Layani et al v. Britt Investment Baltimore LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
GERARD LAYANI, et al.
:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 20-420
:
BENJAMIN S. OUAZANA, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently 	pending 	and 	ready 	for 	resolution 	is 	the 	renewed
motion 	for 	judgment 	pursuant 	to 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	50(b)(3) 	filed 	by
Defendants I&B Capital Investments LLC, Benjamin S. Ouazana, Isaac
Ouazana, 	WAZ-Brothers, 	LLC, 	WAZ-Investments, 	LLC, 	and 	WAZ-
Management, 	LLC 	(“Defendants”). 	(ECF 	No. 	352). 	The 	issues 	have
been 	briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed
necessary. 	Local 	Rule 	105.6. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	the
motion for judgment will be denied.
I. 	Background
The essential facts underlying this case are as follows:
In 	this 	long-enduring 	dispute 	over 	Baltimore
rental 	and 	investment 	properties, 	Plaintiffs
Gerard 	Layani, 	Yehuda 	Ragones, 	Isaac 	Krausz,
Yonnason 	Keyak, 	Devora 	Keyak, 	Yosef 	Keyak,
RDNA 	Investments 	LLC, 	Kandy, 	LLC, 	4802
Frankford 	Ave., 	LLC, 	and 	Britt 	Investment
Baltimore (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege
that 	Defendants 	Benjamin 	Ouazana, 	Isaac
Ouazana, 	I&B 	Capital 	Investments 	LLC, 	WAZ
Brothers 	LLC, 	WAZ-Investments, 	LLC, 	and 	WAZ-
Management 	LLC 	(collectively, 	“Defendants”)
engaged 	in 	a 	wide-ranging 	scheme 	to 	defraud
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investors 	via 	the 	sale 	and 	management 	of
various properties in Baltimore City.
(ECF No. 274, at 1). 	Several district and magistrate judges have
endeavored to manage this unwieldy dispute. 	Judge Ellen Hollander,
to 	whom 	this 	case 	was 	initially 	assigned, 	previously 	provided 	an
extensive 	discussion 	of 	the 	facts 	presented 	in 	the 	initial
complaint, 	(ECF 	No. 	38, 	at 	4-23), 	and 	a 	further 	summation 	of 	the
facts is unnecessary at this time.1 	Since it was filed in February
2020, (ECF No. 1), this case has accumulated a voluminous record.
The 	operative 	second 	amended 	complaint 	contained 	thirteen 	counts
against Defendants, including state law tort and contract claims,
as 	well 	as 	two 	counts 	under 	the 	federal 	Racketeer 	Influenced 	and
Corrupt 	Organizations 	Act, 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1962 	(“RICO”). 	(See 	ECF
No. 	59, 	at 	4). 	Prior 	to 	trial, 	the 	scope 	of 	the 	complaint 	was
“narrowed only slightly by this Court’s subsequent rulings.” 	(ECF
No. 297, at 1).
This court presided over an eleven-day jury trial in September
2025. 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	347). 	During 	trial, 	certain 	claims 	were
abandoned by Plaintiffs as redundant, and others were dismissed or
resolved 	against 	Plaintiffs 	by 	the 	court 	at 	the 	close 	of 	the
1 In later ruling on the parties’ earlier motions for summary
judgment, 	Judge 	Stephanie 	Gallagher 	omitted 	a 	retelling 	of 	the
facts 	“because 	the 	briefing 	d[id] 	not 	provide 	record 	citations
sufficient for it to construct one without Herculean effort.” 	(ECF
No. 	274, 	at 	3 	n.1) 	(citing 	Carlson 	v. 	Bos. 	Sci. 	Corp., 	856 	F.3d
320, 325 (4th Cir. 2017)).
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evidence (including all claims under RICO). 	Some state law claims
for 	fraud, 	breach 	of 	contract, 	unjust 	enrichment, 	and 	breach 	of
fiduciary duty were submitted to the jury.
At 	the 	close 	of 	the 	Plaintiffs’ 	case, 	Defendants 	filed 	a
written 	motion 	for 	judgment 	under 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	50(a). 	(ECF 	No.
