Atlantic Maritime Services, LLC v. Ecopetrol America, LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ATLANTIC MARITIME SERVICES,
LLC
VERSUS
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 20-3097
C/W: 20-3099
ECOPETROL AMERICA, LLC ET AL. 	SECTION: “J”(1)
Applies to: 20-3097, 20-3099
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are five Motions to Vacate and Dissolve Writs of Sequestration
or, Alternatively, for Release of Excess Seizure filed by Intervenor-Defendant Talos
QN Exploration LLC (Rec. Docs. 73, 74), Defendant Ecopetrol America, LLC (Rec.
Doc. 77), Defendant Talos Energy Offshore LLC (Rec. Doc. 75), and Defendants
Ridgewood Katmai, LLC and ILX Prospect Katmai, LLC (Rec. Doc. 80). Plaintiff
Atlantic Maritime Services, LLC filed a consolidated opposition to all of Defendants’
motions (Rec. Doc. 83), and Defendants filed replies (Rec. Docs. 88, 89, 90).
Having 	considered 	the 	motions 	and 	legal 	memoranda, 	the 	parties’ 	oral
arguments, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motions to
vacate and dissolve the writs of sequestration should be DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This consolidated matter arises from two offshore oil leases for which Plaintiff
Atlantic 	Maritime 	Services, 	LLC 	alleges 	that 	it 	“furnished 	goods, 	equipment,
supplies, and services” in 2020. (Rec. Doc. 50, at ¶ 9). Plaintiff performed these
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drilling services pursuant to a contract between Plaintiff and the designated operator
on the two leases at the time, Fieldwood Energy LLC (“Fieldwood”). Subsequently,
Fieldwood filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Texas, and Plaintiff alleges that it is still owed the
following principal amounts: (1) $5,824,743.68 for services performed on mineral
lease OCS-G-28030 located in the Mississippi Canyon Area, Block 948, of the Outer
Continental Shelf adjacent to the coast of Louisiana (“the Gunflint Lease”), a lease in
which Defendants Ecopetrol America, LLC (“Ecopetrol”) and Talos Energy Offshore
LLC (“TEO”), along with Intervenor-Defendant Talos QN Exploration LLC (“Talos
QN”), are interest owners; and (2) $7,111,706.55 for services performed on mineral
lease OCS-G-34536 located on the Green Canyon Area, Block 40 (“the Katmai
Lease”), in which Defendants Ridgewood Katmai, LLC (“Ridgewood”) and ILX
Prospect Katmai, LLC (“ILX”), again with Intervenor-Defendant Talos QN, are
working interest owners.
Because the two mineral leases are located on the Outer Continental Shelf,
they are governed by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”). 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1331–1356c. OCSLA provides that federal law extends to “the subsoil and seabed
of the outer Continental Shelf,” in addition to “artificial islands on the outer
Continental Shelf,” “installations and other devices permanently or temporarily
attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for,
developing, or producing resources,” and “any such installation or other device (other
than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting or transmitting such resources.”
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43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1)(A). Further, “the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State”
are declared to be surrogate federal law governing the “portion . . . of the outer
Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which
would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the
outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf,” but only “[t]o the extent that they are
applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). Based on
Plaintiff’s understanding that Louisiana is the state adjacent to both mineral leases
at issue, Plaintiff sought to take advantage of the protections afforded by the
Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (“LOWLA”) concerning the amounts it was owed by
Fieldwood. Accordingly, Plaintiff took steps to preserve its LOWLA privileges as to
third persons.
It was in August of 2020 that Fieldwood and thirteen affiliated debtors filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Southern District of Texas. Because
Plaintiff could not recover the amounts it was owed from Fieldwood, the operator on
both leases, Plaintiff sought to recover the amounts from the working interest owners
(“WIOs”) in the leases. To this end, Plaintiff initiated two in rem actions (pertaining
to the two leases) in this Court on November 13, 2020, against the WIOs, Defendants
Ecopetrol, Ridgewood, and ILX.1 Shortly thereafter, Ecopetrol, Ridgewood, and ILX
filed Notices of Bankruptcy into the records, and the Court issued automatic stays of
both cases. In April of 2021, Fieldwood sought a declaratory judgment from the
Bankruptcy Court holding that Plaintiff’s LOWLA privileges would be extinguished
1 Plaintiff later named TEO as a defendant in its first amended complaint, which was filed in July of
2021.
