Blidgen v. Braintree Public Schools

UNITED STATES DISTRICT CO
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
EUSIDA BLIDGEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRAINTREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant.
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Civil Action 25-cv-12329-IT
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 17, 2025
TALWANI, D.J.
Plaintiff Eusida Blidgen (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se, brings this action against
Braintree Public Schools and certain school administrators, directors, teachers, and others,
alleging that they have violated her rights and those of her children. Now before the court are
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 16], Addendum thereto [Doc. No. 17], and Letter to
the Court—Exhaustion of Remedies [Doc. No. 18]. Also pending are Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reasonable Accommodation [Doc. No. 12], Motion for Emergency Relief [Doc. No. 13], and
Emergency Motion for Immediate Relief [Doc. No. 16].1 For the reasons set forth below, the
court will require Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint if she chooses to pursue this
lawsuit and will deny the pending motions without prejudice.
1 Each of these documents includes the name of one or more of Plaintiff’s children and has been
placed under seal by the court to protect the children’s privacy. Plaintiff is directed as to all
further filings that any reference to her minor children may only include the children’s initials
and not their full name. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5.2(a).
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I. 	Plaintiff’s Claims in the Amended Complaint, Addendum, and Letter to the Court
Plaintiff filed the amended complaint in response to the court’s October 6, 2025 Order
[Doc. No. 10]. In that order, the court found that Plaintiff’s original complaint did not contain
sufficient well-pleaded allegations to give Braintree Public Schools, the sole Defendant,
adequate notice of the claims against it or to allow the court to draw the inference that Braintree
Public Schools had violated the laws under which Plaintiff sought relief. Id. at 6. The court
directed Plaintiff that if she wished to pursue this lawsuit, she was required to file an amended
complaint curing these pleading deficiencies. Id. at 6, 9. The court also explained that any claim
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) could not be asserted in court
unless Plaintiff met the statute’s administrative exhaustion requirement. Id. at 7. The court
explained further that Plaintiff could not litigate on behalf of her children. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff brings the amended complaint “individually, and as parent/next friend of” her
four minor children, and as the “friend of” one child who is eighteen years old. Am. Compl. 1
[Doc. No. 16]. She names as defendants Braintree Public Schools, seventeen individual
employees of the Braintree Public Schools, and Braintree Public Schools’ private attorney.
The amended complaint is divided into eight sections. Section I of the amended
complaint is titled “Plaintiff – Eusida Blidgen (Mother and Plaintiff, Disability
Accommodation).” Id. at 2. Plaintiff brings four claims in this section. First, Plaintiff alleges that
in Fall 2023, her “first encounter with hostility occurred during school drop-off, related to a
parking spot dispute.” Id. She continues: “Staff were aggressive despite Plaintiff having a
handicap placard.” Id. Plaintiff maintains that this conduct violated her rights under Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq., and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Am. Compl. 2 [Doc. No. 16].
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Second, Plaintiff alleges that, on November 7, 2024, a “[r]ecording [was] denied” at a
meeting concerning the Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) of one of her minor children
“despite Plaintiff’s disability accommodation request.” Id. Plaintiff claims that this conduct
violated her rights under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the IDEA. Id. Third, Plaintiff
alleges that on May 1, 2025, Braintree Public Schools “imposed a communication ban across all
schools, citing a TikTok narration video without notice or hearing.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that this
conduct constituted “free speech retaliation” in violation of the First Amendment, the ADA, and
the IDEA. Id. Fourth, Plaintiff claims that “[r]epeatedly, documents were sent to wrong emails or
withheld” in violation of the IDEA and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(“FERPA”), 22 U.S.C. § 1232g. Am. Compl. 2 [Doc. No. 16].
Sections II-VI two through six concern alleged injuries to Plaintiff’s children, including
the failure to call an ambulance when two of her children suffered concussions during a fight in
the school cafeteria, racial harassment, and failing to provide the Plaintiff’s preschool-age child
with adequate support. Id. at 2-3.
In Section VII, entitled “Pattern of Retaliation and Collusion,” Plaintiff alleges that
Braintree Public Schools “misused waiver forms to hold [meetings concerning] IEPs without
[her]” in violation the IDEA, engaged in a “[r]epeated surveillance of Plaintiff’s child pickups;
harassment emails,” in violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203.
Am. Compl. 4 [Doc. No. 16]. Plaintiff also claims that two school principals “perpetuated
misconduct,” and that when Plaintiff “begged [a superintendent] to stop harassment . . . he
dismissed her, stating, ‘your chain of events does not add up to theirs.’” Id. Plaintiff asserts that
this alleged misconduct “shows systemic collusion” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Am.