342). 	That motion challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for
the 	RICO 	claims, 	asserted 	a 	statute 	of 	frauds 	defense 	to 	the
contract 	claims, 	asserted 	that 	Plaintiffs 	had 	failed 	to 	present
evidence 	of 	fair 	market 	or 	rental 	values 	to 	support 	claims 	for
damages, and argued that the tort claims were barred by Maryland’s
economic 	loss 	doctrine. 	Orally 	the 	next 	morning, 	Counsel 	raised
an additional issue concerning RICO and domestic, versus foreign,
injuries.
The court deferred any resolution of the motion and opted to
have the parties conclude presentation of evidence.
Once 	presentation 	of 	evidence 	was 	concluded, 	the 	court
required Plaintiffs to identify with precision the predicate acts
stated 	in 	the 	amended 	complaint 	for 	any 	potentially 	viable 	RICO
claim, 	and 	then 	to 	describe 	the 	evidence 	supporting 	each 	element
for each Plaintiff and each Defendant. 	That effort was minimally
successful.
At 	the 	ensuing 	conference, 	counsel 	for 	Plaintiffs 	attempted
to specify the predicate acts for which admissible and sufficient
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evidence had been produced. 	At the end of that exercise, the court
concluded 	that 	there 	was 	insufficient 	evidence 	to 	constitute 	a
pattern 	of 	activity 	as 	necessary 	to 	proceed 	with 	the 	RICO 	claims
and all federal RICO claims were dismissed. 	The court also culled
the purported false statements and concealments that were included
in 	the 	amended 	complaint 	to 	a 	list 	that 	was 	manageable, 	albeit
marginally, to support the fraud claims.
Counsel 	for 	Plaintiffs 	essentially 	conceded 	that 	there 	were
no 	claims 	for 	breach 	of 	contract 	for 	the 	acquisition 	packages
because 	evidence 	of 	specific 	terms 	of 	a 	contract 	to 	purchase 	any
of the properties was missing. 	No claim for a breach of contract
for 	the 	acquisition 	of 	a 	property 	went 	to 	the 	jury. 	Plaintiffs
did 	insist 	that 	the 	management 	or 	operating 	agreements 	were
specifically 	definite, 	regarding 	failure 	to 	report, 	to 	pay
government 	agencies, 	and 	to 	remit 	rents. 	Ultimately, 	the 	court
ruled that one plaintiff, Yehuda Ragones, had testified that rents
were not paid over when they should have been for his properties,
thus 	providing 	evidence 	that 	at 	least 	one 	defendant 	breached 	a
management 	agreement 	to 	remit 	rents. 	In 	addition, 	a 	single
property 	for 	Plaintiffs 	Gerard 	Layani 	and 	Britt 	Investment
Baltimore 	was 	also 	allowed 	to 	proceed 	on 	that 	theory. 	Separate,
but 	limited, 	claims 	for 	breach 	of 	contract 	were 	submitted 	to 	the
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jury for the failure to report, failure to pay government agencies,
and failure to remit rent.
The 	court 	also 	sent 	a 	limited 	set 	of 	the 	unjust 	enrichment
and 	breach 	of 	fiduciary 	duty 	claims 	to 	the 	jury. 	While 	the 	jury
deliberated 	for 	about 	a 	day, 	the 	jurors 	were 	unable 	to 	reach 	a
verdict. 	The court declared a mistrial.2
Defendants timely moved to renew their motion for judgment on
September 	20, 	2025. 	(ECF 	No. 	352). 	Plaintiffs 	responded 	to 	the
motion on October 6, 2025. 	(ECF No. 354). 	Defendants replied in
support of their motion on October 15, 2025. 	(ECF No. 356).
II. 	Standard of Review
Fed.R.Civ.P. 	50 	governs 	motions 	for 	judgment 	as 	a 	matter 	of
law during or after a jury trial. 	Rule 50(a) governs motions made
“at 	any 	time 	before 	the 	case 	is 	submitted 	to 	the 	jury,” 	and 	Rule
50(b) 	governs 	motions 	renewed 	after 	trial 	if 	the 	court 	did 	not
grant 	the 	Rule 	50(a) 	motion. 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	50. 	“A 	motion 	under
Rule 	50(b) 	‘assesses 	whether 	the 	claim 	should 	succeed 	or 	fail
because 	the 	evidence 	developed 	at 	trial 	was 	insufficient 	as 	a
matter 	of 	law 	to 	sustain 	the 	claim.’” 	Harris 	v. 	Wormuth, 	669
F.Supp.3d 477, 499 (D.Md. 2023) (quoting Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp.,
2 	The 	jury 	instructions 	and 	verdict 	sheet 	were 	not 	filed 	on
the docket, and an official transcript has not been prepared. 	The
court will attach the jury instructions and verdict sheet to this
opinion.
