Nguyen v. Moniz et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_______________________________________
)
QUOC TIEN VAN NGUYEN, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
) 	Civil Action No.
v. 	) 	26-cv-10741-FDS
)
ANTONE MONIZ, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
_______________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
SAYLOR, J.
This is a habeas petition that concerns the government’s authority to redetain a noncitizen
on supervised release following a final order of removal.1 Petitioner Quoc Tien Van Nguyen
legally entered the United States in 1990 or 1991. He was ordered removed to Vietnam in 2002
following a state criminal conviction. However, because the United States did not have a
repatriation agreement with Vietnam at the time, he was released under an order of supervision.
In 2020, the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Vietnam for the
1 The petition names Antone Moniz, Superintendent, Plymouth County Correctional Facility; Jospeh D.
McDonald, Jr., Sheriff, Plymouth County Correctional Facility; David Wesling, Acting Director of the Boston Field
Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Michael Krol, New England Special Agent in Charge for
Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Todd Lyons, Acting Director, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Kristi Noem, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, as respondents.
The Court notes that Moniz and McDonald, as “the person[s] who ha[ve] custody over [the petitioner],” are the only
possible proper respondents. 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 696 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[A]n alien
who seeks a writ of habeas corpus contesting the legality of his detention by the INS normally must name as the
respondent his immediate custodian, that is, the individual having day-to-day control over the facility in which he is
being detained.”); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (“[I]n habeas challenges to present physical
confinement—‘core challenges’—the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where
the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.”). The Court will
therefore dismiss the claims against the other respondents.
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repatriation of Vietnamese citizens like petitioner who arrived in the United States prior to 1995.
Five years later, in November 2025, ICE took petitioner into custody. ICE began the process of
requesting his travel documents from Vietnam following his detention.
Petitioner contends that his redetention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and its implementing
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, in addition to his Fifth Amendment right to due process. Because
the Court agrees that his redetention violates ICE’s own regulation, the petition will be granted.
I. 	Background
A. 	Factual History
Petitioner Quoc Tien Van Nguyen was born in Vietnam in 1976. (Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 1). He
immigrated to the United States with his immediate family in 1990 or 1991 under Amerasian
status. (Id. ¶ 3). He and his family have resided in Massachusetts since. (Id.). At some point,
he was convicted of a crime in state court. The nature of the crime is not set forth in the record.
His sentence apparently included a term of probation, because in 2001 he was given a custodial
sentence for violating probation. (Id. ¶ 4). The nature of that violation is likewise not set forth in
the record. Consequently, he was transferred to immigration custody, placed into removal
proceedings, and ordered removed to Vietnam in 2002. (Id. ¶ 5).
At the time, the United States and Vietnam did not maintain diplomatic relations.
Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 146, 146 (D. Mass. 2025). Accordingly, about one month after
the entry of his final removal order, Nguyen was released on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”).
(Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 6). In the early 2010s, he had what he describes as “other brushes with the state
criminal system,” on which he does not elaborate. (Id. ¶ 7). Nonetheless, his release under the
OSUP was not terminated. (Id.). He has been in full compliance with his OSUP since at least
2021. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13).
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In 2008, the United States and Vietnam entered into a repatriation agreement. Nguyen,
788 F. Supp. 3d at 147. That agreement, however, did not include Vietnamese citizens like
Nguyen who had entered the United States before July 12, 1995. Id. In 2020, the United States
and Vietnam entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“the 2020 MOU”) to facilitate the
repatriation of those citizens. Id. at 148. Nonetheless, “individuals must meet specific
requirements listed in the MOU before Vietnam will issue travel documents,” and “[t]he
Vietnamese government makes the ultimate decision about whether to issue travel documents
and has significant discretion in its decision.” Huynh v. Wesling, 2026 WL 183467, at *1, 6 (D.
Mass. Jan. 23, 2026). There is no evidence that ICE took any steps to repatriate Nguyen in the
years immediately following the 2020 MOU.
Then, on November 20, 2025, Nguyen was taken into custody when he reported for a
check-in to the ICE field office in Burlington, Massachusetts. (Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 14). According to
his affidavit, ICE officers informed him that he was being redetained “because the current
presidential administration decided Vietnam was going to accept deported people.” (Id. ¶ 14).
The ICE officers did not convey any information specific to his situation nor provide him an
opportunity to ask questions or explain why Vietnam would be unlikely to accept him. (Id.