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Compl. 4 [Doc. No. 16]. Section VIII is Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, in which she seeks injunctive
and declaratory relief and damages. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff attached to the amended a complaint a letter dated August 25, 2025, that she
received from the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
(“DESE”). Letter [Doc. No. 16-1]. In this letter, DESE states its Problem Resolution System
Office (“PRS”) received her complaint alleging that she was “denied an accommodation to
record” two IEP meetings in 2024 and 2025, and that “the District retaliated against [Plaintiff] by
issuing a communication protocol following the posting of a Tik Tok video, which limited [her]
participation in IEP meetings.” Id. at 1. DESE states that the denial of a recording
accommodation was addressed in five different “Letter[s] of Closure” issued earlier in August
2025. Id. DESE informs Plaintiff that “PRS decisions are final and may not be appealed,” but
that she could seek a “due process hearing” through Bureau of Special Education Appeals”
(“BSEA”). Id. at 2. DESE states that “the BSEA’s due process hearing decision would be
binding on the parties and may be appealed.” Id.
In her addendum to the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the individual
Defendants, while acting under color of state law, “denied [her] meaningful participation in her
children’s education and retaliated against her advocacy, including district wide communication
restrictions and deletion or withholding of IEP recordings[.]” Addendum 1 [Doc. No. 17].
Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants “tolerated, minimized, and failed to remediate” racial
harassment of her children. Id.
In Plaintiff’s letter to the court, she represents that she has “exhausted all available
remedies before bringing this matter to federal court.” Letter 1 [Doc. No. 18]. Plaintiff states that
she made complaints to or otherwise sought assistance from DESE, the police department, the
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mayor’s office, Braintree Public Schools, Braintree Public Schools superintendents, the Office
for Civil Rights, and the Massachusetts Office for Children with Disabilities. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff
represents that she also unable obtain legal counsel even though she contacted “attorneys across
the region.” Id. at 1. According to Plaintiff, “[m]any refused, citing the District’s wealth,
influence, reputation,” and “[o]thers required prohibitively high retainers.” Id.
II. 	Discussion
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must comply with Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that a complaint include a “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). The “short and plain” statement of the claim must provide a defendant with “fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)).
To “show that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief,” the complaint must “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true” to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). Id. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555). Similarly, “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” do
not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the well-pleading allegations must
“sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” N.R. by & through S.R. v. Raytheon Co.,
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24 F.4th 740, 746 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir.
2008)).
A. 	Claims for Injuries to Plaintiff’s Children
As the court explained in its October 6, 2025 order, Plaintiff may not bring claims in her
own name based on injuries to her children. Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a claim in Sections II-
VI upon which she is entitled to relief.
In addition, Plaintiff cannot bring claims on behalf of her children unless she is a licensed
attorney. Plaintiff may only serve as “parent/next friend” to her minor children in litigation only
if she is represented by an attorney. See Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906
F.2d 59, 61–62 (2d Cir.1990); see also Local Rule 83.5.5(b) (“[a]n individual appearing pro se
may not represent any other party[.]”).
B. 	FERPA
“Congress enacted FERPA under its spending power to condition the receipt of federal
funds on certain requirements relating to the access and disclosure of student educational
records.” Gonzago Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278 (2002). The statute “directs the Secretary of
Education to withhold federal funds from any public or private ‘educational agency or
institution’ that fails to comply with these conditions.” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)).
However, FERPA limits its enforcement to the Secretary of Education. FERPA does not contain
a provision explicitly allowing enforcement by a private individual through a lawsuit, and the
Supreme Court has found that FERPA does not contain an implied private right of action. Id. at
290; see also Doe v. W. New England Univ., 228 F. Supp. 3d 154, 176 n.20 (D. Mass. 2017)
(“FERPA does not provide either a private cause of action or rights that are enforceable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.” (citing Gonzago Univ., 536 U.S. at 287-88)).
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Thus, even assuming Plaintiff has adequately pled that a Defendant violated FERPA, she
cannot obtain any relief under that statute.
C. 	IDEA
“The IDEA offers states partial federal funding for special education of children with
qualifying disabilities.” Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Schs., 906 F.3d 182, 185 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)). “In exchange, states receiving IDEA funds commit to providing all of those
disabled children within their jurisdiction “a free appropriate public education ('FAPE') in the
least restrictive environment possible.” Id. (quoting Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist.,
685 F.3d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 2012)).
The “IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights,” Winkelman ex rel.
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007), so Plaintiff may bring a claim
under the IDEA on her own behalf. However, “[t]he IDEA requires exhaustion -- i.e., resort to
the administrative process -- before a plaintiff may bring a civil action pursuant to other federal
laws protecting the rights of disabled children if the relief sought is from the denial of a free
appropriate public education.” Doucette v. Georgetown Pub. Schs., 936 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir.
2019) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)). “The administrative process culminates in an impartial due
process hearing conducted by the state educational agency or the local educational agency, as
determined by the state.” Id. at 18-19 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)). “In Massachusetts, the
impartial due process hearings are conducted by the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education
Appeals [‘BSEA’].” Id. at 19 n.1 (citing M.G.L. ch. 71B, § 2A); see also 603 C.M.R. § 28.08(5)
(setting forth procedures for hearings in front of the BSEA).
