USA v. Tunis

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES
v.
GEORGE C. TUNIS
Case Nos. 	25-cr-243-ABA
25-cr-244-ABA
25-cr-245-ABA
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant George C. Tunis owns an amphibious “Iguana” powerboat with
“tracks” underneath that, when deployed, permit it to “move over land.” (The quotations
are from the parties’ factual stipulation.) He drove it onto the beach at Assateague
National Seashore and was cited for violating 36 C.F.R. § 4.10, which forbids “motor
vehicles” from operating off-road in non-designated areas of national parks. The
violations constitute misdemeanors, and Mr. Tunis has challenged the convictions.
Because the Iguana is a motor vehicle when operated on land and the lower beach area
is explicitly within the scope of the regulation, and because the regulations are not
grievously ambiguous on either issue, the Court will affirm the convictions.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
Assateague Island is within the Assateague National Seashore, a national park.
See ECF No. 4 at 11–12. The national park covers not only the Island itself, but extends a
half mile into the surrounding waters. ECF No. 7 at 2 (citing Pub. L. 89-195, 79 Stat.
1 As noted above, the parties have stipulated to the relevant facts. See Case No. 25-cr-
243-ABA, ECF No. 7-1. That stipulation, and the other filings in this case, were filed in
the dockets of all three case numbers (one for each citation that was issued to Mr.
Tunis). Going forward, when the Court refers to ECF numbers, it refers only to entries in
the docket of Case No. 25-cr-00243-ABA. Though the docket entry numbering of the
three citation appeals is slightly different, each has the same substantive filings.
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824, 824 (Sept. 21, 1965)); see also ECF Nos. 7-2 & 7-3 (maps). There is no dispute that
Mr. Tunis was within the national park when, on at least four occasions between
September 2020 and October 2024, he drove his Iguana onto the “foreshore” near the
northern end of Assateague. See ECF No. 4 at 1. The “foreshore” refers to the part of the
beach that becomes submerged at high tide. ECF No. 4-1 at 46. The foreshore, although
undisputedly within the national park, is owned by the State of Maryland; the federal
government owns the beach above the mean high-tide line, as well as the rest of the
island. ECF No. 7-1 ¶¶ 10–11. That delineation of ownership is the product of an
agreement between the State of Maryland and the federal government in 1996. ECF No.
7-4 at 7. That Concurrent Jurisdiction Agreement did not affect the boundaries of
Assateague National Seashore, but rather addressed ownership of certain lands within
the Seashore. Id. at 1–6.
The Iguana is capable of operating both on water as a boat and on land using an
electric-drive continuous track mechanism. Id. at 1. The following are two photos of it,
reflecting its dual modes of operation (ECF No. 7-1 at 6–7):
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On three separate dates (June 11, 2022, September 19, 2022, and October 5,
2024), Mr. Tunis drove his Iguana from the water onto the foreshore at Assateague, and
National Park Service (NPS) police officers issued Mr. Tunis citations under 36 C.F.R.
§ 4.10(a). ECF No. 7-1 at 8–10. That regulation prohibits “[o]perating a motor vehicle . .
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. except on park roads, in parking areas and on routes and areas designated for off-road
motor vehicle use.” The NPS regulations define “motor vehicle” as “every vehicle that is
self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power, but not operated on
rails or water, except an electric bicycle, a snowmobile, and a motorized wheelchair.” 36
C.F.R. § 1.4.
Because a violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.10(a) is a misdemeanor, these cases were
presided over in the first instance by a magistrate judge, Judge C. Bruce Anderson. See
18 U.S.C. § 3401(a). Mr. Tunis filed a motion to dismiss the charges, on which Judge
Anderson held a hearing in August 2025. ECF No. 4-1. Mr. Tunis made two primary
arguments: (1) that the Iguana is not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the
regulations, and (2) that § 4.10(a) does not reach conduct on the foreshore because that
land, although within the national park, is owned by the State of Maryland. Id. Mr.
