Edwards v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, Maryland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DANIEL EDWARDS, 	*
Plaintiff, 	*
v. 	* 	Civil Case No. 1:24-cv-01350-JMC
THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL 	*
OF BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND
*
Defendant.
*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Daniel Edwards (“Plaintiff”) initiated the present suit against the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore City, Maryland (“Defendant”) on May 8, 2024. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Plaintiff
alleges (1) a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
et seq. (“Title VII”) based on racial discrimination; (2) a violation of Title VII based on a hostile
work environment; (3) a violation of Title VII based on retaliation; (4) a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981; and (5) a violation of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, Md. Code Ann., State
Gov’t, § 20-601 et seq. (“MFEPA”). (ECF No. 1 at 12-21).1 Presently pending before the Court
are the parties’ cross Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 29, 34). The Motion is fully
briefed,2 (ECF Nos. 29, 34, 39) and no hearing is necessary pursuant to Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.
1 When the Court cites to a specific page number or range of page numbers, the Court is referring to the page numbers
provided in the electronic filing stamps located at the top of every electronically filed document. If there are none, the
Court is referring to the page number of the PDF.
2 On January 14, 2026, the Court issued an Order that no further extensions to the briefing schedule would be
granted, even by consent, in light of the several extensions already granted. (ECF No. 39). The time for Plaintiff to
file a reply has now passed, and he failed to do so.
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2025). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part, and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The instant litigation concerns several allegations that each transpired over a decade ago.
Defendant employed Plaintiff at the Baltimore City Fire Department (“BCFD”) from November
3, 2006, to the present day as a Firefighter/Paramedic (“FF/PM”). (ECF No. 34-9 at 31); (ECF
No. 29-3). Plaintiff filed a charge alleging racial discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 16, 2013. (ECF No. 29-6). At that time, Plaintiff
was working at the Smokestack Hardy Fire Station (“Engine 13”). Id. at 2. In that charge, Plaintiff
alleges that in early January of 2013, he was the target of racial discrimination at work. Id. Taking
the allegations in chronological order, Plaintiff seeks recovery for the following instances of
conduct:
i. 	Allegations Stemming from Events in 2009 and 2010
From what the Court can discern, the primary conduct at issue concerns an altercation about
a soiled dinner plate on January 19, 2013, and January 20, 2013. However, in an EEOC Charge
that Plaintiff filed in 2013, (the “2013 Charge”), Plaintiff also references two instances of alleged
discrimination in 2009 and 2010, in which white employees at Engine 13 “strung [Plaintiff’s]
BCFD ‘turnout’ gear up in the ceiling” and he was charged with being “un-trainable” respectively.
(ECF No. 29-6). According to Plaintiff, “[t]he alleged discriminatory conduct began as early as
August 2009, when Plaintiff was involved in an incident at Engine 13 with his white supervisor,
Joshua Shaffer, during which Plaintiff was threatened, and an argument ensued that resulted in
discipline.” (ECF No. 34 at 3). The specific details of this incident are unclear. He continues in
reference to an incident that does not appear to be connected to the allegations set forth in the 2013
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Charge3: “Plaintiff’s disciplinary history, including the suspension arising from the August 2009
incident in which he was accused of threatening another member with a knife/tool, is referenced
by the Department in later Workplace Violence documentation as part of its justification for
subsequent actions against him.” Id.
ii. 	January 2013 Allegations of Racial Discrimination
The allegations clearly included in the 2013 Charge articulate the following incidents:
Plaintiff first alleges that on January 6, 2013, he received a phone call from FF Harold Snyder in
which FF Snyder told him, “You’re not Engine 13 material and you have to go.” 	Id. at 1.
Thereafter, Plaintiff “called [his] immediate supervisor, [Lieutenant] Wayne Felix, right after the
phone call” and reported racial discrimination. Id. 	Lieutenant Felix indicated he was also new
and would do what he could, but “[could not] change these guys’ minds in here.” Id.
Second, on January 19, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that upon opening his locker, he found a
soiled dinner plate with a note that read, “you left your dinner in the refrigerator. Please put away
the next time covered. Your mother does not work here. Thank you for your anticipated
cooperation, management.” 	Id. at 3. Following that discovery, Plaintiff showed the note to
Lieutenant Felix and put the plate in the trash can. Id. Lieutenant Felix told Plaintiff to lock his
locker to avoid similar events in the future. Id. Plaintiff alleges Engine 13 had a house policy to
“leave lockers open so that relieving members can put away the gear of relieved members, in the
appropriate locker(s).” Id.
3 Defendant’s reply clarifies that Defendant challenges the timeliness of the following allegations,
[A]ll allegations that occurred prior to 300-days before Plaintiff filed his Charge on May 16, 2013,
with the EEOC must be procedurally dismissed ie. #5 allegation in the EEOC Charge regarding
August 2009, #6 allegation in the EEOC Charge regarding August 2010 and #7 allegation in the
EEOC Charge regarding four years prior to the filing date.
(ECF No. 39 at 5). Based on Defendant’s specification above, these are the allegations the Court will consider
regarding the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claims.
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Third, Plaintiff alleges that the next night, on January 20, 2013, he found “the same
offensive note and soiled dinner plate” in his locker. Id. At an in-person report in the kitchen to
Lieutenant Felix about the note’s reappearance in Plaintiff’s locker, Plaintiff asserts that a
Firefighter/EMT (“FF/EMT”) Daniel Remeikis entered the kitchen and subsequently said, “that
plate you had, its [sic] back in your locker.” An argument broke out, during which Plaintiff asserts
he picked up the “plate [and] threw it underhand toward the trash can; [he] missed.” Id. “[I]t hit
the wall behind the trash can, and broke.” Id. Thereafter, Pump Operator (“PO”) Ryan Wenger
joined the argument. Id. Plaintiff alleges he took Mr. Remeikis “in arguing with [him], threatening
[him], and attempting to give [him] orders.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff filed internal discrimination charges
against Mr. Remeikis and Mr. Wenger. Id. They also filed charges against Plaintiff for assault.
Id. Additionally, the Battalion Chief filed a charge against Plaintiff. Id.
iii. 	Internal Investigation and Disciplinary Action Resulting from
January 20, 2013, Altercation
In an investigation report, Battalion Chief James Green recommended that Plaintiff should
be charged with violating certain policies against throwing objects at other employees and for
insubordination. (ECF No. 29-13 at 14). He further recommended that “[t]he counter-complaints
filed by FF/PM Edwards against EFF Remeikis…,PO Wenger…, and FF Snyder…should be
dismissed due to a lack of evidence and other technical reasons.” Id. Plaintiff received a fifteen-
day suspension without pay as a result of his conduct in the January 20, 2013 altercation. (ECF
No. 14). Thereafter, a disciplinary hearing took place on March 28, 2013, to evaluate PO Wenger’s
conduct. Id. at 15-16. After that hearing, the Deputy Chief of Training and Education, Mr. Paul
Moore, recommended that Mr. Wenger receive a two-day suspension without pay for his conduct
in the January 20, 2013, altercation. Id. at 17.
iv. 	Internal Investigation and Disciplinary Action Resulting from FF
Harold Snyder’s Phone Call Remarks
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On January 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed a detailed Complaint against FF Harold Snyder after
the phone call during which FF Snyder told Plaintiff he did not belong at Engine 13 and was not
“Engine 13 material.” (ECF No. 29-17 at 14). In the ensuing investigation, Battalion Chief Green
noted the Plaintiff “eluded to a suspicion that he had in reference to the members at the station
were trying to create a ‘Caucasian only fire house.’” Id. at 12. To that end, the Battalion Chief
included the following:
After interviewing several Arican American members I found this comment to be
baseless and an attempt to divert from the facts. Additionally, FF/PM Edwards
made no mention of the “Caucasian only fire house” during his 45 minute
interview. It appeared a week later in a written statement. Additionally, all African
American members interviewed reported the opposite in that they felt welcomed at
the Station of Engine 13. No member reported that they were subjected to or
witnessed anything that could be construed as racially biased or discriminatory.
Id.
Thus, the complaint against FF Snyder was dismissed for a lack of evidence. See id. Plaintiff’s
counsel also refers to an allegation that un-named individuals called Plaintiff a racial slur at an
unspecified time.4 (ECF No. 34 at 5). The only reference the Court can find of an alleged racial
4 Plaintiff cites to several points in the record in support of this serious allegation: “Plaintiff’s 06.30.2025 Deposition,
pp. 199:17–19, 203:4–204:21, 225:11–15, 226:16–21, 228:18–229:8; Defendant’s Ex. 5, EEOC Charge No.
