Dorene Robinson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
IN RE: DORENE ROBINSON 	:
_________________________________
DORENE ROBINSON 	:
Appellant 	:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 26-1612
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 	:
Appellee 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant 	Dorene 	Robinson 	(“Ms. 	Robinson”), 	a 	debtor 	in 	the
underlying 	bankruptcy 	case, 	appeals 	from 	the 	Order 	of 	Bankruptcy
Judge 	Lori 	S. 	Simpson, 	denying 	her 	Motion 	for 	Determination 	of
Stay 	Violation 	(“Order”). 	(ECF 	No. 	1). 	The 	issues 	have 	been
briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed
necessary. 	Local Rule 105.6. 	For the following reasons, the order
of the bankruptcy court will be affirmed.
I. 	Background
On 	January 	7, 	2025, 	the 	property 	then-owned 	by 	Ms. 	Robinson
at 9133 Granite Court, Waldorf, MD 20603 (“Property”) was sold at
a 	public 	foreclosure 	auction. 	(ECF 	No. 	3-1, 	at 	2). 	A 	Maryland
state 	court 	ratified 	the 	sale 	on 	February 	26, 	2025. 	(Id.). 	The
state court also referred the matter to an auditor. 	(Id.).
On March 3, 2025, Ms. Robinson filed a Voluntary Petition for
bankruptcy with the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland.
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(Id.); In re Robinson, Bankr. Case No. 25-11792-LSS (Bankr. D.Md.
Mar. 	3, 	2025) 	(“Bankr. 	Case 	I”). 	This 	petition 	triggered 	an
“automatic 	stay” 	of 	enforcement 	actions, 	actions 	to 	obtain
property, 	and 	other 	claims 	against 	Ms. 	Robinson 	and 	her 	property
interests. 	See 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 362. 	The 	Bankruptcy 	Court 	dismissed
the case and terminated the automatic stay on September 30, 2025,
because Ms. Robinson was barred from filing for bankruptcy at the
time of her petition. 	(ECF No. 3-1, at 2); Bankr. Case I, ECF No.
156.
On July 24, 2025, while the automatic stay was in effect, the
state court entered an order ratifying the auditor’s report. 	(ECF
No. 	6, 	at 	3). 	The 	order 	also 	denied 	a 	motion 	by 	Ms. 	Robinson
challenging the ratification of the foreclosure. 	In re Robinson,
Bankr. Case No. 25-20687-LSS (Bankr. D.Md. Apr. 6, 2026) (“Bankr.
Case II”), ECF No. 85, at 2. 	On October 31, 2025, after the stay
was 	terminated, 	the 	deed 	to 	the 	Property 	was 	recorded 	in 	county
land records. 	Id.
Ms. Robinson again filed for bankruptcy on November 13, 2025,
initiating 	the 	current 	bankruptcy 	case. 	Bankr. 	Case 	II, 	ECF 	No.
1. The Bank of New York Mellon fka the Bank of New York (“Appellee”)
filed 	a 	Notice 	of 	Appearance 	and 	an 	Objection 	to 	Ms. 	Robinson’s
proposed 	Chapter 	13 	Plan, 	asserting 	that 	it 	held 	an 	interest 	in
the Property. 	Bankr. Case II, ECF Nos. 38; 39.
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Ms. 	Robinson 	filed 	a 	motion 	seeking 	a 	declaration 	that 	the
state 	court’s 	July 	24 	order 	and 	the 	October 	31 	deed 	recording
“violated 	the 	[March 	3] 	automatic 	stay 	and 	were 	void.” 	(ECF 	No.
8, 	at 	6). 	Ms. 	Robinson 	also 	requested 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	on
the matter. 	Id. at 7. 	Appellee opposed the motion. 	(ECF No. 7,
at 4). 	On April 22, 2026, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion,
holding 	that 	the 	Property 	was 	not 	subject 	to 	the 	automatic 	stay
because 	the 	state 	court’s 	ratification 	of 	the 	foreclosure 	sale
“divested [Ms. Robinson] completely of any interest in the property
before 	[she] 	filed 	her 	bankruptcy 	petition.” 	(ECF 	No. 	1-1, 	at 	2
(quoting 	Scott 	v. 	Bierman, 	429 	F.App’x 	225, 	231 	(4 th 	Cir.
