State of Maryland v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
STATE OF MARYLAND, *
Plaintiff, *
STEPHEN MARTIN and CHERYL *
MARTIN,
*
Intervenor Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. RDB-24-3656
*
v.
*
W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
*
Defendant.
*
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff State of Maryland (the State) filed the above-captioned action against Defendant
W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. (Gore) on December 18, 2024, alleging nuisance, trespass,
negligence, and state and federal statutory environmental claims based on Gore’s alleged
“contamination of Maryland’s natural resources with toxic” substances. ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. On May
12, 2025, the State filed an amended pleading in which it, among other things, added an additional
federal statutory environmental claim, as well as a state law unjust enrichment claim. ECF No. 43
¶¶ 204–221. On October 29, 2025, the Court granted Stephen and Cheryl Martin’s motion to
intervene in Counts V and IX of the State’s amended complaint, which allege state and federal
statutory environmental claims. ECF Nos. 60–61; see also ECF No. 67.
On December 9, 2025, the Honorable Richard D. Bennett referred this case to the
undersigned for discovery and all related scheduling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rules
301 and 302 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2025). ECF No. 71. On December 19, 2025, the undersigned held a
discovery hearing to address a dispute between the State and Gore regarding the production of
Gore’s profit and revenue data, which Gore contends is not relevant because its profits are not
Case 1:24-cv-03656-RDB Document 105 Filed 01/14/26 Page 1 of 5

2
recoverable. ECF Nos. 76–77, 82. At the hearing, the undersigned directed the State and Gore to
file supplemental position statements by January 9, 2026, which the undersigned has reviewed.
ECF Nos. 83, 101–102. For the reasons set forth below, Gore’s request to shield production of its
profit and revenue information is denied.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of
the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The broad sweep of discovery under the federal rules is cabined
only by relevance and proportionality. Virginia Dep’t of Corr. v. Jordan, 921 F.3d 180, 188 (4th
Cir. 2019); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010), aff’d in
part, modified in part, Civil Action No. MJG-06-2662, 2010 WL 11747756 (D. Md. Nov. 1, 2010)
(“[A]ll permissible discovery must be measured against the yardstick of proportionality.”).
“Relevance is not, on its own, a high bar.” Virginia Dep’t of Corr., 921 F.3d at 188. Instead, in the
context of discovery, relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to [any] other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the
case.” Oppenhiemer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). For this reason, “discovery
requests may be deemed relevant if there is any possibility that the information may be relevant as
to the general subject matter of the action.” National Credit Union Admin. v. First Union Cap.
Markets Corp., 189 F.R.D. 158, 161 (D. Md. 1999) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted);
accord Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1977); Santos v. Crowell,
Civil Action No. GLR-15-3907, 2016 WL 6068082, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2016); Kidwiler v.
Progressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 193, 199 & n.61 (N.D.W. Va. 2000) (collecting cases).
The “burden of showing that the requested discovery is not relevant to the issues in this litigation is
clearly on the party resisting discovery.” National Credit Union Admin., 189 F.R.D. at 161 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090, 1114 (E.D.N.C. 1984)).
Case 1:24-cv-03656-RDB Document 105 Filed 01/14/26 Page 2 of 5

3
In Count X of its First Amended Complaint, the State advances an unjust enrichment claim,
which seeks “all legal and equitable relief necessary to remedy the unjust enrichment of Gore,
including restitution and disgorgement.” ECF No. 43 ¶ 221; see also id at ¶¶ 212–220. Under
Maryland law, unjust enrichment has three elements: (1) a “benefit conferred upon the defendant by
the plaintiff”; (2) an “appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit”; and (3) the
“acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.” Berry &
Gould, P.A. v. Berry, 360 Md. 142, 151 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Gore argues that “Maryland law prohibits the State from recovering Gore’s profits in this case, as
does the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment [(2011) (Third Restatement)]
that Maryland courts follow,” which renders its profits and revenue irrelevant. ECF No. 101 at 1.1
The State counters that Gore’s profit and revenue information is relevant and necessary because
restitution is “measured by ‘the amount of profit wrongfully obtained.’” ECF No. 77 at 2 (quoting
Third Restatement § 49).
The question of the State’s ability to disgorge Gore’s profits as a remedy for its unjust
enrichment claim is more complicated than Gore suggests. As the State and Gore each
acknowledge, “Maryland courts look to the Third Restatement in assessing unjust enrichment
claims.” Lacks v. Ultragenyx Pharm., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 3d 397, 420 (D. Md. 2024) (collecting
cases). That treatise explains that the “object of the disgorgement remedy—to eliminate the
possibility of profit from conscious wrongdoing—is one of the cornerstones of the law of restitution
and unjust enrichment.” Third Restatement § 51 cmt. e. As the State argues, the Third Restatement
supports disgorgement of “the net profit attributable to the underlying wrong “ of a “conscious
1 Page numbers refer to the pagination of the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case
Files system printed at the top of the cited document.
Case 1:24-cv-03656-RDB Document 105 Filed 01/14/26 Page 3 of 5

