State of Washington et al v. Federal Emergency Management Agency et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-12006-RGS
STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.
v.
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, et al.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
December 11, 2025
STEARNS, D.J.
Plaintiffs State of Washington; Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
State of Arizona; State of California; State of Colorado; State of Connecticut;
State of Delaware; District of Columbia; State of Illinois; Office of the
Governor, ex rel. Andy Beshear, in his official capacity as Governor of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky; State of Maine; State of Maryland; State of
Michigan; State of Minnesota; State of New Jersey; State of New Mexico;
State of New York; State of North Carolina; State of Oregon; Josh Shapiro,
in his official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
State of Rhode Island; State of Vermont; and State of Wisconsin (collectively,
the States) bring this action against the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA); David Richardson, in his official capacity as Senior Official
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Performing the Duties of the Administrator of FEMA; the United States
Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Kristi Noem, in her official
capacity as Secretary of DHS; and the United States of America (collectively,
the Government) based on the alleged termination of FEMA’s Building
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) pre-disaster mitigation
program. 	In the ten-count Amended Complaint, the States accuse the
Government of violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 706(A)-(C), and several clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Before the court
are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Having reviewed the
briefing and hearing oral argument, the court will allow the States’ motion
and deny the Government’s motion.
BACKGROUND
The BRIC program provides “technical and financial assistance to
States 	and 	local 	governments 	for 	cost-effective 	pre-disaster 	hazard
mitigation measures that reduce injuries, loss of life, and damage and
destruction of property.” Pls.’ Statement of Material Facts (SMF) [Dkt # 103]
¶ 1; see also Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of Material Facts (Resp. to SMF)
[Dkt # 117] ¶ 1. 	It is the largest pre-disaster mitigation program offered
through FEMA, and is funded by direct Congressional appropriations, see
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), Pub. L. 117-58, 135 Stat, 429
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(2021), and set asides from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), see Stafford Act
§ 203(i), 42 U.S.C. § 5133(i).
FEMA makes BRIC financial assistance available during a given fiscal
year through a Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO). SMF ¶ 7; Resp. to
SMF ¶ 7. States and local governments apply through the NOFO for funding
for proposed hazard mitigation projects. FEMA then selects a subset of these
applications as deserving further consideration. 	Richardson Decl. [Dkt #
117-1] ¶ 8. Funding is not obligated when FEMA gives its initial approval to
an application; the parties must further negotiate with FEMA until a final
grant agreement is signed.1 SMF ¶ 6; Resp. to SMF ¶ 6. It may be months or
years before this occurs, as States and local governments must often
complete additional steps (e.g., obtaining permits and regulatory approval
from government agencies) before work on a mitigation project can begin.
SMF ¶ 5; Resp. to SMF ¶ 5.
On 	April 	2, 	2025, 	Cameron 	Hamilton, 	the 	then-Senior 	Official
Performing the Duties of the Administrator of FEMA, issued a memorandum
(the Hamilton Memo) intended to “provid[e] new direction for the BRIC
Program.” Admin. R. (A.R.) [Dkt # 96] at 43. Among other directives, the
1 The States do not dispute that FEMA has discretion over which
applications to select and give ultimate approval.
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memorandum specified that FEMA: (1) “will cancel the FY24 Notice of
Funding Opportunity (NOFO) for the BRIC grant program,” (2) “will [n]ot
award the BRIC projects selected but not yet awarded across all fiscal years,”
and (3) “will . . . [n]ot grant any additional period of performance extensions
on any BRIC projects, without [Hamilton’s] prior approval.” Id. at 43-44.
Two days later, on April 4, 2025, Hamilton issued a press release (the
April 4 Press Release) stating that “FEMA is ending the [BRIC] program” and
“will . . . immediately return[]” any funds which had not yet been distributed
“either to the Disaster Relief Fund or the U.S. Treasury.” A.R. at 55; see also
A.R. 63 (“On April 4, FEMA announced that it is ending the Building
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities Program.”); A.R. 67 (same).
Several FEMA Regional Administrators viewed the Hamilton Memo and the
April 4 Press Release as the official termination of the BRIC program and
notified their stakeholders accordingly.2 	See, e.g., Ezelle Decl. [Dkt # 104-
20], Ex. A; van Leeuwen Decl. [Dkt. # 104-21], Ex. A; Fenning Decl. [Dkt #
120-23], Ex. A; Higgins Decl. [Dkt # 104-25], Ex. A; Osborn Decl. [Dkt # 104-
26], Ex. A; Strickland Decl. [Dkt # 104-30], Ex. A; Rogers Decl. [Dkt # 104-
31], Ex. A; Bray Decl. [Dkt # 104-37], Ex. A; see also A.R. 48-50, 53 (labeling
2 Richardson similarly characterized the April 4 Press Release as
“announcing” that the BRIC program “was ending” in a May 16, 2025
memorandum to Secretary Noem. A.R. at 103.