12B‑2013‑00011 & Position Statement, pp. 2–4; Defendant’s Ex. 9, BCRC Memo & EEOC Charge No.
12B‑2010‑00015, pp. 2–3; Defendant’s Ex. 12, Disciplinary Process Routing Form, Workplace Violence Incident
Report, Complaint Report, and Special Reports, pp. 2–5, 7–10.” (ECF No. 34 at 5). Taking each in turn, review of
the record shows as follows:
(1) Plaintiff’s deposition, ECF No. 34-10 at 23 (199:17–19) refers to attorney payments and litigation costs;
(2) Id. at 27-28 (203:4–204:21) describes stress Plaintiff experienced after the dinner plate altercation;
(3) Id. at 49 (225:11–15) describes the first page of Plaintiff’s first transfer request;
(4) Id. at 50 (226:16–21) refers to the Battalion Chief’s disapproval of Plaintiff’s transfer request;
(5) Id. at 52-53 (228:18–229:8) describes Plaintiff’s second transfer request;
(6) ECF No. 29-7 (Defendant’s Ex. 5, EEOC Charge No. 12B‑2013‑00011 & Position Statement, pp. 2–4)
includes Defendant’s August 7, 2013 response to Plaintiff’s internal complaint and concluded that the
disciplinary action against Plaintiff was a result of his conduct and not racial animus; it includes that “there
is no indication that [Plaintiff] was subjected to racial slurs or references to race that would allow for the
inference of race discrimination.” Id. at 5. There is no other reference on this document to a racial slur;
(7) ECF No. 29-11 (Defendant’s Ex. 9, BCRC Memo & EEOC Charge No. 12B‑2010‑00015, pp. 2–3) includes
Plaintiff’s April 19, 2010 request “that his complaint against Baltimore City Fire Department be withdrawn
from further investigation” and the EEOC’s subsequent confirmation that it will discontinue its investigation.
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slur is FF/EMT Remeikis’s use of the phrase, “lil’ boy” in the context of the soiled-dinner plate
argument. See (ECF No. 29-14 at 11-12).
v. 	Ensuing Transfers and Position Changes
Plaintiff avers that “[t]he disparate treatment also extended to departmental transfer
policies.” 	(ECF No. 34 at 4). 	Plaintiff asserts he “and his harassers were involuntarily
transferred,” but FF/EMT Remeikis “was subsequently granted a voluntary transfer to a preferred
assignment before the one-year period had elapsed.” It appears that Plaintiff was transferred to
Engine 44 as a result of the January 2013 incident on April 18, 2013. See (ECF No. 34-8 at 1).
The record shows that on June 30, 2013, Plaintiff applied for transfer from Engine 44 to Engine
20 or back to Engine 13. Id. His request was denied. Id. Plaintiff applied for transfer to Engine
20 or Engine 46 again on December 21, 2013, which Defendant also denied. Id. at 2. In Plaintiff’s
deposition, Plaintiff clarifies that he eventually was approved for transfer for his second choice,
Engine 46, as a result of his December 2013 transfer request. (ECF No. 34-10 at 56). The evidence
pertaining to the details of FF/EMT Remeikis’s transfer is unclear in the record, but Plaintiff did
testify that “Remeikis had already been gone on his way to 33” at some point prior to one or both
of Plaintiff’s transfer requests. Id. at 53. The above notwithstanding, Defendant later promoted
Plaintiff to Fire Lieutenant, Suppression, ALS on December 14, 2016. (ECF No. 29-4).
These documents appear connected to an unclear 2009 disciplinary hearing that was postponed due to an
ongoing criminal proceeding against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 29-11 at 4); and
(8) ECF No. 29-14 (Defendant’s Ex. 12, Disciplinary Process Routing Form, Workplace Violence Incident
Report, Complaint Report, and Special Reports, pp. 2–5, 7–10) includes FF/EMT Daniel Remeikis’s
Workplace Violence Incident Report against Plaintiff for “threatening [him] with a knife/tool.” (ECF No. 29-
14 at 3). It further includes FF/EMT Remeikis’s January 21, 2013 complaint against Plaintiff for the dinner
plate altercation. Id. at 9. At page 11, the exhibit includes Plaintiff’s report against FF/EMT Remeikis for the
same event. Id. at 11. In that document, Plaintiff alleged that an EMT/FF said “you’re a fucking bum!” and
“…you’re a fucking lil boy!!,” to which Plaintiff responded “NO! If I was truly a lil boy, I would have
believed what you say about me and left, but I got more pride in myself that you think and you’re mad
because you can’t do anything about it.” Id. at 12. After Plaintiff threw the dinner plate at the wall toward
PO Wenger, Plaintiff reported being called a “motherfucker” as the altercation continued to escalate. Id. At
a certain time during the argument, FF/EMT Remeikis yelled, “you’re out of the fucking skin (firehouse
fund)!” Id.
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vi. 	Administrative History
Then, nearly ten years after Plaintiff filed the 2013 Charge, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue
letter on February 9, 2023. (ECF No. 29-8). Indeed, Plaintiff filed the 2013 Charge on May 16,
2013. (ECF No. 29-6). Defendant filed its Position Statement on August 7, 2013. (ECF No. 29-
7). Then Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter on February 7, 2024, which says the following,
Because you filed the above charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and more than 180 days have elapsed since the date the Commission
assumed jurisdiction over the charge, and no suit based thereon has been filed by
this Department, and because you have specifically requested this Notice, you are
hereby notified that you have the right to institute a civil action under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., against the
abovenamed respondent.
If you choose to commence a civil action, such suit must be filed in the appropriate
Court within 90 days of your receipt of this Notice. 	If you cannot afford or are
unable to retain an attorney to represent you, the Court may, at its discretion, assist
you in obtaining an attorney.
(ECF No. 29-6 at 3). The Court cannot discern from the record when Plaintiff sought a right-to-
sue letter or why he waited almost ten years to do so.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to “grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party can make such a showing by demonstrating
the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact or by showing an absence of evidence to
support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986). A
dispute as to a material fact “is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v. S.R.P. Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 115 F. Supp.
3d 593, 600 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Therefore, if there are factual issues “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because
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[those issues] may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party[,]” then summary judgment is
inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
“When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the [C]ourt must construe the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” U.S. ex rel. James Commc’n,
Inc. v. LACO Elec., Inc., No. DKC 14-0946, 2015 WL 1460131, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2015)
(citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir.
2008)). 	A party bearing the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each
element of his or her claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning
an essential element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	There is No Evidence that Would Allow the Court to Conclude that Plaintiff’s
Claim is Barred by Laches as a Matter of Law.
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of laches.5 (ECF
No. 29-1 at 9). “Laches is an equitable doctrine, which requires a party to demonstrate that it was
prejudiced by the opposing party's lack of diligence.” EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Glob. Telecomm.,
Inc., 514 F.Supp.2d 797, 801 (D. Md. 2007). It is well settled that the doctrine of laches may bar
a Title VII suit. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424–425, (1975) (concluding
that when a defendant is prejudiced by an unexcused delay by a private plaintiff, the district court
has the discretionary power to effectuate “a just result.”); Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. American Nat'l Bank, 574 F.2d 1173, 1175–1176 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
5 Although the briefs raise an issue of whether Defendant waived the defense of laches, review of the Answer confirms
that Defendant properly pled laches as its eleventh affirmative defense. Moreover, Rule 12 does not require a defendant
to raise the defense of laches in its first responsive pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Therefore, the Court will consider
Defendant’s laches defense.
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876 (1978); Boone v. Mechanical Specialties, 609 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir.1979) (“We hold
that laches may be used as a defense to a Title VII action.”).
To succeed on a laches defense, a defendant bears the burden to prove “(1) lack of diligence
by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the
defense.” White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1990). A lack of diligence “exists where
‘the plaintiff delayed inexcusably or unreasonably in filing suit.’’ Id. (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n
v. Buford, 835 F.2d 305, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Thus, “[a]n inexcusable or unreasonable delay
may occur only after the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence could have discovered the
facts giving rise to his cause of action.” Id. (collecting cases). However, “[t]he passage of time,
alone, does not ipso facto give rise to a successful laches defense.” Al-Sabah v. World Bus.
