C.M. v. Adams & Associates, Inc.

1:25-cv-02684Mdd4 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
C.M. 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Case No: 1:25-cv-2684-JMC
ADAMS & ASSOCIATES, INC. 	*
Defendant. 	*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff C.M. brought the present lawsuit in state court on May 31, 2025, against Adams
& Associates, Inc.1 	alleging Negligence (Count I); Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision, and
Retention (Count II); and Gross Negligence (Count (III). (ECF No. 4). Defendant removed the
case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on August 14, 2025. 	(ECF
No. 1). Presently before the Court 	The motion
is fully briefed (ECF Nos. 22, 27, 28) and no hearing is necessary. 	See 	Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md.
2025). 	DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
at Woodstock, a center for disadvantages children operated by Adams and Associates, in 2003.
(ECF No. 4 at 2).2 	In 2003, Plaintiff was 	-
Woodstock. 	Id.
[Plaintiff] as defined in Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-117(a), including but not limited to:
1 	Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc § 3-1403 such that Defendant
2 	When the Court cites to a specific page number or range of page numbers, the Court is referring to the page numbers
provided in the electronic filing stamps located at the top of every electronically filed document.
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Id. 	at 4. Moreover, Plaintiff
-
agent was non- 	Id. 	Id.
-staff member was not being adequately supervised, monitored,
Id.
Id. 	at 5. Plaintiff asserts Defendant knew or should have known that
Id. 	Specifically,
residents and independent evaluators which informed [Defendant] that numerous staff had, and
Id.
failed to ensure that investigations into allegations of sexual abuse were thoroughly and timely
Id. 	gations gave adequate weight to
Id.
Defendant removed the instant case to federal court on August 14, 2025. (ECF No. 1).
Thereafter, Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss on October 9, 2025. (ECF No. 22).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting 	Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations
required, but a plaintiff must provide the gr
Case 1:25-cv-02684-JMC Document 29 Filed 12/04/25 Page 2 of 14
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Petry v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 597 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 	62 (D. Md. 2009) (quoting 	Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). In considering a
, 885 F. Supp. 133, 136
(D. Md. 1995) (internal citations omitted). The Court must also construe the facts and reasonable
inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 	Ibarra v. United States, 120
F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997); 	see also 	Petry
stated adequately . . . it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 	et seq. 	, under which Plaintiff has failed
to bring a claim and (2) even if the Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply, Plaintiff has failed to
plead claims under the Maryland common law. 	See generally 	(ECF No. 22-1). Plaintiff opposes
the motion, and argues the Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply and Plaintiff adequately pled
Maryland common law claims.3 	See generally 	(ECF No. 27).
3 	Plaintiff raises an additional issue of timeliness. (ECF No. 27 at 3-
-3). The Court allowed Plaintiff leeway to file an untimely response
for consideration. (ECF No. 23). Therefore, the Court declines to rule for either party on this basis.
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A. 	The Court Declines to Find Plaintiff was Required to Bring Claims under the
FTCA.
Defendant urges this Court to dismiss the Complaint because Plaintiff brought claims of
negligence rather than a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. (ECF No. 22 at 6). Though unclear
from the Complaint, 	the relationship
between Defendant, the 	Woodstock facility, and the federal
government. 	See 	(ECF No. 22-1). 	operated the
-1 at 4).
vocational training to individuals ages 16- 	Id. 	The U.S. Secretary of Labor selects eligible
entities, such as Defendant Adams to operate contract centers on a competitive basis in accordance
with applicable statutes and regulations. 	Id. 	Defendant was one such entity that also operated a
residential facility as part of its operations for Job Corps. 	Id. 	at 4-5. Accordingly, Defendant
Id.
contracted activity, the operation of the Woodstock Job Corps Contract Center, remains with the
Federal Govern 	Id. 	at 10-11. Therefore,
Defendants aver Plaintiffs must
remedy for all tort suits against the government and its employees who commit tortious acts in the
Ross v. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 807
F.Supp.2d 362, 369 (D. Md. 2011).
claims, which have been brought under State common law (negligence), are improper.