Tunis also argued that, at minimum, the regulations are ambiguous and thus his
convictions should be vacated under the rule of lenity. Id. Judge Anderson disagreed
with Mr. Tunis on all three fronts and denied the motion to dismiss. Id. at 43–49. The
parties then proceeded to a trial on the stipulated facts and Judge Anderson found Mr.
Tunis guilty. Id. at 53. (There is no right to a trial by jury for “petty offense[s]” for which
“the maximum term of imprisonment is six months,” United States v. Nachtigal, 507
U.S. 1, 4 (1993), so Judge Anderson held a bench trial.) Mr. Tunis has now appealed to
this Court and raised the same arguments.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(g)(2)(D), a district judge reviewing
a criminal conviction entered by a magistrate judge applies the “same standards of
review applied by a court of appeals in assessing a district court conviction.” United
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States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 2005). “Findings of fact . . . are reviewed
for clear error, and issues of law (such as the interpretation of statutes and regulations)
are reviewed de novo.” Id. at 306. Here, there are no disputes of fact; the only disputes
are legal, namely (1) whether the Iguana is a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of the
NPS regulations, (2) whether the prohibition on motor vehicles in Assateague includes
the foreshore, which although undisputedly part of the national park is owned by the
State of Maryland, and (3) whether the rule of lenity requires vacatur of the convictions.
A. The Iguana is a motor vehicle
As noted above, the NPS regulation at issue prohibits “[o]perating a motor
vehicle . . . except on park roads, in parking areas and on routes and areas designated for
off-road motor vehicle use.” 36 C.F.R. § 4.10(a). And “[m]otor vehicle means every
vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power, but
not operated on rails or water, except an electric bicycle, a snowmobile, and a motorized
wheelchair.” 36 C.F.R. § 1.4.
Mr. Tunis does not dispute that he was “[o]perating” the Iguana within
Assateague, a national park, and that the foreshore is not a “park road[],” a “parking
area[],” or an “area[] designated for off-road motor vehicle use.” He also does not
dispute that the Iguana is “self-propelled” and/or “propelled by electric power”—and of
course that it is not “an electric bicycle, a snowmobile, and a motorized wheelchair.” He
further concedes that, at the time of the citations, the Iguana was not being “operated on
. . . water.” Rather, the question presented is this: Because the Iguana is capable of
operating on water, is it excluded from the definition of motor vehicle by the “not
operated on rails or water” clause? Mr. Tunis contends his vehicle’s aquatic capabilities
bring it outside the definition of “motor vehicle.” See ECF No. 4 at 7–10. The
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government argues that the applicability of § 4.10 turns on how a given vehicle is being
operated at any given time, not whether it is capable of operating in different ways at
other times. ECF No. 7 at 5–7.
As Mr. Tunis notes, although neither party has identified any case interpreting
the definition of “motor vehicle” under the NPS regulations, there are several cases
grappling with the phrase “motor vehicle” generally. See ECF No. 4 at 18–19. And those
cases often cite what has been called “the most famous hypothetical in the common law
world.” Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1109, 1109 (2008). “If you went to law school in the past sixty years, you may have come
across the following question: ‘A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public
park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy
automobiles? What about airplanes?’” Truck Trailer Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc v. EPA, 17 F.4th
1198, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607 (1958)); see also Schauer, A Critical Guide, 83
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1110–11 (discussing a different legal scholar’s version of the
hypothetical: “What if a group of patriots . . . sought to ‘mount on a pedestal’ in the park,
as a war memorial, a military truck ‘in perfect working order’?”) (citing Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 663
(1958)).
But the question of whether the Iguana is a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of
36 C.F.R. § 1.4 is neither abstract nor epistemological. Rather, it is governed by well-
settled methods for interpreting statutes and regulations. “When interpreting a statute,
we first consider the plain meaning of the statutory language.” Schilling v. Schmidt
Baking Co., Inc., 876 F.3d 596, 601 (4th Cir. 2017). The Court “must also consider ‘the
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specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as
a whole.’” United States v. Spirito, 36 F.4th 191, 204 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Yi v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 2005)). In other words, courts “do not . . .
construe the meaning of statutory terms in a vacuum.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662
(2001). These same methods apply to interpreting regulations. See Black & Decker
Corp. v. Comm’r, 986 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Regulations, like statutes, are
interpreted according to canons of construction.”).
