USA v. Madison, et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
___________________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
)
v. 	) 	Criminal Action
) 	No. 24-cr-10201-PBS
QUENTIN MCDONALD, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
______________________________ 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
January 12, 2026
Saris, J.
INTRODUCTION
A federal grand jury indicted Defendant Quentin McDonald and
three 	codefendants 	on 	various 	counts 	related 	to 	the 	February 	19,
2024, 	armed 	robbery 	of 	a 	cash 	courier 	in 	Swansea, 	Massachusetts.
In order to identify suspects, a law enforcement officer obtained
search warrants for three cellular service providers to turn over
a “tower dump" of records of communications made in the vicinities
of the robbery and other related events.
Now 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	McDonald’s 	motion 	to 	suppress 	the
cell-site 	location 	information 	procured 	through 	the 	execution 	of
the warrants. McDonald argues that tower dumps are Fourth Amendment
searches 	and 	thus 	that 	the 	warrants 	were 	constitutionally
required. 	Neither 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	nor 	the 	First 	Circuit 	has
addressed the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to tower dumps,
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and 	the 	case 	law 	is 	unsettled. 	The 	government 	responds 	that 	even
if the Fourth Amendment requires search warrants for tower dumps,
which 	it 	disputes, 	the 	warrants 	obtained 	here 	were 	sufficiently
particular, and, in the alternative, law enforcement relied on the
warrants in good faith.
After hearing, the Court DENIES McDonald’s motion (Dkt. 142).
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed for purposes of McDonald’s
motion 	and 	are 	drawn 	primarily 	from 	the 	“affidavit 	on 	which 	the
challenged warrant[s] rest[].” United States v. Jackson, 118 F.4th
447, 449 (1st Cir. 2024).
I. 	Tower Dumps
Cellular 	devices 	communicate 	primarily 	by 	sending 	and
receiving data through nearby cell towers. When a device connects
with a cell tower, the tower records various items of information,
such as the time of the communication, certain unique identifiers
associated 	with 	the 	device, 	and 	the 	source 	and 	destination
telephone 	numbers. 	These 	data 	enable 	law 	enforcement 	to 	obtain
cell-site 	location 	information 	(“CSLI”), 	i.e., 	the 	locations 	of
devices 	based 	on 	their 	interactions 	with 	cell 	towers. 	See
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 301 (2018).
A “download of information on all the devices that connected
to 	a 	particular 	cell 	[tower] 	during 	a 	particular 	interval” 	-- 	as
opposed 	to 	the 	longer-term 	CSLI 	of 	an 	individual 	device 	-- 	is
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called a “tower dump.” Id. at 316. Tower dumps generally “are used
when law enforcement knows the time and place of the crime but not
the 	identity 	of 	the 	suspects.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Medina, 	712 	F.
Supp. 	3d 	226, 	237 	(D.R.I. 	2024), 	vacated 	on 	other 	grounds, 	125
F.4th 310 (1st Cir. 2025).
II. 	The Robbery
At 	approximately 	12:30am 	on 	February 	19, 	2024, 	surveillance
footage captured two individuals enter the parking lot of a U-Haul
facility 	at 	403 	Bedford 	Street 	in 	Abington, 	Massachusetts. 	The
individuals were wearing dark sweatshirts and sweatpants. For the
next 	few 	minutes, 	the 	two 	individuals 	stood 	near 	a 	key 	drop 	box.
They then walked to a parked U-Haul van, entered it, and drove off
the lot.
Later that morning, at approximately 10:52am, the U-Haul van
was 	captured 	on 	video 	entering 	the 	parking 	lot 	of 	Bay 	Coast 	Bank
at 330 Swansea Mall Drive in Swansea, Massachusetts. The van then
drove into an adjacent parking lot from which the bank was visible.
