The Jewish Federation of Greater Washington, Inc. v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company

8:23-cv-01816Mdd5 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JEWISH FEDERATION OF GREATER 	:
WASHINGTON, INC.
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 23-1816
:
CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this insurance
coverage 	dispute 	are 	the 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	filed 	by
Plaintiff The Jewish Federation of Greater Washington, Inc. (“the
Federation” 	or 	“Plaintiff”), 	(ECF 	No. 	48), 	and 	the 	cross-motion
for 	summary 	judgment 	filed 	by 	Defendant 	The 	Cincinnati 	Insurance
Company 	(“CIC” 	or 	“Defendant”), 	(ECF 	No. 	58). 	The 	issues 	have
been 	briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed
necessary. 	Local 	Rule 	105.6. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	the
motion filed by Defendant will be granted, and the motion filed by
Plaintiff will be denied.
I. 	Background
The history of this case is set out in full in a prior opinion.
(ECF No. 62, at 1-8). 	In brief,
The Federation is a non-profit charitable
organization that “serves various communities
and 	other 	charitable 	organizations 	in 	the
nation’s 	capital 	region, 	including 	the
District of Columbia and Maryland.” 	(ECF No.
48, at 5). 	“One of the Federation’s functions
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is 	to 	manage 	and 	invest 	funds 	held 	for 	the
benefit 	of 	other 	Washington, 	D.C.-area
charitable 	organizations[,]” 	including 	[ORT
America, 	Inc., 	and 	the 	Women’s 	American 	ORT
Foundation (collectively “ORT”)]. (Id.). 	The
Federation 	maintains 	insurance. 	One 	of 	the
Federation’s 	policies 	was 	Policy 	Number 	EMN
044 	97 	53 	(“CIC 	Policy”), 	a 	“claims 	made”
policy issued by CIC for the period of August
15, 2017, to August 15, 2020. 	The CIC Policy
includes three coverage sections: (1) General
Provisions 	Applicable 	to 	All 	Liability
Coverage 	(“General 	Provisions”), 	(2)
Nonprofit Organization Directors and Officers
Liability Coverage (“D&O”), and (3) Employment
Practice Coverage. (ECF No. 58-3).
The 	Federation 	was 	also 	insured 	under 	Policy
Number 	8260-9776 	(“Chubb 	Policy”), 	a 	“claims
made” 	ForeFront 	Portfolio 	For 	Not-for-Profit
Organizations 	Policy 	issued 	by 	Federal
Insurance 	Company 	with 	a 	policy 	period 	of
August 1, 2020, to August 1, 2021. 	The Chubb
Policy 	contains 	four 	coverage 	sections: 	(1)
Directors 	& 	Officers 	Liability 	and 	Entity
Coverage 	Section, 	(2) 	Employment 	Practices
Liability 	Coverage 	Section, 	(3) 	Fiduciary
Liability Coverage Section, and (4) Crime Non-
Liability Coverage Section. 	(ECF No. 48-7).
(Id., at 2-3).
“In 	or 	about 	June 	and 	July 	2020, 	the 	Federation 	fell 	victim
to a fraudulent scheme through which it caused four wire transfers,
totaling 	$7,500,000, 	to 	be 	initiated 	from 	ORT’s 	funds 	to
unauthorized third-party bank accounts in Hong Kong.” (Id. at 3).
The 	Federation’s 	insurance 	agent 	emailed 	CIC 	on 	August 	12, 	2020,
just 	before 	the 	end 	of 	the 	policy 	period, 	to 	notify 	CIC 	of
“wrongful acts . . . which may give rise to a management liability
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claim.” 	(Id.). 	In 	response 	to 	the 	unauthorized 	transfers, 	ORT
“made 	a 	written 	demand 	against 	Plaintiff 	for 	monetary 	damages 	in
the amount of $7,510,700” on September 29, 2020. 	(Id. at 6). 	The
Federation 	forwarded 	the 	ORT 	claim 	to 	CIC 	on 	September 	30, 	2020.
