.O.C. 	v. 	Abercrombie 	& 	Fitch 	Stores, 	Inc.,
575 U.S. 768 (2015). 	As one court explained, in such circumstance
the 	employee 	is 	“not 	deprived 	of 	a 	material 	benefit, 	he 	simply
[chooses] 	to 	use 	the 	benefit 	in 	a 	particular 	way.” 	O’Neill 	v.
City 	of 	Bridgeport 	Police 	Dep’t, 	719 	F.Supp.2d 	219, 	226 	(D.Conn.
2010). 	In 	other 	words, 	being 	required 	to 	use 	paid 	leave 	for
religious 	observance 	does 	not 	affect 	the 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of
employment 	because 	the 	employee 	is 	paid 	for 	the 	same 	number 	of
days 	of 	no 	work 	as 	other 	employees. 	It 	is 	irrelevant 	that 	the
employee 	cannot 	put 	that 	paid 	time 	off 	toward 	nonreligious
activities for as many days as other employees.
It 	is 	a 	closer 	question 	whether 	requiring 	that 	an 	employee
use unpaid leave for religious observance satisfies the discipline
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element. 	St. Juste, 8 F.Supp.3d at 317 (“[I]t is less clear that
being 	required 	to 	take 	unpaid 	leave 	for 	religious 	observances
comprises 	an 	adverse 	action 	for 	purposes 	of 	a 	failure 	to
accommodate claim.” (collecting cases)). 	Courts have diverged in
their approach to this question. 	For example, one court “assume[d]
without deciding that being forced to take unpaid leave to observe
the 	Sabbath, 	when 	that 	results 	in 	a 	reduced 	work 	schedule 	and 	a
loss 	in 	pay, 	could 	constitute 	an 	adverse 	action 	sufficient 	to
establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination.” 	Guy v.
MTA 	N.Y.C. 	Transit, 	No. 	10-cv-1998, 	2012 	WL 	4472112, 	at 	*6
(E.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	6, 	2012) 	(citing 	O’Neill, 	719 	F.Supp.2d 	at 	227),
report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted 	by, 	2012 	WL 	4472098 	(E.D.N.Y.
Sep. 26, 2012).6 	The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, 	on 	the 	other 	hand, 	has 	held 	that 	even 	being 	required 	to
take unpaid leave to avoid working on the Sabbath is not discipline
because 	the 	employee 	“is 	simply 	not 	being 	paid 	for 	the 	time 	he
6 The Supreme Court of the United States in Philbrook did not
address whether required unpaid leave constitutes discipline. 	The
United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	below 	in
Philbrook 	had 	held 	that 	required 	unpaid 	leave 	did 	constitute
discipline of the employee because a “choice . . . between giving
up 	a 	portion 	of 	his 	salary 	and 	his 	religious 	beliefs” 	was
indistinguishable from “a choice between his job and his religious
beliefs.” 	Philbrook 	v. 	Ansonia 	Bd. 	of 	Educ., 	757 	F.2d 	476, 	482–
83 (2d Cir. 1985).
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does 	not 	work.” 	Tepper 	v. 	Potter, 	505 	F.3d 	508, 	514 	(6 th 	Cir.
2007), abrogated on other grounds by, Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,
601 	U.S. 	346 	(2024). 	In 	other 	words, 	the 	rub 	is 	whether 	reduced
pay 	constitutes 	discipline 	when 	the 	employee’s 	pay 	remains
commensurate with his work.