At approximately 12:36pm, a courier carrying over $400,000 in
cash 	collected 	from 	local 	cannabis 	dispensaries 	arrived 	at 	the
bank. 	The 	courier 	removed 	two 	bags 	of 	cash 	from 	the 	trunk 	of 	his
vehicle and set them on the ground. Then, at approximately 12:38pm,
the 	U-Haul 	van 	reentered 	the 	bank’s 	parking 	lot, 	pulling 	up
alongside the courier’s vehicle. Two men wearing dark sweatshirts
and 	sweatpants 	exited 	the 	U-Haul 	van 	and 	held 	the 	courier 	at
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gunpoint 	before 	restraining 	his 	hands 	with 	a 	zip-tie, 	pepper-
spraying 	him, 	and 	loading 	the 	bags 	of 	cash 	into 	the 	van. 	The 	two
men then drove away.
A few minutes later, a witness with a dashboard camera drove
down 	a 	stretch 	of 	Reed 	Street 	about 	a 	mile 	away 	from 	Bay 	Coast
Bank. 	Footage 	from 	the 	camera 	showed 	a 	U-Haul 	van 	parked 	on 	the
side 	of 	the 	road. 	At 	approximately 	12:42pm, 	a 	dark 	Jeep 	Grand
Cherokee pulled up in front of the U-Haul van. Another eyewitness
reported observing two men unloading items from the U-Haul van as
it 	began 	to 	catch 	fire. 	As 	the 	U-Haul 	van 	became 	engulfed 	in
flames, 	the 	two 	men 	boarded 	the 	Jeep, 	which 	drove 	away. 	Law
enforcement subsequently recovered a canister of pepper spray from
the scene.
III. The Search Warrants
Based on these events, law enforcement believed that the same
individuals were involved in the theft of the U-Haul van on Bedford
Street, the robbery of the courier on Swansea Mall Drive, and the
fire 	on 	Reed 	Street. 	Law 	enforcement 	also 	believed 	that 	the
suspects 	had 	likely 	been 	using 	cell 	phones 	to 	coordinate 	the
robbery and communicate with the driver of the Jeep.
In an effort to identify the perpetrators, Special Agent Eric
Mercer applied for and obtained search warrants seeking tower-dump
CSLI from cell towers providing service to the following addresses
on 	February 	19, 	2024: 	(1) 	403 	Bedford 	Street 	from 	12:15am 	to
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12:45am 	(i.e., 	the 	time 	the 	individuals 	took 	the 	van 	from 	the 	U-
Haul 	facility); 	(2) 	330 	Swansea 	Mall 	Drive 	from 	11:30am 	through
12:00pm (i.e., the time the individuals awaited the courier in the
parking lot adjacent to Bay Coast Bank); (3) 330 Swansea Mall Drive
from 12:30pm through 12:45pm (i.e., the time the individuals robbed
the courier); and (4) 300 Reed Street from 12:30pm through 1:00pm
(i.e., 	the 	time 	the 	U-Haul 	van 	was 	set 	on 	fire). 	Agent 	Mercer’s
warrant 	application 	sought 	the 	phone 	numbers, 	location 	data, 	and
other identifying information for any communications made in these
intervals, but not the contents of the communications themselves.
The 	application 	limited 	the 	records 	to 	be 	seized 	to 	only 	those
corresponding with communications made through at least two of the
four cell towers in question.
The Magistrate Judge issued the requested search warrants on
March 	14, 	2024. 	The 	search 	authorized 	by 	the 	warrants 	identified
three 	cellular 	devices 	that 	connected 	with 	at 	least 	two 	towers
during the relevant time periods. Those three devices belonged to
McDonald and two of his codefendants.
DISCUSSION
McDonald moves to suppress the CSLI obtained through the tower
dumps. McDonald’s argument proceeds in three steps, each of which
must 	be 	accepted 	for 	his 	motion 	to 	succeed. 	First, 	he 	contends
that 	a 	tower 	dump 	is 	a 	Fourth 	Amendment 	“search” 	and 	thus 	that 	a
warrant 	is 	constitutionally 	required. 	See 	Carpenter, 	585 	U.S. 	at
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316 	(leaving 	this 	question 	open). 	Second, 	he 	asserts 	that 	the
warrants 	obtained 	by 	Agent 	Mercer 	failed 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment’s
particularity 	requirement. 	See 	U.S. 	Const. 	amend. 	IV 	(requiring
warrants to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and
the 	persons 	or 	things 	to 	be 	seized” 	(emphasis 	added)). 	Third, 	he
argues 	that 	the 	CSLI 	obtained 	through 	the 	warrants 	must 	be
suppressed 	because 	the 	good-faith 	exception 	to 	the 	exclusionary
rule does not apply. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 913-25 (1984) (delineating this exception).
