Hakuzimana v. EPIC Enterprises, Inc

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Case 1:26-cv-10754-WGY Document19_ Filed 02/19/26 Page1ofi11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

JEAN CLAUDE HAKUZIMANA,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

Vv. NO. 26-10754-WGY

EPIC ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendant.

ere ee ee ee ee ee ee ee

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, D.J. February 19, 2026

In this case -- trying for efficiency -- the Court made the
rookie mistake of holding a hearing on a motion for equitable
relief without having before it the complaint upon which such
relief is allegedly warranted. Now, having reviewed the
Plaintiff, Jean Claude Hakuzimana’s (“Hakuzimana”) First Amended
Complaint, it becomes clear that I’ve put the cart before the
horse.

For the reasons stated below, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii), the sole federal claim is DISMISSED. The
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
state-law claims, which supplemental claims are DISMISSED
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (3). The Clerk
is directed to enter a separate order of dismissal and close the

case.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

Case 1:26-cv-10754-WGY Document19_ Filed 02/19/26 Page 2of11

I BACKGROUND

Hakuzimana, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings
this action against EPIC Enterprises, Inc. (“EPIC”), alleging
that it unlawfully rescinded his offer of employment. See
Compl., ECF i.

The Court initially screened the complaint, issued a
summons, and ordered Hakuzimana to file an amended complaint by
March 3, 2026.1 See Order, ECF No. 5. The Court also ordered
that a hearing on Hakuzimana’s emergency motion for a temporary
restraining order take place on February 17, 2026. Id.

At the hearing, the Court collapsed the motion into a trial
on the merits pursuant to Rule 65(a), as is its usual practice,
and set an expedited trial date, agreeable to the parties, for
March 3, 2026.

As the Court had effectively dismissed the original
complaint by ordering an amended complaint, the Court inquired

when the amended complaint would be filed. Hakuzimana informed

1 Hakuzimana’s complaint was subject to mandatory screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (“Section 1915”) because he is
proceeding in forma pauperis. See Order, ECF No. 5. Section
1915 requires federal courts to dismiss a complaint sua sponte
if the claims therein, among other things, fail to state a claim
on which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any
time if the court determines that ... the action. .. fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted[.]”). In
conducting this review, courts liberally construe the complaint.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

2

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the Court that his amended complaint could be filed by the end
of the day. The Court ordered the amended complaint to be filed
by 4:00 p.m. Hakuzimana timely filed the First Amended
Complaint. See First Am. Compl. & Jury Demand (“FAC”), ECF No.
14.

This Court is required pursuant to Section 1915 to screen
the FAC because Hakuzimana is proceeding in forma pauperis. See
n. 1, supra. Upon screening, this Court concludes for the
reasons set forth below, that Hakuzimana has failed to plausibly
plead a claim upon which relief can be granted under federal
law, and therefore all federal claims must be dismissed. As
such, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining claims and dismiss those claims
without prejudice, cancel the trial and close the case.

II. FACTS ALLEGED

The following facts are taken from the FAC and documents
attached to it and the original complaint, and credited as true
for purposes of this review.

On January 20, 2026, EPIC offered Hakuzimana the position
of Quality Control Supervisor. FAC ¢ 5. As part of the on-
boarding process, Hakuzimana was required to pass a background
check, a physical and drug testing, which he did. See Letter,

Compl., Ex. 1-1 5.

Case 1:26-cv-10754-WGY Document19_ Filed 02/19/26 Page4of11

While at his physical, Hakuzimana disclosed “medical use of
marijuana” and certain prescription medications. FAC § 6.

The medical report, attached to the FAC, indicated “Urine Drug
Screen: Fail . . . THC”, though he was “medically cleared for
employment (FIT FOR WORK) .” FAC, Ex. A, ECF No. 14-1; see FAC
7. The parties do not appear to dispute that the drug screen
indicates a positive test for marijuana.

On February 6, 2026, EPIC rescinded the offer, according to
Hakuzimana, “falsely claiming a Background Check failure.” FAC
q 8. The February 6, 2026 letter, attached to the original
complaint, is not specific as to the grounds for the recission.
The letter does not define whether the failure was the
Background Check, the physical or drug screening:

Dear Jean Claude,

As stated in the offer letter you received from EPIC

Enterprises, Inc., offers of employment are contingent

upon several factors, including but not limited to

successfully passing a background check, physical &

drug screening. With your authorization, a background

check was performed. Based on the information we

received, you did not meet the necessary criteria.