22-1 at 12); 	e.g., 	Ross, 807 F.Supp.2d at 369-370 (dismissing a case brought against several federal
Case 1:25-cv-02684-JMC Document 29 Filed 12/04/25 Page 4 of 14
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cases to which Defendant cites name the United States
as the defendant and seek to hold the federal government liable for the acts or omissions of a
government contractor. 	Many of these cases conclude that the United States
was not liable, given
employee, and that those contractors should have been sued in their own capacities instead. Indeed,
the FTCA expressly excludes independent contractors from its scope.4 	Id. 	At this juncture, the
The Court declines to dismiss the Complaint on the basis that the claims must have been
brought under the FTCA.
between an employee and an independent contractor where the relationship is fixed by contract,
he
Harris-Reese, 615 F.Supp.3d
336, 361 (D. Md. 2022) (quoting 	Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 528 (1973)). To be sure,
[t]he fact that the contractor is required to adhere to certain federal government rules and
regulations does not necessarily establish that the government is exercising such control. 	Id.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
-to-day operations and control the detailed physical
performance of the contractor can it be said that the contractor is an employee or agent of the
Wood v. Standard Prods. Co., 671 F.2d 825, 829 (4th Cir.
1982). For example, in 	Logue 	v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a county jail, which
had a contract to house federal detainees, was a mere contractor because the federal government
4 	See
States).
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Logue, 412
U.S. at 529-30. Defendant cites to many of the federal regulations that govern Job Corps contractor
facilities in support of the contention that these regulations create the requisite control under cases
like 	Logue 	to conclude Defendant was an employee and not a federal contractor.5 	(ECF Nos. 22-
1, 28).
It is true that facility operators like Defendant must comply with many federal regulations.
However, based on the information available to the Court at this juncture, none of these regulations
was a federal employee or agency within the meaning of the FTCA such that Plaintiff would be
barred from bringing negligence claims against it. 	See Logue, 412 U.S. at 529-30. Moreover, both
parties recognize that Defendant operated its facility by way of a government contract. From what
the Court can discern, there exists no contention that the federal government exhibited physical,
day-to- 	. Thus, as a matter
of pleading, the Court is not prepared to dismiss the Complaint on the basis that Plaintiff has not
brought a claim under the FTCA. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED on the basis that
Plaintiff was required to bring claims under the FTCA.
5 	Defendant cites
the Job Corp. facilities have already been determined by Congress to be Federal Employees for the purposes of the
This is true.
Court to extend such a
finding to Defendant. To the contrary, the failure of Congress to include any such provision with respect to the facility
operators supports a conclusion that the omission was intentional. 	See Reyes-Gaona v. North Carolina Growers Ass'n,
expressio unis est exclusio alterius 	instructs that where a law
expressly describes a particular situation to which it shall apply, what was omitted or excluded was intended to be
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B. 	Plaintiffs Pleads Cognizable Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Retention,
Supervision, or Training Claims at this Early Stage.
The Complaint presents a close question. To plead a cognizable negligence claim, Plaintiff
must allege
part), a breach of that duty, a legally cognizable causal relationship between the breach of duty
Perry v. Asphalt & Concrete Servs., Inc., 447 Md. 31, 51
(2016). 	Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owed a duty to him as he was in
physical custody and care. As for the alleged breaches of that duty, Plaintiff alleges:
The Defendant failed to use ordinary care in determining whether its facilities were
to protect Plaintiff from sexual abuse, sexual assault and lewd and lascivious acts;
(ii) failing to adequately, properly and completely investigate whether Plaintiff was
safe and free from maltreatment; (iii) failing to adequately, properly and completely
intiff
from the facility where he was placed when it knew or should have known that
Plaintiff was at risk there of foreseeable harm from sexual abuse; (v) failing to
implement and enforce policies and procedures that were adequate to protect the
health, safety and welfare of foster children and protect them from sexual and
physical abuse; (vi) failing to adequately monitor and supervise Plaintiff; (viii)
failing to adequately hire and train employees, agents, counselors, and social
workers; (ix) failing to report the ongoing sexual abuse being committed by
child sexual abuse; and (xi) failing to report the sexual abuse of Plaintiff to law
enforcement.
(ECF No. 4 at 6-7).
6
No. 22- 	Plaintiff does not identify any facts that demonstrate the
6 	Specifically, Defendant argues
Plaintiff concludes, without any factual support, the following: (1) Defendant knew or should have
known that Mr. Porter at Woodstock was sexually abusing children and/or posed a risk to sexual
abuse children; (2) the abuser-staff member was not being adequately supervised, monitored, or
surveilled by Defendant; (3) Plaintiff was not being adequately supervised, monitored, or surveilled
by Defendant; (4) Defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the
facility in which Plaintiff was placed was not safe and that it was foreseeable Plaintiff would be
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to
any prior abuse. Plaintiff also fails to set forth any facts to demonstrate that Defendant had actual
or constructive knowledge of the specific abuse Plaintiff alleges to have been subject to, or any
prior abuse of others. 	- 	The purpose of a
complaint is not establishing, i.e., proving, the elements of a claim 	The allegations in the
Complaint surpass the minimum pleading requirement of enough facts to state a claim to relief
(ECF No. 27 at 18) (cleaned up).
