In Re Application for Order Enforcing a Subpoena

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
EXCHANGE UNION COMPANY;
SHANGHAI HUIYIN GROUP CO.
LTD.; SHANGHAI SHENGYI
INFORMATION NETWORK CO.,
LTD.; and WO WEI
DONG,
Petitioners.
No. 24-mc-91645-ADB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON TERENCE J. CULVER AND JESSICA
DINEEN’S RENEWED MOTION TO INTERVENE
CABELL, U.S.M.J.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Wo Wei Dong (Wo) and three of his companies (the Applicants)
initiated 	this 	action 	by 	filing 	an 	ex 	parte 	application 	for
judicial assistance under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (section 1782) to obtain
documents 	from 	Fidelity 	Digital 	Asset 	Services, 	LLC; 	Fidelity
Brokerage 	Services, 	LLC; 	FMR, 	LLC; 	and 	National 	Financial
Services, LLC (Fidelity), for use in a foreign proceeding pending
in the Republic of Singapore. 	Upon review of the application, the
presiding judge allowed the discovery (“the December 2024 Order”),
which 	resulted 	in 	subpoenas 	being 	served 	on 	Fidelity. 	The
subpoenas sought, inter alia, documents from accounts held in the
name of Terrence J. Culver (Culver) and/or his wife, Jessica Dineen
(Dineen).
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Pending 	before 	the 	court 	is 	a 	motion 	filed 	by 	Culver 	and
Dineen (the Movants) to intervene to vacate the December 2024 Order
authorizing the Applicants to serve the subpoenas. 	More precisely,
the 	Movants 	seek 	to 	intervene 	to 	file 	a 	motion 	to 	quash 	the
subpoenas 	to 	prevent 	the 	disclosure 	of 	financial 	information 	in
seven of their financial accounts. 	(D. 115).
The Applicants oppose the motion and express a willingness to
limit the subpoenas to one of the seven Fidelity accounts, namely
Culver’s 	“personal 	investment 	account.” 	(D. 	49, 	pp. 	1-2) 	(D.
118). 	Hence, the parties agree that the only remaining account in
dispute 	is 	Culver’s 	personal 	investment 	account.1 	(D. 	116) 	(the
Movants stating “The only remaining account in dispute in dispute
is 	a 	wholly 	personal 	investment 	account 	registered 	to” 	Culver);
(D. 118) (the Applicants referring to “the sole account remaining
at issue”); (D. 66-1, ¶ 2(g)) (listing the seven accounts with one
being the “Personal Investment account in the name of Terrence J.
Culver”). 	For 	the 	reasons 	that 	follow, 	the 	court 	will 	allow 	the
motion to intervene as to Culver but deny it as to Dineen.
1 Because the Applicants no longer seek financial information in the accounts
jointly registered to Dineen and Culver, the Applicants correctly maintain that
there is no information related to her that is at risk of disclosure via the
subpoenas. 	See 	(D. 	66-1) 	(listing 	the 	seven 	accounts 	and, 	as 	to 	Dineen,
identifying 	only 	accounts 	jointly 	registered 	to 	Dineen 	and 	Culver).
Accordingly, the discussion primarily addresses Culver as opposed to Dineen.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 contemplates two types of
intervention: 	intervention 	as 	of 	right 	under 	Rule 	24(a) 	and
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).
Intervention as of right requires the following:
(i) 	the 	timeliness 	of 	[the] 	motion 	to 	intervene; 	(ii) 	the
existence 	of 	an 	interest 	relating 	to 	the 	property 	or
transaction that forms the basis of the pending action; (iii)
a 	realistic 	threat 	that 	the 	disposition 	of 	the 	action 	will
impede 	[the 	intervenor’s] 	ability 	to 	protect 	that 	interest;
and (iv) the lack of adequate representation of its position
by any existing party.
