Floyd v. Tidewater Property Management, Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
TIRA FLOYD, 	et al., 	*
*
Plaintiffs, 	*
* 	Civ. No. MJM-25-2003
v. 	*
*
TIDEWATER PROPERTY 	*
MANAGEMENT, INC., 	*
*
Defendant. 	*
*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Tira Floyd filed this putative collective action on behalf of herself and similarly
situated employees of Tidewater Property Management, Inc. (“Defendant”) alleging denial of
overtime compensation in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the
Maryland Wage and Hour Law, 	and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law. ECF 1.
Thereafter, the Complaint was amended to join Mark Hoage as a second plaintiff. ECF 19 (Am.
Compl.).
Currently pending is Plaintiff Floyd’s Motion for Conditional Certification of Collective
Action and Notice to Potential Plaintiffs (“the Motion”) seeking court-authorized notice of this
action to all current or former Property Managers who worked for Defendant at any time within
three years of the date of entry of this Court’s Order and an opportunity for these employees to
opt-in to this action as plaintiffs. ECF 11. Defendant filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion,
ECF 16, and Plaintiff Floyd filed a Reply in Support of the Motion, ECF 18. No hearing is
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necessary to resolve the Motion. 	See 	Loc. R. 105.6. (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that follow,
the Motion will be granted, and distribution of notice will be subject to the parameters set forth
herein.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendant is a real estate services corporation formed under the laws of Maryland with its
principal place of business in Owings Mills, Maryland. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff Floyd was
employed by Defendant from approximately 2020 through May 27, 2025. 	Id. 	¶ 6. Plaintiff Hoage
was employed by Defendant from approximately January 2015 through February 2020 and then
from approximately April 2021 until June 2023. 	Id. 	¶ 7. Plaintiffs were salaried “Community
Association 	Managers” 	(hereinafter, 	“Property 	Managers”) 	and 	their 	job 	duties 	included
interfacing with housing communities in Maryland with which Defendant had contracts. 	Id. 	¶¶ 9–
10. According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ schedules required them to regularly work evening
hours, attending board meetings of condo associations and attending to other responsibilities, as
well as working normal business hours at Defendant’s office. 	Id. 	¶ 11. Floyd worked on average
54.5 hours per week, and Hoage worked approximately 60 to 70 hours per week while employed
by Defendant. 	Id. 	¶¶ 13, 15. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had knowledge of all hours that
Plaintiffs worked, expected Plaintiffs to work these hours, and failed to pay Plaintiffs at the
required overtime pay rate of one-and-one-half times their regular rates. 	Id. 	¶¶ 16–18. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendant avoided overtime pay by making Property Managers salaried employees and
regarding them as “exempt” for purposes of overtime pay. 	Id. 	¶ 11.
In October 2025, Plaintiff Floyd filed the presently pending Motion, accompanied by a
supporting memorandum and a declaration as well as two supporting exhibits. 	See 	Pl. Mot. (ECF
11); Pl. Mem. (ECF 11-1); Pl. Decl. (ECF 11-2); Pl. Exs. 2 & 3 (ECF 11-3, 11-4). 	In the Motion,
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Plaintiff Floyd requests that this Court order conditional certification of a putative collective of
similarly situated employees, authorize distribution of opt-in notices to putative collective
members, and order Defendant to provide to Plaintiffs full names, addresses, email addresses, and
phone numbers of potential plaintiffs for distribution of notice. Pl. Mem. at 7.
While Defendant does not meaningfully oppose the conditional certification of the
proposed collective, Defendant objects to several aspects of Plaintiffs’ proposed notice and
reminder notice. 	See 	Def. Opp’n (ECF 16) at 2. Defendant requests several alterations. These
alterations include limiting notice to email and U.S. mail and excluding notice via text message,
modifying the notice language to explicitly clarify the implications of joining the collective, and
adding defense counsel contact information. 	Id. 	Defendant also wholly opposes Plaintiffs’
proposed reminder notice. 	Id.
In reply, Plaintiff Floyd asserts that distribution of notice via text message—the mode of
notice Defendants seek to omit—is customary in the jurisdiction to ensure notice to potential
collective members. Pl. Reply (ECF 18) at 4, 6–7. Plaintiff Floyd does not oppose modifying the
notice as requested by Defendant, though she requests adding a statement that defense counsel is
obligated to represent the interests of Defendant and has no obligation to notice recipients. 	Id. 	at
5.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The FLSA requires employers to pay non-exempt employees at a rate one-and-one-half
times their regular pay rate for any hours worked longer than forty hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a). A non-exempt employee may, on her own behalf or on behalf of other “similarly situated”
employees, file an action against an employer to recover unpaid overtime compensation. 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b). The statute establishes an “opt-in” scheme whereby similarly situated employees “notify
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the court of their intentions to be a party to the suit.” 	Quinteros v. Sparkle Cleaning, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 2d 762 (D. Md. 2008) (citing 	Camper v. Home Quality Mgmt., Inc., 200 F.R.D. 516, 519
(D. Md. 2000)). The remedial purposes of FLSA collective actions have been summarized as
follows:
First, collective actions allow plaintiffs “the advantage of lower
individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources.” . . .
