USA v. Wells

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	No. 24-206
JOHNNY WELLS 	SECTION I
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the government’s motion1 for reconsideration of this Court’s
order suppressing evidence in the above-captioned matter. Defendant Johnny Wells
(“defendant”) filed a response2 in opposition. For the reasons that follow, the Court
DENIES the government’s motion for reconsideration.
I. 	BACKGROUND
After two rounds of briefing and two evidentiary hearings, this Court granted
the motion to suppress filed by defendant, which sought suppression of a firearm
seized from the residence at 3409 Pauger Street in New Orleans (the “residence”).3
The firearm was seized pursuant to a search warrant that this Court determined was
invalid because it contained false statements and material omissions made with
reckless disregard for the truth, and that the corrected warrant affidavit was
insufficient 	to 	establish 	probable 	cause.4 	Based 	on 	these 	determinations 	and
pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the search warrant was voided
1 R. Doc. No. 69.
2 R. Doc. No. 71.
3 See R. Doc. No. 64 (granting R. Doc. No. 36).
4 See generally id.
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and the firearm was suppressed.5 A complete factual background is described in the
Court’s suppression order and reasons.6
The government filed its timely motion for reconsideration on October 28,
2025.7 The government does not ask the Court to reconsider its Franks analysis,8 nor
does it seek to challenge the Court’s underlying factual findings.9 Instead, the
government seeks reconsideration on the ground that “neither party discussed, and
the Court did not consider, whether the gun would have been inevitably discovered.”10
For the first time in its motion for reconsideration,11 the government asks this Court
to 	apply 	the 	inevitable 	discovery 	exception 	to 	the 	exclusionary 	rule 	to 	deny
defendant’s motion to suppress.12
According to the government, the officers had “at least reasonable suspicion to
stop” defendant once they observed him in a carjacked vehicle13 and officers would
have then learned that defendant had a criminal history.14 Because they saw him
bring the firearm into the residence, the officers would have had probable cause to
“arrest him for being a felon in possession of a firearm” as well as probable cause “to
5 See id. at 50 (quoting United States v. Ortega, 854 F.3d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Kendrick, 980 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2020)).
6 See id. at 1–14.
7 See R. Doc. No. 69. See United States v. Hoffman, 70 F.4th 805, 810 (5th Cir. 2023)
(finding timely “a motion for reconsideration in a criminal case filed within the
original period in which an appeal is permitted”).
8 R. Doc. No. 69-1, at 2 n. 1.
9 See id. at 5.
10 Id. at 1.
11 Id. at 2–3.
12 Id. at 1.
13 R. Doc. No. 69-1, at 3.
14 Id.
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obtain, and reasonably would have obtained, a search warrant for the Pauger
residence to search for the gun as evidence of that offense.”15 The government argues
that “it is reasonable to conclude” from the fact that the officers had applied for a
search warrant that they would have applied for a search warrant based on these
facts, and inevitably discovered the firearm, “had they known the original affidavit
would have been found to be invalid.”16 The government asks the Court to find that
the firearm would have been inevitably discovered “despite any insufficiencies with
the search warrant affidavit”’ identified by the Court in its prior order and reasons.17
This will “correct a clear error of law or fact and prevent manifest injustice.”18
Defendant, 	for 	his 	part, 	opposes 	the 	government’s 	motion 	because 	it
“transparently raises a new legal theory,” which he argues is an improper subject for
a motion for reconsideration.19 According to defendant, motions for reconsideration
are not vehicles for raising theories that the government had “ample opportunity to
raise previously.”20 The theory of inevitable discovery is “a standard defense to
suppression motions” and defendant argues that by not raising it until its motion for
reconsideration, the government has waived the defense.21 Defendant also points out
that the government has made this exact waiver argument when opposing other
defendants’ motions for reconsideration; as defendant states: “[w]ith the shoe on the
15 Id. at 3, 10.
16 Id. at 3, 11.
17 See id. at 4.
18 Id.
19 R. Doc. No. 71, at 4.
20 Id.
21 See id. at 5.
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other foot, the government now offers no explanation for why it should be permitted
to do what it expressly urged a criminal defendant could not: present a new legal
theory in a purported motion to reconsider.”22
While defendant urges the Court to deny the government’s motion “on that
ground alone,”23 he also opposes the government’s motion on the merits. He contends
that the government’s assertion that the officers “would have obtained a valid
warrant” is both speculative and belied by facts in the record establishing that
“officers did not take any steps to obtain a valid search warrant, despite knowing that
the affidavit they submitted was invalid.”24 As explained herein, the Court agrees
with defendant and DENIES the government’s motion for reconsideration.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
While a motion for reconsideration is “a judicial creation not derived from
statutes or rules,” it is a recognized and legitimate procedural device. See United
States v. Hoffman, 70 F.4th 805, 810 (5th Cir. 2023); United States v. Cook, 670 F.2d
46, 48 (5th Cir. 1982) (“A motion for reconsideration in a criminal proceeding is a
legitimate 	procedural 	device.”). 	Indeed, 	“district 	courts 	possess 	continuing
jurisdiction over criminal cases and are free to reconsider their earlier decisions.”