R 	& 	G 	Mortg. 	Corp. 	v. 	Fed. 	Home 	Loan 	Mortg. 	Corp., 	584 	F.3d 	1, 	7
(1st Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). 	The failure of the
prospective 	intervenor 	to 	fulfill 	any 	one 	of 	these 	prerequisites
forecloses [the putative intervenors’] ability to intervene as of
right under Rule 24(a). 	Id. (citations omitted).
Permissive 	intervention 	provides 	that: 	“On 	timely 	motion,
the court may permit anyone to intervene who . . . has a claim or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law
or fact.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 	Apart from these considerations,
district 	courts 	may 	“consider 	‘almost 	any 	factor 	rationally
relevant’” 	to 	a 	motion 	to 	intervene. 	Commonwealth 	of 	Mass. 	v.
United 	States 	Dep’t 	of 	Health 	and 	Human 	Servs., 	289 	F. 	Supp. 	3d
259, 265 (D. Mass. 2018) (quoting Daggett v. Comm’n on Governmental
Ethics and Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 113 (1st Cir. 1999)).
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For 	instance, a 	court 	“is 	free 	to 	consider 	whether 	the 	applicants
may 	be 	helpful 	in 	fully 	developing 	the 	case, 	and 	whether 	more
parties would complicate matters unnecessarily.” 	(D. 72) (quoting
T-Mobile 	Ne. 	LLC 	v. 	Town 	of 	Barnstable, 	969 	F.3d 	33, 	41-42 	(1st
Cir. 	2020)) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	The 	“court’s
discretion to grant or deny motions for permissive intervention is
very broad.” 	T-Mobile, 969 F.3d at 42 (1st Cir. 2020); accord (D.
72).
With 	respect 	to 	both 	types 	of 	intervention, 	the 	court 	“must
consider 	whether 	the 	intervention 	will 	unduly 	delay 	or 	prejudice
the 	adjudication 	of 	the 	original 	parties’ 	rights.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ.
P. 	24(b)(3); 	accord 	(D. 	72). 	Intervention 	as 	of 	right 	and
permissive 	intervention 	also 	require 	a 	“timely 	motion” 	to
intervene. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), 24(b).
As to the requirement of a timely motion, “case law reflects
four 	factors 	that 	inform 	the 	timeliness 	inquiry: 	(i) 	the 	length
of 	time 	that 	the 	putative 	intervenor 	knew 	or 	reasonably 	should
have 	known 	that 	his 	interests 	were 	at 	risk 	before 	he 	moved 	to
intervene; 	(ii) 	the 	prejudice 	to 	existing 	parties 	should
intervention 	be 	allowed; 	(iii) 	the 	prejudice 	to 	the 	putative
intervenor 	should 	intervention 	be 	denied; 	and 	(iv) 	any 	special
circumstances 	militating 	for 	or 	against 	intervention.” 	Id. 	at 	7
(citation 	omitted). 	These 	timeliness 	factors 	are 	“appraised 	in
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light of the posture of the case at the time the motion is made.”
Id. 	In 	general, 	“A 	motion 	to 	intervene 	is 	timely 	if 	it 	is 	filed
promptly after a person obtains actual or constructive notice that
a 	pending 	case 	threatens 	to 	jeopardize 	his 	rights.” 	Id. 	at 	8
(citations omitted).
As 	discussed 	below, 	permissive 	intervention 	is 	warranted.
The 	facts 	are 	therefore 	culled 	to 	address 	the 	requirements 	of
permissive intervention.
III. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 14, 2025, the presiding judge allowed a request by Doe
I 	and 	Doe 	II 	(Doe 	Intervenors) 	for 	permissive 	intervention. 	(D.
