Anthony Derrell Barfield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
IN RE: ANTHONY DERRELL BARFIELD 	:
_________________________________
ANTHONY DERRELL BARFIELD 	:
Appellant 	:
v. 	: 	Civil Action No. DKC 26-1388
SELENE FINANCE LP, as servicer 	:
in fact for U.S. Bank Trust
National Association 	:
Appellee 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Anthony Derrell Barfield (“Mr. Barfield”), a debtor
in 	the 	underlying 	bankruptcy 	case, 	appeals 	from 	the 	order 	of
Bankruptcy Judge Maria Ellena Chavez-Ruark, denying his motion to
compel turnover of property. 	(ECF No. 1-1). 	The issues have been
briefed, 	and 	the 	court 	now 	rules, 	no 	hearing 	being 	deemed
necessary. 	Local Rule 105.6. 	For the following reasons, the order
of the bankruptcy court will be affirmed.
I. 	Background
Mr. Barfield filed his motion to compel turnover of property
on 	September 	4, 	2025, 	pursuant 	to 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 542 	in 	the 	United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. 	Mr. Barfield
sought 	entry 	of 	an 	order 	compelling 	U.S. 	Bank 	Trust 	National
Association 	(“U.S. 	Bank 	Trust 	NA”) 	to 	turnover 	“all 	collateral,
securities, 	and 	cash, 	along 	with 	all 	reserve 	assets,
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investments[,] 	and 	securities 	purchased 	therefrom” 	as 	identified
in two alleged deposit slips. 	(ECF No. 3-1). 	Mr. Barfield later
filed an amendment to his motion, which included three additional
exhibits. 	(ECF No. 3-3). 	No entity has responded in a filing to
Mr. Barfield’s (1) September 4, 2025 motion to compel turnover; or
(2) February 11, 2026 amended motion.
The 	bankruptcy 	court 	first 	considered 	Mr. 	Barfield’s 	motion
at 	a 	February 	17, 	2026 	status 	conference. 	The 	bankruptcy 	court
heard 	further 	argument 	at 	a 	March 	23, 	2026 	hearing, 	at 	the
conclusion 	of 	which 	Judge 	Chavez-Ruark 	denied 	Mr. 	Barfield’s
motion 	to 	compel 	turnover. 	The 	ruling 	was 	memorialized 	in 	a
written order entered on April 6, 2026. 	(ECF No. 1-1, at 1 (stating
that 	“[a]t 	the 	March 	23, 	2026 	hearing, 	the 	Court 	determined 	that
the 	Debtor 	is 	not 	a 	banking 	institution 	and 	that 	Debtor[’]s
Exhibits 1 and 2 are not valid and enforceable documents.”)).
A 	few 	days 	later 	(April 	9), 	Mr. 	Barfield 	filed 	a 	notice 	of
appeal 	to 	this 	court. 	Mr. 	Barfield 	filed 	a 	brief 	in 	support 	of
his appeal on June 25. 	(ECF No. 10). 	Appellee Selene Finance LP
(“Selene 	Finance”), 	servicer 	in 	fact 	for 	U.S. 	Bank 	Trust 	NA, 	has
not 	filed 	a 	brief. 	In 	his 	appellate 	brief, 	Mr. 	Barfield 	argues
that his motion to compel turnover
was 	denied 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	the 	bankruptcy
court’s 	opinion 	as 	to 	“items” [] 	listed 	on 	a
“deposit 	slip” 	by 	the 	Appellant 	not
constituting a “deposit” which has no basis in
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regards to the application of 11 U.S.C. § 542,
under which the motion was brought forward by
the Appellant and to the “items listed on the
deposit slip” that were deemed as “property of
the 	estate” 	to 	be 	turned 	over 	to 	the 	trustee
and/or 	debtor 	in 	possession 	in 	accordance 	to
11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
(ECF No. 10, at 5).
