Martin v. Guidry et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DEX MARTIN 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NUMBER: 25-2195
SILAS GUIDRY, ET AL. 	SECTION: “P” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (rec.
doc. 32) came on for oral hearing before the undersigned. Defendants had filed opposition
to the motion. (Rec. docs. 35, 36, 37). After the oral hearing, the Court ordered Plaintiff to
file a supplemental memorandum in which he identifies each and every difference between
the original Complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint. Plaintiff has done so. (Rec.
doc. 39). 	The Court also allowed Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s supplemental
memorandum, and they did so. (Rec. docs. 40, 41, 42). Having reviewed the pleadings and
the case law, the Court rules as follows.
Because there is no Scheduling Order in place – and therefore no deadline to move
for leave to amend – Rule 15 governs. Under Rule 15(a), a party may amend its pleading
with the opposing party's written consent or leave of court, which leave should be freely
granted when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Rule 15(a) inquiry requires
the court to balance the difficult task of assuring a party a fair opportunity to present his
claims and defenses while at the same time protecting the district court from being
imposed upon by the presentation of theories seriatim. Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199,
203 (5th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). 	Although leave to amend is not automatic, given
Rule 15(a)(2)’s bias in favor of granting leave to amend, a court “must possess a
‘substantial reason’ to deny a request.” 	Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir.
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2004) (citation omitted); accord Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 425
(5th Cir. 2004) (citing Martin's Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S. of Am. Co.,
195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999); Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir.
2000)). 	The five relevant factors considered in determining whether leave to amend is
proper or there is substantial reason to deny the request are: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith
or dilatory motive, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, (4)
undue prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) futility of the amendment. 	Gregory, 634
F.2d at 203 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see also U.S. ex rel. Spicer v.
Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 367 (citation omitted).
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ supplemental pleadings, the Court
cannot find that denial of leave is warranted here. Plaintiff’s supplemental pleading details
the changes between the original and proposed Amended Complaints. 	Most of the
amendments are innocuous and are only included to further clarify the underlying factual
allegations. 	And while Plaintiff seeks to add two new Defendants, the Court also cannot
state that their inclusion is unwarranted at this time. This Court finds no undue delay, bad
faith, or dilatory motive. 	Plaintiff only filed this lawsuit in October 2025, and, as noted,
there is no Scheduling Order in place. 	Plaintiff has not moved to amend his Complaint
before, and therefore he has not failed to cure deficiencies through earlier amendments.
There is no prejudice to Defendants by allowing the amendment, as there is ample
time to conduct discovery. 	Defendants’ supplemental memoranda raise many of the
arguments that they have raised in motions to dismiss pending before the District Court.
But this Court need only concern itself with whether the amendment should be allowed,
not the merits of the underlying claims. 	And while the Court recognizes that the
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amendment may moot Defendants’ motions to dismiss, that is not the type of prejudice that
matters here. See ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. Mars Oil Pipeline Co., L.L.C., No. CV 25-2001, 2026
WL 290983, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 2026). And, while perhaps unfortunate, additional costs
incurred in filing a second motion to dismiss do not constitute undue prejudice either. See
Louisiana v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 19-638, 2020 WL 3966875, at *3 (M.D. La. July 13, 2020)
(rejecting argument that costs and expense of filing “yet another motion to dismiss”
constituted undue prejudice); Molina v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 15-757, 2016 WL
3660621, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2016) (“As to being unduly prejudiced because of time
and money already expended in filing two motions to dismiss, while the Court . . . supports
litigation economy, it also recognizes that justice may require some repetition of effort and
notes the probability that much of the work already done likely can be resubmitted with
minimal additional expense and effort.”). 	Moreover, given the limited nature of the
proposed Amended Complaint (i.e., adding different defendants and additional assertions
with regard to the pending claims against existing parties), it is difficult to see how
Defendants would be required to expend significant time and money (as would be
necessary to implicate undue prejudice) by renewing the previously filed motions.
Neither does the Court find the amendment futile. 	Futility requires that Court to
undergo a merits determination, which is better suited for the motions to dismiss that are
currently pending (or that will be re-filed) before the District Court.
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Accordingly, and for these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (rec.
doc. 32) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of ______________________, 2026.
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
March	30th
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