United States v. Jefferson, No. 19-174, 2022 WL 1001449, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2022)
(Vance, J.); United States v. Scott, 524 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The district
court had continuing jurisdiction over the [criminal] case and was free to reconsider
22 Id. at 7.
23 Id. at 4.
24 R. Doc. No. 71, at 10 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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its own earlier decision.”). “These principles apply to suppression motions.” Jefferson,
2022 WL 1001449, at *1; United States v. Edwards, No. 22-69, 2024 WL 1099291, at
*1 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 13, 2024).
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration “is to allow a court to correct its
own alleged error.” United States v. Barton, No. 19-161, 2020 WL 32441, at *2 (E.D.
La. Jan. 2, 2020) (Africk, J.) (quoting United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976)). To
be sure, a “motion for reconsideration of a motion to suppress can be made on only
three grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law that has occurred since
the Court’s earlier ruling; (2) evidence not previously available has become available;
or (3) reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear error of law or fact or prevent a
manifest injustice.” United States v. Thompson, No. 14-153, 2017 WL 6325818, at *5
(E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2017) (Morgan, J.), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Williams, 774
F. App’x 871 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Staggers, No. 16-36, 2018 WL 4909912,
at *8 (E.D. La. Oct. 10, 2018) (Lemmon, J.).
“A court may deny a motion for reconsideration if the moving party does not
present any new information or there are no ‘new circumstances material to the
court’s determination.’” Barton, 2020 WL 32441, at *2 (quoting United States v.
Stanford, 367 F. App’x 507, 509 (5th Cir. 2010)). “A motion to reconsider should not
be used to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have
been raised earlier.” Id. (quoting United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 539 (10th
Cir. 2014)); see also United States v. Kendrick, No. 16-163, 2023 WL 4174525, at *2
(E.D. La. June 26, 2023) (Milazzo, J.) (stating that a motion to reconsider “is not the
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proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have
been offered or raised before the entry of judgment” (cleaned up)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The government acknowledges that “motions to reconsider are not for raising
arguments that could and should have been urged earlier.”25 But it maintains that
“there is no bar to reconsidering”26 its new inevitable discovery argument because
“this is not a situation where the government withheld its most appropriate argument
when opposing [defendant’s] motion.”27 It seems to be the government’s position that
because defendant based his motion to suppress on a theory that the good faith
exception did not apply because the warrant violated Franks, it was only necessary
for the government to defend against that particular theory of suppression, rather
than making the inevitable discovery argument it raises now.28 The Court does not
agree.
This Court and others in this circuit have denied motions for reconsideration
that simply cast previously available evidence in new light or advance new legal
theories that could have been raised initially. See, e.g., United States v. Mercadel, No.
02-170, 2002 WL 31040171, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 2002) (Barbier, J.), aff’d, 75 F.
App’x 983 (5th Cir. 2003) (denying the government’s motion to reconsider that sought
to “remedy” its “insufficient presentation of facts relevant to the concerns the Court
25 R. Doc. No. 69-1, at 4.
26 Id. at 5.
27 Id. at 4.
28 See id. at 5 (“[I]t was unnecessary for the government to address inevitable
discovery when arguing the affidavit supported the search.”).
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had” in granting the motion to suppress); (“The ‘concerns the Court had,’ which
guided its analysis of the motion to suppress, were not esoteric issues impossible for
counsel to divine prior to the first hearing, but the obvious: whether the government
had 	met 	the 	applicable 	legal 	standards 	to 	justify 	entry 	into 	the 	defendant’s
residence . . . .”); Barton, 2020 WL 32441, at *3 (denying the defendant’s motion for
reconsideration because “she ha[d] not asserted any intervening change in the
controlling law that would explain her failure to raise the legal arguments she now
presents, nor has she presented any new evidence that may have been previously
unavailable”); United States v. Gaulden, 21-14, 2022 WL 2294055, at *1 (M.D. La.
June 24, 2022) (“[T]he Government simply offers two additional arguments in support
of its original Opposition [to the defendant’s motion to suppress]. But the time to raise
those arguments 	has 	passed, 	and 	the Government could have done so in 	its
Opposition, at the three-day hearing, in its post-hearing brief, or in the supplemental
post-hearing briefs.”). Because the government’s motion does just that, the Court will
deny the motion for that reason alone. Barton, 2020 WL 32441, at *2.