72). 	In 	so 	doing, 	she 	determined 	that 	their 	motion 	to 	quash 	the
“subpoena 	and 	accompanying 	arguments 	will 	certainly 	share 	common
questions of law or fact with the other motions to quash that are
forthcoming in this action . . . .” 	(D. 72). 	Simultaneously, the
presiding 	judge 	denied 	the 	Movants’ 	March 	5 	and 	March 	26, 	2025
motions 	to 	intervene. 	(D. 	66, 	73, 	102). 	She 	did 	so 	because 	the
Movants 	“seemingly” 	filed 	the 	motions 	in 	“flagrant 	disregard 	for
the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	and 	this 	district’s 	local
rules.” 	(D. 102). 	The nature of the violations consisted of not
filing a supporting memorandum, citing non-existent rules of civil
procedure, 	and 	misrepresenting 	the 	meet 	and 	confer 	process 	by
attaching 	an 	unsent 	email. 	(D. 	102). 	In 	the 	same 	ruling, 	the
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court 	stated 	that 	that 	despite 	the 	Movants’ 	failure 	to 	properly
move 	to 	intervene, 	the 	“Movants 	could 	have 	a 	colorable 	claim 	for
intervention, 	whether 	permissive 	or 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	right.” 	(D.
102).
Stepping back, on January 17, 2025, Fidelity notified Culver
that it had received subpoenas in connection with the section 1782
action. 	(D. 84-5). 	In that vein, all four subpoenas request “All
Documents and Communications related to any other account or assets
owned, in the name of, or otherwise associated with . . . Terence
John Culver . . . .”). 	(D. 3-3 to 3-6). 	Culver did not file the
motion 	to 	intervene 	until 	five 	and-a-half 	months 	after 	the
notification, 	i.e., 	on 	June 	19. 	The 	subpoenas 	also 	request
documents 	maintained 	in 	any 	account 	in 	the 	name 	of 	Smart 	River
Investment Limited (“SRIL”).2
IV. 	DISCUSSION
The 	Applicants 	argue 	that 	the 	Movants’ 	history 	of 	filing
improper 	motions 	to 	intervene 	militates 	against 	allowing
permissive 	intervention. 	Relatedly, 	they 	contend 	that 	allowing
permissive intervention will lead the Movants to file a motion to
quash the subpoenas, a motion for a protective order, and a motion
2 SRIL as well as the Doe Intervenors move to quash the subpoenas. 	(D. 76, 77).
To 	date, 	there 	is 	no 	ruling 	on 	these 	motions, 	a 	fact 	that 	is 	germane 	to
timeliness.
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for 	in 	camera 	review. 	This, 	in 	turn, 	along 	with 	the 	addition 	of
the Movants as parties, will delay the section 1782 proceeding and
waste 	judicial 	resources, 	according 	to 	the 	Applicants. 	The
Applicants 	argue 	further 	that 	because 	parties 	lack 	standing 	to
object 	to 	subpoenas 	directed 	to 	other 	parties, 	the 	Movants 	lack
standing. 	Lastly, 	having 	limited 	the 	disclosure 	of 	documents 	to
a 	single 	Fidelity 	account 	held 	by 	Culver, 	the 	Applicants 	assert
that 	Dineen 	fails 	to 	explain 	why 	her 	intervention 	is 	necessary.
(D. 118, pp. 9-10). 	To state the obvious, the Applicants maintain
they need the information in Culver’s account to ascertain if the
account contains assets related to the claims in the section 1782
proceeding. 	(D. 118, p. 6).
The Movants submit that the subpoenas seek disclosure of their
personal 	financial 	information, 	including 	banking 	and
transactional 	records. 	Such 	information, 	so 	they 	contend,
implicates their privacy and confidentiality interests.
They also assert that their motion is timely. 	In that regard,
they 	were 	unaware 	of 	the 	subpoenas 	targeting 	their 	financial
information until Fidelity notified them on January 17. 	(D. 116).