II. 	Standard of Review
Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	158(a), 	a 	district 	court 	has 	jurisdiction
over an appeal from “final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . of
bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the
bankruptcy judges” pursuant to section 157 of the same title. 	28
U.S.C. 	§ 158(a). 	A 	bankruptcy 	judge’s 	ruling 	on 	a 	motion 	for
turnover 	may 	constitute 	a 	final 	order 	that 	is 	appealable 	as 	of
right. 	See In re Lents, 644 B.R. 479, 488 (Bankr.D.S.C. 2022); In
re 	Pro. 	Ins. 	Mgmt., 	285 	F.3d 	268, 	281 	(3 d 	Cir. 	2002) 	(quoting 	In
re 	Moody, 	817 	F.2d 	365, 	366 	(5 th 	Cir. 	1987) 	(“Following 	the 	lead
of 	every 	circuit 	court 	that 	has 	considered 	the 	question 	directly
or 	indirectly, 	we 	hold 	that 	a 	bankruptcy 	court’s 	turnover
order . . . is a final order and hence appealable as of right.”).
Generally, 	in 	an 	appeal 	from 	a 	bankruptcy 	court, 	a 	district
court reviews conclusions of law de novo and findings of fact for
clear 	error. 	Ekweani 	v. 	Thomas, 	574 	B.R. 	561, 	567 	(D.Md. 	2017)
(citing 	In 	re 	Taneja, 	743 	F.3d 	423, 	429 	(4 th 	Cir. 	2014)). 	“A
finding is clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing the record,
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the 	reviewing 	court 	is 	left 	with 	‘a 	firm 	and 	definite 	conviction
that 	a 	mistake 	has 	been 	committed.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Klein 	v.
PepsiCo, Inc., 845 F.2d 76, 79 (4 th Cir. 1988)).
In 	an 	appeal 	of 	an 	order 	in 	which 	a 	bankruptcy 	court 	has
exercised its equitable powers, however, the standard of review is
abuse 	of 	discretion. 	In 	re 	Massenburg, 	554 	B.R. 	769, 	773 	(D.Md.
2016) 	(applying 	abuse 	of 	discretion 	standard 	of 	review 	in 	appeal
of 	ruling 	of 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	denying 	debtor’s 	motion 	for
turnover); 	see 	Walker 	v. 	Weese, 	286 	B.R. 	294, 	299 	(D.Md. 	2002)
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 542) (“Commanding turnover is at the very root
of the bankruptcy court’s equitable powers.”)). 	“‘The question is
not 	how 	the 	reviewing 	court 	would 	have 	ruled, 	but 	rather 	whether
a 	reasonable 	person 	could 	agree 	with 	the 	bankruptcy 	court’s
decision; if reasonable persons could differ as to the issue, then
there is no abuse of discretion.’” 	In re Massenburg, 554 B.R. at
773 	(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	In 	re 	M.J. 	Waterman 	&
Assocs., Inc., 227 F.3d 604, 608 (6 th Cir. 2000)).
III. Analysis
The 	relevant 	turnover 	provision 	of 	the 	bankruptcy 	code, 	11
U.S.C. § 542(a), states:
Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of
this 	section, 	an 	entity, 	other 	than 	a
custodian, in possession, custody, or control,
during the case, of property that the trustee
may 	use, 	sell, 	or 	lease 	under 	section 	363 	of
this 	title, 	or 	that 	the 	debtor 	may 	exempt
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under section 522 of this title, shall deliver
to the trustee, and account for, such property
or 	the 	value 	of 	such 	property, 	unless 	such
property 	is 	of 	inconsequential 	value 	or
benefit to the estate.
11 	U.S.C. 	§ 542(a). 	Mr. 	Barfield 	argues 	that 	he 	acted 	as 	a
depositor at the time he filled out the alleged deposit slips and
thereby 	makes 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	that 	the 	items 	listed 	on 	them
“are the property of the Appellant and consequently the estate and
are being held by the Appellee.” 	(ECF No. 10, at 7).
Whatever 	nuances 	make 	implementation 	of 	§ 542 	problematic,
the 	fundamental 	element, 	missing 	in 	this 	case, 	is 	that 	it 	only
applies 	to 	“property.” 	As 	found 	by 	Judge 	Chavez-Ruark, 	Mr.
Barfield utterly failed to provide any credible evidence that the
items he identifies are, in fact, property, as opposed to figments
of 	his 	imagination. 	Upon 	a 	review 	of 	the 	record, 	the 	factual
findings 	made 	by 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	do 	not 	give 	rise 	to 	a 	firm
and 	definite 	conviction 	that 	a 	mistake 	has 	been 	committed.
Additionally, a reasonable person could agree with the bankruptcy
court’s decision. 	Accordingly, Judge Chavez-Ruark’s order will be
affirmed.