As 	explained 	below, 	McDonald 	has 	a 	strong 	argument 	at 	the
first 	step: 	that 	a 	tower 	dump 	constitutes 	a 	search 	necessitating
a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, absent the applicability of
an 	exception 	to 	the 	warrant 	requirement. 	However, 	McDonald’s
argument 	falters 	at 	the 	second 	and 	third 	steps. 	The 	warrants
obtained by law enforcement were sufficiently particular and, even
if 	they 	were 	not, 	the 	good-faith 	exception 	would 	preclude
suppression.
I. 	Warrant Requirement
The threshold question raised by McDonald is whether a tower
dump is a Fourth Amendment search. The Court concludes that it is.
The 	Fourth 	Amendment 	guards 	against 	“unreasonable 	searches
and 	seizures.” 	U.S. 	Const. 	amend. 	IV. 	This 	constitutional
guarantee 	“protects 	people, 	not 	places.” 	Katz 	v. 	United 	States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). As relevant here, if a person “‘seeks to
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preserve something as private[]’ and his expectation of privacy is
‘one 	that 	society 	is 	prepared 	to 	recognize 	as 	reasonable,’” 	a
Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when the government intrudes upon
that 	“private 	sphere.” 	Carpenter, 	585 	U.S. 	at 	304 	(quoting 	Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
In 	Carpenter, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	held 	that 	individuals 	have
reasonable 	expectations 	of 	privacy 	in 	their 	long-term 	CSLI, 	such
that the government’s “accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a
Fourth 	Amendment 	search.” 	Id. 	at 	310 	n.3. 	“[T]he 	intersection 	of
two 	lines 	of 	cases” 	informed 	the 	Court’s 	holding. 	Id. 	at 	306.
First, the Court examined cases involving “a person’s expectation
of privacy in his physical location and movements.” Id. The Court
explained 	that 	tracking 	an 	individual’s 	location 	through
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” CSLI impinges
on 	this 	reasonable 	expectation. 	Id. 	at 	309. 	Second, 	the 	Court
distinguished cases applying the third-party doctrine, under which
the 	“voluntary 	exposure” 	of 	information 	may 	vitiate 	reasonable
expectations 	of 	privacy. 	Id. 	at 	315. 	The 	Court 	“decline[d] 	to
extend” 	this 	doctrine 	“to 	the 	collection 	of 	CSLI” 	due 	to 	CSLI’s
“unique 	nature,” 	noting 	that 	individuals 	have 	“no 	way 	to 	avoid
leaving behind a trail of” CSLI apart from the impractical option
of “disconnecting [a] phone from the network.” Id.
After Carpenter, district courts have split on whether tower
dumps 	involving 	short-term 	CSLI 	are 	subject 	to 	the 	Fourth
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Amendment -- a question that the Supreme Court expressly declined
to 	address, 	see 	id. 	at 	316. 	Some 	district 	courts 	have 	extended
Carpenter’s 	reasoning 	to 	tower 	dumps 	and 	thus 	held 	that 	they
constitute 	Fourth 	Amendment 	searches. 	See 	United 	States 	v.
Spurlock, 778 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1142-45 (D. Nev. 2025); In re Four
Applications 	for 	Search 	Warrants 	Seeking 	Info. 	Associated 	with
Particular Cellular Towers, No. 25-CR-38, 2025 WL 603000, at *2-6
(S.D. 	Miss. 	Feb. 	21, 	2025); 	Medina, 	712 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	236-46.
Others have held the opposite. See United States v. Dickerson, No.
24-CR-83, 	2025 	WL 	2960141, 	at 	*9-11 	(E.D. 	Wis. 	June 	10,
2025), report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	2025 	WL 	2779095 	(E.D.
Wis. Sep. 30, 2025); United States v. Pricop, 775 F. Supp. 3d 1036,
1038-39 	(D. 	Ariz. 	2025); 	United 	States 	v. 	Williams, 	741 	F. 	Supp.