(Id. 	at 	7). 	While 	the 	claim 	from 	ORT 	was 	received 	after 	the 	CIC
Policy 	expired, 	the 	policy 	contained 	an 	automatic 	extended
reporting 	period, 	which 	allowed 	the 	Federation 	to 	report 	a 	claim
related 	to 	wrongful 	acts 	that 	occurred 	during 	the 	policy 	period
within 	ninety 	days 	of 	the 	end 	of 	its 	policy. 	(Id. 	at 	14).
According 	to 	the 	CIC 	Policy, 	the 	extended 	reporting 	period 	would
“immediately terminate on the effective date and time of any other
insurance 	issued 	to 	the 	insureds 	which 	replaces 	this 	insurance.”
(Id.). 	CIC declined to provide coverage for the demand from ORT,
saying that the claim was not made during either the policy period
or 	an 	applicable 	extended 	reporting 	period. 	(Id. 	at 	8). 	CIC
stated 	that 	the 	email 	sent 	during 	the 	reporting 	period 	was
insufficient 	notice, 	(Id. 	at 	4), 	and 	that 	the 	extended 	reporting
period ended when the Federation replaced the CIC Policy with the
Chubb 	Policy. 	(Id. 	at 	7-8). 	The 	Federation 	filed 	suit 	in
response.
The parties previously moved for summary judgment, which the
court 	resolved 	in 	March 	2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	62). 	The 	March 	2025
opinion found that the email sent during the CIC policy period was
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not 	sufficient 	notice, 	but 	further 	briefing 	was 	necessary
regarding 	“what 	‘any 	other 	insurance’ 	means 	or 	how 	it 	may 	affect
the 	meaning 	of 	‘replace,’” 	and 	“whether 	the 	ORT 	claim 	is, 	or 	is
not, covered by the Chubb policy.” 	(Id. at 21). 	Plaintiff filed
its 	supplemental 	brief 	in 	support 	of 	its 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment 	on 	May 	15, 	2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	66). 	Defendant 	filed 	its
opposition and supplement to its cross-motion for summary judgment
on 	June 	16, 	2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	67). 	Plaintiff 	filed 	its 	combined
reply and opposition on July 16, 2025, (ECF No. 68), and Defendant
filed its reply on August 15, 2025, (ECF No. 71).
II. 	Standard of Review
A court may grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine
dispute 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	the 	moving 	party 	is 	entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 	A dispute about a material
fact 	is 	genuine 	“if 	the 	evidence 	is 	such 	that 	a 	reasonable 	jury
could 	return 	a 	verdict 	for 	the 	nonmoving 	party.” 	Anderson 	v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“When cross-motions for summary judgment are before a court,
the court examines each motion separately, employing the familiar
standard 	under 	Rule 	56 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure.”
Desmond 	v. 	PNGI 	Charles 	Town 	Gaming, 	LLC, 	630 	F.3d 	351, 	354 	(4 th
Cir. 2011). 	The court must deny both motions if it finds there is
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a genuine dispute of material fact, “[b]ut if there is no genuine
dispute 	and 	one 	or 	the 	other 	party 	is 	entitled 	to 	prevail 	as 	a
matter 	of 	law, 	the 	court 	will 	render 	judgment.” 	10A 	Wright 	&
Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2720 (4 th ed. 2022).
III. Analysis
Following 	this 	court’s 	earlier 	decision, 	(ECF 	No. 	62), 	the
only 	remaining 	issue 	on 	summary 	judgment 	is 	whether 	there 	was 	an
extended reporting period in place on September 30, 2020, when the
Federation 	sent 	ORT’s 	claim 	to 	CIC.1 	Interpretation 	of 	the 	CIC
Policy 	is 	governed 	by 	Maryland 	law. 	See 	(ECF 	No. 	62, 	at 	10-11).