EPIC Enterprises, Inc. has therefore determined to

rescind the offer of employment for the position of

2nd shift Quality Supervisor.

Please refer to the Disclosure and Authorization Form

you signed for details about requesting addit ional

information, how to dispute incomplete or inaccurate

information, and rights that you have related to
background checks and other screenings.

Case 1:26-cv-10754-WGY Document19_ Filed 02/19/26 Page5of11

Compl., Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1 4 (emphasis added). On February 9,
2026, Epic’s Human Resources Manager purportedly “admitted the
background check was ‘not the determining factor’ and that the
decision was based upon a blanket drug free policy.” FAC q 8.
The February 9, 2026 communication from Epic, in fact, confirms
that in fact the basis for recission was the positive drug
screen. See FAC, EX. B 6, ECF No. 14-2.

The remaining facts concern an incident on February 12,
2026, when Hakuzimana attempted to serve Epic by personally
delivering copies of the relevant documents to Epic, claiming
that he was threatened with arrest, disparaging comments about
his hygiene were made, and his Certificate of Service was
“confiscated.” FAC 9 10. Finally, Hakuzimana claims that
certain evidence in opposition to the motion for temporary
restraining order is brought in bad faith -- again Hakuzimana
states that Epic’s “own representatives admitted on February 9,
2026, that the background check was not the reason for the
recission.” FAC q 11.

IItT. ANALYSIS

On the above facts, Hakuzimana claims three causes of

action:

Count I - State Law Disability Discrimination under
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B

Count II - Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(15 U.S.C. § 1681b)

Case 1:26-cv-10754-WGY Document19_ Filed 02/19/26 Page6ofi11

Count III - Retaliation and Obstruction of Justice for
purported harassment and intimidation while serving
process in this action.
See FAC ¥§ 12-15. As set forth below, the federal claims under
fail. Those claim being dismissed, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remainder of the

claims, which are dismissed without prejudice.

A. The FCRA Claim (Count II) Fails to State a Federal Claim
and is Dismissed

The FCRA claim fails as matter of law. The FCRA provides
in pertinent part with respect to employment use and
notification:

(3) Conditions on use for adverse actions

(A) In general

Except as provided in subparagraph (B),? in using a

consumer report for employment purposes, before taking

any adverse action based in whole or in part on the
report, the person intending to take such adverse

action shall provide to the consumer to whom the

report relates--

(i) a copy of the report; and

(ii) a description in writing of the rights of the

consumer under this subchapter, as prescribed by the

Bureau under section 1681g(c) (3) of this title.

15 U.S.C. 1681b(b) (3) (A). Presuming Hakuzimana has standing to

sue under this provision, see Azeez v. Lifespan Corp., 635 F.

2 Subparagraph (B) is inapplicable, inasmuch as that provision
deals with positions over which the Secretary of Transportation
has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours.
Id. § 1681b(b) (3) (B).

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Supp. 3d 75, 86 (D.R.I. 2022) (ruling as matter of first
impression that employee has standing to sue for failure to
provide report before taking adverse action), the claim fails on
the merits. Here, there are no plausibly pleaded allegations in
the FAC that “any adverse action was taken based in whole or in
part on the report.” See id. § 1681b(b) (3) (A). Rather, the FAC
alleges the opposite: that the recission was based solely upon
the alleged drug screening. FAC 4§ 8,9, and 11. Accordingly,
where Epic took no adverse action based upon the background
check, the FCRA claim fails as matter of law and is DISMISSED

with prejudice. See Goddard v. Slickdeals, LLC, No. 25-CV-06187-

JSC, 2025 WL 2969722, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2025) (“Because
the FCRA only requires notice for adverse actions ‘based in
whole or in part’ on information contained in a consumer report,
Plaintiff does not state an FCRA claim against Apple.”), appeal
dismissed, No. 25-6741, 2025 WL 4076405 (9th Cir. Nov. 21,
2025).

B. Retaliation and Obstruction of Justice Claims (Count III)
Fail to State a Federal Claim and are Dismissed

Hakuzimana claims “retaliation,” “intimidation”, and
“obstruction of justice” with respect to his improper in-person
attempt to make service of filings in this case. Hakuzimana’s
claims concerning the incident relating to his attempt to serve
EPIC on February 12, 2026 does not raise any plausibly pleaded

federal claims of retaliation.