At this stage, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to support plausible inferences showing
(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3)
the defendant's breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. 	Pendleton v. State,
398 Md. 447, 460 (2007); 	Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 582 (2003). As for the existence
of a duty, where, as here, there exists a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care such as the
duty owed by an institution to a student 	exercise reasonable care to protect a pupil
Lunsford v. Bd. of Ed. of Prince George's Cnty., 280 Md. 665, 676 (1977) (considering
the standard of care for a school).
As for a breach of that duty, the actions that Plaintiff alleges would certainly be sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss filed by Mr. Porter. But whether those allegations are sufficient as
against Defendant as his alleged employer often turns on the issue of foreseeability. 	See Gambrill,
).
threat to the health, safety, and welfare of minors; an
with unsupervised and unfettered access to Plaintiff and gave him the opportunity to commits
foreseeable acts of child sexual abuse.
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Relatedly, a negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or training claim requires allegations
sufficient to support an inference of, inter alia, the employer's actual or constructive knowledge of
employee incompetence. 	See Minnick v. Southwest Airline Co., Civil Case No. 1:22-cv-2084-
JMC, 2024 WL 4252988, at *2 (D. Md. Sep. 20, 2024) (internal quotations omitted); 	see also Latty
, 198 Md.App. 254, 272 (Md. Spec. App. 2011) 	abrogated
on other grounds by Plank v. Cherneski
Horridge v. St. Mary's
Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 382 Md. 170, 181 (2004). 	Specifically, a plaintiff must allege an
Bryant
v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Maryland, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 751 (D. Md. 1996). Thus,
whether both the negligence and negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or training claims can
survive the motion to dismiss stage turns on whether the Complaint supports an inference that
Defendant k
In 	J.D. v. Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners, this Court denied a motion to
dismiss 	negligence claim against a school board for the failure to prevent a student-
on-student sexual abuse. 	, Case No. 1:25-cv-1125-
JMC, 2025 WL 2653149 (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2025). With respect to the negligence claim,7 	this Court
considered whether it was foreseeable to a defendant school that a student with previous behavioral
issues would inflict a sexual assault upon another student. 	Id. 	at 8. In 	J.D., the plaintiffs pled that
7 	The Court dismissed the negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or training claim because the facts did not support
an inference that the teacher responsible for the students showed warning signs of incompetence. 	J.D., 2025 WL
2653149, at *8-*9. Of course, those facts with regard to that claim are distinguishable as the Plaintiff here asserts that
Mr. Porter was responsible for the sexual abuse at issue in both the negligence and negligent hiring, retention,
supervision, or training claims. (ECF No. 4). Where the knowledge inquiry there changed under the negligent hiring,
retention, supervision, or training claim, the same facts are at issue for both claims here. 	J.D., 2025 WL 2653149, at
*8-*9.
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- 	had serious
Id. 	This Court reasoned
that although the complaint failed to plead the underlying facts with much precision, the negligence
shed light on exactly what was conveyed
and whether the risk posed was sufficient to put a reasonable school on notice. 	Id.
taken. 	Critically, the 	J.D. 	complaint provided some factual basis upon which the Court could
plausibly infer that the alleged sexual assault was foreseeable to the defendant because the
-grandmother warned the school he suffered from certain behavioral issues.
J.D., 2025 WL 2653149, at *8. Here, there exists one allegation first raised under Count III, which
alleges there were
evaluators which informed [Defendant or its agents] that numerous staff had, and were continuing
to perpetrate sexual abuse upon the youth in their care 	(ECF No. 4 at 12). Plaintiff alludes to
several other instanc 	against Mr.
Porter. (ECF No. 7). 	Plaintiff continues,
member has used the same language in propositioning or threatening more than one resident or
allegations that a staff member has taken more than one resident to the same location to engage in
sexual abuse 	Id. 	Though Plaintiff does not specify those complaints were about Mr. Porter with
much clarity, a liberal construction of those allegations taken together entitles him to such an
inference at this pre-discovery stage.
