Gardner v. International Association of Machinists et al

8:24-cv-00454Mdd23 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
SANDRA GARDNER
:
v. 	: Civil Action No. DKC 24-454
:
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,:
et al.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this breach of
fiduciary duty case is the verified application for leave to file
a complaint pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) filed by Sandra Gardner
(“Plaintiff”). 	(ECF 	No. 	1). 	The 	issues 	have 	been 	briefed, 	and
the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed 	necessary. 	Local
Rule 	105.6. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	Plaintiff’s 	application
for leave will be granted.
I. 	Background
A. 	Factual Background
The 	factual 	background 	of 	this 	case 	was 	described 	in 	detail
in 	this 	court’s 	earlier 	opinion. 	(ECF 	No. 	27). 	In 	short,
Plaintiff 	has 	been 	a 	member 	of 	the 	labor 	organization 	The
International 	Association 	of 	Machinists 	and 	Aerospace 	Workers
(“IAM” or “the union”) since 1999. 	(ECF No. 24-2 ¶ 4). 	In 2021,
Plaintiff 	became 	concerned 	that 	then 	General 	Secretary-Treasurer
Dora Cervantes (“Ms. Cervantes”) was using union funds for personal
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travel in breach of her fiduciary duties. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 19-20).
In 	May 	2022, 	Plaintiff 	and 	another 	IAM 	member 	wrote 	a 	letter 	to
the 	IAM 	President 	and 	Executive 	Council 	regarding 	the 	alleged
misappropriation 	of 	funds 	by 	Ms. 	Cervantes, 	demanding 	that 	the
union 	take 	action 	to 	obtain 	an 	accounting 	and 	garner 	restitution
of 	any 	misappropriated 	funds. 	(ECF 	No. 	1-2). 	IAM 	responded 	to
the 	letter, 	notifying 	Plaintiff 	that 	IAM 	intended 	to 	“conduct 	an
investigation and analysis of [Plaintiff’s] claims.” 	(ECF No. 17-
8, 	at 	2). 	The 	United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Fourth
Circuit described Plaintiff’s further communications with the IAM
General Counsel, Carla Siegel:
Once 	again, 	Siegel 	wrote 	to 	the 	pair,
informing 	them 	that 	WithumSmith+Brown, 	PC
(“Withum”), an outside accounting firm, would
carry out the investigation. 	Siegel provided
them 	with 	the 	independent 	auditor’s 	contact
information 	and 	stated 	“[i]t 	is 	incumbent 	on
you 	to 	provide 	[the 	auditor] 	with 	all
documentation 	and 	information 	you 	have 	to
assist 	him 	in 	his 	investigation 	of 	your
claims.” 	The 	union 	members 	responded 	to
Siegel, 	reiterating 	their 	request 	for
Cervantes’ travel documents. 	Siegel, in turn,
asked that they provide “more specificity with
respect” to their allegations.
Gardner, 	this 	time 	joined 	by 	two 	union
members, 	wrote 	yet 	again 	to 	Siegel. 	They
“demanded that the IAM International President
and Grand Lodge bring suit against IP Martinez
and 	GST 	Cervantes 	to 	recover 	[the
misappropriated 	union 	funds].” 	They 	also
asked 	the 	union 	to 	expand 	the 	accounting 	of
funds 	to 	IAM’s 	General 	Vice 	President, 	Mark
Blondin, 	for 	records 	relating 	to 	his 	travel
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expenses, 	and 	for 	the 	union 	to 	“take 	any 	and
all 	necessary 	legal 	action 	against 	Dora
Cervantes, Robert Martinez and Mark Blondin.”
After this latest epistle, Siegel responded to
Gardner 	and 	the 	other 	union 	member 	with 	whom
she 	had 	sent 	the 	original 	letter. 	Siegel
explained that, in response to their request,
“IAM 	. 	. 	. 	hired 	. 	. 	. 	[an] 	independent
accounting firm, Withum[,] to investigate your
allegations 	[concerning 	Cervantes 	and
Martinez].” 	“Withum concluded that there was
no evidence of wrongdoing, misappropriation or
abuse.” 	Siegel’s letter concluded:
The 	Executive 	Council 	reviewed 	[Withum’s]
report and [the union members’] demand. 	Based
on 	the 	report, 	the 	Executive 	Council
determined 	that 	there 	was 	simply 	no 	support
for 	your 	unfounded 	allegations 	. 	. 	. 	. 	[T]he
IAM 	has 	determined 	there 	is 	no 	basis 	for
taking any further action with respect to your
meritless allegations.