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679 	F.3d 	146, 	155 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2012)). 	The 	court’s 	role 	is 	not 	to
take the place of the factfinder:
When conducting a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
inquiry for a post-trial Rule 50(b) motion we
do not “weigh the plaintiff’s evidence against
that 	offered 	by 	the 	defendant.” 	Ellis 	v.
Int'l 	Playtex, 	Inc., 	745 	F.2d 	292, 	298 	(4 th
Cir. 1984). 	Instead, we take the evidence in
the most favorable light to the party opposing
the 	motion 	and 	ask 	whether 	a 	reasonable 	jury
could have arrived at its conclusion.
Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 153 F.4th 413, 418 (4 th Cir.
2025). 	A mistrial does not, on its own, foreclose the possibility
of judgment as a matter of law. 	DeMaine v. Bank One, Akron, N.A.,
904 F.2d 219, 221 (4 th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
Defendants 	raise 	arguments 	in 	their 	Rule 	50(b) 	motion 	that
were not included in the written Rule 50(a) motion at the close of
Plaintiffs’ 	case, 	which 	mostly 	precludes 	their 	review.
Defendants’ motion also suffers from a lack of clarity throughout,
including 	in 	failing 	to 	identify 	which 	specific 	claims 	are 	meant
to 	be 	foreclosed 	by 	each 	argument. 	Ultimately, 	these 	problems
doom Defendants’ motion.
A. 	Raising Arguments in the Rule 50(a) Motion
“Except 	in 	circumstances 	necessary 	‘to 	avoid 	manifest
injustice to the moving party,’ courts may not consider arguments
under 	Rule 	50(b) 	that 	the 	moving 	party 	failed 	to 	preserve 	under
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Rule 	50(a).” 	Wallace 	v. 	Poulos, 	861 	F.Supp.2d 	587, 	608 	(D.Md.
2012) 	(quoting 	Samuels 	v. 	Air 	Transp. 	Loc. 	504, 	992 	F.2d 	12, 	15
(2d 	Cir. 	1993)). 	Defendants 	filed 	a 	written 	motion 	for 	judgment
under 	Rule 	50(a) 	before 	the 	case 	was 	submitted 	to 	the 	jury, 	(ECF
No. 342), and provided limited additional argument orally. 	After
the 	jury 	failed 	to 	reach 	a 	verdict, 	Defendants 	filed 	a 	renewed
motion for judgment under Rule 50(b). 	(ECF No. 352). 	The renewed
motion 	for 	judgment 	makes 	four 	arguments. 	Two 	arguments 	– 	that
the Plaintiffs did not provide evidence of fair market value, (ECF
No. 	352-1, 	at 	3), 	and 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	are 	barred 	by 	the
Statute of Frauds, (Id. at 10) – were raised in the earlier motion
and will be considered. 	(ECF No. 342-1, at 6, 10). 	The other two
arguments 	– 	that 	many 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	are 	barred 	by
Maryland’s statute of limitations, (ECF No. 352-1, at 9), and that
several 	Plaintiffs 	do 	not 	have 	standing 	to 	bring 	their 	claims,
(Id. at 14) – were not raised in the earlier written motion under
Rule 50(a), and were only hinted at orally.3 	The court will decline
3 	In 	their 	reply 	brief, 	Defendants 	seem 	to 	make 	one 	new
argument 	that 	was 	not 	included 	in 	either 	their 	Rule 	50(a) 	motion
or 	their 	Rule 	50(b) 	motion, 	which 	says 	Plaintiffs 	“failed 	to
produce 	any 	tax 	returns, 	bank 	records, 	title 	company 	records,
cancelled checks, wire transmittals, or cash exchange receipts to
support 	any 	of 	the 	claimed 	damages 	in 	this 	case.” 	(ECF 	No. 	356,
at 8). 	As this argument was not raised in the initial motion for
judgment, the court will not consider it now.