3d 	642, 	650-51 	(E.D. 	Mich. 	2024); 	United 	States 	v. 	Matthews, 	No.
22-CR-429, 2024 WL 688666, at *3-4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2024); United
States v. Walker, No. 18-CR-37, 2020 WL 4065980, at *6-8 (E.D.N.C.
July 	20, 	2020); 	United 	States 	v. 	Rhodes, 	No. 	19-CR-0073, 	2020 	WL
9461131, 	at 	*2-3 	(N.D. 	Ga. 	June 	18, 	2020), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1541050 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2021).
No circuit court of appeals has decided the issue. The Seventh
Circuit 	has 	rejected 	a 	defendant’s 	contention 	that 	Carpenter
resolved 	the 	question 	but 	has 	not 	squarely 	held 	that 	tower 	dumps
do not constitute Fourth Amendment searches. See United States v.
Adkinson, 	916 	F.3d 	605, 	610-11 	(7th 	Cir. 	2019) 	(per 	curiam).
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Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has declined to resolve the question.
See United States v. James, 3 F.4th 1102, 1106 n.3 (8th Cir. 2021).
The 	Fifth 	Circuit 	and 	certain 	judges 	of 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	have
espoused competing views with respect to geofencing, a similar but
distinct 	technology 	from 	tower 	dumps. 	Compare 	United 	States 	v.
Smith, 	110 	F.4th 	817, 	830-36 	(5th 	Cir. 	2024) 	(holding 	that
geofencing 	constitutes 	a 	Fourth 	Amendment 	search), 	cert. 	denied,
No. 	24-7237, 	2025 	WL 	3131804 	(U.S. 	Nov. 	10, 	2025), 	with 	United
States 	v. 	Chatrie, 	136 	F.4th 	100 	(4th 	Cir. 	2025) 	(affirming
district 	court 	judgment 	in 	geofencing 	case 	with 	no 	controlling
opinion), 	petition 	for 	cert. 	filed, 	No. 	25-112 	(U.S. 	July 	28,
2025).
The 	issue 	is 	a 	close 	call. 	This 	Court 	concludes 	that 	the
courts 	that 	have 	held 	that 	tower 	dumps 	constitute 	a 	Fourth
Amendment 	search 	have 	the 	stronger 	argument. 	The 	Court 	finds
Medina’s in-depth discussion of this issue persuasive, see 712 F.
Supp. 	3d 	at 	236-46, 	and 	briefly 	highlights 	the 	two 	primary 	bases
for 	the 	conclusion 	that 	search 	warrants 	are 	required 	to 	execute
tower dumps.
First, although tower dumps typically seek CSLI over a shorter
duration of time than the longer-term individual CSLI at issue in
Carpenter, the same privacy interests are implicated. Tower dumps
seek “time-stamped data [that] provides an intimate window into a
person’s 	life, 	revealing 	not 	only 	his 	particular 	movements, 	but
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through 	them 	his 	‘familial, 	political, 	professional, 	religious,
and 	sexual 	associations.’” 	Carpenter, 	585 	U.S. 	at 	311 	(quoting
United 	States 	v. 	Jones, 	565 	U.S. 	400, 	415 	(2012) 	(Sotomayor, 	J.,
concurring)). 	For 	example, 	even 	though 	the 	tower 	dumps 	here 	were
executed 	to 	identify 	individuals 	operating 	primarily 	on 	“public
thoroughfares” to commit a crime, they may have also incidentally
collected data regarding those individuals’ activities in “private
residences, 	doctor’s 	offices, 	political 	headquarters, 	and 	other
potentially revealing locales.” Id. And tower dumps, like searches
of 	individualized 	CSLI, 	allow 	law 	enforcement 	to 	“travel 	back 	in
time 	to 	retrace 	a 	person’s 	whereabouts,” 	even 	if 	the 	identity 	of
that 	person 	is 	not 	yet 	known. 	Id. 	at 	312; 	see 	id. 	at 	315 	(noting
that 	CSLI 	provides 	a 	“detailed 	chronicle 	of 	a 	person’s 	physical
presence 	compiled 	every 	day, 	every 	moment, 	over 	several 	years”).