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the Hamilton Memo a “directive” and providing Regional Administrators
with a “Rollout Timeline” for notifying stakeholders).
Consistent with the public statements, FEMA removed the FY 2024
NOFO from its website in April of 2025. 	Since that date, it has not issued
any replacement FY 2024 NOFO or a FY 2025 NOFO (effectively foreclosing
States and local governments from submitting new grant proposals), nor has
it obligated funding to projects previously identified for further review but
not formally awarded. SMF ¶¶ 45-48, 50, 52; Resp. to SMF ¶¶ 45-48, 50, 52.
FEMA also reversed the set-aside of funds previously allocated to BRIC in its
June 2025 DRF report.3 See Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of June
30, 2025 [Dkt # 9-19] at 4, 20; Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of
August 31, 2025 (August 2025 DRF Report) [Dkt # 104-12] at 4, 20; see also
Order [Dkt # 79]. FEMA has not, however, officially terminated any awarded
grants to date.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The court begins with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Acosta-Ramirez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 712 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.
3 FEMA has since returned the funds to the Mitigation Fund in
compliance with the court’s August 5, 2025 Order granting the States’
motion for a preliminary injunction.
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2013) (“Federal courts are obliged to resolve questions pertaining to subject-
matter 	jurisdiction 	before 	addressing 	the 	merits 	of 	a 	case.”). 	The
Government levels the same three challenges to the existence of jurisdiction
that it raised at the preliminary injunction phase of this litigation: ripeness,
standing, and sovereign immunity. Again, the court finds the Government’s
arguments unconvincing.
a. Ripeness
“Questions of ripeness that arise incident to challenged governmental
actions in the declaratory judgment context are gauged by means of a two-
part test.” Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 535
(1st Cir. 1995). “First, the court must consider whether the issue presented
is fit for review.” 	Id. 	The critical question is “whether the claim involves
uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated or may
not occur at all.” Id. at 536, quoting Massachusetts Ass’n of Afro-Am. Police,
Inc. v. Boston Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
Second, the court must “consider the extent to which hardship looms.” Ernst
& Young, 45 F.3d at 535. 	This inquiry is focused “on the judgment’s
usefulness.” 	State of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d
685, 693 (1st Cir. 1994). The court must ask “whether granting relief would
serve a useful purpose, or, put another way, whether the sought-after
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declaration would be 	of practical 	assistance 	in setting 	the 	underlying
controversy to rest.” Jensen v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Comm’n, ---
F.4th ----, 2025 WL 3280840, at *5 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 2025), quoting
Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 693.
The first prong is easily satisfied. 	Although the Government argues
that the States’ claims depend on a contingent future event – whether the
agency will in fact terminate the BRIC program – the evidence in the record
indicates that the decision to end the program has, for all practical purposes,
been made. The Hamilton Memo and the April 4 Press Release use language
indicative of a final decision – “is” and “will,” see A.R. 45, 55 – and FEMA
officials have consistently treated these pronouncements as binding during
the months that have ensued.4 	FEMA has, for example, cancelled the FY
2024 	NOFO 	as 	instructed, 	declined 	to 	obligate 	funds 	for 	any 	grants
previously selected but not yet awarded, failed to approve the transition of
any phased projects from Phase I (design) into Phase II (construction), and
attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to reverse the set-aside of more than $4
billion from the DRF to the Mitigation Fund. That FEMA has yet to formally
terminate any already-awarded grants does not convince the court that the
4 Richardson himself acknowledged that FEMA had “beg[u]n activities
to close out the BRIC program” in his May 16 memorandum. A.R. at 103.
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program’s future status remains up in the air.5
The 	second 	prong 	is 	also 	satisfied 	here. 	Even 	accepting 	the
Government’s assertion that it has not formally terminated any awarded
grants (and may not do so in the future), it cannot seriously be disputed that
the States face a “‘direct and immediate’ dilemma,” Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d
at 535, quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. EPA, 959 F.2d 360, 364 (1st Cir. 1992),
such that “granting relief would serve a useful purpose,” Narraganset, 19
F.3d at 693. 	A definitive decision from this court will allow the States to
make a responsible determination whether to proceed with their selected but
not yet awarded projects and will provide guidance whether to expect federal
mitigation funding opportunities in the future.
b. Standing
The standing inquiry has three elements. “First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an ‘injury in fact’–an invasion of a legally protected interest which
is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent.” Lujan v. Defs.