As this court previously explained:
Insurance 	policies 	are 	interpreted
according 	to 	the 	same 	rules 	as 	any 	other
contract. 	See 	Rouse 	v. 	Fed. 	Ins. 	Co., 	991
F.Supp. 	460, 	465 	(D.Md. 	1998). 	Courts 	are
instructed to interpret an insurance policy’s
terms 	“as 	a 	whole, 	according 	words 	their
usual, 	everyday 	sense, 	giving 	force 	to 	the
intent 	of 	the 	parties, 	preventing 	absurd
results, 	and 	effectuating 	clear 	language.”
United 	Cap. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Kapiloff, 	155 	F.3d
488, 	495 	(4 th 	Cir. 	1998) 	(applying 	Maryland
law). 	Neither 	party 	contends 	the 	CIC 	Policy
is ambiguous. 	See Cap. City Real Est., LLC v.
1 	The 	Federation 	purchased 	an 	optional 	one-year 	extended
reporting 	period 	from 	CIC 	on 	October 	15, 	2020, 	with 	an 	effective
date 	of 	August 	14, 	2020. 	(ECF 	No. 	62, 	at 	7, 	ECF 	No. 	58-3, 	at 	3-
4). 	That 	extended 	reporting 	period 	is 	subject 	to 	the 	same
provisions applicable to the automatic extended reporting period.
Plaintiff does not contend separately that coverage is due solely
because 	of 	the 	optional 	one-year 	extended 	reporting 	period
purchased 	after 	the 	claim 	was 	sent, 	although 	it 	noted 	previously
that, 	at 	that 	time, 	CIC 	“has 	never 	returned 	or 	refunded 	that
premium.” (ECF No. 60, at 7 n.2.).
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Certain 	Underwriters 	at 	Lloyd’s 	London,
Subscribing to Pol’y No.: ARTE018240, 788 F.3d
375, 	379 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2015) 	(quoting
Perini/Tompkins Joint Venture v. Ace Am. Ins.
Co., 738 F.3d 95, 101 (4 th Cir. 2013) (“If the
policy’s 	language 	is 	clear 	and 	unambiguous,
the 	court 	will 	assume 	the 	parties 	meant 	what
they 	said.”)). 	On 	the 	other 	hand, 	“[i]n 	the
event 	of 	ambiguity, 	Maryland 	courts 	consult
extrinsic evidence, and only if this extrinsic
evidence 	fails 	to 	clear 	up 	the 	ambiguity 	is
the 	contract 	construed 	against 	the 	insurer.”
Kapiloff, 155 F.3d at 495.
(Id.).
While neither party contends that the contract is ambiguous,
they dispute the proper reading of Section XIX of the CIC Policy,
which 	governs 	extended 	reporting 	periods. 	Specifically, 	the
parties 	disagree 	about 	Section 	XIX.E, 	which 	states 	that 	any
extended reporting period terminates upon the “effective date and
time of any other insurance issued to the insureds which replaces
this 	insurance.” 	(ECF 	No. 	58-3, 	at 	14). 	CIC 	argues 	that 	“no
extended 	reporting 	period 	was 	in 	effect 	when 	the 	ORT 	Claim 	was
made because the Chubb Policy had replaced” the CIC Policy. 	(ECF
No. 	67, 	at 	4-5). 	The 	Federation 	counters 	that 	“any 	other
insurance” 	must 	cover 	the 	same 	claim 	to 	“replace” 	the 	original
policy. 	According to the Federation, “[t]he Chubb policy therefore
is ‘other insurance’ as respects the ORT claim only to the extent
that it covers the ORT Claim along with the Cincinnati Policy. 	It
does not.” 	(ECF No. 66, at 3). 	As will be discussed, upon review
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of 	the 	submissions 	of 	the 	parties 	and 	the 	plain 	language 	of 	the
policy, 	the 	phrase 	“any 	other 	insurance” 	in 	Section 	XIX 	does 	not
require 	that 	the 	“other 	insurance” 	specifically 	cover 	the 	same
claim. 	Rather, 	the 	Chubb 	Policy 	was 	“any 	other 	insurance” 	that
“replace[d]” 	the 	CIC 	Policy, 	terminating 	the 	extended 	reporting
period on August 1, 2020.