(ECF 	No. 	32-2, 	at 	3-4, 	published 	at, 	Gardner 	v. 	Int’l 	Ass’n 	of
Machinists, 	150 	F.4th 	221, 	224 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2025) 	(citation
modified)). 	After the union declined to take any further action,
Plaintiff 	sought 	leave 	of 	the 	court 	to 	file 	a 	complaint 	against
Ms. Cervantes under 29 U.S.C. § 501 and against IAM under 29 U.S.C.
§ 431(c).1
B. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiff 	filed 	her 	verified 	application 	under 	29 	U.S.C. 	§
501(b) 	requesting 	leave 	of 	the 	court 	to 	file 	her 	complaint 	on
1 Count II of the proposed complaint under 29 U.S.C. § 431(c)
does not require leave of the court to file.
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February 	15, 	2024. 	(ECF 	No. 	1). 	After 	briefing 	regarding 	the
application, the court denied Plaintiff’s application for leave to
file 	on 	September 	25, 	2024, 	finding 	that 	Plaintiff 	had 	failed 	to
meet 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	501(b)’s 	demand 	requirement. 	(ECF 	No. 	27, 	at
10). 	Plaintiff 	appealed 	this 	court’s 	decision 	to 	the 	Fourth
Circuit 	on 	October 	24, 	2024. 	(ECF 	No. 	29). 	On 	August 	11, 	2025,
the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	reversed 	the 	decision 	of 	the 	court, 	finding
that Plaintiff had satisfied the demand requirement, and remanded
“for 	further 	consideration 	on 	whether 	[Plaintiff] 	satisfied 	the
good cause requirement.” 	(ECF No. 32-2, at 11, 150 F.4th at 227).
The 	parties 	agreed 	to 	a 	supplemental 	briefing 	schedule 	in
this court on October 8, 2025. 	(ECF No. 41). 	Plaintiff filed her
supplement addressing the “good cause” requirement on October 22,
2025. 	(ECF No. 44). 	Defendants submitted a response on November
19, 2025, (ECF No. 45), and Plaintiff filed a reply on December 3,
2025, (ECF No. 46).
II. 	Standard of Review
The 	Labor-Management 	Reporting 	and 	Disclosure 	Act 	(“LMRDA”)
creates a cause of action against union officials who violate their
fiduciary 	duties. 	29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	501. 	Section 	501(a) 	of 	the 	LMRDA
describes the fiduciary duties of a labor organization’s officers,
and § 501(b) creates a cause of action for a violation of section
(a). 	The 	LMRDA 	includes 	three 	prerequisites 	for 	union 	members
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seeking to file a complaint regarding a violation of § 501(a): (1)
there must be a failure or refusal of the governing board “to sue
or 	recover 	damages 	or 	secure 	an 	accounting 	or 	other 	appropriate
relief,” 	(2) 	leave 	of 	court 	must 	be 	sought, 	and 	(3) 	good 	cause
must be shown. 	Id. § 501(b).
III. Analysis
Following 	the 	earlier 	decision 	of 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit, 	the
only remaining question is whether Plaintiff has shown “good cause”
to 	file 	the 	complaint. 	As 	this 	court 	briefly 	previewed 	in 	its
earlier opinion, there is a circuit split on the precise standard
to 	apply 	when 	evaluating 	the 	good 	cause 	requirement 	of 	§ 	501(b).
(ECF No. 27, at 7). 	The Fourth Circuit has not weighed in. 	After
considering 	the 	different 	standards, 	this 	court 	will 	apply 	the
test used in Horner v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224 (9 th Cir. 1966), which
is 	used 	across 	four 	circuits. 	Under 	the 	Horner 	test, 	the 	court
finds 	that 	Plaintiff 	does 	have 	good 	cause 	under 	§ 	501(b).