The Court recognizes the imprecise nature of these allegations and the conclusory nature
of many of the allegations set forth in the Complaint. However, taken in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff and together with the allegation that youth residents and independent evaluators
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informed numerous staff of sexual abuse, the Complaint supports an inference that certain staff
members, including Mr. Porter, perpetrated some kind of foreseeable sexual abuse based on the
numerous specific complaints. 	See 	J.D., 2025 WL 2653149, at *8. 	Though it is not much, Plaintiff
has alleged more than a mere propensity to abuse; rather, Plaintiff alleged facts that support an
inference that Defendant knew that such a propensity 	whether from Mr. Porter or from Mr. Porter
and others 	pervaded the facility. 	See 	J.D., 2025 WL 2653149, at *8. 	Moreover, the Court
recognizes that at this early stage, Plaintiff does not have access to records from 2003 that may
illustrate the exact reports that were made. 	Albeit a close question, the Court is not prepared to
dismiss the negligence claim for a lack of precision similar to that in 	J.D. See id. 	By extension,
the Court is not prepared to dismiss the negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or training claim
based on the same inferences. 	But see id. 	(dismissing a negligent hiring, retention, supervision, or
training claim because there were no warning signs that a defendant teacher was incompetent to
prevent a student-on-student assault). Like in 	J.D., discovery is necessary to shed light on what
exactly the resident and third-party complaints were and whether they were sufficient to confer the
requisite notice upon Defendant so as to substantiate a negligence claim. 	Id. 	Therefore, the Motion
to Dismiss with respect to Counts I and II is DENIED.
C. 	Plaintiff Pleads a Cognizable Gross Negligence Claim Sufficient to Survive the
Motion to Dismiss Stage.
The gross negligence claim warrants additional discussion. 	Courts have utilized slightly
different language to describe gross negligence, but all agree that it is a demanding standard. 	Doe
v. Bd. of Educ. of Washington Cnty., No. JFM-15-00074, 2015 WL 4716065, at *4 (D. Md. Aug.
6, 2015); 	see also Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's Cnty., 982 F.Supp.2d 641, 658 	59 (D.
Md.
quotation marks omitted); 	Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187 (2007) (recognizing gross negligence
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as
affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the
). Indeed, 	[g]ross negligence must
Khawaja v. Mayor & City Council, City of Rockville, 89 Md. App. 314,
318 (1991). Of course
Palmer v. Kirkland, No. GLR-16- 2636, 2017 WL
11615522, at *4 (D. Md. June 23, 2017).
When the allegations support an inference that the defendant made some effort to act, even
unsatisfactory or negligent efforts are insufficient to state a claim of gross negligence. 	Compare
Doe, 2015 WL 4716065, at *4 (dismissing gross negligence claims against an assistant principal
when he took some steps
and 	J.D., 2025 WL 2653149 at *9
(dismissing a gross negligence claim against a defendant school for failure to prevent a
exposure to the perpetrator of a her alleged assault when the school undertook an investigation
endeavored to keep the students separated) 	with Singleton v. Wade, Civil Action No. 3:21cv553,
2022 WL 4349826 (D. Va. Sept. 19, 2022) (denying a motion to dismiss a gross negligence claim
against certain prison officials for failure to prevent an inmate-on-inmate attack because the
complaint alleged those officials knew about prior assaults in the months, weeks, and days prior
to their attack on the plaintiff). Accordingly, when institutions have knowledge of a threat and fail
to undertake any effort to prevent foreseeable harm, such claims may survive a motion to dismiss.
Singleton, 2022 WL 4349826, at *10.
In 	Singleton v. Wade, the court denied a motion to dismiss a gross negligence claim against
Id. 	The
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plaintiff brought suit after suffering an inmate-on-
supervision and custody. 	Id. 	at *9. In pertinent part, the complaint alleged that certain on-duty
officials failed to conduct timely cell checks. 	Id.
-duty
defendant was subjectively aware of the danger that failing to conduct prison checks could pose
Id. 	Against the prison officials who were not on duty when the
attack transpired, the court noted
Id. 	at *11. The
court reasoned that those officials knew of a pattern of i
Id.
This case differs from 	Singleton 	by the level of detail in the allegations. However, like the
complaint there, the Complaint here does set forth some basis upon which the court can infer that
Defendant knew Mr. Porter posed a risk based on the alleged prior reports of abuse by resident
children and failed to take any action. 	See id. 	at *9-*11. Neither the C
motion to dismiss memoranda offer any assertion that Defendant took steps to prevent abuse after
independent reports of it. 	See 	(ECF Nos. 4, 22, 28). Discovery may well prove otherwise. But
taking the allegations as true, Defendant ignored numerous complaints of sexual abuse and took
no steps to prevent future abuses or break the pattern. 	See generally 	(ECF No. 4). Therefore, based
on the analysis above and construing the Complaint liberally, the Court cannot dismiss the gross
Case 1:25-cv-02684-JMC Document 29 Filed 12/04/25 Page 13 of 14
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negligence claim. 	Singleton, 2022 WL 4349826, at *10-*11.
to dismiss with respect to Count III is DENIED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
2) is DENIED.
Defendant shall file an answer within fourteen (14) days from the entry of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order.
Date: December 4, 2025
/s/
J. Mark Coulson
United States Magistrate Judge
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