Lenders, LLC, Civil Case No. SAG-18-2958, 2020 WL 3868989, at *13 (D. Md. July 9, 2020).
Indeed, time is “one of many circumstances” informing the fact-dependent determination of
whether a delay is inexcusable or unreasonable. Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 645 (2001).
Moreover, “[w]hen evaluating the reasonableness of a delay, courts are reluctant to penalize
plaintiffs who have simply waited for the EEOC (or its state counterpart) to act.” Westmoreland v.
Prince George's Cty., No. CIV.A. TDC-14-0821, 2015 WL 996752, at *14 (D. Md. Mar. 4,
2015) (citing Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 211 (4th Cir. 1984)). 	The prejudice
necessary to prevail on a laches defense includes is “generally held to be anything that places [the
employer] in a less favorable position.” Parker v. Bd. of Elec. Supervisors, 230 Md. 126, 130-31
(1962). Nevertheless, “prejudice must arise from and be assessed with respect to the facts of each
individual claim.” EEOC v. Ches. & Ohio R.R. Co., 577 F.2d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 1978).
Several laches employment discrimination cases shed light on certain nuances the parties
do not address. In Pande v. Johns Hopkins University, this Court held that a ten-year delay
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“between the filing of [the plaintiff’s] discrimination charge and the filing of the instant lawsuit”
was inexcusable as a matter of law. Pande v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 598 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (D.
Md. 1984). There, the plaintiff argued that his delay was excusable because he relied on the EEOC
to resolve his claims. Id. However, the Court noted that he was represented by counsel at the outset
of filing his EEOC charge and “was aware of his right to secure a right-to-sue letter upon request.”
Id. Moreover, the plaintiff chose to leave the country for a significant portion of the delay, and as
a doctor, he was “highly educated.” 	Id. On the issue of prejudice, the Court concluded that
“changes in personnel, the effect of the passage of time on memories, the change in administration
and the loss or destruction of relevant documents” all supported a conclusion that the defendant
was prejudiced by the delay. 	Id. at 1089. 	Therefore, the Court dismissed the action under the
doctrine of laches. Id.
By contrast, this Court concluded that a delayed suit did not “rise to the level of
unreasonable delay in the laches context” when a plaintiff filed a lawsuit within ninety days of
receiving a right-to-sue letter and “undertook numerous actions to protect his rights, including
filing grievances and appeals at work, and filing multiple charges with the EEOC…” Bales v.
Maryland Jud./Admin. Off. of the Cts., Civil No. 15-cv-03293-JFM, 2016 WL 6879902, at *11 (D.
Md. Nov. 22, 2016). 	There, the delay was only a few years. See id. On the issue of prejudice,
the Court concluded there was not a “substantial prejudice to a defendant’s ability to defend itself.”
Id. The Court reasoned that “[t]here is no suggestion here that files or evidence relevant to this
case have been ‘discarded, destroyed or irretrievably dispersed.’” Id. (quoting Pande, 598 F.Supp.
at 1088). Therefore, the Court concluded that even if the plaintiff should have brought suit earlier,
the plaintiff “did not unreasonably delay in filing his complaint in a manner that substantially
prejudiced the [defendant].” Id.
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To that end, the parties posit opposing positions with only rare citations to the record or
employment discrimination cases that considered the issue of laches. Plaintiff insists that the delay
was caused not by Plaintiff, but instead by an administrative backlog. (ECF No. 34 at 10). Like in
Bales, Plaintiff made multiple internal complaints at work in addition to his EEOC Charge. Bales,
2016 WL 6879902, at *11. 	Defendant does not point to any support for its position that an
administrative backlog had no influence on the delay in the record and instead insists that the mere
presence of a ten-year delay must be caused by a lack of diligence and result in prejudice. (ECF
No. 29-2 at 8). By that same token, Plaintiff provides little evidentiary support of his position that
the delay was no fault of his own. 	(ECF No. 34 at 10). 	In its reply, Defendant elaborates, but
again without much support in the record. 	(ECF No. 39 at 4). 	There, Defendant asserts it was
“Plaintiff’s choice and dilatoriness that let this matter sit and languish for almost ten (10) years
until eventually requesting a [right-to-sue letter],” this time citing to the two EEOC documents—
the EEOC Charge and right-to-sue letter, which indicates that Plaintiff requested the letter. Id.
(citing ECF Nos. 29-6, the EEOC Charge, 29-8). 	In sum, the Court is presented with a word-
versus-word scenario on the question of whether the delay was inexcusable or unreasonable. Of
course, such an inquiry is only one part of a laches defense. Pande, 598 F.Supp. at 1088.
In the Court’s view, and based on the arguments presented, the Court recognizes that the
issue of an unreasonable and inexcusable delay is a close question, but even if there is an
unreasonable delay for the purposes of laches, there is not support for the kind of prejudice
necessary to bar Plaintiff’s suit. 	On the issue of delay, a ten-year delay is certainly significant.
Pande, 598 F. Supp. at 1086. 	However, unlike the plaintiff in Pande, Plaintiff here was not a
highly educated doctor who was represented by counsel during his hearings and out of the country
for a significant portion of the decade. See id. Moreover, time is just one of many circumstances.
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Al-Sabah, 2020 WL 3868989, at *13. Indeed, Plaintiff has represented that the delay was at least
partially influenced by Plaintiff’s dependence on the EEOC, and it is clear from the record that
Plaintiff did retain counsel and file his lawsuit by May 8, 2024, which is ninety-one days after the
EEOC issued the February 7, 2024, right-to-sue letter.6 Considering this Court’s reluctance to
penalize a plaintiff for delays caused by the EEOC and notable differences between this case and
Pande, this Court is reluctant to conclude that a ten-year delay alone is enough to bar Plaintiff’s
case in the employment discrimination context. Westmoreland, 2015 WL 996752, at *14; Holsey
v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d at 211; Pande, 598 F.Supp. at 1086. 	Defendant offers no other
argument in support of a finding to the contrary.
However, even if the Court were to find that the delay was unreasonable and inexcusable,
it cannot be said that this case presents the kind of prejudice necessary to bar a case. Bales, 2016
WL 6879902, at *10 (indicating there “must be a clear showing of substantial prejudice to the
defendant’s ability to defend itself”). Here, Defendant argues only that the passage of time and
staff changes create undue prejudice. This is the precise argument that failed in Bales at the motion
to dismiss stage. Bales, 2016 WL 6879902, at *11. Indeed, Defendant posits—without explaining
how—that because fourteen out of twenty-three “people who managed the 2013 investigation…are
no longer with BCFD,” that “[t]his would be very prejudicial to Defendant.” (ECF No. 39 at 4-5).
While it is conceivable that memories may fade, Bales concluded that such an obstacle is not
enough to support a conclusion of undue prejudice. See Bales, 2016 WL 6879902, at *11. Without
more, it is unclear how these retirements or other change in profession could result in the kind of
prejudice a laches defense requires. Id. Here, like in Bales Defendant does not suggest that there
6 It is unclear when Plaintiff received his right-to-sue letter compared to the February 7, 2024, right-to-sue date.
Defendant does not challenge whether Plaintiff’s suit has been timely filed with regard to the allegations set forth in
the EEOC charge from 2013.
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exist certain files or other evidence relevant to this case that has been “discarded, destroyed, or
irretrievably dispersed” or that any particular former employees cannot be located. Id. (quoting
Pande, 598 F. Supp. At 1088). To the contrary, discovery concluded on August 29, 2025 (ECF
No. 27), and Defendant provided the Court with hundreds of documents in support of its motion
for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 29, 39). Defendant does not point to any outstanding discovery
that it requires but cannot obtain due to the passage of time. Moreover, it is unclear how Defendant
could be prejudiced from defending itself when discovery yielded such a great number of
documents that Defendant could file a motion for summary judgment substantive and procedural
issues in this case. See id. Therefore, a finding that laches bars the case as a matter of law would
be improper here. Thus, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) is DENIED
on this issue.
B. 	Administrative Exhaustion & Timeliness
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff “is precluded from bringing suit for the alleged
discriminatory and/or retaliatory acts set forth in his Complaint for which Plaintiff failed to make
a complaint with the EEOC.” Based on the Court’s review of the EEOC Charge, Plaintiff reported
(1) the January 2013 phone call between FF Snyder and Plaintiff; (2) the January 2013 dinner-
plate altercation; (3) the 2009 turnout gear incident; and (4) a 2010 incident in which Plaintiff was
“charged with being ‘un-trainable.’” (ECF No. 29-6). Thorough review of the record shows that
these incidents each involved related facts that were not all specified in the EEOC Charge.