Accordingly, the court will grant leave for Plaintiff to file her
complaint.
A. 	Circuit Split
The 	United 	States 	Courts 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Third, 	Ninth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits follow the test first laid out by the
Ninth 	Circuit 	in 	Horner. 	See 	Loretangeli 	v. 	Critelli, 	853 	F.2d
186, 192 (3 d Cir. 1988); Erkins v. Bryan, 663 F.2d 1048, 1053 (11 th
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Cir. 	1981); 	George 	v. 	Loc. 	Union 	639, 	98 	F.3d 	1419, 	1422 	(D.C.
Cir. 	1996). 	“The 	requirement 	of 	section 	501(b) 	that 	a 	plaintiff
. . . show ‘good cause’ before being entitled to file the complaint
is intended as a safeguard to the affected union against harassing
and 	vexatious 	litigation 	brought 	without 	merit 	or 	good 	faith.”
Horner, F.2d at 228. 	Thus, the good cause requirement must entail
a 	showing 	that 	there 	is 	some 	level 	of 	merit 	to 	the 	claim. 	The
question 	is 	what 	level 	and 	type 	of 	scrutiny 	to 	apply 	to 	that
determination. 	The 	Ninth 	Circuit 	laid 	out 	the 	standard 	for
evaluating good cause:
[T]he court may, if it chooses, look somewhat
beyond 	the 	complaint 	in 	determining 	whether
the 	plaintiff 	has 	made 	the 	‘good 	cause’
showing 	required 	by 	section 	501(b). 	Thus 	if
the 	defendant 	can 	establish, 	by 	undisputed
affidavit, 	fact 	which 	demonstrate 	that 	the
plaintiff 	is 	not 	a 	member 	of 	the 	defendant
union, 	or 	that 	the 	action 	is 	outlawed 	by 	a
statute 	of 	limitations, 	or 	that 	the 	action
cannot 	succeed 	because 	of 	the 	application 	of
the 	principles 	of 	res 	judicata 	or 	collateral
estoppel, 	or 	that 	plaintiff 	has 	not 	complied
with 	some 	controlling 	condition 	precedent 	to
the 	bringing 	of 	such 	a 	suit, 	then 	although
these defects do not appear on the face of the
complaint, 	they 	may 	warrant 	denial 	of 	the
application.
However, 	we 	think 	it 	inappropriate 	to
consider, 	at 	such 	a 	hearing, 	defenses 	which
require the resolution of complex questions of
law 	going 	to 	the 	substance 	of 	the 	case.
Defenses of this kind should be appraised only
on 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	or 	after 	a
trial. 	. 	. 	. 	Defenses 	involving 	disputed
questions 	of 	fact 	should 	be 	appraised 	only
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after 	a 	trial 	at 	which 	the 	parties 	and 	the
court 	can 	have 	the 	benefit 	of 	a 	complete
inquiry, assisted by such pre-trial discovery
as may be undertaken.
Horner, 	362 	F.2d 	at 	229 	(footnotes 	omitted). 	While 	this 	test
outlines appropriate considerations and defenses that represent a
bar to good cause, a conception of what courts should affirmatively
look for has come from subsequent case law. 	In finding good cause,
courts 	applying 	the 	Horner 	test 	have 	considered 	whether 	the
plaintiff has “set forth facts which tend to show that union funds
were 	misspent 	for 	[the 	union 	official’s] 	benefit.” 	Cowger 	v.