Critically, regardless of whether the government seeks longer-term
individual CSLI or shorter-term tower-dump CSLI, the location data
at 	issue 	is 	“detailed, 	encyclopedic, 	and 	effortlessly 	compiled,”
thus implicating the privacy interests of the countless people who
“carry cell phones with them all the time.” Id. at 309, 311.
Second, 	Carpenter’s 	rationale 	for 	declining 	to 	apply 	the
third-party 	doctrine 	to 	long-term 	individual 	CSLI 	applies 	with
equal 	force 	to 	tower 	dumps. 	Carpenter 	“recognize[d] 	that 	CSLI 	is
an 	entirely 	different 	species 	of 	business 	record” 	from 	those
usually underpinning the third-party doctrine, such that the fact
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that CSLI is shared with wireless carriers does not undermine the
privacy 	interests 	at 	issue. 	Id. 	at 	318. 	And 	as 	the 	Supreme 	Court
noted, 	“[v]irtually 	any 	activity 	on 	[a] 	phone 	generates 	CSLI,”
effectively 	forcing 	individuals 	to 	“leav[e] 	behind 	a 	trail 	of
location 	data.” 	Id. 	at 	315. 	For 	that 	reason, 	and 	because 	a 	cell
phone is “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy,’” id. at 311 (quoting
Riley 	v. 	California, 	573 	U.S. 	373, 	385 	(2014)), 	users 	of 	cell
phones 	cannot 	reasonably 	be 	viewed 	as 	voluntarily 	exposing 	their
location information. These principles are inherent to the “unique
nature” 	of 	CSLI, 	id. 	at 	309, 	whether 	it 	is 	collected 	through 	an
individualized search or through a tower dump.
II. 	Particularity
The 	government 	points 	out 	that 	even 	if 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment
requires 	a 	search 	warrant 	for 	a 	tower 	dump, 	law 	enforcement 	in
this 	case 	did 	obtain 	warrants. 	McDonald 	does 	not 	dispute 	that
sufficient 	probable 	cause 	existed 	for 	law 	enforcement 	to 	obtain
the 	warrants. 	Rather, 	he 	contends 	that 	the 	warrants 	were
insufficiently particular in describing the places to be searched
and the items to be seized. The Court disagrees.
A 	search 	warrant 	complies 	with 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	only 	if
it 	“particularly 	describ[es] 	the 	place 	to 	be 	searched, 	and 	the
persons 	or 	things 	to 	be 	seized.” 	U.S. 	Const. 	amend. 	IV. 	This
particularity requirement, which “exists ‘to prevent wide-ranging
general 	searches 	by 	the 	police,’” 	“implicat[es] 	two 	distinct
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demands.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Corleto, 	56 	F.4th 	169, 	176 	(1st 	Cir.
2022) 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Moss, 	936 	F.3d 	52, 	58 	(1st 	Cir.
2019)). First, the warrant “must supply enough information to guide
and 	control 	the 	executing 	agent’s 	judgment 	in 	selecting 	where 	to
search and what to seize.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lindsey,
3 	F.4th 	32, 	40 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021)). 	Second, 	the 	warrant 	“cannot 	be
too 	broad 	in 	the 	sense 	that 	it 	includes 	items 	that 	should 	not 	be
seized.” Id. (quoting Lindsey, 3 F.4th at 40).
The 	warrants 	obtained 	by 	the 	special 	agent 	satisfy 	both 	of
these 	conditions. 	First, 	the 	warrants 	provided 	sufficient
information 	delineating 	the 	government’s 	search 	and 	seizure.
Attachment 	A 	to 	the 	warrant 	application 	identified 	the 	four 	cell
towers and specific time periods to be searched, and Attachment B
listed 	six 	categories 	of 	data 	to 	be 	seized, 	including 	telephone
numbers, 	unique 	device 	identifiers, 	communication 	metadata, 	and
location information, while specifically excluding the contents of
communications. 	These 	descriptions 	“provided 	sufficient 	guidance
to 	‘control 	the 	[government]’s 	judgment 	in 	selecting 	what 	to
take.’” 	Lindsey, 	3 	F.4th 	at 	41 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Tiem
Trinh, 665 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2011)).