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to consider the first argument but will consider the second, as it
implicates the justiciability of the case.
The 	only 	claims 	that 	went 	to 	the 	jury 	were 	fraud, 	breach 	of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.
First, in their renewed motion for judgment, Defendants argue
that 	many 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	are 	barred 	by 	Maryland’s 	statute
of 	limitations. 	(ECF 	No. 	352-1, 	at 	9-10). 	Defendants 	did 	not
make 	this 	argument 	in 	their 	earlier 	written 	Rule 	50(a) 	motion;
rather, they argued that several of the claims were barred by the
statute of limitations period for federal RICO enterprise claims.4
(ECF No. 342-1, at 17). 	These arguments are not interchangeable;
the 	federal 	and 	state 	statutes 	of 	limitations 	have 	different
lengths 	and 	pertain 	to 	different 	claims. 	Counsel 	for 	Defendants
did allude briefly to a statute of limitations defense for some of
the fraud claims relating to some of the properties at the charging
conference but did not elucidate at any point.
Despite Defendants’ failure to assert this defense adequately
at 	the 	motion 	for 	judgment 	stage, 	Plaintiffs 	respond
substantively, 	and 	Defendants 	did 	not 	reply. 	There 	is 	no 	risk 	of
manifest 	injustice 	to 	the 	moving 	party 	in 	not 	considering 	this
4 None of the federal RICO claims were submitted to the jury
because 	the 	court 	granted 	judgment 	based 	on 	the 	lack 	of 	evidence
for necessary elements.
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argument 	more 	fully 	now. 	Defendants 	have 	had 	over 	five 	years 	of
litigation 	to 	argue 	the 	affirmative 	defense 	that 	the 	statute 	of
limitations 	should 	bar 	some 	or 	all 	of 	the 	state 	law 	claims,
including 	at 	the 	summary 	judgment 	stage. 	(ECF 	No. 	274, 	at 	5-7).
They did not seek a jury instruction on the issue.
Defendants 	also 	argue 	in 	their 	renewed 	motion 	for 	judgment
that 	Plaintiffs 	Ragones 	and 	Krausz5 	have 	no 	standing 	to 	bring
claims 	for 	two 	specific 	properties. 	(ECF 	No. 	352-1, 	at 	14).
Defendants 	did 	not 	raise 	this 	argument 	in 	their 	initial 	motion.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, (ECF No. 354, at 19), however,
the 	argument 	is 	not 	waived. 	Because 	the 	doctrine 	of 	standing
strikes at the power of the court to hear the case, “the issue of
standing 	may 	be 	raised 	at 	any 	time 	or 	sua 	sponte 	by 	the 	Court.”
Rock 	Spring 	Plaza, 	LLC 	v. 	Invs. 	Warranty 	of 	Am., 	LLC, 	No. 	20-cv-
01502-JRR, 	2025 	WL 	1504850, 	at 	*21 	(D.Md. 	May 	27, 	2025) 	(citing
Buscemi v. Bell, 964 F.3d 252, 258 (4 th Cir. 2020)).
B. 	Standing for Plaintiffs Ragones and Krausz
Defendants 	argue 	that 	Plaintiffs 	Ragones 	and 	Krausz 	do 	not
have 	standing 	to 	bring 	claims 	for 	the 	properties 	at 	1109 	N.
5 	Defendants 	repeatedly 	refer 	to 	Plaintiff 	“Kraus” 	in 	their
motion. 	(ECF No. 352-1, at 14). 	As there is no Plaintiff by that
name, the court presumes that Defendants are referring to Plaintiff
Issac Krausz.
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Lyndhurst 	or 	3022 	E. 	Northern 	Parkway, 	respectively.6 	(ECF 	No.