The 	Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	weighed 	in 	on 	this 	question 	in 	the
context 	of 	the 	American 	with 	Disabilities 	Act 	(“ADA”). 	When
evaluating 	Title 	VII 	religious 	discrimination 	claims, 	the 	Fourth
Circuit looks to ADA law on disability discrimination claims. 	See
Firestone 	Fibers, 	515 	F.3d 	at 	314 	(interpreting 	“reasonable
accommodation” 	in 	the 	Title 	VII 	religion 	context 	to 	require 	the
same as “reasonable accommodation” in the ADA context). 	In Thomas
v. City of Annapolis, a police officer’s knee injury rendered him
unable 	to 	work 	full 	duty, 	but 	he 	declined 	the 	department’s 	offer
for 	him 	to 	take 	a 	full-time 	light 	duty 	role 	as 	a 	records
specialist. 	851 F.App’x 341, 343–44 (4 th Cir. 2021). 	Consequently,
the department placed him on unpaid leave. 	Id. at 344. 	The Fourth
Circuit 	held, 	without 	further 	discussion, 	that 	“being 	placed 	on
leave 	without 	pay” 	constituted 	an 	adverse 	employment 	action 	for
the purpose of his ADA failure-to-accommodate claim. 	Id. at 345.
Likewise, 	courts 	in 	this 	district 	have 	concluded 	that 	requiring
unpaid leave in other Title VII contexts can constitute an adverse
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action. 	See, 	e.g., 	Snyder 	v. 	Azar, 	No. 	18-cv-0511-TDC, 	2020 	WL
4605223, at *6 (D.Md. Aug. 10, 2020) (holding, in a race, sex, and
age 	discrimination 	suit, 	that 	a 	five-day 	suspension 	without 	pay
constituted 	an 	adverse 	employment 	action 	because 	it 	caused 	a
“decrease 	in 	compensation”), 	aff’d 	sub 	nom., 	Snyder 	v. 	Becerra,
No. 	20-2073, 	2021 	WL 	5505403 	(4 th Cir. 	Nov. 	24, 	2021); 	Wiggins 	v.
Balt. 	Police 	Dep’t, 	No. 	22-cv-1089-MJM, 	2023 	WL 	6381515, 	at 	*6
(D.Md. Sep. 29, 2023) (explaining, in a race and sex discrimination
suit, 	that 	“placing 	an 	employee 	on 	leave 	without 	pay 	could 	be 	an
adverse 	action,” 	whereas 	“[p]lacing 	an 	employee 	on 	paid 	leave 	is
generally considered not to be an adverse employment action”). 	Of
course, there is an important formal distinction in voluntariness
between 	being 	placed 	on 	unpaid 	leave 	and 	taking 	unpaid 	leave 	to
avoid possible employment consequences, as Plaintiff did here. 	If
the reason unpaid leave can be an adverse action is its effect on
the employee’s compensation, however, it is unclear why it matters
whether 	the 	unpaid 	leave 	was 	formally 	rather 	than 	effectively
involuntary.
Furthermore, 	Defendant 	cites 	two 	in-circuit 	religious
accommodation cases that do not distinguish between paid and unpaid
leave, 	but 	which 	both 	conclude 	that 	required 	leave 	is 	not
disciplinary. 	First, 	she 	relies 	principally 	on 	Abdelkader 	v.
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Sears, 	Roebuck 	& 	Co., 	780 	F.Supp.2d 	389 	(D.Md. 	2011), 	where 	a
Muslim employee alleged that she was forced to work on her Sabbath
eight 	times, 	id. 	at 	392. 	The 	court 	determined 	that 	“an 	employer
does not commit an adverse act if he permits his employee to take
leave to avoid working on a religious holiday, even if the employee
feels 	that 	requiring 	her 	to 	use 	leave 	is 	unfair 	and 	coercive.”
Id. 	at 	395 	(citing 	Williams 	v. 	Harvey, 	No. 	05-cv-161, 	2006 	WL
2456406, 	at 	*10 	(E.D.Va. 	Aug. 	21, 	2006)). 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	to
distinguish that case on the basis that the employee there did not
take 	leave 	and 	instead 	worked 	on 	her 	Sabbath. 	(ECF 	No. 	17, 	at
11). 	Plaintiff’s 	distinction 	is 	unavailing 	because 	the 	non-
disciplinary nature of required leave was necessary to the court’s
conclusion that the employee was not forced to work on her Sabbath.