Second, the warrants were narrowed in several important ways
to avoid an overbroad seizure. Most importantly, the warrants were
tailored 	“both 	geographically 	and 	temporally” 	to 	the 	events 	at
issue 	(i.e., 	the 	theft 	of 	the 	U-Haul 	van, 	the 	van’s 	waiting 	for
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the 	courier’s 	arrival, 	the 	robbery 	of 	the 	courier, 	and 	the 	van’s
being 	set 	on 	fire). 	James, 	3 	F.4th 	at 	1106. 	Each 	tower 	dump 	was
geographically 	associated 	with 	one 	of 	these 	four 	events 	and 	was
limited 	to 	an 	interval 	of 	no 	more 	than 	thirty 	minutes,
corresponding to the times at which video footage and eyewitnesses
had 	shown 	that 	the 	event 	had 	occurred. 	See 	id. 	(holding 	that
warrants for tower dumps satisfied particularity requirement where
“they covered only the cellular towers near each robbery” and were
confined 	to 	approximately 	ninety-minute 	time 	periods). 	Further,
the 	warrants 	allowed 	law 	enforcement 	to 	seize 	only 	the 	CSLI 	of
devices 	that 	connected 	to 	two 	or 	more 	of 	the 	four 	cell 	towers 	in
question, 	thereby 	ruling 	out 	individuals 	who 	may 	have 	been
incidentally present near only one of the events. And the warrants
did 	not 	seek 	the 	contents 	of 	any 	communications, 	only 	the
identifying information associated with them.
The 	Court 	is 	unpersuaded 	by 	McDonald’s 	argument 	that 	the
warrants were “general warrants” lacking in particularity. General
warrants historically “specified only an offense,” leaving “to the
discretion 	of 	the 	executing 	officials 	the 	decision 	as 	to 	. 	. 	.
which places should be searched.” United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d
316, 	323 	(1st 	Cir. 	2017) 	(quoting 	Steagald 	v. 	United 	States, 	451
U.S. 	204, 	220 	(1981)); 	see 	also 	Riley, 	573 	U.S. 	at 	403 	(noting
that 	colonial-era 	general 	warrants 	“allowed 	British 	officers 	to
rummage 	through 	homes 	in 	an 	unrestrained 	search 	for 	evidence 	of
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criminal 	activity”). 	The 	warrants 	at 	issue 	here, 	in 	contrast,
specifically 	identify 	the 	four 	cell 	towers 	to 	be 	searched, 	while
limiting 	the 	seized 	information 	according 	to 	the 	above-described
parameters. 	The 	warrants 	thus 	demarcated 	“about 	the 	narrowest
definable 	search 	and 	seizure 	reasonably 	likely 	to 	obtain” 	the
identities 	of 	the 	perpetrators. 	Corleto, 	56 	F.3d 	at 	177 	(quoting
United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999)).
III. Good-Faith Exception
Finally, in the alternative, the Court concludes that even if
the warrants here were not sufficiently particular, the good-faith
exception 	to 	the 	exclusionary 	rule 	would 	prevent 	suppression 	of
the 	evidence 	derived 	from 	the 	warrants. 	McDonald’s 	argument 	thus
falls short at the third step as well as the second.
Although the Fourth Amendment “says nothing about suppressing
evidence 	obtained 	in 	violation 	of 	[its] 	command,” 	the 	judicially
created 	“exclusionary 	rule” 	allows 	for 	suppression 	in 	some
instances. 	Davis 	v. 	United 	States, 	564 	U.S. 	229, 	236 	(2011). 	The
exclusionary 	rule 	is 	prophylactic: 	its 	“sole 	purpose 	. 	. 	. 	is 	to
deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” Id. at 236-37. For that
reason, 	courts 	only 	apply 	the 	exclusionary 	rule 	where 	“the
deterrence benefits of suppression . . . outweigh its heavy costs.”
Id. at 237.
In 	evaluating 	the 	deterrence 	benefits 	of 	applying 	the
exclusionary rule, courts must gauge “‘the culpability of the law
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enforcement 	conduct’ 	at 	issue.” 	Id. 	at 	238 	(quoting 	Herring 	v.