Rohrbach, 868 F.2d 1064, 1068 (9 th Cir. 1989). 	While the specific
language 	has 	differed, 	courts 	essentially 	consider 	whether
plaintiffs 	have 	included 	facts 	that 	tend 	to 	show 	a 	breach 	of
fiduciary duty. 	“At this early stage of the proceedings, this is
sufficient 	to 	satisfy 	the 	threshold 	‘good 	cause’ 	requirement 	of
section 501(b).” Id.; see also Stone v. Vitale, 738 F.Supp. 1047,
1049 (E.D.Mich. 1989) (finding good cause where there are “specific
claims 	of 	unauthorized 	approval 	of 	expenditures, 	the 	direct
personal benefit of an official, and the interpretation of bylaws
and management of funds which is so manifestly unreasonable as to
constitute 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty”); 	Hanahan 	v. 	Lucassen, 	764
F.Supp. 	194, 	196 	(D.D.C. 	1991) 	(finding 	good 	cause 	where 	“the
plaintiffs have presented a colorable claim”). 	The Horner test is
comparatively 	more 	lenient 	than 	other 	standards 	for 	meeting 	good
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cause, 	which 	courts 	in 	these 	circuits 	have 	found 	to 	be 	most
faithful 	to 	the 	statutory 	language. 	“The 	good 	cause 	standard 	is
a threshold requirement that a plaintiff can satisfy through an ex
parte 	application. 	It 	would 	therefore 	be 	illogical 	to 	impose 	a
heightened pleading standard, requiring a plaintiff to show a high
likelihood of success on the merits.” 	George, 98 F.3d at 1422.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
adopted 	the 	standard 	outlined 	in 	Dinko 	v. 	Wall, 	531 	F.2d 	68 	(2d
Cir. 	1976).2 	See, 	e.g., 	Patrick 	v. 	Loc. 	51, 	Am. 	Postal 	Workers
Union, 	AFL-CIO, 	No. 	19-cv-10715-NSR, 	2021 	WL 	5106638, 	at 	*7
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2021). 	The standard is slightly more demanding
than 	that 	of 	Horner. 	In 	Dinko, 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	adopted 	a
“reasonable likelihood of success” test:
Here, 	two 	policies 	compete: 	supervision 	of
union 	officials 	in 	the 	exercise 	of 	their
fiduciary obligations and protection, through
a 	preliminary 	screening 	mechanism, 	of 	the
internal 	operation 	of 	unions 	against
unjustified 	interference 	or 	harassment. 	We
2 This court’s earlier opinion stated that the United States
Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Eighth 	Circuit 	also 	followed 	the 	test
laid 	out 	in 	Dinko. 	(ECF 	No. 	27, 	at 	7 	n.3). 	More 	precisely, 	at
least 	one 	district 	court 	in 	that 	circuit 	has 	applied 	the 	Dinko
test, and the Eighth Circuit has not specifically endorsed any of
the 	tests. 	See 	Gould 	ex 	rel. 	St. 	Louis 	- 	Kansas 	City 	Carpenters
Reg'l 	Council 	v. 	Bond, 	1 	F.4th 	583, 	589 	(8 th 	Cir. 	2021) 	(“[O]ur
sister 	circuits 	to 	some 	extent 	disagree 	over 	the 	proper 	standard
to apply in determining whether a union member has shown the good
cause 	required 	to 	be 	granted 	leave 	to 	file 	a 	§ 	501(b) 	suit. 	The
district 	court 	applied 	the 	Dinko 	standard. 	Our 	circuit 	has 	not
taken 	sides 	in 	this 	debate, 	and 	this 	case 	does 	not 	require 	us 	to
do so.” (citation omitted)).
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believe that both these policies are served if
good 	cause 	in 	section 	501(b) 	is 	construed 	to
mean 	that 	plaintiff 	must 	show 	a 	reasonable
likelihood of success and, with regard to any
material 	facts 	he 	alleges, 	must 	have 	a
reasonable 	ground 	for 	belief 	in 	their
existence.
Dinko, 	531 	F.2d 	at 	75. 	No 	other 	circuit 	has 	adopted 	the 	Dinko
standard.