It is of no matter that defendant did not argue in his motion to suppress that
the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule was inapplicable. It was
the 	government’s 	burden 	in 	defending 	against 	suppression 	to 	prove 	that 	the
inevitable discovery exception applied if it wished to pursue such defense. United
States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 581 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Because the Government has not
carried its burden, it is not entitled to the benefit of the inevitable discovery
exception.”); Mercadel, 2002 WL 31040171, at *1 (“The government blames its failure
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to address the applicable standard on the fact that defense counsel did not argue that
the exigent circumstances required to enter the defendant’s home were lacking. . . .
[I]t is the government’s burden to identify and satisfy the applicable legal standard,
and not the duty of the moving defendant to inform the government of the applicable
law . . . .”). 	The government should 	have 	“present[ed] 	its 	strongest arguments”
against suppression “upon initial consideration of [the] matter.” United States v.
Rodgers, No. 20-358, 2022 WL 889942, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2022); Gaulden, No.
2022 WL 2294055, at *1 (“[L]itigants are expected to present their strongest case
when the matter is first considered.”). Put simply, the government’s invocation of the
inevitable discovery doctrine is too late.
As previously stated, for this reason alone, the Court denies the government’s
motion for reconsideration. Barton, 2020 WL 32441, at *2. Still, the Court notes that
it is not convinced that the government’s motion would have succeeded had the Court
considered it on the merits.
The inevitable discovery doctrine requires the government to demonstrate “by
a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the
contested evidence would have been discovered by lawful means in the absence of
police misconduct and (2) the Government was actively pursuing a substantial
alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation.” United
States v. Jackson, 596 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Lamas,
930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir.1991)). The fact that the officers likely had sufficient
probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the residence cannot alone establish
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that the firearm would have been inevitably discovered. See United States v. Cherry,
759 F.2d 1196, 1206 (5th Cir. 1985); Lamas, 930 F.2d at 1102 (“[A]vailability of a
search warrant [does] not alone establish inevitable discovery.” (emphasis omitted)).
“Where the Government claims inevitable discovery on the possibility of a search
warrant, a court must ask whether the officers had made any effort to obtain the
warrant at the time of the illegal search.” United States v. Li, No. 15-102, 2016 WL
5407874, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 16, 2016) (cleaned up); compare Cherry, 759 F.2d at
1206 (holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable because even
though “at the time of the warrantless search the agents could have obtained a
warrant” they “had made no effort to do so”) with Lamas, 930 F.2d at 1103 (finding
sufficient for inevitable discovery that “an officer in fact left the house to get a
warrant” at the time the defendant had consented to the search of his house).
Although the government contends that facts in the record “demonstrate action
directed to obtaining a search warrant” for the residence,29 there is no evidence that
the government took any steps to pursue an alternate search warrant based on
additional non-disclosed facts demonstrating probable cause to search the residence
for evidence of defendant’s criminal possession of the firearm.30 See Zavala, 541 F.3d
at 580 (“For the inevitable discovery exception to apply, ‘the alternate means of
obtaining the evidence must at least be in existence and, at least to some degree,
imminent, if yet unrealized.’”); cf. Jackson, 596 F.3d at 242 (“In this case, we need not
29 R. Doc. No. 69-1, at 11.
30 See generally R. Doc. No. 64.
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address the continuing vitality of the active-pursuit element, as an ongoing grand
jury investigation that has already led to an indictment would clearly satisfy it.”).
Indeed, the Court found Officer Johnson was reckless precisely because he had
reason to question the validity of the search warrant and yet “made ‘no effort’ to
update” the search warrant affidavit with any newly obtained information.31 The
facts tend to undermine, rather than support, the government’s position that there is
a reasonable probability that the firearm would have been discovered by lawful
means 	because 	“the 	officers 	would 	have 	obtained 	a 	warrant 	based 	on 	[these
alternative] facts . . . had they believed the affidavit they submitted was invalid.” Cf.
Jackson, 596 F.3d at 242 (holding that the evidence obtained pursuant to a later-
invalidated state search warrant was admissible under the inevitable discovery
doctrine); (“[H]ad [the officers] had reason to question the validity of the state search
warrant or had there been no state search warrant, we have little doubt that the
officers nonetheless could have secured a search warrant and conducted the search
that yielded the disputed evidence.”).
However, as explained above, the Court need not explore the applicability of
the inevitable discovery doctrine further because the Court independently denies the
government’s motion for reconsideration for raising a new legal argument that it
could and should have raised previously.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
31 See id. at 36 (quoting R. Doc. No. 59, at 69)).
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IT IS ORDERED that the government’s motion32 for reconsideration is
DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, December 29, 2025.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
32 R. Doc. No. 69.
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