Turning back to the text, “motor vehicle” means “every vehicle that is self-
propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power, but not operated on rails
or water, except an electric bicycle, a snowmobile, and a motorized wheelchair.” 36
C.F.R. § 1.4. The Iguana can operate on water, but it also can operate on land—and was
being operated on land (the foreshore) when the citations were issued. The text of
section 1.4 does not expressly state whether the “rails or water” exclusion applies based
on the capabilities of a vehicle or its operating status at a moment in time—i.e., whether
the Iguana is always excluded from the definition because it is capable of being operated
on water (Mr. Tunis’s position), or whether it is only excluded from the definition while
it is actively being operated on water (the government’s position). But the structure and
context of the regulations clearly establish that an amphibious craft such as the Iguana
is a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of section 1.4 when it is operated on land.
First, grammar. In defining “motor vehicle” in part as a “vehicle . . . not operated
on rails or water,” the NPS chose the word “operated.” It did not say “capable of being
operated on rails or water” or describe vehicles that “may be operated on rails or water.”
It said that if a vehicle is “operated” on rails or water, it is not a motor vehicle. That
word choice is strong evidence that the NPS understood the “rails or water” exclusion to
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apply only if and while a vehicle “operates” on rails or water. This point is confirmed by
the sentence structure and use of present tense: the exclusion applies if a vehicle “is . . .
operated on rails or water.” The NPS is far more likely to have intended “is . . . operated”
to mean “is in the process of being operated” than as “is capable of being operated.” The
grammatical structure of the “motor vehicle” definition shows that the question of
whether something is a “motor vehicle” turns on how it was being operated when the
citation was issued.
Second, this conclusion is confirmed by contrasting the definition of “motor
vehicle,” and specifically NPS’s incorporation of a “not operated on rails or water”
requirement, with other definitions within section 1.4. When the NPS defined “vehicle,”
it adopted a definition that focused on whether the object is capable of operating “on
land”: “Vehicle means every device in, upon, or by which a person or property is or may
be transported or drawn on land, except snowmobiles and devices moved by human
power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or track.” 36 C.F.R. § 1.4 (emphasis
added).2 The Iguana undisputedly qualifies as a “vehicle” under this broad definition. It
transports people or property, and it “may” be operated over land. In contrast, within
the definition of “motor vehicle,” when NPS excluded vehicles “not operated on . . .
water” it did not adopt a standard based on capability, but rather operation: a “motor
vehicle” is a vehicle that is “not operated on rails or water.” The fact that NPS adopted
2 The Iguana is a continuous track vehicle akin to a tank. So it is not excluded from the
definition of vehicle by the “exclusively upon stationary rails or track” clause, which
would apply to exclude, for example, trains; the Iguana’s “track” is not “stationary.” See
Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1135 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining
that Cal. Vehicle Code § 670, which uses nearly identical language in defining vehicles,
“explicitly excludes trains from the definition of ‘vehicle’ by excepting any device ‘used
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks’”).
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different formulations in these definitions is strong evidence that, as applied here, the
exclusion within the “motor vehicle” definition for “vehicle[s] . . . operated on rails or
water” turns on whether the vehicle was actively operating “on rails or water” at the
relevant moment. In other words, even if the definition of “motor vehicle” standing
alone might suggest, as Mr. Tunis argues, that the phrase “operated on rails or water”
could mean capable of “operat[ing] on rails or water,” the “vehicle” definition shows
that NPS knew how to draft a definition that turns on a vehicle’s capability—and chose
not to do so when it adopted the “operated on rails or water” exclusion.