352-1, 	at 	14). 	In 	support 	of 	their 	argument, 	they 	assert 	that
“Ragones 	never 	had 	an 	ownership 	interest 	in 	1109 	Lyndhurst,” 	and
“Kraus[z] 	has 	no 	standing 	to 	sue 	Defendants 	after 	the 	lender
rejected an offer . . . to which Kraus[z] contributed to purchase
3022 E. Northern Parkway.” 	(Id.).
Defendants’ 	assertion 	does 	not 	implicate 	standing. 	“To
establish 	an 	injury 	sufficient 	to 	confer 	standing 	to 	bring 	suit
under 	Article 	III, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	plausibly 	allege: 	(1) 	‘an
injury 	in 	fact, 	(2) 	that 	is 	fairly 	traceable 	to 	the 	challenged
conduct 	of 	the 	defendant, 	and 	(3) 	that 	is 	likely 	to 	be 	redressed
by 	a 	favorable 	judicial 	decision.’” 	Buscemi, 	964 	F.3d 	at 	258
(quoting 	Spokeo, 	Inc. 	v. 	Robins, 	578 	U.S. 	330, 	338 	(2016)).
Defendants do not argue that any of these parameters are not met;
rather, Defendants argue that the relevant Plaintiffs never had an
ownership interest in the properties, (ECF No. 352-1, at 14). 	As
Plaintiffs 	note, 	Defendants 	“improperly 	conflate[] 	the 	notion 	of
a 	plaintiff’s 	standing 	to 	pursue 	claims 	with 	the 	identity 	of 	the
title 	owner 	of 	properties.” 	(ECF 	No. 	354, 	at 	19). 	Standing 	to
sue 	for 	the 	surviving 	claims 	does 	not 	rely 	on 	ownership, 	and
6 	Curiously, 	in 	Defendants’ 	reply, 	they 	only 	argue 	that
Plaintiff 	Ragones 	lacks 	standing 	for 	1109 	N. 	Lyndhurst 	with 	no
mention of Plaintiff Krausz or the second property. 	(ECF No. 356,
at 16). 	The omission is not explained.
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Defendants 	provide 	no 	other 	reason 	that 	the 	Plaintiffs 	lack
standing. 	The court will deny judgment on this point.
C. 	Fair Market Value and Fair Market Rental Value
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ failure to present evidence
of 	the 	fair 	market 	value 	for 	the 	properties 	at 	issue 	forecloses
any finding of damages. 	(ECF No. 352-1, at 5). 	Plaintiffs counter
that the “jury had before it sufficient evidence of actual losses
from 	which 	to 	calculate 	damages 	without 	resort 	to 	hypothetical
‘fair market value’ appraisals.” 	(ECF No. 354, at 7).
Defendants’ 	argument 	fails 	because 	they 	have 	made 	no 	effort
to 	identify 	the 	specific 	claims 	that 	should 	be 	defeated 	by 	the
omission of this single piece of evidence. 	Defendants only barely
narrow 	their 	argument 	in 	the 	reply, 	where 	they 	state 	that
“Plaintiffs 	failed 	to 	meet 	their 	burden 	of 	proof 	in 	presenting
breach of contract or fraud damages under Maryland law.” 	(ECF No.
356, 	at 	2). 	This 	case 	involves 	multiple 	defendants, 	multiple
plaintiffs, 	and 	multiple 	properties. 	While 	it 	is 	possible 	that
Defendants’ 	argument 	is 	applicable 	to 	some 	individual 	claims, 	a
blanket 	assertion 	that 	all 	fraud 	and 	breach 	of 	contract 	claims
must 	fail 	for 	lack 	of 	fair 	market 	value 	evidence 	is 	flatly
incorrect. 	To 	give 	just 	one 	example, 	Maryland 	law 	allows 	for
nominal 	damages 	in 	breach 	of 	contract 	actions, 	even 	when 	a
plaintiff has not shown actual damages. 	Ambling Mgmt. Co. v. Univ.
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View 	Partners, 	LLC, 	581 	F.Supp.2d 	706, 	718 	(D.Md. 	2008) 	(citing
Taylor 	v. 	NationsBank, 	N.A., 	365 	Md. 	166, 	175 	(2001); 	Hooton 	v.
Kenneth 	B. 	Mumaw 	Plumbing 	& 	Heating 	Co., 	Inc., 	271 	Md. 	565, 	572
(1974)). 	As 	Judge 	Gallagher 	noted 	during 	the 	summary 	judgment
phase:
Defendants 	have 	not 	explained 	which 	of
Plaintiffs’ claims should fall based on those
evidentiary 	deficiencies, 	nor 	have 	they
identified 	the 	elements 	of 	the 	claims 	at
issue. 	Defendants 	cannot 	prevail 	by 	merely
gesturing 	toward 	a 	generalized 	lack 	of
evidence without making specific arguments as
to why Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of
law.