Acting 	diligently 	thereafter, 	the 	Movants 	contend 	they 	retained
new 	counsel 	and 	filed 	the 	prior 	motions 	to 	intervene. 	They 	also
point 	out 	that 	the 	motions 	to 	quash 	filed 	by 	SRIL 	and 	the 	Doe
Intervenors 	(D. 	76, 	77) 	remain 	outstanding. 	Hence, 	they 	reason
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that 	allowing 	intervention 	at 	this 	juncture 	will 	not 	delay 	a
resolution 	of 	the 	motions 	to 	quash. 	In 	addition, 	they 	maintain
that 	for 	the 	same 	reasons 	the 	presiding 	judge 	allowed 	the 	Doe
Intervenors’ motion to intervene under Rule 24(b), the Applicants
will not be prejudiced or unduly delayed by the need to respond to
an additional motion to quash. 	(D. 116). 	As to this last point,
the Applicants disagree that the Movants are similarly situated to
the 	Doe 	Intervenors. 	(D. 	118) 	(“Culver 	and 	Dineen 	are 	not
similarly 	situated 	to 	the 	Doe 	Intervenors 	as 	to 	permissive
intervention.”).
A. 	TIMELINESS
Permissive 	intervention 	requires 	a 	timely 	motion 	to
intervene. 	On 	January 	17, 	Fidelity 	notified 	Culver 	that 	it 	had
received 	subpoenas 	in 	connection 	with 	the 	section 	1782 	action.
The 	Movants 	concede 	that 	they 	were 	aware 	that 	their 	personal
financial 	information 	was 	subject 	to 	the 	subpoenas 	as 	of 	January
17. 	(D. 	116) 	(supporting 	memorandum 	stating 	“[T]he 	Putative
Intervenors were unaware that their personal financial information
was 	subject 	to 	the 	subpoenas 	until 	Fidelity 	notified 	them 	on
January 17, 2025”). 	The length of time that the Movants knew that
their interests were at risk (January 17) and the time they filed
the 	motion 	to 	intervene 	(June 	19) 	spans 	a 	period 	of 	five-and-a-
half months. 	See R&G Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d at 7) (stating first
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timeliness 	factor 	is 	“the 	length 	of 	time 	that 	the 	putative
intervenor knew or reasonably should have known that his interests
were at risk before he moved to intervene”). 	This time-period is
somewhat substantial and therefore favors rendering the motion to
intervene untimely.
None 	of 	the 	remaining 	factors, 	however, 	favor 	untimeliness.
The existing parties, namely the Applicants, the Doe Intervenors,
and SRIL, would not be prejudiced by allowing intervention. 	This
is 	because 	there 	has 	as 	yet 	been 	no 	ruling 	on 	SRIL’s 	and 	the 	Doe
Intervenors’ motions to vacate the December 2024 Order and to quash
the 	subpoenas. 	What 	is 	more, 	the 	five-and-a-half 	month 	delay
between 	January 	17 	and 	June 	19 	did 	not 	prevent 	SRIL 	and 	the 	Doe
Intervenors from filing these motions, which they did on April 7.
Thus, the delay in filing a procedurally proper motion to intervene
in 	a 	more-timely 	manner 	did 	not 	prevent 	these 	parties 	from
protecting 	their 	interests. 	After 	all, 	“The 	timeliness
requirement 	was 	not 	designed 	to 	penalize 	prospective 	intervenors
for failing to act promptly, but rather to insure that the existing
parties 	to 	the 	litigation 	are 	not 	prejudiced 	by 	the 	failure 	of
would-be intervenors to act in a timely fashion.” 	P.R. Tel. Co.,
Inc. v. Sistema De Retiro, 637 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
Fiandaca 	v. 	Cunningham, 	827 	F.2d 	825, 	834 	(1st 	Cir. 	1987))
(internal 	brackets 	omitted). 	Further, 	the 	Applicants 	do 	not
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sufficiently explain how they would be prejudiced by allowing the
Movants to intervene. 	See id. at 16 (“[M]otion to intervene filed
over 	two 	years 	after 	putative 	intervenor 	was 	on 	notice 	that 	its
interests 	might 	be 	impaired 	by 	suit 	found 	timely 	where 	plaintiff
could point to no prejudice from the delay.” (quoting Zurich Cap.
Markets, 	Inc. 	v. 	Coglianese, 	236 	F.R.D. 	379, 	384–85 	(N.D. 	Ill.
2006))).