And it is not just the definition of “vehicle” that illustrates this contrast with the
“not operated on rails or water” exclusion. The NPS regulations also use broad language
focused on capability when defining several other means of transport. For example:
• 	“Vessel means every description of watercraft, or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation
on the water.”
• 	“Un-manned submersible means any device operated by remote control,
used or capable of being used, to search or collect below the surface of the
water.”
• 	“Bicycle means every device propelled solely by human power upon which
a person or persons may ride on land, having one, two, or more wheels,
except a manual wheelchair.”
36 C.F.R. § 1.4 (emphases added).
It is a “well-settled principle[] of statutory interpretation” that a legislature
“generally acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another.” Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U.S. 1, 12 (2019) (quotation
omitted); see also Yonek v. Shinseki, 722 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (applying the
same rule to the context of agencies and regulations). This principle requires rejecting
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Mr. Tunis’s argument that “operated on . . . water” applies to the Iguana merely because
it is capable of being operated on water. Instead, the context and structure of the
regulation establish that the Iguana is a motor vehicle when it operates on land, even
though it is also capable of being operated on water at other times.
Third, the practical implications of excluding the Iguana from the definition of
motor vehicles further undermine Mr. Tunis’s proposed construction of the regulation.
“[C]ourts should avoid interpretations that ‘would produce absurd results’ contrary to
congressional intent.” Akkus v. Rocket Mortg., LLC, 715 F. Supp. 3d 726, 731 (D. Md.
2024) (quoting United States v. Joshua, 607 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2010)); see also
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 568 U.S. 115, 121 (2013) (finding that a floating
home was not a “vessel” in part because the Court “must apply [statutory] definition[s]
in a ‘practical,’ not a ‘theoretical,’ way”) (quoting Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S.
481, 496 (2005)). If Mr. Tunis’s argument were correct, no amphibious vehicle that is
capable of being operated on water would be considered a motor vehicle. Thus, under
part 4 of the regulations, owners of amphibious vehicles, for example, would not be
required to report vehicle accidents resulting in property damage or personal injury to
park officials (36 C.F.R. § 4.4), would not be prohibited from openly carrying alcohol
while driving or indeed from being intoxicated while driving (id. §§ 4.14, 4.23), and
would not be required to operate their vehicle safely on park roads (id. at § 4.22). And
although the Iguana may not be able to drive as fast as a car, Mr. Tunis’s interpretation
would exclude even faster-moving amphibious vehicles from the definition of “motor
vehicle”—they too would be capable of being operated on water, and thus excluded.
Under Mr. Tunis’s proposed construction, the “duck boats” sometimes found in
waterfront tourist areas would not qualify as a “motor vehicle”—even when driving on
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roads at traffic speed. Cf. Ride the Ducks of Philadelphia, LLC v. Duck Boat Tours, Inc.,
138 F. App’x 431, 432 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Ride The Ducks . . . operates a tourist attraction
in Philadelphia using amphibious vehicles known as ‘ducks boats.’ These duck boats
take tourists on a ride through the historic streets of Philadelphia and then enter the
Delaware River via a ramp at the end of Race Street near the Benjamin Franklin Bridge
for a water tour.”). Although some of the conduct listed above may also be subject to
state law or prohibited under other NPS regulations, the general implication is clear: the
context and structure of part 4 confirm NPS’s intent for “motor vehicle” to apply to
powered vehicles when they are operated on land, as the Iguana was being operated
when the citations here were issued.
In summary, the language, context and structure of the NPS regulations clearly
establish that the Iguana is a motor vehicle when it is being operated on land, as it was
when Mr. Tunis drove it up onto the foreshore at Assateague. Mr. Tunis offers two
remaining arguments against this interpretation. Neither is successful.
First, Mr. Tunis argues that the Iguana “is a vessel, not a motor vehicle.” ECF No.
4 at 8. As evidence of this, he notes that at least one of his citations described the Iguana
as a “boat.” Id. Mr. Tunis is correct that the Iguana is a “vessel” under that term’s broad,
capability-based definition in section 1.4 (“Vessel means every . . . description of
watercraft . . . capable of being used[] as a means of transportation on the water.”).