(ECF No. 274, at 9).
Defendants 	also 	argue 	that 	a 	measure 	of 	fair 	rental 	market
value is an essential part of any finding of damages for the loss
of 	rental 	income. 	(ECF 	No. 	352-1, 	at 	8). 	They 	provide 	no 	case
law supporting this assertion, and once again do not identify which
claims 	this 	argument 	is 	seeking 	to 	foreclose. 	(Id. 	at 	8-9).
Defendants try to argue that judgment in their favor is warranted
because 	Plaintiffs 	did 	not 	present 	“any 	credible 	testimony 	or
evidence 	. 	. 	. 	supporting 	Plaintiffs’ 	burden 	to 	present 	evidence
that 	they 	did 	not 	receive 	net 	rental 	payments 	to 	which 	they 	were
entitled.” 	(Id. 	at 	8). 	It 	is 	the 	jury’s 	role 	to 	determine
credibility, not that of the Defendants or this court. 	See Harris,
669 F.Supp.3d at 504. 	Defendants’ motion is denied on this ground.
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D. 	Statute of Frauds
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred
as a matter of law by Maryland’s Statute of Frauds. 	Under Maryland
law, 	“[n]o 	action 	may 	be 	brought 	on 	any 	contract 	for 	the 	sale 	or
disposition of land or of any interest in or concerning land unless
the contract on which the action is brought, or some memorandum or
note of it, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged or
some 	other 	person 	lawfully 	authorized 	by 	him.” 	Md. 	Code 	Ann.,
Real 	Prop. 	§ 	5-104. 	According 	to 	Defendants, 	this 	provision
“applies 	to 	agreements 	involving 	real 	property, 	including 	oral
agreements 	to 	purchase 	or 	manage 	investment 	rental 	properties.”
(ECF No. 352-1, at 11). 	Defendants assert that the “only written
contract introduced by Plaintiffs was the Management Agreement of
Yosef 	Keyak 	signed 	by 	Isaac 	Ouzana.” 	(Id.). 	Without 	additional
written 	contracts, 	they 	argue, 	“Plaintiffs 	cannot 	satisfy 	the
requirements 	of 	Maryland’s 	Statute 	of 	Frauds, 	and 	their 	claims
related 	to 	these 	alleged 	contracts 	must 	fail.” 	(Id. 	at 	13).
Plaintiffs 	counter, 	in 	part, 	that 	“[t]he 	property 	management
agreements 	at 	issue 	here 	were 	service 	contracts, 	not 	conveyances
of real property,” so the Statute of Frauds does not apply.7 	(ECF
No. 354, at 16).
7 The court was unable to find any record of three cases cited
by 	Plaintiffs 	in 	their 	response. 	(ECF 	No. 	354, 	at 	14-16).
Litigants are reminded that cases cited in briefs submitted to the
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Once again, Defendants make their blanket argument untethered
to any specific claim. 	Defendants assert that any “claims related
to 	these 	alleged 	contracts,” 	previously 	identified 	as 	contracts
“for 	the 	sale 	or 	management 	of 	real 	property,” 	must 	fail. 	(ECF
No. 	352-1, 	at 	13). 	Nearly 	every 	claim 	is 	in 	some 	way 	related 	to
agreements between the Plaintiffs and Defendants “for the sale or
management of real property.” 	It is not the role of this court to
see 	if 	Defendants 	may 	have 	a 	point 	on 	any 	of 	the 	nearly 	fifty
claims sent to the jury.
The motion will be denied on this ground.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Rule 50 motion will be
denied. 	A separate order will follow. 	After the parties have had
a 	chance 	to 	review 	this 	opinion, 	the 	court 	will 	convene 	a
status/scheduling 	conference. 	Among 	the 	topics 	to 	be 	discussed
will 	be 	whether 	the 	claims 	should 	be 	severed 	for 	trial 	under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b) and grouped into four sets of Plaintiffs. 	Now
that 	the 	federal 	RICO 	claims 	are 	no 	longer 	in 	the 	case, 	the
remaining 	state 	law 	claims 	are 	particular 	to 	each 	set 	of
Plaintiffs.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
court 	must 	be 	legitimate 	cases 	that 	support 	their 	proposition.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(2).
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