Lastly, 	“One 	of 	the 	core 	purposes 	of 	the 	timeliness
requirement is to prevent disruptive, late-stage intervention that
could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”
R&G 	Mort., 	584 	F.3d 	at 	9 	(citations 	omitted). 	Here, 	the 	efforts
the Movants made in filing repeated motions to intervene on March
5 and 26 evidence reasonable diligence. 	Moreover, allowing Culver
to 	intervene 	at 	this 	juncture 	is 	not 	a 	late-stage 	intervention.
Given 	the 	single 	account 	at 	issue, 	Culver’s 	intervention 	will
hardly, if at all, disrupt the Singapore proceeding.
To be sure, the Applicants point to the delay associated with
the Movants’ anticipated motion to quash, motion for a protective
order, and motion for in camera review as well as the addition of
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the 	Movants 	as 	parties. 	The 	delay, 	however, 	is 	likely 	minimal
because there is only one account under Culver’s name at issue.3
Per the foregoing, the motion to intervene is timely.
B. 	COMMON QUESTION OF LAW OR FACT
To 	continue, 	permissive 	intervention 	requires 	a 	claim 	or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law
or fact.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). 	Here, Culver’s anticipated
motion to quash will likely share a common question of law or fact
to SRIL’s and the Doe Intervenors’ motions to quash. 	See (D. 80)
(SRIL 	arguing 	that 	the 	discovery 	is 	not 	for 	use 	in 	the 	Singapore
proceeding 	and 	Intel 	factors4 	favor 	quashing 	subpoenas); 	(D. 	77-
1) (Doe Intervenors arguing subpoenas are not for use in Singapore
proceeding 	and 	Intel 	factors 	favor 	quashing 	subpoenas).
Specifically, 	Culver’s 	anticipated 	motion 	to 	quash 	will 	likely
share 	the 	common 	question 	of 	law 	or 	fact 	that 	the 	subpoena[s] 	is
not for use in the Singapore proceeding and the Intel factors favor
quashing the subpoena. 	Hence, the Movants satisfy the requirement
for 	permissive 	intervention 	in 	Rule 	24(b)(1)(B). 	Indeed, 	the
presiding 	judge 	determined 	that 	the 	Doe 	Intervenors’ 	motion 	to
3 The above reasoning applies equally to the Rule 26(b)(3) calculus that “the
court 	must 	consider 	whether 	intervention 	will 	unduly 	delay 	or 	prejudice 	the
adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” 	It will not.
4 See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264-265 (2004).
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quash 	the 	“subpoena 	and 	accompanying 	arguments 	will 	certainly
share 	common 	questions 	of 	law 	or 	fact 	with 	the 	other 	motions 	to
quash that are forthcoming in this action.” 	(D. 72).
C. 	STANDING
Next, the Applicants assert that parties do not have standing
to 	object 	to 	subpoenas 	directed 	to 	other 	parties. 	The 	assertion
does not resonate, for three reasons. 	First, the Movants are not
parties 	at 	this 	juncture. 	Second, 	the 	Applicants 	overlook 	that
“[a] 	party 	has 	standing 	to 	quash 	a 	subpoena 	served 	on 	a 	nonparty
if he or she has a personal right or privilege with respect to the
requested 	information.” 	Enargy 	Power 	(Shenzhen) 	Co. 	Ltd. 	v.
Xiaolong Wang, Civil Action No. 13–11348–DJC, 2014 WL 2048416, at
*2 	n.4 	(D. 	Mass. 	May 	16, 	2014) 	(citations 	omitted). 	And 	“[b]ank
customers have a personal right with respect to their bank account
records.” 	Id. 	In 	that 	regard, 	the 	Movants 	aptly 	point 	out 	that
Culver 	has 	an 	interest 	in 	protecting 	the 	confidentiality 	of 	the
financial 	information 	in 	the 	targeted 	bank 	account. 	(D. 	116)
(Movants 	arguing 	they 	“are 	accountholders 	at 	Fidelity 	and 	have 	a
direct and substantial interest in protecting the confidentiality
of 	their 	financial 	and 	proprietary 	information, 	which 	is 	now 	at
risk 	of 	disclosure 	due 	to 	the 	subpoenas 	issued 	in 	this 	action).