Because the definition of “vessel” is explicitly based on capability, the Iguana remains a
vessel regardless of whether it is operating on land or water at a given time. Mr. Tunis
does not explain why the Iguana cannot be both a vessel and, when it is operated on
land, a motor vehicle, too. Nothing in the regulation prohibits multiple simultaneous
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classifications. Thus, the conclusion that the Iguana is not a motor vehicle does not
follow from the premise that the Iguana is a “vessel.”3
Second, Mr. Tunis similarly argues that an operating-status definition of “motor
vehicle” is contrary to other characteristic-based definitions in the regulation and would
lead to illogical consequences—for example, that airplanes and boats would cease to be
“aircraft” and “vessels” when driven on land, and would instead be regulated as motor
vehicles. ECF No. 4 at 9. But again, Mr. Tunis assumes without any authority that means
of transportation are fixed in one category. Under the regulations, an aircraft does not
stop being an aircraft when driven on a road, and neither does a vessel. But that is
because the regulatory definitions of those means of transport are broad: “Aircraft” is
defined as “a device that is used or intended to be used for human flight in the air” and
“vessels” include craft “capable of being used[] as a means of transportation on the
water.” 36 C.F.R. § 1.4 (emphasis added). The “operated on . . . water” exclusion for
motor vehicles does not use similarly broad language focused on immutable capabilities
3 This conclusion is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis and holding in
Lozman. There, the question was whether a “home consist[ing] of a houselike
plywood structure with French doors on three sides” constructed atop an “empty bilge
space underneath the main floor” that “kept it afloat” was a “vessel,” which in that
context Congress has defined as a “‘watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.’” 568 U.S. at 118 (quoting
1 U.S.C. § 3). That “floating home,” although capable of floating, was not capable of
“being used . . . as a means of transportation on water,” 1 U.S.C. § 3, because it had no
motor or other way to propel itself (it had to be towed to be moved anywhere) and was
not otherwise “designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water.”
Id. at 121; see also id. at 121–30 (analyzing the text, structure and purpose of the
relevant statute, language from other statutes, and cases interpreting similar statutory
language). Here, there is no dispute that Mr. Tunis’s Iguana was capable of being
operated on land; that is how it got onto the foreshore, and the mode in which it was
being operated at the time these citations were issued.
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or design, as explained above. Pilots must both follow the regulations for “aircraft”
generally and, if they were to drive their planes on national park land, must obey the
regulations for motor vehicles. So too for Mr. Tunis’s Iguana.
B. 	The foreshore is within the scope of the NPS traffic regulations
Mr. Tunis also argues that, even if the Iguana was a motor vehicle, section 4.10
does not apply to him because the foreshore is not owned by the federal government. As
noted above, the parties have stipulated that the Iguana was on the foreshore of the
beach, which is titled to Maryland. Relying on two district court cases from the Ninth
Circuit, Mr. Tunis contends that (a) NPS regulations can only be enforced on land that is
federally owned unless their scope is explicitly extended to reach conduct on state- or
privately-owned land; and (b) section 4.10 lacks any such statement, so it does not apply
to the Maryland-owned portions of Assateague, including the foreshore. The two cases
he relies on are United States v. Mendez Concrete, Case No. 07-cr-767-RCF, 2009 WL
733881 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2009) and United States v. Grant, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1045 (D. Mont. 2004).
As an initial matter, by relying on Mendez Concrete and Grant, the argument
conflates the question of whether land is part of a national park with the question of who
owns land within a national park. In Mendez Concrete, the government charged a
concrete company with having caused a wildfire that burned tens of thousands of acres
of the Los Padres National Forest. But the company was located outside the boundaries
of the national park—on land that was neither federally owned nor within a federal park.