United 	States, 	555 	U.S. 	135, 	143 	(2009)). 	Exclusion 	is 	generally
justified 	where 	“police 	exhibit 	‘deliberate,’ 	‘reckless,’ 	or
‘grossly 	negligent’ 	disregard 	for 	Fourth 	Amendment 	rights,” 	but
not 	when 	“police 	act 	with 	an 	objectively 	‘reasonable 	good-faith
belief’ that their conduct is lawful.” Id. (first quoting Herring,
555 U.S. at 144; and then quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 909). In other
words, an exception to the exclusionary rule exists when officers
act 	in 	good 	faith 	or 	even 	where 	“their 	conduct 	involves 	only
simple, ‘isolated’ negligence.” Id. (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at
137).
As relevant here, the good-faith exception can apply where an
officer 	has 	acted 	“in 	objectively 	reasonable 	reliance 	on 	a
subsequently 	invalidated 	search 	warrant.” 	Leon, 	468 	U.S. 	at 	922.
“The 	existence 	of 	a 	warrant 	issued 	by 	a 	magistrate 	will 	usually
establish 	this 	form 	of 	good 	faith,” 	unless 	one 	of 	four
circumstances applies:
(1) if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was
misled 	by 	information 	in 	an 	affidavit 	that 	the 	affiant
knew was false or would have known was false except for
his 	reckless 	disregard 	of 	the 	truth; 	(2) 	where 	the
issuing 	magistrate 	wholly 	abandoned 	his 	judicial 	role;
(3) 	when 	an 	affidavit 	is 	so 	lacking 	in 	indicia 	of
probable 	cause 	as 	to 	render 	official 	belief 	in 	its
existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when, depending
on 	the 	circumstances 	of 	the 	particular 	case, 	a 	warrant
is 	so 	facially 	deficient 	-- 	i.e., 	in 	failing 	to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to
be 	seized 	-- 	that 	the 	executing 	officers 	cannot
reasonably presume it to be valid.
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United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2017) (cleaned up)
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
McDonald does not argue that the Magistrate Judge was “misled”
or 	“wholly 	abandoned 	his 	judicial 	role” 	in 	issuing 	the 	warrants,
or that the special agent’s application was “so lacking in indicia
of probable cause” that no reasonable officer could have believed
probable 	cause 	existed. 	Id. 	(quoting 	Leon, 	468 	U.S. 	at 	923).
Rather, 	only 	the 	fourth 	circumstance 	is 	relevant 	here: 	McDonald
argues that the tower dump warrants issued by the Magistrate Judge
were 	“facially 	deficient 	. 	. 	. 	in 	failing 	to 	particularize 	the
place 	to 	be 	searched 	or 	the 	things 	to 	be 	seized.” 	Id. 	(quoting
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
The 	Court 	disagrees. 	For 	the 	reasons 	explained 	above, 	the
warrants 	obtained 	by 	law 	enforcement 	here 	satisfied 	the 	Fourth
Amendment’s 	particularity 	requirement. 	And 	even 	if 	they 	did 	not,
they 	certainly 	were 	not 	“so 	facially 	deficient” 	that 	executing
officers 	could 	not 	“reasonably 	presume 	[them] 	to 	be 	valid.” 	Id.
(quoting 	Leon, 	468 	U.S. 	at 	923). 	In 	other 	words, 	“regardless 	of
whether 	the 	warrant[s] 	w[ere] 	sufficiently 	particular,” 	law
enforcement 	officials 	“reasonably 	relied 	on 	the 	warrant[s] 	when
executing 	their 	search.” 	Jackson, 	118 	F.4th 	at 	449. 	Further, 	as
previously 	discussed, 	the 	warrants 	were 	not 	akin 	to 	“general
warrant[s]” 	and 	thus 	were 	not 	“so 	obviously 	lacking 	in
particularity that the [government’s] reliance on [them] amounted
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to bad faith.” Levin, 874 F.3d at 322. Given these circumstances,
“the deterrence rationale” of the exclusionary rule “loses much of
its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” Id. (quoting Davis,
564 U.S. at 238). Suppression is not warranted.
ORDER
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	McDonald’s 	motion 	to 	suppress
(Dkt. 142) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ PATTI B. SARIS________________
Hon. Patti B. Saris
United States District Judge
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