To that end, Defendant makes three administrative exhaustion arguments. First, Defendant
posits that the allegations from the transfer approval requests in June (FF/EMT Remeikis
approved), August (Plaintiff disapproved), and December (Plaintiff approved for second choice)
must be dismissed because they “allegedly occurred after the date Plaintiff filed his May 16, 2013,
EEOC charge” (ECF No. 29-2 at 9). Second, Defendant posits that each of the allegations that
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occurred prior to July 20, 2012, must be dismissed because they occurred before the 300-day
deadline by which to file an EEOC Charge. (ECF No. 29-3 at 10). Third, Defendant posits that
the following allegations in the Complaint must be dismissed for failure to include them in the
EEOC Charge: (1) a January 2, 2013, suspension without pay; and (2) a disciplinary letter that
claimed Plaintiff did not use a stretcher to transport a patient in September of 2012. (ECF No. 1 at
8).
1. 	A Plaintiff Need Not File an Additional EEOC Charge Alleging Retaliation
for Filing an EEOC Charge, and Plaintiff’s Transfer Allegations Will Not
be Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust for the Purposes of his Retaliation
Claim.
It is well taken that the Complaint does not make clear which allegations purportedly
support each respective claim. The standards for administrative exhaustion differ between racial
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims. See, e.g., Cosens-Wagaman v.
Maryland Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., Civil Case No: 1:23-cv-01953-JMC, 2025 WL
2978422, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 2025) (“What a plaintiff must include in an EEOC charge of
retaliation 	differs 	slightly 	from 	what 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	include 	in 	an 	EEOC 	charge 	of
discrimination.”). 	In Nealon v. Stone, the Fourth Circuit resolved the question of “whether
a plaintiff asserting a Title VII claim of retaliation for filing a previous EEOC charge must exhaust
administrative remedies before suing in federal court.” Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th
Cir. 1992). Indeed, under the “relation-back” rule, “once a party has properly filed an EEOC charge
for discrimination, she is not required to file a new charge for retaliation that is related to claims
made in the initial charge.” Plunkett v. Potter, 751 F.Supp.2d 807, 811 (D. Md. 2010). As this
Court has recognized, Nealon made clear that a plaintiff’s failure to allege retaliatory acts in an
EEOC Charge will not bar a lawsuit alleging that those same acts were retaliation for filing a
previous EEOC Charge. Cosens-Wagaman, 2025 WL 2978422, at *8; see also Tonkin v. Shadow
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Management, Inc., 605 Fed. App'x 194, 194 (4th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the district court
properly dismissed retaliation claims when the plaintiff had knowledge of the factual basis for her
retaliation claim before she filed a charge with the EEOC); Dickerson v. Mack Trucks, Inc., Civil
No. 	WDQ-12-2593, 	2013 	WL 	3507508, 	at 	*3-*4 	(D. 	Md. 	July 	10, 	2013) (reasoning
that Nealon did not excuse a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies because his
termination occurred before he filed his EEOC charge).
This Court considered a similar scenario to that presented here in Cosens-Wagaman.
There, as here, plaintiff brought an action under Title VII alleging a hostile work environment and
retaliation for multiple instances of alleged discrimination.7 Cosens-Wagaman, 2025 WL
2978422, at *1-*2. Additionally, the plaintiff there was not fired after filing her first EEOC charge,
“meaning as a matter of policy, that it was possible workplace retaliation could continue after filing
the First Charge.” Id. at *9. Critically, the allegations in Cosens-Wagaman that took place after
the plaintiff filed her first and amended EEOC charges “ma[de] clear that the retaliatory acts had
not occurred in full at the point of filing…” Id. Therefore, the Court reasoned that even though
the plaintiff there seemed to have had knowledge of some of her selective discipline allegations
by the time she filed her amended charge, the record did not contain enough facts to “infer either
act was unrelated to filing” with the EEOC. Id.
The situation here is even clearer than that in Cosens-Wagaman. Here, Plaintiff filed only
one EEOC charge and could not possibly have had knowledge of the transfers because they had
not yet occurred when he filed with the EEOC. (ECF No. 29-6, 29-11). Moreover, as articulated
in greater detail below, there is no suggestion anywhere in the record that would allow the court
to infer that the BCFD’s choice to disapprove Plaintiff’s transfer requests (and later preferred
7 The plaintiff there brought claims alleging sex discrimination rather than race discrimination. Cosens-Wagaman,
2025 WL 2978422, at *1.
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transfer request, as Plaintiff puts it) but approve FF/EMT Remeikis’s request was unrelated to
Plaintiff’s May 2013 EEOC Charge, which alleged that the BFD engaged in racial discrimination
against Plaintiff with explicit reference to FF/EMT Remeikis. Cosens-Wagaman, 2025 WL
2978422, at *9. Based on the Court’s review of the record, a jury could reasonably conclude that
the selective transfer approvals were retaliation for Plaintiff’s choice to file an EEOC charge based
on the January 2013 dinner-plate altercation. Moreover, Defendant does not point to any case law
that supports a finding to the contrary.
Based on the analysis above, for the purposes of retaliation only, summary judgment will
accordingly be DENIED such that the aforementioned acts may support Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim, namely Plaintiff’s two transfer requests and the Defendant’s decisions regarding each in
contrast to its decisions regarding FF/EMT Remeikis’s transfer request following the January 2013
dinner plate incident.
2. 	It is Settled that Otherwise Untimely-Filed Allegations that Make Up a
Hostile Work Environment May Nonetheless Be Considered Pursuant to the
Continuing Violation Doctrine
Defendant correctly asserts that a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by
filing a timely charge with the EEOC. Radbod v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n., No.
Civ. JFM–03–309, 2003 WL 21805288, at *2 (D. Md. July 14, 2003). Plaintiff relies on National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan in support of his position that the allegations starting as early as
2009 are all part of a continuing course of conduct, for which the 2013 EEOC Charge and related
conduct “serve as an anchor for the entirety of the hostile work environment claim, [thereby]
allowing the [C]ourt to consider the full history of harassment dating back to 2009.” (ECF No. 34
at 9) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). Defendant urges
that these acts are discrete, thereby necessitating a conclusion that those events that took place in
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2009 and 2010 were not timely filed in the 2013 EEOC Charge as a matter of law. (ECF No. 29-
2 at 10-11).
As to discrete discriminatory acts, this issue has been settled. 	In Morgan, the Supreme
Court explained that “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they
are related to the acts alleged in timely filed charges.” 	Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. 	The Court
specified that discrete acts include “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal
to hire” and are “easy to identify.” Id. However, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the
hostile work environment claims alleged a continuing violation, the Morgan Court noted that
unlike claims for discrete acts, a hostile work environment occurs “over a series of days or perhaps
years…” Id. Thus, under Title VII, “[i]t does not matter…that some of the component acts of the
hostile work environment fall outside of the statutory time period…[p]rovided that an act
contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile work
environment may be considered by a court for the purpose of determining liability.” Id. at 117.
Post-Morgan, “even if most of the harassing conduct on which a plaintiff relies to establish [his]
hostile work environment claim occurred outside the statutory period, the claim will be considered
timely if at least one act continuing the violation occurred within the statutory period.” Guessous
v. 	Fairview 	Prop. 	Inv., 	LLC, 	828 	F.3d 	208, 	222 	(4th 	Cir. 	2016). 	Thus, 	the
“continuing violation doctrine applies to a hostile work environment claim.” Perkins v. Int’l Paper
Co., 936 F.3d 196, 209 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116–17, Guessous, 828 F.3d
at 223 n.5). 	In order to file a timely EEOC charge, “the employee need only file a charge
within...300 days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 118
(emphasis added).
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Accordingly, the Court will consider both the 2009 “turnout gear” incident and the 2010
comment that Plaintiff was “untrainable” in its substantive evaluation of Plaintiff’s underlying
hostile work environment claim. Therefore, summary judgment based on untimeliness and failure
to exhaust is DENIED to the extent those acts they will be considered under Count II (hostile work
environment). They shall not, however, be considered by the Court is its substantive evaluation
Plaintiff’s other claims.