Second, 	Defendant 	points 	to 	Williams 	v. 	Harvey, 	No. 	05-cv-161,
2006 WL 2456406 (E.D.Va. Aug. 21, 2006), which Plaintiff does not
address. 	There, the court held that “Plaintiff’s opinion that she
‘feels’ 	that 	it 	was 	unnecessary 	to 	use 	her 	leave 	days 	[for
religious 	observance] 	fails 	to 	establish 	that 	she 	suffered 	an
adverse employment action for failing to comply with her employer’s
requirements.” 	Id. at *10 (citing Boone, 178 F.3d at 255; Ali v.
Alamo 	Rent-A-Car, 	Inc., 	8 	F.App’x 	156, 	159 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2001)).
Neither case clarifies whether paid or unpaid leave was at issue,
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much 	less 	addresses 	the 	distinct 	effects 	of 	required 	paid 	versus
unpaid 	leave 	on 	the 	employee’s 	compensation. 	Accordingly, 	while
they 	bolster 	the 	conclusion 	that 	required 	paid 	leave 	is 	not
disciplinary, 	they 	cannot 	resolve 	the 	question 	as 	it 	relates 	to
required unpaid leave.
In short, the law is clear that requiring an employee to take
paid 	leave 	does 	not 	satisfy 	the 	discipline 	element 	of 	a 	failure-
to-accommodate 	prima 	facie 	case. 	It 	is 	not 	so 	clear, 	however,
whether 	requiring 	an 	employee 	to 	take 	unpaid 	leave 	satisfies 	the
discipline 	element. 	At 	this 	stage, 	the 	court 	cannot 	dismiss 	the
claim for failure to allege facts plausibly stating a prima facie
case.
2. 	Defendant’s Reasonable Accommodation Defense
As noted at the outset, once a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie 	case, 	the 	burden 	switches 	to 	the 	defendant 	to 	show 	either
that 	it 	offered 	reasonable 	accommodations 	or 	that 	reasonable
accommodations 	would 	present 	an 	undue 	burden. 	Affirmative
defenses 	are 	not, 	however, 	normally 	addressed 	on 	a 	motion 	to
dismiss:
When[] 	. 	. 	. 	“facts 	sufficient 	to 	rule 	on 	an
affirmative 	defense 	. 	. 	. 	are 	alleged 	in 	the
complaint, 	the 	defense 	may 	be 	reached 	by 	a
motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Goodman 	v. 	Praxair, 	Inc., 	494 	F.3d 	458, 	464
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21
(4th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 	But this principle
applies 	only 	in 	the 	“relatively 	rare
circumstances” 	when 	“all 	facts 	necessary 	to
the affirmative defense clearly appear on the
face 	of 	the 	complaint.” 	Id. 	(cleaned 	up).
And 	even 	to 	succeed 	in 	these 	rare
circumstances, 	the 	defendant 	must 	show 	“that
the 	plaintiff’s 	potential 	[response] 	to 	the
affirmative 	defense 	was 	foreclosed 	by 	the
allegations in the complaint.” 	Id. at 466.
L.N.P. v. Kijakazi, 64 F.4th 577, 585–86 (4 th Cir. 2023).
In 	this 	area, 	it 	is 	generally 	the 	case 	that 	the 	affirmative
defenses 	of 	reasonable 	accommodation 	or 	undue 	hardship 	cannot 	be
resolved on a motion to dismiss because the facts and circumstances
of a discrete situation are at play. 	A recent case in this district
illustrates this general point:
Wegmans 	make 	several 	sound 	arguments
regarding 	the 	unreasonableness 	of
Niederberger’s 	requested 	accommodation 	and
the 	hardship 	it 	would 	pose. 	However, 	the
Court must deny Wegmans’ Motion to Dismiss at
this 	juncture, 	because 	these 	are 	issues 	of
fact 	more 	appropriately 	resolved 	on 	summary
judgment. 	See 	Dean 	v. 	Acts 	Ret. 	Life
Communities, 	No. 	23-cv-1221-GLR, 	2024 	WL
964218, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 6, 2024) (“Whether
an undue hardship exists is usually considered
an 	issue 	of 	fact 	to 	be 	determined 	on 	summary
judgment . . . [Defendant] does not identify,
and the Court could not locate, a single case
where 	a 	federal 	court 	decided 	whether 	an
accommodation 	imposed 	an 	undue 	hardship 	on 	a
motion 	to 	dismiss.” 	(citations 	omitted)).