5 	Nor is the court swayed by the fact that the Government has
submitted six requests for information on selected but not yet awarded
projects (the seventh request identified by the Government pertains to an
already awarded grant, not a selected grant). This figure is well below what
would be expected over a seven-month period given historical trends and the
sheer number of existing selected projects (nearly seven hundred). 	In any
event, the Government does not contend that any of these requests led to a
selected grant being awarded.
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of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). “Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of.” 	Id. 	“Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to
merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable [court]
decision.’” Id. at 561, quoting Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rts. Org., 426
U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976).
The Government focuses on the first prong, arguing that the States
have not suffered any actual injury because they are not entitled to funding
for any non-awarded projects. But this is not literally true. The Stafford Act
and the IIJA guarantee each State an overall, if minimal, threshold of
mitigation funding each fiscal year. 	See Stafford Act § 203(f)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 5133(f)(2) 	($575,000 	or 	1% 	of 	total 	appropriations 	“shall” 	be 	made
available to each State); IIJA, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 135 Stat. at 1387 (requiring
the agency to offer $200 million in mitigation funding for each fiscal year
between 2022 and 2026). 	Thus, while FEMA has discretion whether to
award funding for any single grant, it lacks discretion to refuse to award any
funds to selected grants in a given fiscal year.
In any event, the States also allege that the shuttering of the BRIC
program has cost them the opportunity to pursue future benefits. 	Courts
have found similar injuries sufficient to create standing in the past. 	See CC
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Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[A]
plaintiff 	suffers 	a 	constitutionally 	cognizable 	injury 	by 	the 	loss 	of
an opportunity to pursue a benefit . . . even though the plaintiff may not be
able to show that it was certain to receive that benefit had it been accorded
the lost opportunity.”) (emphasis in original). 	The Government tries to
minimize this harm by contending that the funds remain available in the
Mitigation Fund for future use. 	But the record does not support this
contention. 	FEMA has repeatedly stated that it intends to return any
unspent IIJA funds to the Treasury. 	See, e.g., A.R. at 55 (“Approximately
$882 million of funding from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
will be returned to the U.S. Treasury or reapportioned by Congress in the
next fiscal year.”) (emphasis added); A.R. at 64 (same); A.R. at 102 (“The
remaining $854M will remain unspent.”) (emphasis added); A.R. at 104
(same). And as for the $4 billion in funding set aside for the BRIC program
from prior DRF appropriations, FEMA has already attempted to move that
money out of reach. That FEMA did not succeed in this attempt is only by
virtue of the court’s granting the States injunctive relief.
c. 	Sovereign Immunity
The court need pause but briefly on the issue of sovereign immunity.
The States do not challenge any discretionary authority possessed by FEMA
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over the decision whether to approve any specific grant application. On the
contrary, the thrust of the States’ claims is that FEMA lacked the discretion
to not act at all. The States’ claims thus fall outside the scope of 42 U.S.C. §
5148.
The Tucker Act is similarly inapplicable. The States do not allege that
FEMA 	breached 	any 	specific 	contract,6 	nor 	do 	they 	seek 	to 	compel
performance under or enjoin the termination of any contract. Their claims
are focused solely on whether the agency has the authority to shutter the
entire BRIC program.
d. Remaining Threshold Arguments
The 	Government 	raises 	three 	additional 	threshold 	challenges 	to
reviewability under the APA: (1) there has been no final agency action; (2)
the claims address action committed to agency discretion by law; and (3) this
action seeks to compel agency action that is not required by law. 	None of
these arguments is availing.
The first challenge is flatly contradicted by the record. The unequivocal
language used in the Hamilton-era pronouncements and the tangible steps
taken by FEMA to implement Hamilton’s directives (e.g., cancelling the FY
6 By the Government’s own account, it continues to pay all sums due
under existing grant agreements.
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2024 NOFO, attempting to redirect funds to the DRF, and failing to advance
any selected but not yet awarded projects) convince the court that a final
determination (sub silentio or not) has been made to end the BRIC program.
See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-178 (1997) (agency action is final if it
marks the consummation of the decision-making process and determines
rights and obligations from which legal consequences flow); see also Gen.
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 	(“[A]n agency
pronouncement will be considered binding as a practical matter if it . . . is
applied by the agency in a way that indicates it is binding.”).