Second, collective actions allow the courts efficiently to resolve
common issues in one proceeding. . . . Third, FLSA collective
actions promote enforcement of the law by empowering employees
to “join in their litigation so that no one of them need stand alone in
doing something likely to incur the displeasure of an employer.”
Jackson v. Am. Elec. Warfare Assocs., Inc., Civ. No. TDC-22-1456, 2023 WL 5154518, at *2 (D.
Md. Aug. 10, 2023) (quoting 	Hoffman–La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989), and
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945)).
If a plaintiff pursues a collective action against an employer, “they may seek court-
approved notice to inform similarly situated employees that they may join the litigation.” 	Santos
v. E&R Servs., Inc., Civ. No. DLB-20-2737, 2021 WL 6073039, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2021)
(citing 	Hoffman–La Roche, 493 U.S. at 169–70). In its discretion, the district court may facilitate
notice to potential plaintiffs in appropriate cases. 	See Kneppar v. Elevance Health Companies,
Inc., Civ. No. 23-863, 2024 WL 1156406, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 18, 2024) (citations omitted).
Most courts in this circuit employ “a two-step inquiry when deciding whether to certify a
collective action under the FLSA.” 	Baylor v. Homefix Custom Remodeling Corp., 443 F. Supp. 3d
598, 605 (D. Md. 2020). At the first step, the plaintiff must provide “a minimal evidentiary
showing that” the potential additional plaintiffs are similarly situated. 	Id. 	“Determinations of the
appropriateness of conditional collective action certification … are left to the court’s discretion.”
Li v. Escape Nails & Spa, LLC, Civ. No. DKC 23-1487, 2024 WL 2728497, at *2 (D. Md. May
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28, 2024)). Plaintiffs “may rely on ‘affidavits or other means,’ such as declarations and deposition
testimony, to make the required showing.” 	Id. 	(cleaned up) (citing 	Williams v. Long, 585 F.Supp.2d
679, 684–85 (D. Md. 2008)).
If the Plaintiff makes the minimal showing required, then “court-facilitated notice to the
putative [plaintiffs is] appropriate.” 	Syrja v. Westat, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687 (D. Md. 2010).
At the second step, following discovery, “the court engages in a more stringent inquiry to
determine whether the plaintiff class is [in fact] ‘similarly situated’ in accordance with the
requirements of § 216, and renders a final decision regarding the propriety of proceeding as a
collective action.” 	Id. 	at 686 (D. Md. 2010) (quoting 	Rawls v. Augustine Home Health Care, Inc.,
244 F.R.D. 298, 300 (D. Md. 2007)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. The Proposed Collective
Plaintiff Floyd requests, for purposes of court-authorized notice of this action, conditional
certification of a putative collective. She defines the putative collective as “all current or former
Property Managers who worked for Defendant at any time within three years of the date of entry
of this Court’s Order granting this Motion.” Pl. Mem. at 1; Pl. Reply at 1. Although Defendant
contends “the evidence will ultimately show that collective action is improper based on the
individualized nature of working conditions and circumstances of each of Tidewater’s Community
Association Managers,” Def. Opp’n at 1, Defendant does not meaningfully challenge conditional
certification of Plaintiffs’ proposed collective.
The Court must determine whether Plaintiff Floyd has made a modest showing that the
above-described group of employees are similarly situated to Plaintiffs and that she and the
putative collective members were subject to a common policy or plan by Defendant that violated
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the FLSA. 	See 	Butler v. DirectSAT USA, LLC, 876 F. Supp. 2d 560, 568 (D. Md. 2012). “[T]his
inquiry will be limited . . . because courts are not to ‘delve into the merits’ of the case[]” at the
notice stage. 	Biscardi v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., Civ. No. GJH-21-2240, 2023 WL 155238, at *4 (D.
Md. Jan. 11, 2023) (quoting 	Blake v. Broadway Servs., Inc., Civ. No. CCB-18-086, 2018 WL
4374915, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 13, 2018)).