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Thus, 	Wegmans’ 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	will 	be
denied as to Counts 2 and 7.
See, e.g., Niederberger, 2024 WL 2866609, at *4 (footnote omitted).
In 	the 	situation 	in 	this 	case, 	however, 	the 	law 	is 	clear
regarding the combination of alternatives available to accommodate
a 	religious 	need 	when 	a 	seniority 	system 	sets 	a 	work 	schedule,
meaning 	that 	the 	defense 	appears 	on 	the 	face 	of 	the 	complaint.
Plaintiff 	does 	not 	dispute 	that 	he 	was 	offered 	a 	combination 	of
shift 	swaps, 	paid 	leave, 	and 	unpaid 	leave. 	He 	does, 	however,
dispute 	the 	adequacy, 	efficacy, 	and 	legal 	sufficiency 	of 	those
accommodations. 	Plaintiff’s arguments present either legal issues
or 	immaterial 	factual 	ones, 	neither 	of 	which 	are 	fatal 	to 	the
affirmative defense. 	As will be seen, it does not matter whether
Plaintiff 	was 	able 	to 	swap 	shifts 	or 	had 	enough 	paid 	leave
available 	to 	cover 	all 	weeks. 	Instead, 	the 	facts 	readily 	show
that these accommodations were reasonable.
Fourth 	Circuit 	precedent 	squarely 	governs 	this 	case. 	In
Firestone 	Fibers, 	the 	employee 	was 	a 	member 	of 	the 	Living 	Church
of God and observed the Sabbath from sundown on Friday to sundown
on Saturday. 	515 F.3d at 309. 	The operative collective bargaining
agreement 	used 	a 	seniority-based 	scheduling 	system. 	See 	id.
Although 	initially 	he 	was 	not 	scheduled 	to 	work 	on 	the 	Sabbath,
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his 	schedule 	then 	changed 	due 	to 	the 	operation 	of 	the 	seniority
system 	and 	required 	him 	to 	work 	on 	the 	Sabbath. 	Id. 	at 	309–10.
His employer declined to change his schedule because doing so would
violate the collective bargaining agreement. 	Id. at 310. 	Instead,
his 	employer 	informed 	him 	that 	he 	would 	need 	to 	“rely 	on 	the
standard 	attendance 	accommodations 	provided 	to 	all 	employees,”
including fifteen days of paid leave, eight voluntary shift swaps
per year, and sixty hours of unpaid leave. 	Id. 	The employee used
his 	paid 	and 	then 	unpaid 	leave 	but 	did 	not 	swap 	shifts. 	Id. 	at
311. 	He was ultimately terminated for exceeding the maximum amount
of unpaid leave available. 	Id. 	The Fourth Circuit concluded that
voluntary shift trades,7 paid leave, and unpaid leave individually
and in combination constituted reasonable accommodations, provided
7 The EEOC regulations expressly provide that voluntary shift
trades 	are 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation. 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
1605.2(d)(1)(i). 	If 	the 	employer 	offers 	voluntary 	shift 	trades,
the 	employer’s 	obligation 	is 	to 	“facilitate 	the 	securing 	of 	a
voluntary 	substitute 	with 	substantially 	similar 	qualifications”
through, 	for 	instance, 	“a 	central 	file, 	bulletin 	board 	or 	other
means for matching voluntary substitutes with positions for which
substitutes 	are 	needed.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	cites 	the 	regulatory
language 	in 	his 	papers 	but 	argues 	that 	DHS 	has 	not 	met 	its
obligation 	to 	facilitate 	shift 	trades. 	(ECF 	No. 	17, 	at 	9). 	The
Murgia 	letter, 	however, 	states 	that 	DHS 	“has 	created 	electronic
shift and schedule trade boards on the TSA-BWI iShare site.” 	(ECF
No. 	15-2, 	at 	2). 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	explain 	why 	the 	trade 	board
is 	not 	a 	bulletin 	board 	as 	contemplated 	in 	the 	governing
regulations.