The second and third arguments misconstrue the nature of the States’
claims. The States do not accuse FEMA of unreasonably denying funding for
any individual grant; they challenge only whether the agency had the
discretion to terminate the BRIC program altogether. In that vein, their
requested 	relief 	is 	for 	an 	injunction 	enjoining 	the 	allegedly 	unlawful
termination of the program. They do not ask the court to compel the agency
to exercise its discretion in a particular way (e.g., awarding specific projects),
nor do they ask the court to monitor FEMA’s day-to-day conducting of
business.
II. 	Summary Judgment
a. Termination of the BRIC Program
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The States argue that the termination of the BRIC program is unlawful
under §§ 706(2)(A)-(C) of the APA, violates the separation of powers, and
violates the Appropriations and Spending Clauses because it contravenes
Congressional mandates in three ways.7 The court addresses each in turn.
1. 	Substantial Reduction of Mitigation Functions (Counts I, II,
and IX)
First, the States argue that the Government lacked discretion to
terminate the BRIC program because mitigation is one of FEMA’s core
responsibilities, 	see 	6 U.S.C. §§ 313(b)(1), 313(b)(2), 314(a)(9)(A), and
Congress 	has 	explicitly 	prohibited 	the 	agency 	from 	“substantially 	or
significantly reduc[ing] . . . the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of
the Agency or the capability of the Agency to perform those missions,
authorities, responsibilities, except as otherwise specifically provided in an
Act enacted after October 4, 2006.” 6 U.S.C. § 316(c)(1) (footnote omitted).
The court agrees.
The BRIC program is the largest pre-disaster mitigation program
offered 	through 	FEMA. 	Its 	summary 	termination 	(without 	the
7 Because the claims implicate constitutional considerations (whether
the Executive Branch can terminate a program despite a Congressional
mandate or spend funds in a manner not authorized by Congress at the time
of appropriation), the court rejects the Government’s suggestion that the
separation of powers and Appropriations and Spending Clauses claims are
simply APA claims in a constitutional disguise.
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implementation of any replacement program through which states and local
governments can obtain mitigation funding) undoubtedly qualifies as a
substantial reduction of FEMA’s mitigation responsibilities within the scope
of § 316. The Government does not persuasively argue otherwise,8 nor does
it 	identify 	any 	Congressional 	Act 	authorizing 	FEMA 	to 	abandon 	its
mitigation duties. It follows that the termination of the BRIC program was
unlawful.
2. Repurposing of Funds (Counts III, IV, and IX)
The States next argue that the Government lacked discretion to
terminate the BRIC program because one of the planned steps in the
termination is to channel funds previously set aside for the BRIC program to
post-disaster relief grant programs. Again, the court agrees.
The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act 2024 provides that “no
funds shall be reprogrammed within . . . appropriations . . . to increase or
8 At best, the Government asserts that operations have not ceased
because the funding is still available. But it cannot reasonably be disputed
that, by refusing to obligate any of the funds in the Mitigation Fund to
previously selected projects or to provide States with the opportunity to
apply for new projects, the agency’s mitigation responsibilities have been
reduced from prior levels. 	That mitigation funding may be restored in the
future does not negate the violation taking place now.
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decrease 	funding 	for 	grant 	programs.”9 	Further 	Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-47, § 503(d)(2), 138 Stat. 460, 615
(2024). 	Reprogramming 	funds 	includes 	“shifting 	funds 	within 	an
appropriation or fund account to use them for purposes other than those
contemplated at the time of appropriation.” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off.,
GAO-05-734SP, A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process 85
(2005), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-05-734sp.pdf.
At the time of each BRIC appropriation, Congress contemplated that
FEMA would (as it promised) dedicate these funds to the BRIC program (as
evidenced by the agency’s budget requests to Congress). 	To now redirect
those funds to post-disaster relief grant programs as the Government
apparently intends (and, indeed, has attempted) to do, would unlawfully
shift funds within an appropriation to decrease funding for BRIC grants and
increase funding for post-disaster relief grants. The termination accordingly
9 The Stafford Act also appears to limit the discretion of the executive
branch to redirect funds once they are allocated to the BRIC program. 	See
42 U.S.C. § 5133(f)(3). 	The Government disputes this point, arguing that
another subsection authorizes it to shift funds to post-disaster relief grants.
See § 5133(i)(3) (stating that any amount set aside from the DRF for the BRIC
program “shall not reduce the amounts otherwise made available for” post-
disaster relief grants). 	But to interpret that subsection as the Government
proposes leads to a nonsensical result: It would prevent set-aside funds from
ever being used for their nominal mitigation purposes because use of the
funds for mitigation would necessarily always reduce the amounts available
for post-disaster relief grants.