Mr. 	Barfield’s 	testimony 	at 	the 	two 	hearings 	on 	his 	motion,
as 	well 	as 	the 	alleged 	deposit 	slips 	and 	affidavit 	submitted 	in
support 	of 	his 	motion, 	do 	not 	pass 	muster. 	At 	the 	February 	17,
2026 	hearing, 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	asked 	Mr. 	Barfield 	about 	the
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origin 	of 	the 	alleged 	deposits 	and 	Mr. 	Barfield 	suggested 	that
they relate to a “first time mortgage” and have been “moved around
several times.” 	(ECF No. 8, 4:9-16). 	Appellee Selene Finance is
the 	servicer 	of 	the 	loan 	and 	U.S. 	Bank 	Trust 	NA 	is 	the 	holder.
(See 	id. 	at 	4:17-20). 	Mr. 	Barfield 	went 	on 	to 	describe 	how 	the
purported 	deposit 	slips 	in 	Debtor’s 	Exhibit 	1 	state 	that, 	among
other things, Mr. Barfield’s signature and social security number
were 	deposited. 	(Id. 	at 	5:23-6:10). 	Mr. 	Barfield 	also 	affirmed
that 	he 	believes 	that 	these 	items 	and 	his 	“original 	loan
application 	where 	[he] 	applied 	for 	a 	loan 	ha[ve] 	cash 	value,” 	as
noted on the face of the alleged deposit slips. 	(See id. at 6:1-
18; see also ECF No. 6-1, at 9, 11).
During the bankruptcy court’s questioning of Mr. Barfield at
the March 23, 2026 hearing, Mr. Barfield confirmed that he drafted
a “certificate of deposit” that was attached to “the deposit slip
in 	duplicate”—and 	that 	it 	was 	“not 	issued 	by 	the 	bank,” 	but 	was
instead “issued by [Mr. Barfield]” himself. 	(ECF No. 9, at 10:16-
25). 	Mr. Barfield further testified that he “put a CUSIP number”
on 	the 	deposit 	slip, 	which 	he 	“got 	from 	the 	fund 	manager.” 	(Id.
at 	11:15-12:2). 	Later 	on, 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	stated 	to 	Mr.
Barfield, “[y]ou are using a lot of banking terms and you want the
Court to believe that you are a banking institution, that there is
a 	CUSIP 	number 	assigned 	to 	your 	note 	and 	that 	your 	signature 	has
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value. On what are you basing all of this?” 	(Id. at 13:5-9). 	Mr.
Barfield did not supply support for his arguments except mere ipse
dixit. 	(Id. 	at 	13:10-12). 	At 	the 	close 	of 	the 	hearing, 	the
bankruptcy 	court 	described 	Mr. 	Barfield’s 	motion 	as 	“gibberish”
and wondered aloud “whether [Mr Barfield] actually truly believes
[he] 	is 	a 	banking 	institution 	or 	if 	[he 	is] 	just 	trying 	to 	be
creative and find a way to get out of repaying a loan of hundreds
of thousands of dollars that was made to [him] so that [he] could
buy 	the 	property.” 	(Id. 	at 	17:4-9). 	The 	bankruptcy 	court
ultimately 	determined 	that 	Mr. 	Barfield’s 	alleged 	deposit 	slips
were 	“fake 	documents . . . 	[and] 	are 	not 	legally 	binding.” 	(Id.
at 	17:12-17). 	As 	detailed 	above, 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	did 	not
appear to arrive at this conclusion lightly.
Upon 	review 	of 	the 	record 	and 	Debtor’s 	Exhibit 	1 	and 	2 	that
were 	admitted 	into 	evidence 	at 	the 	March 	23, 	2026 	hearing 	in
particular, 	none 	of 	Mr. 	Barfield’s 	supplied 	materials 	amount 	to
credible 	evidence 	that 	the 	requested 	property 	exists 	so 	that 	it
might 	be 	part 	of 	the 	bankruptcy 	estate 	and 	support 	a 	request 	for
turnover under § 542(a). 	Overall, the bankruptcy court’s factual
findings do not leave one with a firm and definite conviction that
a mistake has been committed, and a reasonable person could agree
with the bankruptcy court’s decision.
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IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the bankruptcy court
will be affirmed. 	A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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