In 1978, a court in this district – in a different procedural
posture 	- 	endorsed 	the 	Dinko 	standard. 	Brink 	v. 	DaLesio, 	453
F.Supp. 272 (D.Md. 1978). 	In Brink, the defendant union official
filed 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	arguing 	in 	part 	that 	the 	requirements
under 	§ 	501(b) 	had 	not 	been 	met 	before 	the 	plaintiff 	filed 	his
complaint. 	Id. at 275. 	The court found that the plaintiff easily
met 	the 	“reasonable 	likelihood 	of 	success” 	standard 	under 	Dinko
because 	the 	court 	had 	already 	granted 	the 	plaintiff 	a 	temporary
restraining 	order. 	Id. 	at 	277. 	While 	the 	court 	did 	not 	discuss
why 	it 	was 	using 	the 	Dinko 	standard 	as 	opposed 	to 	the 	Horner
standard, the court did note that “[t]he purpose of the [§] 501(b)
prerequisites 	is 	to 	shield 	union 	officers 	from 	the 	harassment 	of
unwarranted actions.” 	Id. at 276. 	This characterization conflicts
with the Fourth Circuit’s observation in this case that “§ 501(b)
is 	designed 	to 	protect 	two 	often 	conflicting 	interests: 	those 	of
union members and those of union officials.” 	(ECF No. 32-2, at 8,
150 	F.4th 	at 	226). 	Given 	that 	the 	Brink 	court 	was 	proceeding 	in
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a different procedural posture and lacked the benefit of the Fourth
Circuit’s recent decision, the persuasive force of its approach is
considerably diminished.
Finally, 	the 	United 	States 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Fifth
Circuit follows the “objectively reasonable” test from Hoffman v.
Kramer, 362 F.3d 308 (5 th Cir. 2004). 	Under the Hoffman standard:
[T]he 	district 	court 	should 	ensure 	that 	the
plaintiff 	show—either 	in 	verified 	pleadings,
affidavits, 	or 	a 	hearing, 	if 	ordered 	by 	the
district court—that the union’s refusal to act
was 	objectively 	unreasonable, 	assessed 	from
the point of view of the membership as a whole.
This 	deference 	is 	appropriate 	only 	when 	the
democratic 	accountability 	of 	a 	union 	is 	not
seriously at issue.
Id. 	at 	317. 	This 	represents 	a 	higher 	bar 	and 	a 	different 	focus
than 	the 	tests 	explained 	in 	both 	Horner 	and 	Dinko. 	According 	to
the 	Fifth 	Circuit, 	“[o]bjectively 	reasonable 	determinations 	by
disinterested 	union 	leaders 	not 	to 	bring 	an 	action 	seem 	to 	us 	a
strong 	indication 	that 	the 	claims 	may 	be 	ill-suited 	as 	a
springboard 	for 	judicial 	intervention 	into 	the 	management 	of 	a
labor 	organization 	that 	is 	democratically 	accountable 	to 	its
membership.” 	Id. 	The 	Hoffman 	court 	emphasizes 	elections 	as 	a
check 	on 	union 	officials, 	asserting 	the 	good 	cause 	requirement
reflects 	“faith 	that 	union 	democracy 	will 	ordinarily 	serve 	as 	an
adequate safeguard against mismanagement by rogue officials.” 	Id.
at 	318. 	Judge 	Wilkinson 	applied 	the 	Hoffman 	“objectively
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reasonable” standard to the facts of this case in his dissent from
the 	Fourth 	Circuit’s 	opinion, 	(ECF 	No. 	32-2, 	at 	14-15, 	150 	F.4th
at 	229), 	emphasizing 	that 	these 	same 	allegations 	had 	been 	raised
during 	the 	most 	recent 	union 	elections, 	(Id. 	at 	12-13, 	150 	F.4th
at 228).
B. 	Adoption of the Horner Test
The 	test 	from 	Horner, 	followed 	by 	most 	circuits 	that 	have
considered 	this 	question, 	best 	complies 	with 	the 	statutory
directive. 	As the Fourth Circuit stated in their earlier opinion
in 	this 	case, 	“§ 	501(b) 	is 	designed 	to 	protect 	two 	often
conflicting 	interests: 	those 	of 	union 	members 	and 	those 	of 	union
officials.” 	(ECF 	No. 	32-2, 	at 	8, 	150 	F.4th 	at 	226). 	The
comparatively 	high 	level 	of 	scrutiny 	for 	proposed 	complaints 	in
the 	Hoffman 	test 	weighs 	too 	heavily 	in 	one 	direction 	without
considering 	the 	interests 	of 	the 	union 	members. 	The 	Horner 	test
offers the best balancing of both parties’ interests.