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violates the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act 2024.
3. Withholding of Funds (Counts V, VI, IX, and X)
Third, the States argue that the termination of the BRIC program is
unlawful because it has caused FEMA to withhold funds appropriated for
BRIC grants. Here, too, the court finds in the States’ favor.
The Stafford Act requires FEMA to provide each State with a certain
minimum amount of mitigation funding for each fiscal year. 	The IIJA
further requires FEMA to make $200 million available for each fiscal year
between 2022 and 2026. 	Because FEMA ceased implementing the BRIC
program, it has not provided the States with the minimum level of funding
mandated by statute for fiscal years 2024 or 2025, nor has it made available
the $200 million appropriated in the IIJA for these years.10 	Its actions are
therefore unlawful.
a. Remaining Claims
Although the court recognizes the doubts about the legality of the
appointment 	of 	Hamilton 	and 	Richardson 	in 	their 	vaguely 	defined
governance roles, given its holding and its reluctance to issue what might
10 	The 	Government’s 	deferral 	argument, 	even 	if 	not 	waived, 	is
unavailing. The delay in providing States with these funds is intentional, not
the result of some inevitable bureaucratic red tape.
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fairly be thought to be an advisory opinion,11 the court declines to address
the merits of the States’ Appointments Clause argument.
III. 	Permanent Injunction
The States seek the entry of a permanent injunction enjoining the
termination of the BRIC program (at least as currently structured). 	A
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction
must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are 	inadequate 	to 	compensate 	for 	that 	injury; 	(3) 	that,
considering the balance of the hardships between the [parties], a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
will not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Lopez-Freytes, 522 F.3d 136, 148 (1st Cir. 2008),
quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
Here, the States have met their burden of showing irreparable harm for
which monetary damages would provide inadequate compensation. 	The
Stafford Act and IIJA entitle the States to a certain measure of funding for
mitigation projects each fiscal year. 	The agency indisputably has not
provided the States with that funding, and while the Government suggests
that the States “could theoretically receive reimbursement for BRIC awards
11 Hamilton and Richardson have both since resigned from the position
of Senior Official Performing the Duties of FEMA Administrator. 	Karen
Evans is now Senior Official Performing the Duties of FEMA Administrator.
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if they prevail on their claims,”12 Opp’n [Dkt # 116] at 40, monetary damages
will not remedy hardships caused by the delay in accessing the funds. Some
projects have expired while the BRIC program has remained terminated
(which has also had the effect of rendering the relevant States and local
governments ineligible for certain post-disaster relief grants), while others
have lost access to secondary sources of funding or had stakeholders drop
out in the face of uncertainty. These harms threaten the very existence of the
States’ projects and cannot be compensated with damages.
The States have also shown that the balance of hardship and public
interest factors tilt in their favor. 	There is an inherent public interest in
ensuring that the government follows the law, and the potential hardship
accruing to the States in the absence of an injunction is great. 	The BRIC
program is designed to protect against natural disasters and save lives. 	It
need not be gainsaid that the imminence of disasters is not deterred by
bureaucratic obstruction.
Any potential hardship to the Government, in contrast, is minimal.
The States do not ask the court to compel the agency to award any specific
12 	The 	court 	entertains 	doubts 	that 	monetary 	relief 	will 	remain
available absent an injunction. 	Nothing would prevent the agency from
repurposing funds set aside for the BRIC program, as it previously attempted
to do. And once any repurposed funds are spent elsewhere, they cannot be
recovered for the BRIC program.
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grants, nor do they ask the court to enjoin the agency from replacing the
BRIC program in the future with a different mitigation program. Nor do they
seek to prevent the Secretary of Homeland Security, as the overseeing
executive of FEMA, from recommending to Congress that the BRIC program
be abolished. The States’ requested relief is to enjoin the cancellation of the
BRIC program as it is currently constituted by an act of Congress.
In 	sum, 	this 	is 	not 	a 	case 	about 	judicial 	encroachment 	on 	the
discretionary authority of the Executive Branch. 	This is a case about
unlawful 	Executive 	encroachment 	on 	the 	prerogative 	of 	Congress 	to
appropriate funds for a specific and compelling purpose, and no more than
that.
ORDER
For the forgoing reasons, the States’ motion for summary judgment is
ALLOWED 	and 	the 	Government’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	is
DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in the States’ favor on Counts I-VI
and IX-X.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns___ 	_____
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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