3. 	The Court Will Not Disregard Allegations in the Complaint that Refer to a
September 7, 2012 Discipline Letter and January 2, 2013, Suspension
Because It is Reasonably Related to His EEOC Charge
Even when a plaintiff has properly exhausted the administrative process, he is barred from
bringing Title VII claims that “exceed the scope of the EEOC charge and any charges that would
naturally have arisen from an investigation thereof ....” Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151,
156 (4th Cir. 1995). “The exhaustion requirement ensures that the employer is put on notice of the
alleged violations so that the matter can be resolved out of court if possible.” Cowgill v. First Data
Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 384 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491 (4th
Cir. 2005)). Of course, the EEOC charge “generally operate[s] to limit the scope of any subsequent
judicial complaint.” Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 509 (4th Cir. 2005). 	Indeed, “the
factual allegations made in formal litigation must correspond to those set forth in the administrative
charge.” Id. Because EEOC charges are often brought “by those unschooled in the technicalities
of formal pleading” and should be construed with the “utmost liberality.” Hart v. Broadway Servs.,
Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440 (D. Md. 2012) (quoting Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs. of Montgomery
Cmty. Coll., 848 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 1988)). Thus, “[a] federal court may hear a claim that
was not presented to the EEOC so long as it is reasonably related to plaintiff's EEOC charge and
can be expected to follow from a reasonable administrative investigation.” Faulkenberry v. U.S.
Dep’t of Defense, 670 F. Supp. 3d 234, 252 (D. Md. 2023).
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Here, the five-day January 2013 suspension resulting from the September 7, 2012 stretcher
incident is reasonably related to the allegations in Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge. See id. at 253. Like
the January 2013 dinner plate altercation allegation, the January 2013 suspension involves the
same FF/EMT, Mr. Remeikis, and a similar allegation of selective discipline imposed against
Plaintiff instead of FF/EMT Remeikis on the basis of race. To that extent, and considering the
analysis above, the Court concludes that they are reasonably related to the allegations in Plaintiff’s
EEOC Charge. Plaintiff’s 2013 EEOC Charge clearly asserts that Plaintiff “worked in a hostile
work environment” for “the past four years.” (ECF No. 29-6 at 3). Plaintiff explicitly attributes
certain instances of his alleged hostile work environment to FF/EMT Remeikis in January 2013.
Id. It follows that a reasonable investigation would discover a preceding instance of selective
discipline involving Plaintiff and FF/EMT Remeikis that also took place in January 2013, as
related to their September 7, 2012, conflict. As such, the Court applying the “utmost liberality,”
declines to penalize Plaintiff for failure to include a reasonably related allegation of a hostile work
environment by disregarding the 2012 stretcher incident and subsequent discipline from the
Court’s substantive analysis.
By rejecting, in part, Defendant’s arguments regarding timeliness, exhaustion of remedies
and scope, the Court is merely making clear that it will not exclude these incidents in its substantive
analysis of each count in the Complaint. 	As will be discussed in more detail below however,
consideration of these incidents does not make each of the counts substantively viable.
C. 	Recent Fourth Circuit Precedent Precludes Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s
Race and Color Discrimination Claims (Counts I, IV, V).
Turning now to Defendant’s substantive arguments, Defendant urges this Court to grant
summary judgment because “Plaintiff has no evidence to show that any of the discipline or
investigations undertaken by Defendant were based on his race or his color.” (ECF No. 29-2 at
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11). Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise ...
discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race.” 42 U.S.C § 2000e–2(a); Coleman v.
Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff may establish a claim
of employment discrimination under Title VII through one of two avenues of proof. Holland v.
Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Foreman v. Weinstein, 485
F. Supp. 2d 608, 612 (D. Md. 2007). First, a plaintiff may establish through direct or circumstantial
evidence that his race motivated an employer’s adverse employment action. 	Holland, 487 F.3d
at 	213; Burns 	v. 	AAF-McQuay, 	Inc., 	96 	F.3d 	728, 	731 	(4th 	Cir. 	1996). 	Second, 	under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 646 (4th Cir. 2007). “To do so, a
plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [his] employer took an
adverse action against her; (3) [he] had been fulfilling her employer's legitimate expectations at
the time of the adverse action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances that raise
a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination[.]” Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., 19
F.4th 643, 649–50 (4th Cir. 2021). “Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to put forth a nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions.” Id. at 650. “If
the employer does so, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's
explanation was actually a pretext for discrimination.” Id. Here, Plaintiff seeks to proceed under
the McDonnell Douglas framework.
To begin, Plaintiff brings three claims predicated on allegations of adverse action resulting
from race and color discrimination. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges a violation of Title VII based on
racial discrimination; in Count IV, Plaintiff alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 through 42
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U.S.C. §1983; and in Count V, Plaintiff alleges a violation of The Maryland Fair Employment
Practices Act (MFEPA), Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t, § 20-601 et seq. (ECF No. 1). Courts apply
the Title VII McDonnell Douglass burden shifting framework to discrimination, retaliation, and
harassment claims brought under the MFEPA and § 1981. Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC,
828 	F.3d 	208, 	216 	(4th 	Cir. 	2016) (“This 	framework 	was 	initially 	developed
for Title VII discrimination cases ... but has since been held to apply in discrimination cases arising
under § 1981.”) (internal citations omitted); Passwaters v. Wicomico Cnty., No. RDB-18-2923,
2019 	WL 	6341623, 	at 	*8 	(D. 	Md. 	Nov. 	27, 	2019) 	(“The 	same 	framework 	governs
Plaintiffs’ Title VII and S.G. § 20-606 claims.”). 	Therefore, each of the aforementioned counts
are subject to the analysis below.
Defendant urges that “Plaintiff has no evidence to show that any of the discipline or
investigations undertaken by Defendant were based on his race or his color” and “Plaintiff has
offered no more than his subjective beliefs.” (ECF No. 29-2 at 13). Plaintiff’s brief largely focuses
his racial discrimination claim on the discipline that followed the January 2013 dinner-plate
altercation. (ECF No. 34). In addition, Plaintiff argues that his suspension without pay in 2009
and transfer request decisions in 2013 constitute additional adverse employment actions connected
to his racial discrimination claim. 	(ECF No. 34 at 12).8 Based on the analysis supra Section
8 Regarding any other existing allegations in the Complaint that Plaintiff does not argue fall under the racial
discrimination claims but may seek to explore at trial, the Court observes that instances of FF Snyder’s rude phone
call, and the 2009 turnout gear incident are not actionable adverse employment actions for the purposes of a racial
discrimination claim. See Holland, 487 F.3d at 219. “Although conduct short of ultimate employment decisions can
constitute adverse employment action, there still must be a tangible effect on the terms and conditions of employment.”
Geist v. Gill/Kardash P'ship, 671 F.Supp.2d 729, 737 n. 6 (D.Md.2009). “Title VII does not remedy everything that
makes an employee unhappy.” Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F.Supp.2d 314, 329 (D.Md.2003); see also De La Torre v.
Fink, No. PX-23-3202, 2025 WL 460757, at *7 (D. Md. Feb. 11, 2025) (recognizing that a low performance score is
an adverse employment action because it is tied to future compensation or employment opportunities). Here, there is
no evidence that these kinds of remarks or otherwise unpleasant conduct Plaintiff faced at the workplace resulted in a
“tangible effect on the terms and conditions” of Plaintiff’s employment or risked impacting his future employment
opportunities. Therefore, they will not be part of Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim. Turning to the 2010 incident
in which Plaintiff was “charged with being ‘un-trainable,’ aside from a reference to this issue in the 2013 Charge,
there is no evidence Plaintiff offers to show why he received such a charge, what it meant, or that it was motivated by
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III.B.1., although the transfer allegations may be considered as part of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim,
they were not properly exhausted such that they may be applied to a racial discrimination claim
because Plaintiff failed to file an EEOC charge to that effect. Looking at the suspension without
pay allegations from 2009, a suspension does constitute an adverse employment decision.
Holland, 487 F.3d at 219. However, the record concerning this event is entirely unclear. The briefs
suggest that the disputed suspension arose from an event where Plaintiff was “arrested for wielding
a knife.” 	(ECF No. 39 at 9); (ECF No. 39-2). 	A police report included in Defendant’s reply
indicates a witness found Plaintiff and Mr. Shaffer at work. (ECF No. 39-2). When the witness
entered the room, “[Plaintiff] was standing in front of a lounge chair about five feet away [from
Mr. Shaffer]…[Plaintiff]had a knife and was waiving it in an unsafe manner at Mr. Shaffer yelling
and cursing at Mr. Shaffer who had his back against the weight room door located in the rear of
the station.” Id. at 2. There is no evidence to the contrary, let alone any evidence showing that
such a resulting suspension from this kind of an event gives rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination. 	See Magassouba v. Prince George’s Cnty., 773 F. Supp. 3d 196, 217 (D. Md.