Thus, the question arose whether the pertinent Department of Agriculture regulations
applied to conduct outside a national park that caused harm within a national park—in
other words, whether the regulation “reaches conduct on non-federal land.” 2009 WL
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733881, at *2. That issue took on a constitutional dimension because “[t]he Property
Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, authorizes the Secretary [of Agriculture] ‘to regulate
conduct on non-federal land when reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal
property.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1982)). That
court held that the regulation at issue (about causing timber, etc., “to burn except as
authorized by permit, 36 C.F.R. § 261.5(c)) was “not intended to apply to conduct on
adjacent non-federal property.” 2009 WL 733881, at *4. In context, “non-federal
property” referred to property outside the boundaries of a national park. So too in
Grant, where “all of the fires set by Grant were on state lands”—land that was not only
not owned by the federal government, but outside the boundaries of any “federal lands.”
318 F. Supp. 2d at 1043, 1044. Accordingly, the analysis in Mendez Concrete and Grant
has no bearing on the question here, where the conduct at issue undisputedly occurred
within a national park.
Beyond the distinctions between those cases and this case, the NPS regulations
do contain a clear statement of scope that reaches Assateague Island’s state-owned
foreshore. NPS regulations expressly apply to “all persons entering, using, visiting, or
otherwise within . . . [w]aters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States located
within the boundaries of the National Park System.” 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3). That
“includ[es]” not only “navigable waters” but also “areas within their ordinary reach (up
to the mean high water line in places subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and up to the
ordinary high water mark in other places).” Id. Section 1.2(a)(3) goes on to provide that
other than in Alaska, the regulations apply “without regard to the ownership of
submerged lands, tidelands, or lowlands.” Id. The pertinent regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 4.1,
explicitly adopts this scope provision for the traffic regulations contained in part 4,
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including section 4.10 (the provision under which Mr. Tunis was charged): “[t]he
applicability of the regulations in this part is described in § 1.2 of this chapter.”
The foreshore is clearly encompassed within section 1.2(a)(3). The foreshore is
within the “ordinary reach” of “[w]aters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
Mr. Tunis does not dispute that the portion of the Atlantic Ocean within the Assateague
Island National Seashore is water subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. His
argument is that the regulation at issue does not apply to the state-owned land that
becomes submerged at high tide (the foreshore). See ECF No. 4-1 at 12–13. But the
foreshore is clearly an “area within” that water’s “ordinary reach” because the regulation
expressly includes submerged land “up to the mean high water line in places subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide.” 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3). The foreshore is also undisputedly
“within the boundaries of the National Park System,” because the entire area is part of
the Assateague Island National Seashore, even if the foreshore and submerged lands are
titled to Maryland. See ECF No. 7-2, 7-3. And finally, section 1.2(a)(3) extends to non-
federally-owned lands, as it applies “without regard to the ownership of submerged
lands, tidelands, or lowlands.” 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3) (emphasis added). This is the clear
statement of extended scope that Mr. Tunis contends is missing: section 1.2(a)(3)
extends the scope of NPS regulations to foreshore areas regardless of who owns those
areas. The text of 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3) applies NPS regulatory authority, including its
authority under section 4.10, to the foreshore at issue here.4
4 The foreshore of Assateague Island is also within the scope of the regulation pursuant
to 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(2). That provision extends NPS’s regulatory authority to the
“boundaries of lands and waters administered by the National Park Service for public-
use purposes pursuant to the terms of a written instrument.” As noted above, Maryland
and the federal government entered into an agreement establishing “concurrent
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The only case addressing the scope of section 4.10 that the parties have cited or of
which the Court is aware holds similarly. In United States v. Carstens, 982 F. Supp. 2d
874 (N.D. Ind. 2013), the Defendant used an all-terrain vehicle on a beach on the shore
of Lake Michigan to tow a personal watercraft. He was cited under section 4.10 for
operating the all-terrain vehicle and under 36 C.F.R. §§ 3.8 and 3.9 for improper use of
the personal watercraft. Id. at 877. The beach included “land between the edge of the
water of Lake Michigan and the ordinary high water mark” that was “held in public trust
by the State of Indiana.” Id. at 878. Even though the beach area in question was not
owned by the federal government, it was within the boundaries of the Indiana Dunes
National Lakeshore Park. Id. at 877–78. The Carstens court cited 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3)
and held that “[t]he National Park Service had and has jurisdiction to regulate that
beach area and properly had and has legal jurisdiction to enforce its regulations at that
beach area.” Id. at 878. Mr. Tunis claims that the jurisdictional analysis in Carstens only
applied to boating regulations because the Defendant was cited for violations of part 3.