¶ 15). The petition further alleges that he has never been issued a written Notice of Revocation
of Release. (Dkt. No. 6 ¶ 30).
Nguyen was then transferred to Plymouth County Correctional Facility in Plymouth,
Massachusetts, where he remains detained. (Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 17). During his first three days
there, ICE requested that he sign a piece of paper to receive a Vietnamese passport. (Id. ¶ 18).
About one month later ICE further requested that he complete a detailed self-declaration form to
obtain travel documents. (Id. ¶ 19). He listed his only living relative in Vietnam as his uncle,
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although he does not know his uncle’s whereabouts. (Id. ¶ 21). From that timeline, it appears
that ICE did not begin the process of requesting his passport and travel documentation until after
Nguyen was detained.
B. 	Procedural History
On February 11, 2026, petitioner filed, through counsel, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. No. 1).2 The petition contends that his redetention
without an individualized determination is in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and its
implementing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. (Dkt. No. 6 ¶¶ 40-43). It also alleges that his
redetention is in violation of his due-process rights. (Id. ¶¶ 44-49). Petitioner seeks immediate
release subject to the terms of his OSUP at the time of his redetention; a declaration that his
redetention violates his Fifth Amendment rights and is void; and attorney’s fees and costs
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Id. at 15-16).
The next day, the Court ordered that petitioner not be moved outside this District without
prior notice until further order of the Court. (Dkt. No. 4).
On February 20, 2026, respondents answered the petition. (Dkt. No. 8). They submitted
an abbreviated response and requested to proceed without additional briefing or argument. The
response maintains that “the legal and factual issues presented in this Petition appear similar to
those examined by multiple other sessions of this Court to include Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp.
3d 144 (D. Mass. 2025); Huynh v. Wesling, 2026 WL 183467 (D. Mass. Jan. 23, 2026); and Tran
v. Hyde, 2025 WL 3724853 (D. Mass. Dec. 24, 2025),” and that, “if this Court adheres to the
reasoning of the other sessions of this Court, a similar result is likely in this case.” (Id. at 1-2).
2 An amended petition correcting inconsistent identification of the petitioner was filed on February 19,
2026. (Dkt. No. 6).
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That is, “release from detention pursuant to an Order of Supervision after determining ICE had
failed to present the necessary evidence to demonstrate that removal to Vietnam was likely in the
foreseeable future.” (Id. at 2). Respondents “rely upon, and incorporate by reference, the legal
arguments presented in [those] cases.” (Id.).
II. 	Statutory Framework
The detention of noncitizens with final orders of removal is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
Under § 1231(a)(2)(A), a noncitizen must be detained for the 90-day removal period after the
entry of the final order “so that the government may carry out the noncitizen’s removal.” Kong
v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 620 n.12 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2);
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 683 (2001)). “However, the connection between executing a
removal order and detaining a noncitizen unravels if the noncitizen is not removed within that
ninety-day window, especially when, as in this case, the noncitizen has been released with
supervision.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3), (6)). As the First Circuit has explained, under
the implementing regulation, “once a noncitizen has been granted supervised release, that release
can only be revoked upon a showing that because of changed circumstances there is now a
‘significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)). That is, “ICE’s own
regulation require[es] (1) an individualized determination (2) by ICE that, (3) based on changed
circumstances, (4) removal has become significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Id. at 620-21. That “determination must be conducted prior to re-detention.” Huynh, 2026 WL
183467, at *3 (citing cases). Moreover, ICE carries the burden of proving that removal was
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Tran, 2025 WL 3724853, at *2
(citing cases).
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The regulation lays out factors for ICE to consider in deciding whether changed
circumstances exist. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f). “Courts considering a challenge to re-detention
must review ICE’s determination ‘in light of’ those same factors.” Huynh, 2026 WL 183467, at
*3 (quoting Kong, 62 F.4th at 620). Those factors include, but are not limited to, (1) the history
of the noncitizen’s efforts to comply with the removal order, (2) the history of ICE’s efforts to
remove noncitizens generally to the country in question or to third countries, (3) the ongoing
nature of ICE’s efforts to remove the individual noncitizen, (3) the reasonably foreseeable results
of those efforts, and (5) the views of the Department of State regarding the prospects for removal
of noncitizens to the country in question. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f). Furthermore, while “there is no
presumptive period of time within which the [noncitizen’s] removal must be
accomplished, . . . the prospects for the timeliness of removal must be reasonable under the
circumstances.” Id.