2011))(citation modified)).
On 	April 	24, 	2026, 	Ms. 	Robinson 	filed 	a 	notice 	of 	appeal 	of
the Order. 	(ECF No. 1). 	Ms. Robinson filed her opening brief on
June 18, 2026. 	(ECF No. 6). 	Appellant filed their brief on July
16, 	2026. 	(ECF 	No. 	7). 	Ms. 	Robinson 	filed 	her 	reply 	brief 	on
July 30, 2026. 	(ECF No. 8).
II. 	Standard of Review
This 	court 	has 	jurisdiction 	over 	this 	appeal 	pursuant 	to 	28
U.S.C. 	§ 	158(a), 	which 	states 	in 	relevant 	part: 	“The 	district
courts 	of 	the 	United 	States 	shall 	have 	jurisdiction 	to 	hear
appeals[ ] 	(1) 	from 	final 	judgments, 	orders, 	and 	decrees . . . 	of
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bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the
bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title.”
In an appeal from Bankruptcy Court, this Court
reviews 	factual 	findings 	for 	clear 	error 	and
conclusions 	of 	law 	de 	novo. 	Gold 	v. 	First
Tenn. 	Bank 	Nat’l 	Ass’n 	(In 	re 	Taneja), 	743
F.3d 	423, 	429 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2014). 	A 	finding 	is
clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing the
record, 	the 	reviewing 	court 	is 	left 	with 	“a
firm 	and 	definite 	conviction 	that 	a 	mistake
has 	been 	committed.” 	Klein 	v. 	PepsiCo, 	Inc.,
845 F.2d 76, 79 (4 th Cir. 1988).
Ekweani v. Thomas, 574 B.R. 561, 567 (D.Md. 2017).
III. Analysis
An 	automatic 	stay 	protects 	“the 	property 	of 	the 	estate”
against 	post-petition 	actions 	to 	obtain 	possession, 	enforcements
of judgments, and liens. 	11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2)–(5). 	The property
of the estate is comprised of “all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the [bankruptcy]
case,” 	subject 	to 	exceptions 	not 	relevant 	here. 	11 	U.S.C. 	§
541(a)(1); 	see 	also 	In 	re 	Alvarez, 	733 	F.3d. 	136, 	141 	(4 th 	Cir.
2013). 	Ms. Robinson argues that she retained a legal interest in
the Property at the time she filed for bankruptcy on March 3, 2025.
(ECF No. 8, at 5). 	At the least, Ms. Robinson maintains that the
Bankruptcy 	Court 	should 	have 	held 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	on 	the
question. 	(ECF 	No. 	8, 	at 	10–11). 	There 	are 	no 	factual 	disputes
on the chronology relevant to this appeal, and the Bankruptcy Court
properly 	recited 	the 	applicable 	law: 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the
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commencement of the bankruptcy case, Ms. Robinson no longer had an
interest in the Property. 	(ECF No. 1-1, at 2). 	Accordingly, the
Order will be affirmed.
“[W]hen 	determining 	the 	substance 	of 	property 	rights 	and
security interests in bankruptcy, ‘the basic federal rule is that
state 	law 	governs.’” 	In 	re 	Price, 	562 	F.3d 	618, 	624 	(4 th 	Cir.
2009) 	(quoting 	Butner 	v. 	United 	States, 	440 	U.S. 	48, 	57 	(1979)).
Maryland state law applies here because the Property is located in
Maryland. 	See Singh v. Shao Lin Lai, 417 F.Supp.3d 694, 700 (D.Md.
2019); Scott, 429 Fed.App’x at 229.
Under 	Maryland 	law, 	a 	foreclosure 	sale 	must 	be 	ratified 	by
the 	state 	court. 	Md. 	R. 	14-305(f). 	It 	is 	this 	ratification 	of
the 	sale 	“that 	allows 	title 	of 	the 	property 	to 	pass 	to 	the
purchaser” 	and 	“terminates 	the 	mortgagor’s 	interest 	in 	the
property.” 	Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 539 (2004); see also Md.