ECF No. 10 at 10–11. But Carstens did not analyze parts 3 and 4 differently, likely
because both incorporate the same scope provision: 36 C.F.R. § 1.2. Compare 36 C.F.R.
§ 3.1 with 36 C.F.R. § 4.1. As Carstens indicates, section 1.2(a)(3) reaches foreshore
jurisdiction” over the Assateague Island National Seashore, among other lands. ECF No.
7-4 at 2, 4. This agreement “vest[s] in the State of Maryland and the United States all
the rights accorded a sovereign with the broad qualifications that such authority is held
concurrently over matters including but not limited to criminal law [and] police
powers[.]” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). The NPS administers Assateague Island for
purposes of the public national park, and its authority is pursuant, at least in part, to
this written agreement. Thus, the foreshore is also within the scope of NPS authority
under section 1.2(a)(2).
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areas that are within national park boundaries even if they are not owned by the federal
government.
This conclusion is further confirmed by Sturgeon v. Frost, a case that twice went
to the Supreme Court on the question of whether Mr. Sturgeon could use a hovercraft
for moose hunting on national parkland in Alaska. Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U.S. 424
(2016) (“Sturgeon I”); Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U.S. 28 (2019) (“Sturgeon II”). This is
where the carve-out in § 1.2(a)(3) for Alaska is illuminating. As noted above, the NPS
regulations apply to, among other areas, “[w]aters subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States within the boundaries of the National Park System . . . without regard to
the ownership of submerged lands, tidelands, or lowlands.” 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3)
(emphasis added). That last part, as explained above, is incompatible with Mr. Tunis’s
argument that the foreshore’s ownership by the State renders the NPS regulations
inapplicable. But that same regulatory phrase, emphasizing that NPS regulations apply
“without regard” to the ownership of submerged lands, expressly does not apply “in
Alaska.” “Alaska is often the exception, not the rule.” Sturgeon I, 577 U.S. at 440. In
Sturgeon, the hunter was driving his hovercraft within a national park (the Yukon–
Charley Rivers National Preserve) on land owned by the State of Alaska (the Nation
River). Because this was in Alaska, 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3) did not apply, and ownership
did matter. Sturgeon II, 587 U.S. at 46. But “[i]f Sturgeon lived in any other state, his
suit would not have a prayer of success”—meaning, anywhere other than Alaska, the
ownership of land within national parks does not affect whether NPS regulations apply.
Although the Supreme Court’s “prayer of success” comment was dicta, its reasoning was
clearly correct, and further illustrates why Maryland’s ownership of the Assateague
foreshore does not render the foreshore outside the reach of the NPS regulations.
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Mr. Tunis offers many counterarguments and alternative framings, but none
succeed. Mr. Tunis first contends that 36 C.F.R. § 4.1 creates a more limited, specific
jurisdictional reach for part 4 as compared to section 1.2. This is belied by the plain
language of the regulation. Section 4.1 states as follows:
The applicability of the regulations in this part is described in
§ 1.2 of this chapter. The regulations in this part also apply,
regardless of land ownership, on all roadways and parking
areas within a park area that are open to public traffic and that
are under the legislative jurisdiction of the United States.