Likewise, 	as 	stated 	by 	the 	presiding 	judge, 	“the 	Doe 	Intervenors
certainly 	have 	some 	confidentiality 	and/or 	privacy 	interest 	in
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their 	own 	financial 	records, 	which 	warrants 	an 	opportunity 	to
permissively intervene to protect that interest.” 	(D. 72) (citing
In 	re 	Hornbeam 	Corp., 	No. 	14-mc-00424, 	2015 	WL 	13647606, 	at 	*3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015)).
Third, the Second Circuit has held in the context of a section
1782 	application 	that 	“‘parties 	against 	whom 	the 	requested
information 	will 	be 	used 	may 	have 	standing 	to 	challenge 	the
lawfulness’ of the request.” 	In re JSC BTA Bank, 577 F. Supp. 3d
262, 	265 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2021) 	(granting 	non-party’s 	motion 	to
intervene); (D. 72) (citing JSC BTA Bank, 577 F. Supp. 3d at 265,
as 	“granting 	motion 	to 	intervene 	on 	non-party 	subpoena 	‘in 	light
of 	[applicant’s] 	stated 	intention 	to 	use 	the 	records 	against’
movant).” 	Culver falls into this category.
D. 	DINEEN’S INTERVENTION
As 	for 	Dineen, 	she 	is 	not 	entitled 	to 	intervene 	as 	a 	matter
of 	right. 	She 	lacks 	“‘a 	significantly 	protectible 	interest’” 	in
the targeted account because it is registered to Culver. 	(D. 72)
(quoting 	Pub. 	Serv. 	Co. 	of 	N.H. 	v. 	Patch, 	136 	F.3d 	197, 	205 	(1st
Cir. 	1998), 	and 	explaining 	intervention 	as 	of 	right 	requires
protectible 	interest 	to 	satisfy 	Rule 	24(a)(2)). 	Permissive
intervention is also inappropriate. 	Again, this is because there
is 	only 	one 	financial 	account 	at 	issue, 	and 	it 	is 	registered 	to
Culver. 	Lastly, 	as 	earlier 	noted, 	the 	Applicants 	correctly
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maintain that there is no information related to Dineen that is at
risk of disclosure.
In 	sum, 	the 	motion 	is 	timely, 	there 	are 	common 	questions 	of
law 	or 	fact, 	Culver’s 	intervention 	will 	not 	unduly 	delay 	or
prejudice 	the 	existing 	parties’ 	rights, 	and 	the 	Applicants’
standing 	argument 	as 	to 	Culver 	lacks 	merit. 	Accordingly,
permissive 	intervention 	is 	appropriate 	as 	to 	Culver. 	Any 	motion
to 	quash 	filed 	by 	Culver 	as 	well 	as 	any 	opposition 	to 	the 	motion
are 	limited 	to 	five 	pages. 	Both 	the 	motion 	and 	any 	opposition
shall 	be 	filed 	no 	later 	than 	December 	18. 	Counsel 	should 	not
expect a continuance of this deadline.
V. 	CONCLUSION
In 	accordance 	with 	the 	foregoing 	discussion, 	the 	motion 	to
intervene (D. 15) is ALLOWED as to Culver and DENIED as to Dineen.
Any 	motion 	to 	quash 	filed 	by 	Culver 	as 	well 	as 	any 	opposition 	to
the 	motion 	are 	limited 	to 	five 	pages. 	Both 	the 	motion 	and 	any
opposition 	shall 	be 	filed 	no 	later 	than 	December 	18. 	Counsel
should not expect a continuance of this deadline.
/s/ Donald L. Cabell
DONALD L. CABELL, U.S.M.J.
DATED: 	December 12, 2025
Case 1:24-mc-91645-ADB Document 122 Filed 12/12/25 Page 14 of 14