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they are not restricted to nonreligious absences. 	Id. at 315–16.
Such 	precedent 	plainly 	forecloses 	Plaintiff’s 	argument 	that
“voluntary 	schedule 	trade[s], 	voluntary 	shift 	trade[s], 	annual
leave, 	and/or 	other 	forms 	of 	leave[] 	. 	. 	. 	do 	not 	constitute
reasonable religious accommodations.” 	(ECF No. 17, at 5).
Here, 	much 	like 	in 	Firestone 	Fibers, 	DHS 	informed 	Plaintiff
that he could swap shifts and use paid and unpaid leave. 	As with
the 	employee 	in 	Firestone 	Fibers, 	Plaintiff 	relied 	on 	paid 	and
then 	unpaid 	leave 	to 	avoid 	working 	on 	the 	Sabbath. 	DHS 	did 	not
restrict 	paid 	or 	unpaid 	leave 	to 	nonreligious 	absences. 	Just 	as
in Firestone Fibers, then, Plaintiff’s accommodations were clearly
reasonable.
Plaintiff 	does 	not 	address 	Firestone 	Fibers 	and 	instead
attacks 	Defendant’s 	reliance 	on 	Philbrook. 	In 	Philbrook, 	the
employee 	was 	a 	member 	of 	the 	Worldwide 	Church 	of 	God, 	and 	her
religion 	required 	her 	to 	miss 	six 	days 	of 	work 	each 	year. 	479
U.S. 	at 	62–63. 	The 	operative 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement
provided 	the 	employee 	three 	days 	of 	paid 	leave 	for 	religious
observance, 	but 	required 	that 	she 	use 	unpaid 	leave 	for 	the 	other
three days. 	See id. at 63–65. 	The Court concluded that the three
days 	of 	required 	unpaid 	leave 	were 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation
because 	they 	“eliminate[d] 	the 	conflict 	between 	employment
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requirements and religious practices by allowing the individual to
observe fully religious holy days and require[d] him only to give
up 	compensation 	for 	a 	day 	that 	he 	did 	not 	in 	fact 	work.” 	Id. 	at
70. 	The 	Court 	continued 	that 	the 	“loss 	of 	income 	for 	the 	period
the employee is not at work . . . has no direct effect upon either
employment 	opportunities 	or 	job 	status.” 	Id. 	at 	70–71 	(quoting
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 145 (1977)). 	Defendant,
and 	the 	Firestone 	Fibers 	court 	for 	that 	matter, 	rightly 	seize 	on
this 	language 	for 	the 	general 	proposition 	that 	required 	unpaid
leave 	is 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation. 	(ECF 	No. 	15-1, 	at 	9 	n.4);
Firestone 	Fibers, 	515 	F.3d 	at 	316 	(citing 	Philbrook, 	479 	U.S. 	at
70–71). 	Plaintiff, 	however, 	seeks 	to 	draw 	a 	line 	between 	this
case 	and 	Philbrook, 	arguing 	that 	the 	three 	days 	at 	issue 	in
Philbrook pale in comparison to the amount of unpaid leave he has
had to take, which is allegedly so substantial as to have an effect
on 	his 	job 	status. 	(ECF 	No. 	17, 	at 	7–8). 	Plaintiff 	does 	not
allege 	the 	number 	of 	Saturdays 	on 	which 	he 	took 	unpaid 	leave 	and
only 	states 	the 	obvious, 	namely 	that 	on 	those 	weeks 	he 	was 	only
paid 	80% 	for 	the 	four 	days 	he 	did 	work. 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	14 	¶ 	29
(“When Plaintiff’s leave balances were depleted, he was unable to
take 	Saturdays 	off, 	resulting 	in 	a 	loss 	of 	20% 	of 	his 	pay 	during
those weeks.”)).