Both 	Defendants 	and 	Judge 	Wilkinson 	argue 	that 	this 	court
should 	apply 	the 	“objectively 	unreasonable” 	test 	from 	Hoffman.
(ECF Nos. 45, at 19; 32-2, at 14, 150 F.4th at 229). 	They emphasize
the relationship to shareholder derivative suits, (ECF Nos. 45, at
19; 	32-2, 	at 	15, 	150 	F.4th 	at 	229), 	and 	the 	fact 	that 	the 	LMRDA
seeks 	to 	ensure 	that 	union 	leaders 	are 	not 	subject 	to 	harassing
lawsuits, (ECF Nos. 45, at 17; 32-2, at 14, 150 F.4th at 228-229).
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But 	this 	argument 	overlooks 	the 	second 	purpose 	of 	the 	LMRDA:
protecting union members from breaches of fiduciary duty by their
leaders. 	Defendants 	also 	point 	to 	the 	Hoffman 	court’s 	assurance
that 	union 	democracy 	is 	an 	adequate 	safeguard 	against 	breach 	of
fiduciary duty by union officials. (ECF No. 45, at 19-20). 	While
the 	allegations 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	were 	previously 	raised
during Ms. Cervantes’ successful run for reelection, the facts of
other 	cases 	brought 	under 	§ 	501(b) 	may 	not 	be 	aired 	during
elections. 	The 	Horner 	test 	offers 	the 	best 	balance 	of 	the
interests of union leaders and members, regardless of whether any
allegations have been raised during elections.
C. 	Application of the Horner Test
Applying 	the 	Horner 	test, 	Plaintiff 	has 	good 	cause 	to 	file
her complaint. 	Plaintiff has provided facts supporting a possible
breach of fiduciary duty by a union officer. 	Defendants have not
argued that any of the threshold issues contemplated in Horner bar
the complaint. 	Defendants do argue that the equitable doctrine of
laches 	should 	apply, 	but 	the 	court 	finds 	that 	applying 	laches 	to
the current suit would be unwarranted.
1. 	Plaintiff Provided Factual Support
Plaintiff has provided declarations and facts that support a
finding of good cause to file a complaint. 	The verified complaint
contains 	allegations 	that 	“there 	were 	numerous 	times 	that
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Defendant 	Cervantes 	violated 	her 	fiduciary 	responsibilities 	by
traveling 	first 	class 	air 	at 	union 	expense 	to 	Houston, 	Texas,
without 	any 	legitimate 	reason 	for 	her 	to 	perform 	this 	travel.”
(ECF 	No. 	1-1 	¶ 	20). 	The 	complaint 	provides 	facts 	supporting 	the
allegations, 	raising 	specific 	trips 	and 	occasions 	that 	Plaintiff
believes 	were 	inappropriate 	uses 	of 	union 	funds 	that 	benefitted
Ms. 	Cervantes. 	(Id. 	¶¶ 	25-34). 	In 	support 	of 	her 	verified
application to file a complaint, Plaintiff submitted declarations
and extensive supporting exhibits for herself and three other union
members, as well as a filing from another union member’s action in
another 	district. 	(ECF 	No. 	24-1, 	at 	1-2). 	These 	facts 	“tend 	to
show 	that 	union 	funds 	were 	misspent” 	for 	Ms. 	Cervantes’ 	benefit,
Cowger, 	868 	F.2d 	at 	1068, 	which 	could 	support 	a 	claim 	for 	breach
of fiduciary duty. 	“At this early stage of the proceedings, this
is sufficient to satisfy the threshold ‘good cause’ requirement of
section 501(b).” 	Id. 	Plaintiff has shown good cause to file the
complaint under § 501(b).