A. 	Text of Section XIX
“Unless 	there 	is 	an 	indication 	that 	the 	parties 	intended 	to
use 	words 	in 	a 	special, 	technical 	sense, 	the 	words 	in 	a 	policy
should be accorded their ‘usual, ordinary, and accepted meaning.’”
Catalina 	Enters., 	Inc. 	Pension 	Tr. 	v. 	Hartford 	Fire 	Ins. 	Co., 	67
F.3d 63, 65 (4 th 	Cir. 1995) (quoting Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Utica
Mutual Ins. Co., 330 Md. 758, 778 (1993)). 	CIC argues that “[t]he
plain 	meaning 	of 	‘any 	other 	insurance’ 	is 	insurance 	that 	is
separate 	and 	distinct 	from 	the 	Cincinnati 	Policy.” 	(ECF 	No. 	67,
at 	5). 	This 	reading 	is 	consistent 	with 	the 	structure 	of 	the 	CIC
Policy. 	In 	multiple 	sections 	of 	the 	CIC 	Policy, 	the 	words 	“any
other insurance” are followed by a phrase that clarifies the scope
of coverage referenced: “which replaces this insurance” in Section
XIX, and “applies to any claim” in Section X.
The 	overall 	structure 	of 	Section 	XIX 	supports 	this 	reading.
Section 	XIX.A.1 	starts 	the 	automatic 	extended 	reporting 	period
“immediately after the end of the policy period of the applicable
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Coverage Part.”2 	(ECF No. 58-3, at 20). 	Neither “Coverage Part”
nor 	“other 	insurance” 	are 	defined 	in 	the 	policy. 	Section 	XIX.E,
governing 	the 	termination 	of 	the 	extended 	reporting 	period, 	does
not mention coverage parts. 	Rather, the extended reporting period
terminates 	when 	“any 	other 	insurance 	. 	. 	. 	replaces 	this
insurance.” 	The 	parties 	provide 	dictionary 	definitions 	of
“replace” including “take the place of” from the American Heritage
Dictionary 	of 	the 	English 	Language, 	(ECF 	No. 	58, 	at 	31), 	and
“supplant 	with 	substitute 	or 	equivalent” 	from 	Black’s 	Law
Dictionary, (ECF No. 60, at 17). 	The extended reporting period is
granted 	to 	individual 	coverage 	parts; 	any 	other 	insurance
“replaces” 	the 	coverage 	part 	when 	it 	takes 	the 	place 	of, 	or
substitutes for, the coverage part. 	In plain English, to replace
the 	coverage 	part, 	the 	separate 	and 	distinct 	policy 	must 	provide
a 	similar 	type 	of 	coverage 	as 	the 	coverage 	part 	provided. 	If 	it
does, 	then 	the 	extended 	reporting 	period 	terminates 	for 	that
coverage part.
The operative coverage part in this dispute is the directors
& 	officers 	liability 	coverage. 	Directors 	& 	officers 	liability
(“D&O”) 	coverage 	is 	one 	of 	the 	more 	common 	coverage 	types 	of
2 	The 	optional 	extended 	reporting 	period 	endorsement 	to 	the
CIC 	Policy 	specifies 	that 	the 	optional 	period 	applied 	to 	two
distinct 	coverage 	parts: 	the 	employment 	practices 	liability
coverage part and the nonprofit organization directors & officers
coverage part. 	(ECF No. 58-3, at 4).
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professional 	liability 	insurance. 	Jordan 	R. 	Plitt, 	et 	al., 	Couch
on 	Insurance 	§ 	1:35 	(3d 	ed. 	2025). 	Both 	the 	CIC 	Policy 	and 	the
Chubb 	Policy 	provided 	D&O 	liability 	coverage. 	(ECF 	No. 	58, 	at
30). 	Chubb 	has 	participated 	in 	the 	defense 	of 	the 	ORT 	claim
because it was “potentially covered” under the Chubb Policy, (ECF
No. 	66, 	at 	4), 	further 	demonstrating 	that 	it 	covers 	the 	types 	of
claims 	covered 	by 	the 	CIC 	Policy. 	See 	Chicago 	Title 	Ins. 	Co. 	v.