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What 	Plaintiff 	ignores 	is 	that 	the 	assessment 	of
“reasonableness” is not “an area for absolutes.” 	Firestone Fibers,
515 F.3d at 313. 	The Firestone Fibers court recognized that “[a]
duty 	of 	‘reasonableness’ 	cannot 	be 	read 	as 	an 	invariable 	duty 	to
eliminate 	the 	conflict 	between 	workplace 	rules 	and 	religious
practice.” 	Id. 	at 	314. 	The 	amount 	of 	unpaid 	leave 	Plaintiff
claims 	he 	was 	“required” 	to 	use 	is 	not 	to 	be 	viewed 	in 	isolation
or 	in 	retrospect. 	At 	the 	time 	Plaintiff 	expressed 	a 	need 	for 	a
religious accommodation, Defendant offered a combination of shift
swaps, paid leave, and unpaid leave. 	That was sufficient.
Plaintiff’s 	other 	arguments 	on 	whether 	the 	accommodations
were 	reasonable 	similarly 	fail. 	First, 	he 	argues 	that 	the
accommodations were not reasonable because they placed “the entire
burden” on him and the voluntary shift trades proved ineffective.
(See ECF No. 17, at 5–6). 	It is not true that Plaintiff shouldered
the 	entire 	burden; 	DHS 	set 	up 	a 	shift-trading 	system 	and 	allowed
Plaintiff 	to 	take 	leave 	potentially 	without 	replacement. 	Also,
there 	is 	no 	rule 	barring 	the 	accommodation 	from 	placing 	some 	of
the burden on the employee. 	See Firestone Fibers, 515 F.3d at 316
(explaining that the employee’s failure to avail himself of shift
trades “does not render the accommodation any less significant in
the reasonableness calculus” (citing Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69)).
Case 8:24-cv-03257-DKC Document 21 Filed 12/11/25 Page 26 of 28
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In 	fact, 	“bilateral 	cooperation” 	is 	the 	essence 	of 	a 	reasonable
accommodation. 	Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Philbrook, 479 U.S.
at 	69). 	Moreover, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	rejected 	the 	argument 	that
“reasonable accommodation” must mean “effective accommodation” in
the 	ADA 	context, 	see 	US 	Airways, 	Inc. 	v. 	Barnett, 	535 	U.S. 	391,
399–401 	(2002), 	and 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	incorporated 	that 	logic
into Title VII religious accommodation cases in Firestone Fibers,
515 F.3d at 314. 	See also Hill v. Jamestown-Yorktown Found., No.
18-cv-137, 2021 WL 2142694, at *19 (E.D.Va. May 26, 2021) (“[T]hat
an employee is ultimately unsuccessful in finding another employee
willing 	to 	swap 	shifts 	does 	not 	render 	the 	accommodation
unreasonable.” 	(citing, 	inter 	alia, 	Miller 	v. 	Drennon, 	966 	F.2d
1443, 	1992 	WL 	137578, 	at 	*3 	(4 th Cir. 	June 	19, 	1992) 	(unpublished
table decision))). 	Second, Plaintiff argues that requiring him to
take 	unpaid 	leave 	is 	unreasonable 	because 	it 	effectively 	allows
DHS 	to 	employ 	him 	at 	a 	discount. 	(ECF 	No. 	17, 	at 	8). 	DHS 	does
not 	employ 	Plaintiff 	at 	a 	discount 	because 	it 	does 	not 	receive
five 	days’ 	worth 	of 	labor 	from 	Plaintiff 	for 	four 	days’ 	worth 	of
money 	each 	week. 	Instead, 	DHS 	receives 	four 	days 	of 	labor 	from
Plaintiff for four days of pay.
Because 	the 	facts 	alleged 	in 	the 	Amended 	Complaint
(supplemented 	by 	the 	document 	properly 	supplied 	by 	Defendant)
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clearly 	show 	that 	Defendant 	has 	provided 	reasonable
accommodations, 	Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	and 	the
Amended Complaint will be dismissed.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will
be granted. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
Case 8:24-cv-03257-DKC Document 21 Filed 12/11/25 Page 28 of 28

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