“Plaintiffs are similarly situated when they raise a similar legal issue as to coverage,
exemption, or nonpayment of minimum wages or overtime arising from similar job requirements
and pay provisions.” 	Calderon v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., Civ. No. RWT-10-1958, 2011 WL 98197,
at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2011) (quoting 	Robinson v. Empire Equity Grp., Inc., Civ. No. WDQ-09-
1603, 2009 WL 4018560, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 19, 2009)). “Stated otherwise, plaintiffs are similarly
situated when there is a demonstrated similarity among individual situations, and some factual
nexus that binds the named plaintiffs and potential class members together as victims of a
particular alleged policy or practice.” 	Yeibyo v. E-Park of DC, Inc., Civ. No. DKC-07-1919, 2008
WL 182502, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 18, 2008) (citation omitted). They “must be similarly situated with
respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions[,]” but “the positions need
not be identical, only similar.” 	Id. 	(citation omitted). “[G]ranular differences in job titles and
duties” cannot defeat a preliminary showing of similarity sufficient to justify conditional
certification. 	Learing v. Anthem Cos., No. 21-cv-2283-KMM/JFD, 2022 WL 594378, at *5 (D.
Minn. Feb. 28, 2022). Rather, at the notice stage, a plaintiff’s showing of similarity should “be
considered at a higher level of abstraction.” 	Kneppar, 2024 WL 1156406, at *4 (quoting 	Midkiff
v. Anthem Companies, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 3d 486, 495 (E.D. Va. 2022) (citation omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff Floyd has made an adequate showing that she and the proposed collective
members are sufficiently similarly situated and have been subjected to the same alleged
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misclassification of exemption from overtime pay. Pl. Mem. at 2, 6. Members of the proposed
collective all shared the title of Property Manager. Pl. Decl. ¶ 4. In her declaration, Plaintiff Floyd
attests to three specific names of other salaried Property Managers with whom she discussed
working overtime hours without compensation. 	Id. 	¶ 5. Plaintiff Floyd also notes the fact that she
observed specific, common work responsibilities that other Property Managers employed by
Defendant undertake outside of normal work hours. 	Id. 	¶ 6. These responsibilities include working
on-site at properties, attending evening meetings, and making work calls/emails outside of normal
work hours. 	Id. 	¶ 6. Plaintiff Floyd also attests that her regular job duties included “interfacing
with housing communities in Maryland with which Defendant had contracts and conducting
property and resale inspections[,]” 	id. 	¶ 1, and that these duties were “roughly the same” as those
of other employees employed by Defendant with the title of “Property Manager.” 	Id. 	¶ 7. Plaintiff
Floyd’s evaluation of the shared typical job duties would only encompass the responsibilities of
fifteen people, as that was the alleged number of people employed by Defendant with the job title
of “Property Manager” during the relevant period. 	Id. 	¶ 19. In sum, Plaintiffs have met their initial
burden.
B. 	Content and Method of Notice
While Defendant does not meaningfully contest conditional certification of the proposed
collective, Defendant does dispute Plaintiffs’ proposed method of notice and its contents. 	See
generally 	Def Opp’n.
Plaintiffs present a proposed notice form and draft communications they seek to distribute
to Defendant’s employees who may be members of the putative collective. 	See 	Pl. Exs. 2 & 3 (ECF
11-3, 11-4). Plaintiffs request that the Court authorize a notice period of 90 days; distribute the
notice by U.S. mail, email, and text message; and distribute reminder notices by the same means
21 days before the end of the opt-in period. Pl. Mem. at 7–8; Pl. Prop. Order (ECF 11-5). Plaintiffs
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assert that utilizing several methods of communication will “ensure that all relevant individuals
receive notice.” Pl. Mem. at 7. To effectively communicate notice via mail, email, and text
message, Plaintiffs request the Court order Defendant to share the names, last known personal and
business email addresses and phone numbers, and last known residential addresses of all Property
Managers it employed “at any time within three years of the date of entry of this Court’s Order
granting this Motion.” 	Id.
Defendant 	raises 	four 	primary 	issues 	in 	opposition 	to 	Plaintiffs’ 	proposed 	notice.
Defendant first objects to sending notice via text message and, relatedly, to the production of phone
numbers of potential collective members, arguing that notice by text message is unnecessary when
email is far less intrusive, risks ex-parte communications, and is unsupported by special
circumstances. Def. Opp’n at 2–4. Defendant next objects to the language of the proposed notice,
arguing that it is vague and must be cured by a clearer articulation of Defendant’s position and of
the possibility of participating in discovery and trial if joined in the collective action, as well as
the inclusion of defense counsel contact information. 	Id. 	at 4–6. Defendant also notes that
Plaintiff’s proposed notice incorrectly identifies putative plaintiffs as “Property Managers,” and
Defendant suggests that the title should be revised to the correct job title, “Community Association
Managers.” 	Id. 	at 6. Finally, Defendant objects to the issuance of a reminder notice. 	Id. 	at 6–7.
