Bell, et al v. Caruso Homes, Inc, et al

8:24-cv-00157Mdd3 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Erica Bell, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
APEX Realty, LLC, et al.,
Defendants
No. 24-cv-0157-ABA
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The purchase agreement between Plaintiffs Erica Bell, Xana Colvin, and Carlos
Colvin and Defendant NVR, Inc./Ryan Homes (“Ryan Homes”) contains a one-year
contractual limitations period. ECF No. 70-2 and 70-3 ¶ 13. Ryan Homes moved for
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Ryan Homes based on that contractual provision.
ECF No. 70-1 at 9–18.1 Specifically, Ryan Homes argued that the contractual limitations
provision required dismissal of Plaintiffs’ “non-express warranty claims.” See, e.g., id. at
16. Plaintiffs opposed dismissal in part by arguing that equitable estoppel bars
enforcement of the contractual limitations period. ECF No. 85 at 11–15. In its September
29, 2025 memorandum opinion on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, this Court
concluded that equitable estoppel did not bar the enforcement of the contractual
limitations period. ECF No. 103 at 30–35. Because equitable estoppel was the only
argument Plaintiffs raised against Ryan Homes’ position that the limitations provision
barred the non-warranty claims against it, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’
negligence and implied warranty claims against Ryan Homes found in counts 2, 5, and
1 Page numbers herein refer to the CM/ECF pagination, not necessarily the original page
numbering.
Case 8:24-cv-00157-ABA Document 137 Filed 12/03/25 Page 1 of 4
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12. Id. at 34–35; ECF No. 104. Based on the parties’ briefs, the Court understood Ryan
Homes’ reference to “non-express warranty claims” to seek dismissal on limitations
grounds of the “warranty” claims other than Plaintiffs’ express warranty claims—as
opposed to all of Plaintiffs’ claims other than the express warranty claims. In other
words, the Court did not understand Ryan Homes to be arguing that the contractual
limitations provision barred count 7, alleging a violation of the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act (“MCPA”).
On October 14, 2025, Ryan Homes moved for reconsideration or clarification,
contending that it had argued that the contractual limitations provision also barred the
MCPA claim in count 7 and that the Court’s reasoning regarding the provision applied
equally to the MCPA claim. ECF No. 113. Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion and
Ryan Homes filed a reply. ECF Nos. 115 & 132. In their response, Plaintiffs agree that
Ryan Homes argued in its motion to dismiss that the contractual limitations provision
barred the MCPA claim. See ECF No. 115 at 1 (arguing that the motion for
reconsideration “merely relitigates arguments the Court has already heard and rejected.
It repackages the same limitations arguments that this Court has already weighed”); id.
at 4 (arguing that Ryan Homes’ motion for reconsideration “refers to points already
argued in its motion to dismiss papers”). Therefore, it is apparent that the Court
misapprehended Ryan Homes’ argument regarding Plaintiffs’ MCPA claim.
Ryan Homes is correct that the Court’s analysis regarding the contractual
limitations provision in connection with counts 2, 5, and 12 applies equally to the MCPA
claim in count 7. The limitations provision states that these three Plaintiffs
AGREE[D] THAT ANY AND ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF
OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT . . . , REGARDLESS
OF LEGAL THEORY, EXCEPT ANY CLAIMS UNDER THE
Case 8:24-cv-00157-ABA Document 137 Filed 12/03/25 Page 2 of 4
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LIMITED WARRANTY (“CLAIMS”), SHALL BE SUBJECT
TO A ONE (1) YEAR LIMITATION OF ACTION PERIOD AND
BAR 	DATE. 	SUCH 	CLAIMS 	BASED 	ON 	MATTERS
OCCURRING BEFORE THE SETTLEMENT DATE SHALL
BE DEEMED TO HAVE ARISEN AND ACCRUED, IF AT ALL,
AND THE ONE YEAR LIMITATION OF ACTION PERIOD
FOR ALL SUCH CLAIMS SHALL BEGIN TO RUN ON THE
ACTUAL SETTLEMENT DATE.
ECF No. 70-2 and 70-3 ¶ 13. Like counts 2, 5, and 12, Plaintiffs’ MCPA claim in count 7
is premised on Ryan Homes’ alleged misrepresentations that pre-dated settlement,
bringing that claim within the ambit of the contractual limitations provision. See, e.g.,
ECF No. 103 at 38 (“In support of count 7, Plaintiffs alleged that Ryan Homes . . .
‘engaged in false and misleading statements to these Plaintiffs’ that contributed to
Plaintiffs’ decision to purchase . . . the houses.”) (quoting ECF No. 63 ¶ 359); id. at 39
(“Plaintiffs have alleged that Ryan Homes made specific statements that the properties
were free of defects and were of a particular standard, that those statements were made
before Plaintiffs purchased the homes, that those statements induced Plaintiffs to buy
the properties and that, with respect to the sewer system, the statements listed above
were false.”).
A court should grant a motion for reconsideration “(1) to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at
trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Mayfield v.
Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Zinkand v. Brown, 478 F.3d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 2007)). Moreover, “[i]n considering
whether to revise interlocutory decisions, district courts in this Circuit have looked to
whether . . . the court has ‘obviously misapprehended a party’s position or the facts or
applicable law.’” Cohens v. Maryland Dep’t of Hum. Res., 933 F. Supp. 2d 735, 742–43
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(D. Md. 2013) (quoting United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 218 F.R.D. 468, 474
(M.D.N.C. 2003)).
Here, the Court misapprehended Ryan Homes’ argument in its motion to
dismiss. The Court’s reasoning regarding why equitable estoppel does not bar
application of the one-year contractual limitations provision pertains equally to
Plaintiffs’ claim in count 7 against Ryan Homes as it does to counts 2, 5, and 12.
Therefore, to correct a clear error in the Court’s analysis, it is ORDERED that the
motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 113) is GRANTED and the MCPA claim against
Ryan Homes in count 7 is DISMISSED with prejudice. All Plaintiffs’ claims against Ryan
Homes have now been dismissed, but Ryan Homes remains named as a defendant with
respect to Airvac’s crossclaim (which, as to Ryan Homes, the Court will now construe as
a third-party claim). See ECF No. 106.
Date: December 3, 2025 	/s/
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge
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