Veronica T. Jumpp

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Case 06-40677 Doc35_ Filed 06/09/06 Entered 06/09/06 15:16:24 Desc Main
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United States Bankruptcy Court
District of Massachusetts

In re:

VERONICA JUMPP,
DEBTOR.

Chapter 13
Case No. 06-40677-JBR

ee a a a

DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [# 33]

This matter having come before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of
Debtor’s Motion to Extend Automatic Stay and To Permit [sic] [docket #33] (the
“Reconsideration Motion”) and after due consideration of the Reconsideration Motion, the
Motion to Extend Automatic Stay [docket #19] (the “Motion to Extend”), the Opposition to the
Motion to Extend [docket # 24], the tape recording of the June 6, 2006 hearing, and the Court’s
Order of June 7, 2006 denying the Motion to Extend [docket # 29], the Court hereby makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. A motion to reconsider is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) made applicable to
bankruptcy cases by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 made applicable to bankruptcy
cases by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024. The reconsideration Motion does not specity which of the rules
the movant believes applicable but the distinction is not relevant to the Court’s determination in
this instance. “[T]he purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law
or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. A party may not submit evidence that is not
newly discovered in support of a motion for reconsideration.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779
F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986) (citations omitted). A motion

for reconsideration is appropriate when there has been a significant change in the law or facts

since the submission of the issue to the court; it is not a vehicle for an unsuccessful party to

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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rehash the same facts and same arguments previously presented. Keyes v. National Railroad

Passenger, 766 F. Supp. 277, 280 (E.D.Pa. 1991).

2. The Debtor filed the instant bankruptcy on May 1, 2006. On May 30, 2006 she filed
the Motion to Extend which offers little by way of facts and nothing by way of law. Indeed the
Motion to Extend consists of the following substantive paragraphs:

1. On or about May 1, 2006, Debtor filed her chapter 13 petition.
2. Debtor’s Section 341 meeting is scheduled for June 16, 2006
and the Debtor is in the process of completing Amended Schedules
and Amended Plan that addresses claims presented by creditors.

3. Debtor’s Chapter 13 filing was presented in good faith based on
increased income and the Amended Plan to be presented is

confirmable.

4. Allowance of this motion is necessary for an effective
reorganization.

3. Although not stated in the Motion to Extend, the Debtor filed a previous Chapter 13
case that was dismissed upon the Chapter 13 Trustee’s Motion on February 6, 2006. The Motion
to Extend was not accompanied by a motion seeking emergency or expedited consideration, and,
although it would not have been in compliance with the local rules, neither did the Motion to
Extend itself refer to such treatment. The Motion to Extend was set for hearing on June 6, 2006.

4. The secured creditor holding a mortgage on the Debtor’s residence filed an opposition
on the grounds that the automatic stay could not be extended as the hearing was not held within
30 days as required by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3).

5. Alt the hearing the Debtor urged this Court to adopt the holding of In re Toro-Arcilla,
334 B.R. 224 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005), in which Judge Isgur held that § 362(c)(4) and not just §
362(c)(3) applied to motions to extend the automatic stay in a second filing. Although the

Debtor argued that Toro-Arcilla was the only case on point with regard to this issue, that is not

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so. In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 344 (Bankr. S.D.Ga. 2006), rejects Toro-Arcilla’s holding in a
decision this Court found and continues to find persuasive.

6. At oral argument the Debtor also argues that this Court should reconsider its Order in
light of In re Johnson, 335 B.R. 805 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2006), in which the court concluded
that § 362(c)(3) applies only to “debts” and property of the debtor” and not to “property of the
estate.” Because in this district the property, including, most important to this Debtor, her home,
remains property of the estate until a Chapter 13 plan has been fully consummated, she argues
that under the holding in Johnson the automatic stay continues as to her home and other property
of her estate. She does not deal with the issue of how Johnson’s holding, even if followed by
this Court, would apply in an instance such as this where she has exempted approximately
$86,000 of equity in her home. The Reconsideration Motion is not the proper context in which
to consider this issue nor others, such as whether Johnson renders § 362(c)(3) a nullity. Such
concerns were not dealt with by the Debtor thus leading the court to enter its June 6, 2006 Order.
The facts and the law were known to Debtor’s counsel prior to filing the second case’ and could
have and should have been more fully presented to the Court.

7. The Reconsideration Motion fails to allege any newly discovered evidence, any
manifest error of law, or any significant change in the law that would affect the prior outcome.

For the foregoing reasons, the Reconsideration Motion is hereby DENIED.

Joel B. Rosenthal
United States Bankruptcy Judge.

Dated: June 9, 2006

'The Debtor had the same counsel in her previous case.

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