Jen, 	249 	Md.App. 	246, 	266 	(2021) 	(“Maryland 	law 	is 	well 	settled
that the insurer owes a duty to the insured to defend if there is
a 	potentiality 	that 	a 	claim 	could 	be 	covered 	by 	the 	policy.”).
CIC 	is 	correct 	that 	“the 	Chubb 	D&O 	Policy 	was 	a 	separate 	and
distinct policy that took the place of the Cincinnati D&O Policy,”
terminating the extended reporting period. 	(ECF No. 67, at 5).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Definition Is Too Narrow
The 	Federation 	argues 	that 	“any 	other 	insurance” 	must
specifically cover the claim at issue. 	It supports that argument
by 	citing 	to 	case 	law 	dealing 	with 	“other 	insurance” 	clauses.
(See, e.g., ECF Nos. 66, at 6 (citing Empire Fire and Marine Ins.
Co. 	v. 	Liberty 	Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	117 	Md.App. 	72 	(1997)); 	68, 	at 	5
(citing Nolt v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 329 Md. 52, 60 (1993); Nat’l
Indem. 	Co. 	v. 	Cont’l 	Ins. 	Co., 	61 	Md.App. 	575, 	577-581 	(1985))).
“Other 	insurance” 	clauses 	“limit 	an 	insurer’s 	liability 	where
other 	insurance 	may 	cover 	the 	same 	loss.” 	Jordan 	R. 	Plitt, 	et
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al., 	Couch 	on 	Insurance, 	§ 	219:1 	(3d 	ed. 	2025). 	The 	clauses 	are
meant 	to 	allocate 	responsibility 	for 	a 	payment 	in 	cases 	of
overlapping coverage. 	But the phrase “other insurance” is used in
multiple 	ways 	in 	the 	insurance 	context, 	and 	the 	Federation’s
attempt to extrapolate the Maryland case law on “other insurance”
clauses 	to 	the 	current 	context 	is 	unavailing. 	In 	fact, 	Couch
“caution[s] 	that 	the 	concept 	of 	‘other 	insurance’ 	can 	rapidly
become 	confusing 	given 	the 	number 	of 	other 	contexts 	in 	which 	the
term is used.” 	Jordan R. Plitt, et al., Couch on Insurance § 98:1
(3d ed. 2025). 	The “other insurance” clause is not at issue here;
rather, 	the 	parties 	are 	disputing 	an 	entirely 	different 	clause
which 	also 	has 	the 	words 	“other 	insurance.” 	In 	Section 	XIX, 	the
phrase 	“any 	other 	insurance” 	is 	used 	only 	to 	indicate 	when 	the
extended 	reporting 	period 	ends, 	not 	to 	allocate 	coverage 	over 	a
particular claim.
The 	Federation’s 	definition 	of 	“other 	insurance,” 	which
requires that both insurance policies cover the same claim, would
create redundancies in the text of the CIC Policy. 	Under Maryland
law, 	courts 	reviewing 	contracts 	“construe 	the 	instrument 	as 	a
whole.” 	W. 	F. 	Gebhardt 	& 	Co., 	Inc. 	v. 	Am. 	Eur. 	Ins. 	Co., 	250
Md.App. 	652, 	666 	(2021) 	(quoting 	Pac. 	Indem. 	Co. 	v. 	Interstate
Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388 (1985)); see also Baltimore Gas
& 	Elec. 	Co. 	v. 	Com. 	Union 	Ins. 	Co., 	113 	Md.App. 	540, 	554 	(1997)
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(“A 	contract 	must 	be 	construed 	as 	a 	whole, 	and 	effect 	given 	to
every 	clause 	and 	phrase, 	so 	as 	not 	to 	omit 	an 	important 	part 	of
the agreement.”). 	If the “other insurance” must inherently cover
the 	same 	claim 	for 	it 	to 	be 	a 	replacement, 	the 	phrase 	“which
replaces 	this 	insurance” 	becomes 	redundant. 	Rather, 	“any 	other
insurance” means a separate and distinct policy, and it “replaces”
the prior policy by providing a similar scope of coverage.