2025) (granting summary judgment on a racial discrimination claim when a plaintiff failed to
“establish[] any causal connection between [an employee’s] alleged derogatory comments and the
adverse employment actions).
Contrary to Defendant’s arguments, the Court views Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the
dinner-plate altercation differently. 	However, the undisputed facts show that (1) Plaintiff is a
member of a protected class, (2) he engaged in a dispute with two white colleagues at work; (2) he
was disciplined thereafter; and (4) his white counterparts were not. (ECF Nos. 29-12, 29-13, 29-
14, 29-15). As Plaintiff points out, establishing a prima facie case is not an onerous task, and it
a racial animus. Therefore, considering the lack of evidence concerning the 2010 allegation, that too will not be part
of the racial discrimination claim.
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may be established by temporal proximity. 	Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir.
2007) (concluding that when a plaintiff relied on a seven-month temporal proximity in addition to
allegations of continued retaliatory conduct and animus directed at her supported a causal link).
Here, the Court will assume for the purposes of this analysis that Plaintiff has met the low bar of
stating a prima facie case. See Holland, 487 F.3d at 214.
In response, Defendant has generated evidence by way of the hearing documents that
Plaintiff was disciplined because he was the aggressor in the dinner plate incident, and department
policy justified his discipline. (ECF Nos. 29-12, 29-13, 29-14, 29-15). Though stated differently,
it seems that Plaintiff points to Defendant’s policies in support of a selective-enforcement
argument to show a pretext. (ECF No. 34 at 20) (“Defendant’s pretextual claim that it was ‘simply
following its own policy’ is belied by the evidence. The policy was weaponized against Plaintiff
in retaliation for his complaints, while his white colleagues violated it with impunity.”).
Thus, the issue of disparate treatment of similarly situated comparators warrants some
consideration. 	When 	a 	plaintiff 	“attempts 	to 	rely 	on 	comparator 	evidence 	to 	establish
circumstances 	giving 	rise to 	an 	inference of 	unlawful 	discrimination, 	the plaintiff 	must
demonstrate that the comparator is similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Williams-Johnson v.
Paris Foods Corp., Civil Action No. RDB-24-1197, 2025 WL 775513, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 10,
2025) (internal quotations omitted). This includes evidence “that the employees ‘dealt with the
same supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards and...engaged in the same conduct without
such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the
employer's treatment of them for it.’” Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App'x 355, 359 (4th Cir.
2010) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). However, “no single
comparator” must “perfectly align[] with every incident…” because “the analysis does not require
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a perfect one on one fit.” 	Johnson v. Baltimore City, Md., 163 F.4th 808, 817 (4th Cir. 2026).
“Instead, the analysis focuses on the ‘similarity between [the] comparators’ and their conduct such
that a jury could reach an inference of discrimination, so long as the comparison is ‘meaningful.’”
Id. (quoting Lightner v. City of Wilington, N.C., 545 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008)) (alterations in
original).
In Johnson v. Baltimore City, Maryland, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a complaint
sufficiently alleged “sufficient facts to demonstrate similar comparators so as to allow for a
reasonable inference as to their similarities to [the plaintiff]” when all comparators were Baltimore
police officers and were therefore “subject to the same standards.” Id. Here, the evidence shows
that like in Johnson, while Plaintiff, FF/EMT Remeikis, FF Snyder, and PO Wenger were all
subject to the same standards because they all shared similar positions at the BCFD, and none of
the white employees involved in the dinner plate dispute had supervisory authority. Id. Turning
to the alleged conduct in Johnson, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision to
dismiss the complaint on the issue of whether their conduct was sufficiently similar. Id. Where
the District Court concluded that there could be no inference of unlawful discrimination because
none of the comparators “were accused of and found guilty following a trial board of misconduct
similar to [the plaintiff],” the Fourth Circuit reasoned that a “perfect one-to-one match” is not
necessary. See id. There, because the plaintiff was “charged with misconduct for assault, failing
to notify her supervisors of assault, and making false statements” and “at least six other officers
who were charged with assault and seven others who allegedly made false statements” were not
terminated, those allegations were sufficient to state a claim for discrimination. Id. In other words,
in the context of the claim brought here, it did not matter that those other comparators had not been
“accused and found guilty following a trial board of misconduct.” See id.
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The scenario here does present some minor differences from Johnson. First, the procedural
posture at the pleading stage, where “a full analysis of whether comparators are similarly situated
does not necessarily occur at the motion-to-dismiss stage,” and “a plaintiff must still plead
sufficient facts to justify an inference that the employer treated the plaintiff differently from the
way it treated others under ‘arguably similar circumstances.’” Tittle v. Petro, Civ. No. TDC-24-
3061, 2025 WL 1920936, at *6 (D. Md. July 11, 2025) (quoting Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855
F.3d 639, 651 (4th Cir. 2017)). Second, the allegations the Fourth Circuit determined to be
sufficiently similar so as to support an inference of unlawful discrimination each concerned
separate instances in which certain white police officers’ assaults, failures to notify, and false
statements were ignored, and plaintiff’s were not. Johnson, 163 F.4th at 817. Here, the conduct
instead concerns that of multiple firefighters and the Defendant’s subsequent treatment of each of
them as it relates to their involvement in the same fight. Recognizing that differences between this
case and Johnson exist, the Court is nevertheless satisfied that Johnson precludes summary
judgment.
Here, despite Defendant’s conclusion that Plaintiff was the aggressor, it is clear from the
record that FF/EMT Remeikis and PO Wenger were equally involved in the verbal altercation that
ensued. (ECF No. 29-6 at 3). While there is no evidence that they too threw items at Plaintiff, and
in consideration of Johnson, the Court is mindful that their statements, aggression, use of profanity,
and decisions to enter the conflict could very well have warranted equal discipline under
Defendant’s policies. 	Johnson, 163 F.4th at 817; (ECF No. 29-14) (describing the dinner-plate
altercation in great detail). It is not as though the evidence shows they were innocent bystanders.
Nevertheless, Defendant concluded that Plaintiff’s resulting complaints were meritless, and PO
Wenger’s and FF/EMT Remeikis’s were not. (ECF No. 29-16 at 6-7) (dismissing each of
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Plaintiff’s complaints but substantiating an assault in insubordination complaint against Plaintiff).
Defendant certainly could have concluded that each complaint had some merit and warranted some
level of discipline to each member involved in the altercation. Thus, a reasonable jury could find
that the Defendant’s policy defense is a mere pretext for discrimination. 	See id. Therefore, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff has met its burden necessary to defeat summary judgment under the
McDonell Douglas test.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Counts I, IV, and V is therefore
DENIED on the narrow grounds that Plaintiff may pursue the racial discrimination claims based
on selective enforcement of discipline policies following the dinner plate altercation only.
Otherwise, summary judgment is GRANTED.
D. 	There is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Concerning Plaintiff’s Hostile
Work Environment Claim (Count II).
Defendant next moves for summary judgment under Count II, Plaintiff’s hostile work
environment claim. “The elements of a Title VII claim for hostile work environment are: ‘(1)
unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on [a protected status]; (3) which is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter...conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4)
which is imputable to the employer.’” Milo v. CyberCore Techs., Inc., No. RDB-18-3145, 2019
WL 4447400, *5 (D. Md. Sep. 17, 2019) (quoting Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 328
(4th Cir. 2018)) (other citation omitted). To that end, Defendant argues each element fails. (ECF
No. 39 at 13) (emphasis omitted). 	The Court is primarily concerned with the second and third
elements, as there is clear evidence that these actions were unwelcome, and that his supervisors
knew about them based on his complaints.9
9 Further, it is undisputed that Plaintiff complained of the alleged discrimination to his supervisor on multiple
occasions. See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 333–34 (4th Cir.2003) (en banc) (“[T]he employer
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1. 	There is No Evidence That the Alleged Acts Underlying the Hostile Work
Environment Claim were Based on Race
Plaintiff’s alleged hostile work environment claim is made up of five primary instances of
conduct: (1) the 2009 incident in which Plaintiff found his “turnout” gear in the ceiling; (2) the
2010 incident in which Plaintiff was charged with being “un-trainable”; (3) the January 2013
events in which Plaintiff was suspended because he did not use a stretcher during a fire; (4) the
January 2013 phone call from FF/Snyder during which he told Plaintiff, “you’re not Engine 13
material and you have to go”; and (5) the January 2013 soiled dinner plate altercation. See (ECF
Nos. 1; 29-6). 	Plaintiff emphasizes only the 2009 turnout gear incident and 2013 dinner plate
altercation and the statements made in connection to each of those instances in his brief.10 (ECF
No. 34 at 16). Plaintiff further alleges the soiled dinner plate altercation involved threats and the
use of a racial slur, by way of calling Plaintiff a “lil’ boy.”