In reply, Plaintiffs concede to Defendant’s proposed modifications to the language in the
notices, 	see 	Def. Exs. A & B (ECF 16-1, 16-2) with one additional change. Pl. Reply at 5. Plaintiffs
request that, if defense counsel’s name and address are included on the notice form, that
information be accompanied by a disclaimer stating that “[d]efense counsel are obligated to
represent the best interests of Defendant[] and have no legal obligation to you or your interest.”
Pl. Reply at 5.
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Courts “have broad discretion regarding the details of the notice sent to potential opt-in
plaintiffs.” 	Kneppar, 2024 WL 1156406, at *6 (quoting 	Firestone v. Food Concepts, LLC, No.
2:22-CV-04020-BHH, 2024 WL 578454, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2024)). “Notices are expected to
be ‘timely, accurate, and informative,’ so that potential plaintiffs can make informed decisions
about whether to participate.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170). “The goals of
the notice are to make as many potential plaintiffs as possible aware of the action and their right
to opt in without devolving into a fishing expedition or imposing undue burdens on the
defendants.” 	Lazaar v. Anthem Companies, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 434, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)
(cleaned up) (citation omitted). Yet courts “must take care to avoid even the appearance of judicial
endorsement of the action.” 	Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174.
First, the Court will allow notice by text message, in addition to postal mail and email. I
find the late Judge Messitte’s reasoning to be persuasive:
From a practical standpoint, [three]-year-old mailing addresses may
be outdated, but phone numbers and email addresses are more likely
to have remained constant, which would facilitate contact with
potential Plaintiffs who may have changed homes. In addition,
potential collective action members who will be contacted by phone
or email are the very same people who will be targeted with any
mailing; the addition of other modes of communication simply
increases the likelihood that these people will be reached. The Court
sees little danger of “stirring up litigation” on the part of new
litigants. Plaintiffs do not have to demonstrate a special need to
justify the disclosure of phone numbers.
Boyd v. SFS Commc’ns, LLC, Civ. No. PJM 15-3068, 2017 WL 386539, at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 27,
2017). Defendant will be directed to produce all the contact information requested by Plaintiffs,
including phone numbers and email addresses to the extent Defendant possess them.
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Second, the Court finds that Defendant’s proposed modifications to Plaintiff’s notices are
appropriate. 	See 	Def. Exs. A & B (ECF 16-1, ECF 16-2). Defendant’s amended language serves
to accurately indicate that Defendant denies Plaintiffs’ allegations and that participation in the
litigation may require testifying, taking part in discovery, or being deposed, but that potential
plaintiffs may abstain from participation in the litigation by simply ignoring the notice. Def. Exs.
A & B. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not dispute that “Community Association Managers” is the correct
job title.
The Court also finds appropriate Plaintiffs’ request that if defense counsel’s name and
address are included on the notice form, this information be accompanied by a disclaimer stating
that “[d]efense counsel are obligated to represent the best interests of Defendant[] and have no
legal obligation to you or your interest.” Pl. Reply at 5. I find that
[i]ncluding at least the names of counsel for both parties allays any
concern that the Court, in endorsing the Notice, may appear to be
endorsing the position or one side or the other. At the same time, …
including the disclaimer tends to suggest to prospective collective
action members who might be unfamiliar with the nuances of
representation in litigation that one set of counsel proposes to
represent them and the other to oppose them.
Boyd, 2017 WL 386539, at *4. Accordingly, the Court directs counsel to include this disclaimer
requested by Plaintiffs.
Finally, the Court approves of Plaintiffs’ proposed distribution of a reminder notice.
“Courts in this district generally … allow reminder notices[.]” 	Johnson v. Miss Toyas Creole
House, LLC, Civ. No. GLR-23-2821, 2025 WL 403704, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2025) (collecting
cases). However, the Court finds that the distribution of the subsequent reminder notice to potential
collective members via all three requested modes of communication goes beyond the necessary
means for effective notice and may give the appearance of judicial endorsement of this litigation.
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See Kneppar, 2024 WL 1156406, at *6. Accordingly, the Court will authorize that the preliminary
notices be sent via U.S. mail, text message, and email, and that reminder notices to be sent by
email only, with the content of the agreed-upon, revised notice and reminder letters. Def. Exs. A
& B.
In sum, the Court shall direct Defendant to disclose to Plaintiffs full names, phone numbers,
and last-known e-mail and home address information for potential members of the putative
collective; authorize initial distribution of Plaintiff’s proposed notice form to collective members
by U.S. mail, e-mail, and text message; and authorize reminder notices by email only, 21 days
before the end of a 90-day notice period.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Floyd’s Motion for Conditional Certification and Court Authorized Notice Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (ECF 11) is GRANTED IN PART, and Plaintiffs’ proposed notice
and distribution plan is APPROVED with incorporation of the modifications described herein. A
separate Order will issue.
2/2/26
Date 	Matthew J. Maddox
United States District Judge
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