C.M. v. Adams & Associates, Inc.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

C.M.

*

Plaintiff,

*

V.

* Civil Case No. 1:25-cv-02684-JMC

ADAMS &amp; ASSOCIATES, INC.

*

*

Defendant.

# MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Extend the Discovery Deadline
by forty-five (45) days (the "Motion"). (ECF No. 43). Defendant objects to Plaintiff's request.
(ECF No. 47). The issue is fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
2025); (ECF Nos. 43, 47). As set forth immediately below, Plaintiff's Motion shall be DENIED.

## I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The instant case arises from Plaintiff's alleged sexual abuse while he was a child residing
at Woodstock Job Corps Center, a center for disadvantaged children operated by Adams and
Associates in 2003. (ECF No. 4 at 2).1 Plaintiff was "approximately 16-17 years old" while
residing at Woodstock. Id.

Defendant removed the instant case to federal court on August 14, 2025. (ECF No. 1).
Thereafter, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 9, 2025 (ECF No. 22), which the
Court denied on December 14, 2025 (ECF No. 29). The Court then issued a proposed scheduling
order on December 18, 2025, setting a discovery deadline of April 15, 2026. (ECF No. 31). On
December 22, 2025, upon joint request by the parties, the Court extended the scheduling order and

1 When the Court cites to a specific page number or range of page numbers, the Court is referring to the page numbers
provided in the electronic filing stamps located at the top of every electronically filed document.

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set a new discovery deadline of July 14, 2026. (ECF No. 34). Then, on April 30, 2026, the Court
granted the parties' second joint motion to extend the scheduling order, and set a new discovery
deadline of September 14, 2026. (ECF No. 42).

Plaintiff filed the disputed Motion on September 10, 2026, requesting a forty-five (45) day
extension of the discovery deadline. (ECF No. 43). Defendant filed its Opposition on September
24, 2026. (ECF No. 47).

## II. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts have broad discretion to manage the timing of discovery. Ardrey v. United
Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir.1986). A party must demonstrate good cause to amend the
scheduling order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); DiStefano,
Inc. v. Tasty Baking Co., Civil Case No. SAG-22-01493, 2024 WL 1329268, at *2 (D. Md. Mar.
28, 2024) ("[A] party must first demonstrate good cause to modify the scheduling order deadlines,
before also satisfying the Rule 15(a)(2) standard for amendment.") (internal quotations omitted).
"The primary consideration of the Rule 16(b) 'good cause' standard is the diligence of the movant."
Rassoull v. Maximus, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 372, 374 (D. Md. 2002) (citing West Virginia Housing Dev.
Fund. V. Ocwen Technology Xchange, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 564, 567 (S.D.W.Va. 2001)). Indications of
a lack of diligence and carelessness are "hallmarks of failure to meet the good cause standard." Id.
"To establish good cause, the party seeking to amend the scheduling order must 'show that the
deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the party's diligence" Id. (quoting Cook v. Howard,
484 F. App'x 805, 815 (4th Cir. 2012). Besides diligence, other factors in determining good cause
include "the length of the delay and its effects, and whether the delay will prejudice the non-
moving party." Elat v. Ngoubene, 993 F. Supp. 2d 497, 520 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Tawwaab v.
Va. Linen Serv., Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768-69 (D. Md. 2010)).

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## III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks a forty-five (45) day extension to the discovery deadline to "subpoena the
entity and/or individual to gain access to the [Woodstock Job Corps Center] for the site inspection."
(ECF No. 43 at 2). Counsel for the Plaintiff asserts that he had "requested a site inspection of the
facility previously owned and operated by Defendant" but Defendant no longer possesses or
controls the property. Id. Counsel for the Plaintiff asserts that he will need to issue a subpoena the
entity or individual in possession of the Woodstock Job Corps Center to inspect the property and
claims that the requested extension will not prejudice any party or delay the matter because no trial
date or mediation deadline has been scheduled. Id.

Defendant represents that from the outset, "Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel have been
aware that the location of the alleged sexual assault is the Woodstock Job Corps Center." (ECF
No. 47 at 1). Defendant states that it received Plaintiff's discovery requests on December 22, 2025,
and responded on January 21, 2026. Id. at 2. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff did not request a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition until July 16, 2026, which "subsequently occurred on August 24, 2026." Id.
Defendant avers that shortly thereafter, "[o]n September 2, 2026, less than two weeks before the
close of Discovery, Plaintiff inquired, for the [first] time, about performing a site inspection on the
Woodstock Job Corps Center." Id. Defendant states that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate good cause
to amend the operative scheduling order, as the parties have been engaged in discovery since
December 2025, yet Plaintiff has failed to address a potential site inspection until shortly before
the close of discovery despite knowing that Defendant no longer operates the facility. Id. at 3.

Good cause exists "when the moving party demonstrates that the scheduling order
deadlines cannot be met despite diligent efforts." Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Meents, 302 F.R.D.
364, 382 (D. Md. 2014) (citing Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor Supply, Inc., 190 F.R.D.

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372, 375 (D. Md. 1999)). Based on review of parties' prior filings, the Court cannot find that good
cause exists to grant Plaintiff's request to modify the discovery deadline. As detailed supra, the
parties have worked through discovery since December 2025 and the Court has granted two prior
extensions of the discovery deadline. (ECF Nos. 34, 42). That notwithstanding, Counsel for the
Plaintiff did not request Defendant's cooperation in scheduling a site inspection until September
2, 2026.

At the outset, Plaintiff fails to provide the Court with any explanation for his lack of
diligence in pursuing a site inspection. Plaintiff's claims arise from events alleged to have occurred
at the Woodstock Job Corps Center Plaintiff now seeks to inspect,2 yet Plaintiff's Motion offers
no explanation for why an inspection was not pursued earlier, nor does Plaintiff identify any newly
discovered information or changed circumstances that prompted the request at this late stage.
Instead, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion less than one week before the discovery deadline was to
pass and merely cites the fact that the Woodstock Job Corps Center is no longer controlled by
Defendant to as good cause sufficient to modify the scheduling order. Additionally, Plaintiff's
Motion lacks any explanation of how a site inspection would be probative of the issues in this case.
Thus, Plaintiff leaves the Court without any basis to find that he exercised the requisite diligence
to justify a modification of the scheduling order.

The Court also rejects Plaintiff's argument that the lack of a trial date defeats a claim of
prejudice. A trial date will typically not be set until discovery is complete, a status report is
submitted, and dispositive motions, if any, are decided. No scheduling order would be effectively
enforced if a party could rely on the lack of a trial date to defeat a finding of prejudice, as a delay
in discovery necessarily results in a delay in the assignment of a trial date.

2 Plaintiff's Complaint, filed on May 31, 2025, expressly stated that the alleged abuse occurred at the Woodstock Job
Corps Center in 2003. (ECF No. 4 at 1).

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On these facts, Plaintiff has not demonstrated the diligence necessary to support a finding
of good cause under Rule 16(b)(4). Plaintiff's belated decision to pursue such discovery, without
more, does not warrant modification of the scheduling order.

## IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion to Extend the Discovery
Deadline Discovery Deadline is DENIED.

/s/

J. Mark Coulson
United States Magistrate Judge
October 13, 2026