III. 	Analysis
For the reasons that follow, this Court concludes that the redetention of petitioner violates
8 C.F.R. § 241.13.
According to petitioner, ICE officers informed him that he was being detained “because
the current presidential administration decided Vietnam was going to accept deported people.”
(Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 14). Indeed, in the three cases that respondents incorporate by reference, the
government maintained that the 2020 MOU along with recent success repatriating pre-1995
Vietnamese citizens constituted the requisite “change of circumstances.”3 It is doubtful whether
those facts alone establish a change of circumstances given that ICE apparently made no effort in
3 In those cases, the petitioners had also taken some steps to request travel documents shortly before being
detained. See Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 148-49; Tran, 2025 WL 3724853, at *1; Huynh, 2026 WL 183467, at *2.
Here, petitioner did not complete the passport or self-declaration form until after his detention.
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the five years following the 2020 MOU to repatriate petitioner. Nor is it clear that they represent
an individualized determination. Nevertheless, the Court need not decide so today, as
respondents have not shown that petitioner, at the time of his detention, was reasonably likely to
be removed in the foreseeable future.
One factor favors respondents. In Huynh v. Wesling, the government submitted evidence
of its “successful recent history of removing noncitizens to Vietnam . . . who entered prior to
1995.” 2026 WL 183467, at *5. Of 296 travel document requests submitted in 2025, 207 had
been granted and the noncitizens removed. Id.
The other factors, however, heavily weigh in favor of petitioner. There is no evidence
that petitioner has ever been noncompliant or attempted to obstruct the removal order.
Moreover, at the time of his detention, ICE had apparently not initiated a request for petitioner’s
Vietnamese passport or travel documents. The fact that petitioner was not asked to complete a
self-declaration until a month into his detention suggests that ICE was not even prepared to
initiate such a request. There is therefore no evidence that ICE made any effort to remove
petitioner prior to his detention other than the decision to detain him. Since ICE made no effort
to remove petitioner, the reasonably foreseeable result of its efforts was that petitioner would not
be removed.
Even if ICE had initiated the travel documents request, the Vietnamese government still
exercises significant discretion over the issuance of such documents. Some sort of
individualized evidence therefore may be necessary to show that Vietnam was likely to grant
such a request. See Huynh, 2026 WL 183467, at *6 (“The lack of individualized evidence is
particularly relevant in this case, because Petitioner has a criminal history, no living relatives in
Vietnam, and no physical address in Vietnam.”).
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Finally, the Court notes that, at the time of filing, petitioner had been redetained for 83
days—nearly the length of mandatory detention during the statutory 90-day removal period
following entry of a final removal order. He has now been in custody for longer. The fact that
petitioner was not removed—nor, it seems, even had his request for travel documents
approved—within the time period that Congress deemed reasonable to effectuate removal is
further evidence that the “the prospects for the timeliness of [petitioner’s] removal [was not]
reasonable under the circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f).
Thus, there was not a “significant likelihood that [petitioner] w[ould] be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). His redetention is in violation of ICE’s
own regulation and thus “in violation of the . . . laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3); see Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (“ICE, like any agency, has the duty to follow
its own federal regulations.” (quoting Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D. Mass.
2017))). The Court will therefore grant his petition. Accordingly, at this stage, the Court does
not reach petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claims.
That leaves the question of petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to
the Equal Justice Act. In relevant part:
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other
expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),
including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the
United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances
make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The government bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that its position was “substantially justified.” Saysana v. Gillen, 614 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2010). In their abbreviated answer, respondents did not address petitioner’s request for fees
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and costs. The Court will therefore give respondents an opportunity to respond to that request
within 14 days of the issuance of this order.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
is GRANTED. Respondents Antone Moniz and Joseph McDonald, Jr., are hereby ORDERED to
immediately release petitioner pursuant to the conditions in his preexisting Order of Supervision.
The claims against respondents David Wesling, Michael Krol, Todd Lyons, and Kristi Noem are
DISMISSED. The remaining respondents shall respond to petitioner’s request for fees and costs
within 14 days.
So Ordered.
/s/ F. Dennis Saylor IV
F. Dennis Saylor IV
Dated: February 26, 2026 	United States District Court Judge
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