2. 	Laches
Defendants 	do 	not 	raise 	any 	of 	the 	bars 	to 	good 	cause
identified 	in 	Horner, 	362 	F.2d 	at 	229; 	however, 	Defendants 	argue
that Plaintiff lacks good cause because her claim should be barred
by laches. 	(ECF No. 45, at 26). 	This court previously explained
the doctrine of laches:
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The judicially created doctrine of laches “may
be applied by a court to bar a suit in equity
that has been brought so long after the cause
of 	action 	accrued 	that 	the 	court 	finds 	that
bringing 	the 	action 	is 	unreasonable 	and
unjust.” 	Lyons 	P'ship, 	L.P. 	v. 	Morris
Costumes, 	Inc., 	243 	F.3d 	789, 	798 	(4 th 	Cir.
2001). 	But when a cause of action is “brought
pursuant 	to 	a 	statute 	for 	which 	Congress 	has
provided a limitations period, a court should
not apply laches to overrule the legislature’s
judgment 	as 	to 	the 	appropriate 	time 	limit 	to
apply for actions brought under the statute.”
Id.; see also Haley Paint[ v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours 	and 	Co.], 	279 	F.R.D. 	[331,] 	337[
(D.Md. 2012)].
Long 	v. 	Welch 	& 	Rushe, 	Inc., 	28 	F.Supp.3d 	446, 	463 	(D.Md. 	2014).
Laches is an affirmative defense against a case, and the defendant
has 	the 	burden 	of 	proving 	“(1) 	lack 	of 	diligence 	by 	the 	party
against 	whom 	the 	defense 	is 	asserted, 	and 	(2) 	prejudice 	to 	the
party 	asserting 	the 	defense.” 	White 	v. 	Daniel, 	909 	F.2d 	99, 	102
(4th 	Cir. 	1990) 	(quoting 	Costello 	v. 	United 	States, 	365 	U.S. 	265,
282 (1961)).
Defendant 	first 	argues 	that 	Plaintiff 	showed 	a 	lack 	of
diligence by bringing this action approximately three years after
she 	became 	aware 	of 	the 	possible 	claim, 	outside 	the 	analogous
statute of limitations. 	(ECF No. 45, at 27). 	“When federal courts
. 	. 	. 	consider 	laches, 	they 	are 	guided 	by 	the 	limitations 	period
that 	they 	would 	borrow 	for 	actions 	at 	law 	and 	presume 	that 	if 	an
equitable claim is brought within the limitations period, it will
not 	be 	barred 	by 	laches.” 	Lyons 	P'ship, 	L.P., 	243 	F.3d 	at 	799.
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Congress 	did 	not 	include 	a 	statute 	of 	limitations 	for 	claims
brought 	under 	the 	LMRDA. 	Plumbers 	& 	Steamfitters 	Union 	Loc. 	No.
10 v. Waters, 451 F.Supp.3d 543, 548 (E.D.Va. 2020). 	When Congress
has 	not 	supplied 	a 	statute 	of 	limitations, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of
the United States has “generally concluded that Congress intended
that 	the 	courts 	apply 	the 	most 	closely 	analogous 	statute 	of
limitations 	under 	state 	law.” 	Reed 	v. 	United 	Transp. 	Union, 	488
U.S. 	319, 	323 	(1989) 	(quoting 	DelCostello 	v. 	Teamsters, 	462 	U.S.
151, 158 (1983)). 	Defendants argue that the statute of limitations
for 	shareholder 	derivative 	actions 	is 	analogous, 	(ECF 	No. 	45, 	at
27-28), asserting that Plaintiff is therefore bound by the union’s
deadline for a breach of fiduciary duty claim under Maryland law,
(Id.). 	By Defendants’ count, Plaintiff would have needed to file
the 	suit 	by 	November 	2023 	to 	fall 	within 	Maryland’s 	three-year
statute 	of 	limitations 	for 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty, 	because 	IAM
knew 	about 	the 	claims 	as 	early 	as 	November 	2020. 	(Id. 	at 	28).