4
wrongdoer.” Third Restatement § 51(4); see also ECF Nos. 77 at 2 (citing Third Restatement §§ 3,
49, 51); 102 at 2 & n.6 (citing Third Restatement § 51(4)).
Conceptually, this remedy has support in Maryland case law. E.g., Linton v. Consumer
Prot. Div., 467 Md. 502, 519 (2020). The cases upon which the State and Gore rely, however, do
not address the availability of disgorgement of profits as an unjust enrichment remedy under
Maryland law in an environmental case such as this. See, e.g., Village of Rockton, Ill. v. Sonoco
Prods. Co., 135 F. Supp. 3d 700, 711 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (applying Illinois law); Little Hocking Water
Ass’n, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 940, 984 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (applying
Ohio law); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, 2013
WL 5230814, at *2-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013) (interpreting the Second Restatement of Torts § 929
and the “common law of restitution” and applying Puerto Rico law). Regardless, the availability of
disgorgement is not a question that should be determined at this juncture in the case, which is before
the undersigned only for resolution of a discovery dispute.
Upon closer analysis, the contours of Gore’s relevance argument reveal its faulty premise.
At bottom, Gore argues that the State cannot disgorge its profits because of the inadequacy of its
allegations. ECF No. 101 at 5. Gore contends that the State has not identified “a cognizable
benefit” or a “colorable nexus between any benefit it conferred and Gore’s profits.” Id. at 1, 5. As
a sister court in this Circuit stated previously when presented with a similar relevance argument
regarding the discoverability of profit and tax information:
The Court declines any invitation to resolve, in this Order ruling on
discovery matters, the merits of one of the core issues in this case,
namely: whether certain carpet manufacturing inventions and
innovations created by Weiner are Weiner’s or Milliken’s intellectual
property. Indeed, the arguments raised by Defendants as predicate
assumptions to the putative lack of relevance and proportionality of the
discovery request for profit and tax information also form the core of
Defendants[’] arguments in support of their pending Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.
Case 1:24-cv-03656-RDB Document 105 Filed 01/14/26 Page 4 of 5

5
Milliken & Co. v. Evans, No. 7:14-CV-4422-BHH, 2016 WL 11530305, at *5 (D.S.C. July 22,
2016).
Here, too, the undersigned declines Gore’s invitation to stray from Judge Bennett’s
discovery referral and render a decision on the sufficiency of the State’s allegations or the scope of
available relief. Thus far, Gore has not raised a legal challenge to the State’s unjust enrichment
claim—and the pending discovery dispute is not an appropriate vehicle to do so. Unless and until
such time as Gore secures a ruling from the Court that removes restitution and disgorgement of its
profits from the array of available relief, Gore’s profits and revenue remain “matter[s] that bear[ ] or
may bear on an[] issue that is or may be in the case.” Carr v. Double T Diner, 272 F.R.D. 431, 433
(D. Md. 2010). Gore has not carried its burden of showing that there is not “any possibility” that its
profits and revenue “may be relevant as to the general subject matter” of this action. National
Credit Union Admin., 189 F.R.D. at 161.
In light of the foregoing, Gore is ORDERED to respond to the State’s Request for
Production No. 14 and Interrogatory No. 13. The State and Gore shall meet and confer as needed to
agree upon the scope and timeframe of Gore’s production to ensure that it is timely, responsive, and
proportional. Furthermore, Gore may utilize the procedures outlined in the existing
Protective/Confidentiality Order (ECF No. 40) to designate, as appropriate, responsive material as
confidential or highly confidential. The further discovery hearing set for January 15, 2026, at 9:30
am (ECF No. 83) is cancelled because it is unnecessary for the resolution of this discovery dispute.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 14, 2026 /s/
Erin Aslan
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:24-cv-03656-RDB Document 105 Filed 01/14/26 Page 5 of 5