Kauffman v. Trikeriotis

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, NORTHERN DIVISION
*
CHRISTOPHER TRIKERIOTIS,
*
Appellant,
* 	CIVIL NO.: WDQ-07-0852
v.
*
JUDITH KAUFFMAN,
*
Appellee.
*
* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	* 	*
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On February 3, 2006, Christopher Trikeriotis, the Debtor,
filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 	On March 15, 2006, Judith Kauffman, a creditor,
filed a complaint to determine the dischargeability of debt. 	On
February 9, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court found that the debt owed
Kauffman was non-dischargeable. 	Christopher Trikeriotis appealed
the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. 	For the reasons discussed
below, the Bankruptcy Court’s order will be affirmed.
I. 	Background
The Appellant and the Appellee had been married and were
divorced on August 1, 1995. 	Their marriage resulted in one
child, for whom the Appellant owed child support to Kauffman.
Although the Appellant’s statement of facts is replete with
chronological inconsistencies and mistakes, the Court has
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attempted to discern a coherent chronology of events leading to
this appeal. 	In 2002, the Appellant filed, in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County: (1) a petition for contempt against
Kauffman for her failure to perform under the party’s marital
settlement agreement; and (2) a complaint, subsequently amended,
for visitation and for modification of child support joined by
Joyce Trikeriotis, the Debtor’s current wife, and Beverly
Trikeriotis, the Debtor’s mother. 	In 2003, the Circuit Court, in
a memorandum opinion and order, denied the petition for contempt.
Within a few months, the Circuit Court issued an order that
actually increased the child support Christopher Trikeriotis
owed; a separate order assessed against Beverly Trikeriotis,
Christopher Trikeriotis, and Joyce Trikeriotis the $22,600.45 in
attorneys’ fees incurred by Kaufmann in defending against the
complaint. 	In 2004, Joyce and Beverly Trikeriotis settled with
Kauffman for $4,000.00 and were released from the Court’s order,
leaving $18,600.45 still owing.
Upon the Appellant’s filing for Bankruptcy, Kauffman sought
to ensure recovery of the $18,600.45 by filing her complaint to
determine the dischargeability of debt. The Bankruptcy Court
found the debt non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and
(a)(15).
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II. 	Analysis
Christopher Trikeriotis appeals the decision on the grounds
that: (1) an amendment to § 523 eliminated the Bankruptcy Court’s
jurisdiction to hear Kauffman’s complaint; (2) the payment
ordered by the Circuit Court is not of the type that can be found
non-dischargeable; and (3) given the release of the others, he
does not owe $18,600.45, but instead owes simply his pro-rata
share of the $22,600.45 ordered by the Circuit Court. 	The
Appellee counters that: (1) the Bankruptcy Court could hear the
complaint; (2) the debt is non-dischargeable; and (3) the
Appellant is not entitled to a pro-rata reduction caused by the
settlement of his mother and current wife.
The Appellee’s amended complaint to determine
dischargeability sought non-dischargeability under: (1) §
523(a)(5); (2) § 523(a)(15); and (3) § 523(a)(6). 	The Bankruptcy
Court found the debt non-dischargeable under (a)(5) and (a)(15).
The Appellant argues that amendments to § 523 make the
complaint to determine dischargeability a “non-suit.”
Specifically, the Appellant argues that § 523(c)(1) eliminated
(a)(15) from the list of causes for which a complaint to
determine dischargeability must be filed to except the debt from
discharge. 	However, the fact that a complaint is not required
does not prohibit a complaint from being filed. 	Indeed, under
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007, “any creditor may file
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a complaint to obtain a determination of the dischargeability of
any debt . . . other than under § 523(c) . . . at any time.”
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(a),(b). 	Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court
was free to hear the Appellee’s complaint.
Next, the Appellant argues that the counsel fees were
awarded because the proceeding was “brought without substantial
justification” and so the order was entered under Md. Code Ann.,
Fam. Law § 12-103(b), not § 12-103(a). 	Appellant’s Br. at 9.
The Appellant argues that this distinction means that the award
was “not in the nature of support.” 	Id. 	The nature of fees is
relevant because the Appellant is challenging the Bankruptcy
Court’s decision that the counsel fees award ordered by the
Circuit Court is non-dischargeable because it is a debt:
(5) for a domestic support obligation; [or]
(15) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and
not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred
by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or
other order of a court of record, or a determination made in
accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental
unit[.]
11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
The Appellant’s distinction between 12-103(a) and (b) has no
effect. 	Section 12-103(a) simply states that a court may award
either party counsel fees in cases, like this one, in which a
person “applies for a decree or modification of a decree
concerning the custody, support, or visitation of a child of the
parties.” 	Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 12-103(a). 	Section 12-
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103(b) simply sets forth specific factors (financial status,
needs of each party, etc.) that a court should consider in making
the determination that subsection (a) authorizes the court to
make. 	Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 12-103(b). 	The Circuit Court
awarded the counsel fees to Kaufmann because she incurred them in
defending against the Trikeriotis’s motion, which sought
modification of the Appellant’s required child support payments
and visitation privileges. 	Accordingly, the Court finds no error
in the Bankruptcy Court’s decision that the counsel fees award is
non-dischargeable under (a)(5) and (a)(15).
The Appellant argues that the release of his mother and
current wife from the obligation to pay the counsel fees entitles
him to a pro-rata (2/3) reduction in the amount owed (rather than
a reduction equal to the amount paid by the settling parties).
The Appellant cites law on joint tort-feasors without explaining
why that law is applicable in this situation. 	The Court need not
make that determination, however, as the Appellant is not
entitled to a pro-rata reduction even under the law cited. 	Under
Maryland law
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor,
whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the
other tort-feasors unless the release so provides, but it
reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the
amount of the consideration paid for the release or in any
amount or proportion by which the release provides that the
total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the
consideration paid.
Md. Code. Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1404 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the default is a reduction equal to the amount paid by the
settling parties and any deviation must be specifically stated in
the release. 	The Appellant has provided no evidence or argument
that the release of Joyce and Beverly Trikeriotis contained any
statement regarding its effect on him. 	The Appellant cites no
other law and provides no other support for his pro-rata
argument. 	Accordingly, the Court finds no error in the
Bankruptcy Court’s determination that Christopher Trikeriotis
remains liable for the outstanding counsel fees, amounting to
$18,600.45.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court affirms the
decision of the Bankruptcy Court.
August 2, 2007 	/s/
Date 	William D. Quarles, Jr.
United States District Judge
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