However, 	starting 	Plaintiff’s 	“statute 	of 	limitations” 	when 	the
union was made aware of the claims is nonsensical, because it does
not account for when the union member becomes aware of the possible
claim. 	See White, 909 F.2d at 102 (“An inexcusable or unreasonable
delay 	may 	occur 	only 	after 	the 	plaintiff 	discovers 	or 	with
reasonable 	diligence 	could 	have 	discovered 	the 	facts 	giving 	rise
to 	his 	cause 	of 	action.”). 	Rather, 	any 	analogous 	statute 	of
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limitations 	should 	begin 	running 	when 	Plaintiff 	learned 	of 	the
possible claim, which Defendants acknowledge is “March 2021 at the
latest.” 	(ECF No. 45, at 27). 	Applying the three-year statute of
limitations for breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiff had until March
2024 	to 	bring 	her 	claim. 	Plaintiff 	filed 	her 	application 	on
February 	15, 	2024. 	(ECF 	No. 	1). 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	timely
application 	to 	file 	under 	§ 	501(b), 	barring 	the 	application 	of
laches.
Defendants also briefly argue that they have been prejudiced
by the delay. 	(ECF No. 45, at 29). 	Their lament is insubstantial,
even if relevant. 	The delay found here is far from the delay found
to 	warrant 	an 	application 	of 	laches 	in 	other 	cases. 	See, 	e.g.,
White, 909 F.2d at 102 (finding the delay was unreasonable when it
took 	seventeen 	years 	to 	file 	suit); 	Knickman 	v. 	Prince 	George's
County, 187 F.Supp.2d 559, 567 (D.Md. 2002) (applying laches when
the 	plaintiff 	took 	two 	years 	to 	serve 	the 	defendant 	after 	filing
suit, 	and 	the 	relevant 	EEOC 	file 	had 	been 	destroyed). 	Defendant
has 	clearly 	been 	on 	notice 	of 	this 	controversy 	given 	the 	three
other 	lawsuits 	they 	identify, 	as 	well 	as 	the 	demand 	letters 	from
Plaintiff 	and 	resulting 	audit, 	making 	it 	much 	less 	likely 	that
memories 	have 	faded 	or 	documents 	have 	been 	destroyed. 	The
equitable defense of laches does not bar this complaint.
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IV. 	Conclusion
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	Plaintiff’s 	verified 	application
for leave to file a complaint pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) will
be granted.3 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
3 	The 	clerk 	will 	be 	directed 	to 	detach 	and 	file 	Plaintiff’s
proposed 	complaint 	that 	appears 	at 	ECF 	No. 	1-1. 	There 	is 	some
ambiguity about whom the proposed defendants are in that complaint.
The 	caption 	and 	the 	complaint 	identify 	the 	union 	along 	with 	all
officers 	as 	defendants. 	In 	the 	introduction, 	Plaintiff 	states
“[i]n 	Count 	I, 	Plaintiff 	sues 	defendant 	IAM 	General 	Secretary
Treasurer 	Dora 	Cervantes 	for 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty 	under 	29
U.S.C. § 501(a).” 	(ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 1). 	In Count I itself, Plaintiff
states, in part, “the failure of the governing board of Defendant
IAM 	to 	remedy 	the 	situation 	or 	seek 	reimbursement 	gives 	the
Plaintiff 	the 	right 	to 	pursue 	litigation 	under 	29 	U.S.C. 	§
501(b)[.]” 	(Id. 	¶ 	47). 	Finally, 	the 	Prayer 	for 	Relief 	“demands
judg[]ment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, on Count
I” 	and 	seeks 	not 	only 	reimbursement 	of 	the 	funds 	but 	also 	an
accounting, 	and 	an 	order 	prohibiting 	the 	union 	from 	improperly
paying 	for 	personal 	travel 	by 	its 	officers. 	(Id. 	at 	18). 	Both
parties 	have 	focused 	their 	arguments 	on 	the 	assumption 	that 	Ms.
Cervantes 	is 	the 	only 	defendant 	for 	Count 	I. 	The 	only 	defendant
named in Count II is the union itself. 	Plaintiff will be directed
to clarify this ambiguity and will do so by requesting the issuance
of 	a 	summons 	only 	for 	the 	proper 	defendants. 	If 	additional
clarification 	is 	necessary, 	Plaintiff 	should 	consider 	filing 	an
amended complaint.
Case 8:24-cv-00454-DKC Document 48 Filed 12/23/25 Page 17 of 17

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