Mr. Tunis contends that the second sentence operates to limit the broader grant of
jurisdictional applicability to non-federally-owned land contained in Section 1.2. ECF
No. 4 at 16–18. Emphasizing the canon of statutory construction that specific provisions
control over more general provisions, Mr. Tunis contends that “NPS explicitly
considered whether the Vehicles and Traffic Safety regulations would apply on non-
federal lands within park areas, and extended jurisdiction only to ‘roadways and parking
areas within a park area that are open to public traffic and that are under the legislative
jurisdiction of the United States.’” ECF No. 10 at 8 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 4.1).
But this analysis leaves out the word “also.” The second sentence of section 4.1
does not limit the scope of section 1.2. Instead, it is additive. The jurisdictional scope
articulated in section 4.1 extends as far as section 1.2 reaches, and also extends to
roadways and parking areas that are not federally owned but are within park
boundaries. Such an addition is not surplusage when compared to section 1.2(a)(1),
which does not specify whether the regulations apply to roadways within national parks
that are not owned by the federal government. Because section 4.1 incorporates section
1.2 without limits, and because section 1.2(a)(3) clearly encompasses foreshore areas
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that are within park boundaries regardless of whether they are owned by the federal
government, 36 C.F.R. § 4.10 applies to the area of the beach below the high-water mark
upon which Mr. Tunis parked the Iguana.
Mr. Tunis also argues that section 1.2(a)(3) does not allow enforcement because it
was only intended to regulate boating and water-based activities. See ECF No. 4 at 15–
18. But the text of section 1.2(a)(3) is clear. It extends the regulatory scope not only to
waters, but also to “areas within [the water’s] ordinary reach (up to the mean high water
line in places subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and up to the ordinary high water
mark in other places) and, except in Alaska, without regard to the ownership of
submerged lands, tidelands, or lowlands.” 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3). There is no ambiguity:
the plain text of the regulation explicitly includes the foreshore where Mr. Tunis was
operating his Iguana.
C. 	Lenity
Finally, Mr. Tunis argues that even if operating the Iguana on the Assateague
Island foreshore violates 36 C.F.R. § 4.10, he should prevail under the rule of lenity.
“The rule of lenity guides courts to ‘strictly construe’ criminal statutes and avoid
interpreting them to ‘extend criminal liability beyond that which Congress has plainly
and unmistakably proscribed.’” United States v. Kuehner, 126 F.4th 319, 328 (4th Cir.)
(quoting United States v. Hilton, 701 F.3d 959, 966 (4th Cir. 2012)). The rule of lenity
applies equally to regulations. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, Case No. 23-cr-52-
RDA, 2025 WL 310128, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 27, 2025) (applying lenity to a regulatory
offense). But “[t]he rule of lenity is a last resort, not a primary tool of construction.”
Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 383 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Ehsan, 163
F.3d 855, 858 (4th Cir. 1998)). “It only applies when courts ‘can make no more than a
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guess as to what Congress intended’ and there is a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in
the statute.’” Bonnie v. Dunbar, 157 F.4th 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Muscarello
v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998)). “[L]enity . . . has [no] role to play where
‘text, context, and structure’ decide the case.” Bondi v. VanDerStok, 604 U.S. 458, 484
(2025) (quoting Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374, 393–394 (2021)).
The ambiguities here are not grievous. The definition of “motor vehicle” contains
some ambiguities, but any doubts are resolved by considering the text, context, and
structure, as discussed above. After all, the rule of lenity “is not triggered . . . by the
‘simple existence of some statutory ambiguity’ given that ‘most statutes are ambiguous
to some degree.’” United States v. George, 946 F.3d 643, 645 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138). And section 4.10’s scope is not ambiguous at all given the
text of 36 C.F.R. §§ 1.2 and 4.1, which combine to extend the regulation’s reach to the
foreshore areas within park boundaries, regardless of whether the underlying land is
owned by the federal government or the state. Because the Court can readily ascertain
the meaning of the regulations by applying the normal canons of statutory construction,
there is no basis for reversing the conviction under the rule of lenity.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the convictions are AFFIRMED. A separate order will
follow.
Date: January 29, 2026 	___________________
Adam B. Abelson
United States District Judge
/s/
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