Abuein v. State Farm Life Insurance Company

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JEHAD ABUEIN 	* 	CIVIL ACTION
*
VERSUS 	* 	NO. 24-2261
*
STATE FARM LIFE INSURANCE CO. 	* 	SECTION L (1)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant State Farm Life
Insurance Company (“State Farm”). R. Doc. 22. Plaintiff Jehad Abuein opposes the motion, R.
Doc. 24, and State Farm has submitted a reply memorandum, R. Doc. 27. Having considered the
parties’ briefing in light of the record facts and applicable law, the Court will DENY State Farm’s
motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PRESENT MOTION
On May 4, 2022, Plaintiff obtained a life insurance policy from State Farm (the “Policy”).
R. Doc. 22-6 at 1. On September 19, 2023, State Farm informed Plaintiff that it would be
rescinding 	the 	Policy 	and 	refunding 	Plaintiff’s 	premiums 	because 	of 	a 	“material
misrepresentation” it had discovered Plaintiff made in his application for the Policy. R. Doc. 24-3
at 1. Believing this rescission to be improper, Plaintiff filed the instant suit against State Farm
asserting breach of contract. R. Doc. 1-1 at 2–3. State Farm now moves for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claims, arguing it breached no provision of the Policy, but rather exercised its right
under the Policy to rescind within the two-year contestability period based on Plaintiff’s alleged
material misrepresentation. R. Doc. 22-1 at 5–6.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues he made no material misrepresentation in his application for
the Policy. R. Doc. 24 at 4. The basis for this disagreement lies in the report of Jennifer Jacober, a
genetics counselor with whom Plaintiff met on April 27, 2022, prior to applying for life insurance
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through State Farm. See R. Doc. 22-5. Plaintiff consulted with Ms. Jacober to discuss his family
history of Huntington’s disease and the possibility of being tested. Id. at 2–3. State Farm claims
that 	Plaintiff’s 	failure 	to 	disclose 	his 	meeting 	with 	Ms. 	Jacober 	constitutes 	a 	material
misrepresentation justifying its recission of the Policy because Plaintiff denied in his application
that he had been advised to have further testing to determine any diagnosis by a member of the
medical profession. R. Doc. 22-1 at 2, 6. On the other hand, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Jacober did
not, in fact, recommend that he pursue testing, rendering his failure to disclose the meeting with
Ms. Jacober immaterial and an improper basis for recission of the Policy.
II. 	APPLICABLE LAW
Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997). Initially, the movant bears the burden of presenting the basis
for the motion; that is, the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact or facts. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to come forward
with specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). A fact is “material” if its
resolution in favor of one party may affect the outcome of the case. Saketkoo v. Adm’rs of Tulane
Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 997 (5th Cir. 2022). “A dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
State Farm seeks the entry of summary judgment in its favor because, it claims, Plaintiff
made a material misrepresentation in his application for the Policy. Louisiana Revised Statute §
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22:860(B) provides, in pertinent part, that the falsity of a statement made by an insured in an
application for life insurance shall not bar the insured’s right to recovery under the contract unless
either “[t]he false statement was made with actual intent to deceive” or “[t]he false statement
materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer under the
policy.” There is no evidence in the record before the Court that Plaintiff actually intended to
deceive State Farm when he neglected to disclose his meeting with Ms. Jacober in the application
for the Policy.1 However, State Farm argues that, had it known about Plaintiff’s meeting with Ms.
Jacober, it would not have approved Plaintiff’s application for life insurance until Plaintiff had
been tested for Huntington’s disease; thus, that Plaintiff’s allegedly false statement that no member
of the medical profession had advised him to have further testing to determine any diagnosis
materially affected its acceptance of the risk and/or the hazard it assumed in agreeing to insure
Plaintiff. R. Doc. 22-1 at 8.
But it is far from clear whether Ms. Jacober actually recommended Plaintiff pursue testing
for Huntington’s disease. In fact, Ms. Jacober testified explicitly that she had not, and that she
would “would never say that.” R. Doc. 24-4 at 43. It is true that Ms. Jacober’s report ends with
two “RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. Option to be seen by [Huntington’s disease] at-risk clinic
(patient declined) | 2. Genetic testing for [Huntington’s disease] after [Plaintiff] obtains long-term
care insurance (patient will follow-up with me).” R. Doc. 22-5 at 3. However, Ms. Jacober’s
second recommendation can be read to recommend that Plaintiff obtain insurance prior to pursing
any testing rather than to recommend testing itself. Especially in light of Ms. Jacober’s denial that
she advised Plaintiff be tested, this creates at minimum an issue of material fact whether Plaintiff’s
1 State Farm asks the Court to infer actual intent to deceive from the fact that Ms. Jacober recommended to
Plaintiff that he obtain life insurance prior to pursuing testing for Huntington’s disease. R. Doc. 22-1 at 8–9. However,
this constitutes a credibility determination that must be submitted to the jury at trial, not the Court at the summary
judgment stage.
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statement that no such testing had been recommended to him was false.2 This is a question for the
jury and not a determination this Court can make on summary judgment.3 Because a factual dispute
exists as to whether Plaintiff made a material false statement on his application for the Policy,
summary judgment is inappropriate and State Farm’s motion must be denied.4
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that State Farm Life Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, R. Doc. 22, is hereby DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of December, 2025.
2 In its reply memorandum, State Farm points out that while Ms. Jacober denied having recommended
Plaintiff pursue testing for Huntington’s disease, upon questioning she admitted recommending him for “[m]ore
evaluation I guess.” R. Doc. 27 at 1 (citing R. Doc. 22-8 at 35). Nonetheless, as the Court has determined, it is unclear
from Ms. Jacober’s medical report whether she was recommending Plaintiff pursue testing or, even evaluation.
Accordingly, a fact issue remains whether Plaintiff made any material misrepresentation on his application for the
Policy.
3 Plaintiff’s application for the Policy also asked Plaintiff whether, in the last five years, he had seen any
member of the medical profession. See R. Doc. 22-4 at 10–11. To the extent State Farm may be arguing that it could
permissibly rescind the Policy because Plaintiff did not disclose the fact of his meeting with Ms. Jacober, an issue of
material fact also exists as to whether this constitutes a misrepresentation, let alone a material one, as Plaintiff did not
answer “no” to this question, but merely did not answer it. See id.
4 State Farm argues additionally that Plaintiff cannot prove damages in this matter because he is still alive
and his premiums have been refunded. R. Doc. 22-1 at 9. The Court has already rejected this argument in denying
State Farm’s prior Motion to Dismiss and will not address it again. See R. Doc. 7 at 3.
United States District Judge
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