The 	Federation’s 	interpretation 	of 	“other 	insurance” 	would
also 	make 	a 	portion 	of 	the 	CIC 	Policy’s 	“other 	insurance” 	clause
redundant. 	Section X of the CIC Policy reads, in relevant part,
This 	insurance 	is 	primary 	except 	when 	all 	or
any 	part 	of 	loss 	is 	also 	insured 	under 	any
other 	prior 	or 	current 	policy. 	If 	any 	other
insurance 	issued 	by 	another 	insurer 	. 	. 	.
applies 	to 	any 	claim, 	then 	this 	insurance 	is
excess over that other insurance[.]
(ECF 	No. 	58-3, 	at 	12). 	The 	language 	“[i]f 	any 	other 	insurance 	.
. . applies to any claim” clarifies that the other insurance must
apply 	to 	the 	specific 	claim 	for 	the 	provision 	to 	be 	operative.
It 	would 	be 	redundant 	for 	Section 	X 	to 	say, 	“any 	other 	insurance
[that 	necessarily 	applies 	to 	the 	same 	claim] 	. 	. 	. 	which 	applies
to any claim.” 	Rather, “any other insurance” refers to a separate
insurance 	policy, 	which 	may 	or 	may 	not 	cover 	the 	same 	claim. 	The
phrase “applies to any claim” is not in Section XIX governing the
extended 	reporting 	period. 	Another 	insurance 	policy 	must 	cover
the specific claim for it to be “other insurance” under Section X,
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but 	no 	such 	overlap 	is 	necessary 	when 	considering 	the 	expiration
of an extended reporting period under Section XIX.
The 	Federation’s 	interpretation 	would 	also 	lead 	to 	“absurd
results.” 	See Kapiloff, 155 F.3d at 495. 	As CIC has pointed out,
requiring the extended reporting period to be dependent on whether
another 	insurance 	company 	will 	cover 	the 	claim 	could 	create 	a
situation 	where 	the 	extended 	reporting 	period 	ends 	at 	different
times for different claims, and could even be reinstated depending
on 	another 	company’s 	coverage 	decisions. 	(ECF 	No. 	67, 	at 	17).
The Chubb D&O policy began on August 1, 2020, which terminated the
CIC 	Policy’s 	extended 	reporting 	period. 	This 	clear, 	predictable
termination 	date 	follows 	the 	plain 	language 	of 	the 	insurance
contract and creates clear expectations for contracting parties.
Because 	the 	CIC 	Policy’s 	extended 	reporting 	period 	was
terminated 	by 	the 	Chubb 	Policy 	starting 	on 	August 	1, 	2020, 	there
was 	no 	extended 	reporting 	period 	active 	when 	the 	Federation
submitted the ORT claim to CIC.
IV. 	Conclusion
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment
filed 	by 	Defendant 	(ECF 	No. 	58) 	will 	be 	granted, 	and 	the 	motion
for 	summary 	judgment 	filed 	by 	Plaintiff 	(ECF 	No. 	48) 	will 	be
denied. 	The 	Amended 	Complaint 	contains 	a 	claim 	for 	breach 	of
contract and a request for declaratory judgment. 	(ECF No. 33, at
Case 8:23-cv-01816-DKC Document 72 Filed 12/05/25 Page 12 of 13
13
9-11). 	Judgment will be entered in favor of CIC on the first, and
an 	appropriate 	declaration 	will 	be 	entered 	on 	the 	second. 	A
separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
Case 8:23-cv-01816-DKC Document 72 Filed 12/05/25 Page 13 of 13

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