Case 1:26-cv-10754-WGY Document19_ Filed 02/19/26 Page 8of11

Furthermore, although Hakuzimana does not identify any
statute, “[t]o the extent the complaint asserts a claim for
obstruction of justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1503, [he] cannot
bring a civil lawsuit based upon the alleged violation of a
federal criminal statute” because “[a] private citizen ‘‘has no
authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution,’ nor to
seek other relief based on alleged violations of federal

criminal statutes.’” Bouvier v. Fusaro, 799 F. Supp. 3d 34, 38

(D. Mass. 2025) (quoting Diaz v. Perez, No. 16-11860-RGS, 2016

WL 6871233, at *5 (D. Mass. Nov. 21, 2016)). Accordingly, to
the extent that Count III is construed to seek relief under
federal law, it is DISMISSED.

C. The Court Discerns No Americans with Disabilities Act

Claims Based Upon Positive Marijuana (THC) Test and Use.

The Court observes that the FAC assert federal jurisdiction
in part under the “ADA,” which this Court interprets as the
Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
There is no plausibly pleaded federal claim under the ADA.

The FAC alleges at most that Hakuzimana was discriminated
against on the basis of his alleged use of medical marijuana.
FAC ¥{ 9 (decision to rescind based upon drug-free policy), 12
(state law discrimination). While the First Circuit has not
ruled on this issue, other courts have ruled that medical

marijuana is not covered under the ADA because under federal law

Case 1:26-cv-10754-WGY Document19_ Filed 02/19/26 Page9of11

medical marijuana is an illegal drug. See James v. City of

Costa Mesa, 700 F.3d 394, 405 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We hold ... that

the ADA does not protect medical marijuana users who claim to
face discrimination on the basis of their marijuana use.”);

Beckman v. Collier Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, No. 2:24-

CV-585-JES-DNF, 2026 WL 91580, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2026);

Zimmerman v. Health Network Laboratories, L.P., No. 5:24-CV-

01142, 2025 WL 457100, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2025) (observing
that federal “district courts that have directly engaged the
issue of whether an individual who is prescribed medical
Marijuana can state a prima facie case under the ADA for
discrimination based on marijuana use consistent with their
prescription have concluded that they cannot.”) (collecting
cases).

Indeed, “[t]he ADA is an anti-discrimination statute that
exempts the use of illegal drugs from its scope of protection.
Beyond doing so, the ADA does not preclude the States from
regulating employers who discriminate against employees who
engage in the medicinal use of drugs in compliance with state

law.” Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co. LLC, 273 F. Supp.

3d 326, 338 (D. Conn. 2017). As here, “this dynamic will
continue to raise interesting questions of federalism and
conflict preemption as state legislatures explore marijuana's

efficacy in medical treatment.” Zimmerman, 2025 WL 457100, at *

Case 1:26-cv-10754-WGY Document19_ Filed 02/19/26 Page 10of11

4. Thus, while Hakuzimana may have different rights under

Massachusetts law, see Barbuto v. Advantage Sales and Mktg.,

LLC, 477 Mass. 456, 464 (2017), -- a point on which this Court
has no opinion -- there is no ADA claim where the continued use
of medical marijuana cannot be the basis of a reasonable
accommodation under federal law. In any event, there is no ADA

claim pleaded.

D. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c) (3)

“In a federal-question case, the termination of the
foundational federal claim does not divest the district court of
power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction but, rather, sets
the stage for an exercise of the court's informed discretion.”

Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256-57

(lst Cir. 1996); See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (3). The Court “must
take into account concerns of comity, judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and the like.” Id. at 257. “It is the
usual case that where all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial, the balance of factors will point toward declining
to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”

Vazquez-Velazquez v. Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation

Auth., 73 F.4th 44, 53 (lst Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
So it is here. The sole pleaded FCRA federal claim has

been dismissed at the earliest stage of the litigation, and

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there are no factors that favor retention of purported state-law

claims. See Kenn v. Eascare, LLC, 483 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36 (D.

Mass. 2020) (Burroughs, J.) (declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law discrimination claim under Mass.
Gen. Laws. ch. §151B after FCRA dismissed). Accordingly, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
state law claims and they are DISMISSED but without prejudice.
IV. CONLCUSION
After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions,
and for the reasons set forth above, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii), the sole federal claim is DISMISSED, and
after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
state-law claims, the supplemental claims are DISMISSED without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (3). The Clerk is
directed to enter a separate order of dismissal and close the
case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ William G. Young
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
JUDGE

of the
UNITED STATES;

3 This is how my predecessor, Peleg Sprague (D. Mass 1841-1865),
would sign official documents. Now that I’m a Senior District
Judge I adopt this format in honor of all the judicial
colleagues, state and federal, with whom I have had the
privilege to serve over the past 47 years.

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