Starting with Plaintiff’s argument that there is evidence that the “lil’ boy” was used as a
racial epithet, it is true that the use of the word “boy” in reference to African-American employees
can, in certain circumstances, be probative of racial discrimination. 	Evans v. Coates Elec.
Instrumentation Inc., Case No. 2:16–cv–01196–DAK, 2017 WL 2543933, at *2 (D. Utah June 12,
2017) (“Because use of the term “boy,” even without modifiers, is potentially probative of
discrimination…”). In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the Supreme Court recognized that “[a]lthough it
is true [the word “boy”] will not always be evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the
term, standing alone, is always benign.” 	Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006).
may be liable in negligence if it knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take effective action
to stop it.”).
10 Plaintiff often cites to his deposition, which in several instances contains new allegations, not contained in the
EEOC charge or subject of the administrative exhaustion arguments set forth supra Section III.B. Therefore, the
Court will not consider them pursuant to supra Section III.B.3.
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Therefore, “[t]he speaker's meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection,
tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.” Id.
Here, the context is as follows:
On January 20th 2013 at approximately 1440 hours, I entered the quarters of Engine
13… EMT/FF Remeikis entered the kitchen, stood at the doorway, looked directly
at me and said "hey! That plate you had ... it's back in your locker!". I looked at him
and said ''well, you know that don't belong in my locker!" he cut off my words by
repeating "but, u left it out! U left it out for two tricks" as I repeated my before
mentioned statement. EMT/FF Remeikis then abruptly changed his words and
shouted "well, you don't belong in this firehouse!!" I quickly stated "I don't care
what you think! I'm here and aint going anywhere!" He then repeated his statement
including "you don't belong in this firehouse! Nobody wants you here! Nobody
likes you! You're a bum!" In defense of my humanity, I responded with "I don't
care what anyone thinks of me, I'm here! I'm not going anywhere! I do my job! You
can't change that! Think what you want, you think you're perfect, you're wrong!
You're not better than me, you won't make me leave!" During the exchange, PM
Ronnie Atkinson attempted to give reason between us by saying "aint no need to
be arguing like this ya!" I understood his reasoning, but as was attempting to walk
out the kitchen door to my locker, EMT/FF continued his barrage against my
personal and professional character in front of other members. He loudly repeated
his before mentioned statements, now including "you're a fucking bum! Put a
fucking transfer in! Sign the fucking transfer!" I responded in my defense "I
didn't leave five years ago, I'm not going anywhere now!" he then stated "oh,
so you just wanna stay here to prove a point?!" I stated "I'm here because I
have a fucking right to be here!!" his response was "you're gonna get someone
fucking killed! See, that's your problem, you're a fucking lil boy!!" I stated
"NO! If I was truly a lil boy, I would have believed what you say about me and
left, but I got more pride in myself that you think and you're mad because you
can't do anything about it!" as he responded with "that's bullshit! That's fucking
bullshit!"
(ECF No. 29-14 at 11-12) (emphasis added). Here, there is no evidence that the statements “you’re
a fucking bum!” and “…you’re a fucking lil boy!!” are grounded in a racial animus. Id. at 12. The
statements were clearly made in context of the fight Plaintiff had about the soiled plate, Plaintiff’s
fulfillment 	of 	his 	workplace 	responsibilities, 	and 	whether 	(as 	FF/EMT 	Remeikis 	stated
immediately before the “lil boy” comment) Plaintiff was “gonna get someone fucking killed.” Id.
Moreover, there is no evidence generated, nor does Plaintiff argue, that tone, inflection, or
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historical usage made Plaintiff believe the use of the term was motivated by a racial animus; rather,
Plaintiff insists that the use of the word and is offense to the entire incident is enough to prove a
racial animus. (ECF No. 34 at 14) (“First Acting Lieutenant Daniel Remeikis repeatedly called
Plaintiff “boy”—a deeply offensive and historically charged racial slur—while shouting at
Plaintiff that “you don’t belong in this firehouse.”). The evidence is simply not consistent with
Plaintiff’s arguments or his characterization of the record. Ash, 546 U.S. at 456 (Although it is
true [the word “boy”] will not always be evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term,
standing alone, is always benign.”).
In McIver v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc., the Fourth Circuit considered whether there
existed a genuine issue of material fact with respect to certain acts being (1) based on race and (2)
whether they were severe and pervasive. McIver v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc., 42 F.4th 398, 408
(4th Cir. 2022). There, the allegations of discrimination included: “(1) tampering that [the plaintiff]
attributes to racial animus, (2) abhorrent and explicitly racial harassment11 that was not directed at
[the plaintiff], but which she knew about, and (3) comments of racial animus made directly to her
ten years or more before her claim was filed.” Id. Concluding that evidence of mere tampering
“is not inherently race based” without obviously racist comments or imagery, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that such evidence was insufficient to support a causal link under a hostile work
environment claim. 	Id. at 409. 	Indeed, “To establish that harassment was based on race, [the
plaintiff] must show that but for her race, she would not have been the victim of the alleged
discrimination.” Gilliam v. S.C. Dep't of Juv. Justice, 474 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2007) (cleaned
up). Accordingly, “a plaintiff cannot rely on ‘conjecture’ to impute a racial character ‘what appears
11 The alleged “abhorrent and explicitly racial harassment” included an instance in which the plaintiff “found
unexplained grease on the buffer arm of her machine and when the sidewall drum on her MTS machine was too
big.” To that end, the court noted that the plaintiff “testified in her deposition that she could not recall [the accused
employee] saying or doing anything racially derogatory to her.” McIver, 42 F.4th at 410
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to be neutral harassment.’” McIver, 42 F.4th at 409 (citing Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d
274, 280–81 (4th Cir. 2000)).
Regarding the remaining allegations that underly the hostile work environment claim, they
fail for precisely the same reasons as the allegations in McIver. Here, while evidence of having
turnout gear strung up in the ceiling, receiving discipline for being “un-trainable,” and being told
“you’re not Engine 13” material would be unwelcomed, there is simply no evidence that but for
Plaintiff’s race, he would not have been the victim of these same acts. McIver, 42 F.4th at 408-
09. Further, the evidence shows that the statements made in the dinner-plate altercation were about
how Plaintiff failed to clean his dinner plate and the lack of competency his co-workers perceived.
(ECF No. 29-14 at 11-12). 	Therefore, because Plaintiff “fails to connect [his] tampering
allegations to circumstances that imply racial animus, and [his] other allegations…were not
committed by supervisors and are too remote in time to support this claim,” there is no genuine
issue of material fact concerning the second element of a hostile work environment claim. Id. at
410.
2. 	The Evidence is Insufficient to Prove Severe or Pervasive Abuse
Plaintiff also fails to meet the high bar to prove severe or pervasive abuse. As the parties
note, the severe and pervasive inquiry involves an objective and subjective component. 	See
Faulkenberry v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 670 F.Supp.3d 234, 254 (D. Md. 2023). 	While there is
sufficient evidence of Plaintiff’s subjective perception, the evidence here falls short of the high bar
for what may be considered an objectively hostile work environment. “To show that harassment
was severe or pervasive, a plaintiff must show that he perceived, and a reasonable person would
perceive, the work environment to be abusive.” Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas and Elec. Co., 60 F.3d
1126, 130–31 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 530 (4th Cir. 1994);
citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)). Indeed, a plaintiff “must clear a high
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bar in order to satisfy the [objective] severe or pervasive test.” Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d
196, 	208 	(4th 	Cir. 	2019). 	“[W]hen 	determining 	whether 	the 	harassing 	conduct 	was
objectively severe or pervasive,” a court considers “all the circumstances, including the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance.” Id. Thus, “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of
employment.” Id. Similarly, “complaints premised on nothing more than rude treatment by
[coworkers], callous behavior by [one's] superiors, or a routine difference of opinion and
personality conflict with [one's] supervisor, are not actionable under Title VII.” EEOC v. Sunbelt
Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315–16 (4th Cir. 2008).