Code 	Ann., 	Real 	Prop. 	Section 	7-105(c) 	(West 	2026) 	(foreclosure
sale, 	ratification 	and 	payment 	of 	purchase 	money 	“operate[] 	to
pass 	all 	the 	title 	which 	the 	borrower 	had 	in 	the 	property 	at 	the
time 	of 	the 	recording 	of 	the 	mortgage 	or 	deed 	of 	trust”). 	The
ratification thus leaves the former owner with no interest in the
property to be carried into a future bankruptcy estate. See Singh,
417 F.Supp.3d. at 701 (holding that following the ratification of
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a 	foreclosure 	sale, 	“the 	mortgagor's 	interest 	in 	the 	property 	is
extinguished completely”); Scott, 429 Fed.App’x at 230.
Further 	state 	court 	procedures, 	such 	as 	a 	referral 	to 	an
auditor, do not change the legal effect of the ratification.
Even 	though 	the 	foreclosure 	case 	continues
after 	the 	ratification 	of 	the 	sale, 	the
proceeding no longer involves an adjudication
of 	rights 	in 	the 	real 	property. 	The
ratification 	of 	the 	sale 	has 	the 	practical
effect of putting the parties out of court, as
they 	can 	no 	longer 	prosecute 	or 	defend 	their
rights 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	property;
therefore, 	an 	order 	ratifying 	a 	foreclosure
sale 	is 	a 	final 	judgment 	with 	respect 	to 	the
in 	rem 	aspects 	of 	a 	foreclosure 	proceeding.
See 	Fairfax 	Savings, 	F.S.B. 	v. 	Kris 	Jen 	Ltd.
P’ship, 	338 	Md. 	at 	16-17, 	655 	A.2d 	1265. 	The
process 	of 	referring 	the 	case 	to 	an 	auditor
and resolving any exceptions to the auditor’s
report 	is 	collateral 	to 	the 	foreclosure
proceeding, 	and 	thus 	it 	does 	not 	affect 	the
finality of an order ratifying the foreclosure
sale.
Huertas v. Ward, 248 Md.App. 187, 205–06 (2020).
In 	this 	case, 	the 	state 	court 	ratified 	the 	foreclosure 	sale
of the Property on February 26, 2025. 	This ratification terminated
Ms. 	Robinson’s 	interest 	in 	the 	Property. 	See 	Laney, 	379 	Md. 	at
539. 	As 	a 	result, 	when 	Ms. 	Robinson 	later 	filed 	a 	bankruptcy
petition, the Property was not a part of the bankruptcy estate and
therefore 	not 	covered 	by 	the 	automatic 	stay. 	See 	Scott, 	429
Fed.App’x at 230; Singh, 417 F.Supp.3d. at 701.
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Ms. 	Robinson 	raises 	two 	arguments 	to 	support 	her 	continued
interest in the Property. 	First, she cites to Houck v. Substitute
Trustee Services, Inc., a case decided by the United States Court
of 	Appeals 	for 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	involving 	an 	alleged 	violation
of an automatic stay over a property in North Carolina. 791 F.3d.
473, 476 (4 th Cir. 2015). 	Plaintiff cites Houck for the proposition
that conduct of various actors in the foreclosure can be relevant
to a stay violation question. 	(ECF No. 8, at 11–12). 	The relevance
of that case is unclear.
Second, Ms. Robinson points to filings withdrawn by Appellant
that 	she 	argues 	”created 	a 	contradiction 	requiring 	clarification
or 	findings” 	by 	the 	Bankruptcy 	Court. 	(ECF 	No. 	6, 	at 	4). 	Ms.
Robinson’s 	interest 	in 	the 	Property, 	however, 	was 	terminated
months earlier by the ratification of the foreclosure sale and was
unaffected 	by 	later 	bankruptcy 	proceedings. 	Thus, 	those 	events
are not relevant to a violation of the automatic stay.
The 	Bankruptcy 	Court 	correctly 	held 	that 	state 	court’s
ratification 	of 	the 	foreclosure 	sale 	“divested 	completely” 	Ms.
Robinson 	of 	her 	interest 	in 	the 	Property. 	(ECF 	No. 	1-1, 	at 	2).
Consequently, the Property was not a part of the March 3 bankruptcy
estate and was not protected by the automatic stay. 	This holding
did 	not 	require 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	because 	it 	rested 	on 	the
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undisputed fact that the state court ratified the foreclosure sale
before Ms. Robinson filed for bankruptcy.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the bankruptcy court
will be affirmed. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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