In her filings, Plaintiff indicates that she has sought relief through the DESE. See Letter
[Doc. No. 16-1]. That informal procedure does not fulfill the IDEA exhaustion requirement,
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however. As DESE has explained, Plaintiff may seek a “due process hearing” through the BSEA.
Id. at 2. Because Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that she exhausted her remedies as required by
the IDEA, she has failed to state a claim for judicial relief under that statute.
D. 	ADA
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A “qualified individual with a disability” is defined as “an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications . . . meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by
a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).2
An ADA claim which is “premised on a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation --
or, in other terminology, to make reasonable modifications . . . alleges that: (1) due to the
claimant’s disability, he needs an individualized change to a public entity’s facially neutral
policies, practices, or procedures if he is to effectively access some opportunity; but (2) the
public entity unjustifiably failed to make that change.” Sosa v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Corr., 80
F.4th 15, 31 (1st Cir. 2023) (footnote omitted).
Plaintiff identifies three scenarios in which the Braintree Public Schools allegedly failed
to accommodate her disabilities, but she has not adequate pled her claims of disability
2 Plaintiff also seeks relief under the Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The same standards
apply to claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. See Conlon v. Scaltreto, 158 F.4th
211, 226 (1st Cir. 2025).
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discrimination.3 Plaintiff claims that, in 2023, during school drop-off, she encountered
“hostility” “related to a parking related to a parking spot dispute,” and that “[s]taff were
aggressive despite Plaintiff having a handicap placard.” Am. Compl. 2 [Doc. No. 16]. However,
Plaintiff does not identify her disability, the accommodation she needed, and whether staff on the
scene “were on notice of a reasonable accommodation that would be necessary to prevent
discrimination.” Conlon v. Scaltreto, 158 F.4th 211, 226 (1st Cir. 2025); see also id. (“The
reasonableness of any accommodation necessarily takes account of both the context and the facts
and circumstances known to the officers when they acted.”). Plaintiff’s allegation concerning the
denial of the recording of an IEP meeting does not show how she was excluded from
participation in or was denied the benefits of the meeting.4 Plaintiff’s allegation that Braintree
Public Schools violated the ADA by “impos[ing] a communication ban across all schools, citing
a TikTok narration video without notice or hearing,” does not plausibly plead that she was
discriminated on the basis disability.
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12203. This
statute, which is applicable to all titles of the ADA, prohibits retaliation against any individual
because such individual asserted their rights under the ADA. Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged
that the defendants engaged in “[r]epeated surveillance of Plaintiff’s child pickups; harassment
emails,” because she had exercised her rights under the ADA.
3 For purposes of this order, the court assumes that Plaintiff’s claims under Title II of the ADA
concern her access to or participation in the “benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
4 An exhibit to one of Plaintiff’s Motion suggests that, on at least one occasion, Braintree Public
Schools provided her with a transcript of an IEP meeting and made the recording of the meeting
available to Plaintiff to view. Letter to School 24 [Doc. No. 14-1].
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E. 	First Amendment
Plaintiff’s allegation that Braintree Public Schools violated her rights under the First
Amendment rights by imposing a “communication ban” because she because she posted a video
on TikTok does not contain enough information to state a claim for relief. If Plaintiff wishes to
pursue this claim, she must include allegations that describe the content of the video, the nature
and scope of the “communication ban,” and who imposed the ban.
III. 	Filing of a Second Amended Complaint
If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with this action, she must file a second amended complaint
that cures the above-identified issues. In summary, Plaintiff may not (1) assert claims based on
injuries to her children on her own behalf or on their behalf; (2) seek relief under FERPA; or (3)
seek relief under the IDEA without first exhausting her administrative remedies in front of the
BSEA. In addition, in any claim under Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must clearly identify her
disability, the reasonable accommodation sought, how she requested this accommodation, and
the Defendant’s response any such requests. Plaintiff must also include additional allegations
detailing the “communication ban” if she wishes to bring a First Amendment claim based on that
ban. Plaintiff must also identify the facts entitling Plaintiff to relief as to each Defendant named.
Finally, Plaintiff shall use only initials, and not the names, of her minor children in all further
filings.
IV. 	Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby orders:
1. 	If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with this action, she must, within twenty-eight (28)
days file a second amended complaint in accordance with the above discussion.
2. 	In the absence of an operative complaint, the Motion for Reasonable
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Accommodation [Doc. No. 12], Motion for Emergency Relief [Doc. No. 13], and Emergency
Motion for Immediate Relief [Doc. No. 14] are DENIED.5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Indira Talwani
United States District Judge
Dated: December 17, 2025
5 The Motion for Reasonable Accommodation [Doc. No. 5] is also denied because, as the court
previously explained when Plaintiff filed the identical motion, see Mot. [Doc. No. 5], the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to federal courts, see
Order 2 [Doc. No. 9].
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