In Nelson v. Crane Service Co., Inc., this Court denied summary judgment on this issue
when the plaintiff contended “that supervisors and co-workers alike used the n-word as well as
other racial epithets, such as ‘monkey’ and ‘cookie,’ both in his presence and directed at him on
an almost daily basis.” Nelson v. Crane Service Co., Inc., Civil Action No. No. 24-cv-766-ABA,
2026 WL 118358, at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 15, 2026). 	In Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., the
Fourth Circuit recognized concluded for the first time, that the use of racial epithets, even if a
single incident, can be sufficiently serious enough to engender a hostile work environment when
stated by a supervisor. 	Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280-81 (4th Cir.
2015). In McIver, which similarly considered evidence that failed to establish a neutral harassment
was based on a plaintiff’s race, the Fourth Circuit further noted that “[t]he totality of [the]
allegations, and the evidence put forward to support them, fails to create a genuine question of
material fact that racial discrimination in [the defendant’s] MTS department was so severe or
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pervasive that it constituted a hostile work environment.” McIver, 42 F.4th at 410. To that end,
“all of the explicitly racial conduct alleged by [the plaintiff], both directed at her and not, all
occurred long ago and intermittently over seven years.” Id. “Moreover, the most recent instance
of racial animus at [the defendant’s facility] occurred more than five years before she filed this
claim.” Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that those allegations were “simply ‘too remote to be
pervasive, and, thus, insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.’” Id. (quoting Perkins,
936 F.3d at 210).
Here, despite the Court’s finding that these claims do not fail for administrative reasons
such as timeliness, scope and exhaustion, the Court nonetheless concludes that each event, which
happened most recently over ten years ago, is too remote to be pervasive. Id. Further, considering
that the five events took place over the course of a period greater than four years, and the record is
devoid of the kind of evidence like that in Nelson involving racial epithets directed at the plaintiff
in his presence on an almost daily basis, the evidence hardly supports a conclusion that Plaintiff
was subjected to pervasive harassment. Nelson, 2026 WL 118358, at *6. 	While Plaintiff was
clearly offended by the events in 2009 and 2010, they are not of the serious nature described in
Nelson or Boyer-Liberto. 	Id.; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 280-81. 	Moreover, none of the
statements made or actions of which Plaintiff complaints were perpetrated by a supervisor. But
see Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 280-81 (recognizing the severity of racial epithets directed at an
employee by a supervisor); see also McIver, 42 F.4th at 410. Further, while the 2010 event in
which Plaintiff’s turnout gear was strung up in the ceiling would be annoying or unwelcomed, it
can hardly be stated to be of the severity necessary to prove a hostile work environment claim.
Nelson, 2026 WL 118358, at *6; see also McIver, 42 F.4th at 410. Similarly, no more compelling
are the statements that Plaintiff was not “Engine 13 material” or the placement of his own soiled
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dinner plate in his locker with a message to clean up after himself. McIver, 42 F.4th at 410 (“[A
coworker] as no degree of control over [a plaintiff], which gives [allegedly discriminatory]
comments less weight in the hostile-workplace analysis.”).
Ultimately, considering each of the allegations underlying a hostile work environment,
including those Plaintiff abandons in his brief, none of these events, taken together, rise to the kind
of conduct that would “amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of
employment” considering their infrequency, lack of severity, and context. Perkins, 936 F.3d at
208. While Plaintiff was undoubtedly involved in several workplace conflicts that angered him,
the evidence presented is insufficient to overcome the high bar imposed on hostile work
environment claims.
Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to Count
II.
E. 	There Exists a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Concerning Retaliation
Finally, Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Retaliation claim (Count
III). 	Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing” under Title VII. Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 299 (4th Cir. 2022). Again, the
McDonnell Douglas test applies. Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 839 Fed. Appx. 781, 782-
83 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus,
to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing he engaged
in a protected activity, his employer took an adverse action against him, and a causal relationship
existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. 	Roberts v. Glenn
Industrial Group, Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 122 (4th Cir. 2021). 	Plaintiff begins by arguing that he
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engaged in protected activity by reporting “racially discriminatory and harassing conduct by white
colleagues to his supervisors.” 	(ECF No. 34 at 18). Plaintiff posits that the adverse employment
action includes the dinner-plate argument in which “Remeikis hurling racial slurs at Plaintiff and,
along with another white firefighter, threatening Plaintiff’s life.12” Id. As Defendant points out,
the causation element here fails, consistent with the analysis set forth supra Section III.D.1.
Plaintiff does, however, point to the discipline that resulted from the dinner-plate altercation (and
related transfer decisions.
A plaintiff may demonstrate the requisite causal link by (1) by establishing a “temporal
proximity between the protected activity and adverse action,” or (2) by establishing that “other
relevant 	evidence 	indicates 	‘continuing 	retaliatory 	conduct 	and 	animus’ 	toward 	the
plaintiff.” Alberti v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 65 F.4th 151, 156 (4th Cir.
2023) (quoting Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2007)). Generally “the gap
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action can generally be no longer than
two months.” Barnhill v. Bondi, 138 F.4th 123, 132 (4th Cir. 2025); see also Roberts v. Glenn
Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 127 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting that three months was insufficient to
infer a causal relationship without other evidence of a causal link). Further, “intervening events
can bridge what would otherwise be a prohibitively long temporal gap.” Barbour v. Garland, 105
F.4th 579, 593 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 300 (4th Cir. 2022)).
Here, Plaintiff reported an allegation of racial discrimination multiple times in January
2013. 	(ECF No. 29-14 at 11-12). 	Thereafter, on February 21, 2013, an investigation had been
completed, at which point the investigating chief recommended that Plaintiff’s claim against
FF/EMT Remeikis and PO Wenger, including that of racial discrimination, should be dismissed
12 As explored in supra Section III.D.1, this characterization of the evidence is a serious deviation from the evidence
on the record and unsupported as a matter of law.
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and the claims against Plaintiff should be substantiated. 	Id. at 20-21. 	On March 8, 2013, the
department sent Plaintiff a hearing notice resulting from this incident, which took place on April
25, 2013. Id. at 22, 25. From what the Court can discern of the record, the decision was made final
on June 27, 2013. 	Id. at 26. 	Therefore, considering that the investigation and disciplinary
decisions were set in motion within one month after Plaintiff first complained of racial
discrimination, the department had knowledge of it during the course of its investigation, by its
own admission, and adopted the same recommended discipline as first suggested in February 2013,
the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has established evidence of a prima facie case. See Holloway,
32 F.4th at 300 (recognizing that an impermissible temporal gap was tempered by the defendant’s
intervening awareness of a protected complaint).
The remaining arguments mirror those set forth under Counts I, IV, and V. 	Therefore,
consistent with the Court’s analysis on that issue, there is, at the very least, a genuine issue of
material fact concerning whether the adverse employment actions were a mere pretext for
discrimination when they knew Plaintiff complained of racial discrimination and decided to
discipline him instead of his white counterparts for their involvement in the same argument.
Therefore, to that extent only, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED to the
extent that Plaintiff relies on disparate discipline of similarly situated comparators resulting from
the dinner-plate altercation and related transfer decisions. 	Otherwise, Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is this 17th day of February 2026, hereby ORDERED that
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) is:
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(1) 	DENIED with respect to Counts I, IV, and V to the extent that Plaintiff relies on
disparate discipline of similarly situated comparators resulting from the dinner-
plate altercation, and is otherwise GRANTED;
(2) 	GRANTED with respect to Count II;
(3) 	DENIED with respect to Count III to the extent that Plaintiff relies on disparate
discipline 	of 	similarly 	situated 	comparators 	resulting 	from 	the 	dinner-plate
altercation and related transfer decisions, and is otherwise GRANTED; and
(4) 	The Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as containing
no substantive request for summary judgment nor any arguments supporting
summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. (ECF No. 34).13
The parties are hereby directed to confer and jointly inform the Court within fourteen (14)
days from the date of this Memorandum Order and Opinion whether there is mutual desire to
participate in a settlement conference before proceeding to schedule a trial and related dates.
Dated: February 17, 2026 	/s/
J. Mark Coulson
United States Magistrate Judge
13 Plaintiff’s Opposition, styled as a Motion for Summary Judgment, does not move for summary judgment.
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