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by Fieldwood’s bankruptcy plan. Also during this time, the Bankruptcy Court
confirmed 	Fieldwood’s 	Eighth 	Amended 	Joint 	Chapter 	11 	Plan, 	under 	which
QuarterNorth, which is now Talos QN Exploration LLC, purchased Fieldwood’s
assets.
In February of 2022, the Bankruptcy Court issued a permanent injunction
against Plaintiff’s in rem actions against Defendants, the WIOs, an order which
Plaintiff appealed and the Fifth Circuit reversed. The Fifth Circuit held that
“Fieldwood’s reorganization plan clearly does not render Fieldwood’s obligation to
Atlantic 	extinct; 	it 	merely 	discharges 	Fieldwood’s 	liability 	for 	the 	debt,” 	thus
concluding that “the plan did not extinguish Atlantic’s LOWLA privileges on the
working-interest owners’ [i.e., Ecopetrol’s, TEO’s, Ridgewood’s, and ILX’s] property.”
In re Dynamic Offshore Res. NS, L.L.C., No. 23-20218, 2025 WL 1651901, at *6 (5th
Cir. June 11, 2025). Pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the stays in the cases
before this Court were lifted, and the suits were consolidated. On December 4, 2025,
Plaintiff filed ex parte motions for writs of sequestration under LOWLA, which the
Court granted. On December 12, Talos QN moved to intervene in the consolidated
action. This very long and winding road brings us to the instant motions, whereby
Defendants seek to have the writs of sequestration that were issued in December
2025 vacated and dissolved.
Prior to filing suit against Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that it perfected and
preserved 	privileges 	on 	these 	oil 	leases 	pursuant 	to 	LOWLA. 	La. 	Stat. 	Ann.
§§ 9:4861–4880. Plaintiff did so by first filing statements of privilege in the mortgage
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records of all Louisiana parishes that are adjacent to the two offshore leases; these
statements were filed between July 16, 2020, and July 23, 2020. Under LOWLA,
Defendants Ecopetrol, TEO, Ridgewood, and ILX are considered third persons
because they are WIOs who were not in contractual privity with Plaintiff for the goods
and services provided. LOWLA provides that a “privilege shall . . . cease to have effect
against a third person unless the claimant institutes an action for the enforcement of
the privilege within one year after the date of the filing of the statement of privilege
or financing statement.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4865(B). Therefore, to preserve its
privileges, 	Plaintiff 	instituted 	two 	in 	rem 	actions—one 	naming 	Ecopetrol 	as
Defendant and the other against Ridgewood and ILX—on November 13, 2020, and
these matters were later consolidated, as explained above.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]t the
commencement of and throughout an action, every remedy is available that, under
the law of the state where the court is located, provides for seizing a person or
property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment,” and one such remedy
available under the rule is “sequestration.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 64. Under Louisiana law,
a party who holds a security interest in property, such as a privilege, may have that
property seized under a writ of sequestration “if it is within the power of the
defendant to conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom . . .
during the pendency of the action.” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3571.
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A writ of sequestration does not effect a transfer of title to the property, but
instead, it is a conservatory writ that is “intended to preserve property pending the
outcome of a judicial proceeding.” Grantt Guillory Enters., Inc. v. Quebedeaux, 2012-
931 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/6/13), 110 So. 3d 182, 189. For a writ of sequestration to issue,
a claimant must meet strictly construed pleading requirements that are provided in
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3501:
A writ of attachment or of sequestration shall issue only when the
nature of the claim and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds
relied upon for the issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts
shown by the petition verified by, or by the separate affidavit of, the
petitioner, his counsel or agent.
La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3501. Furthermore, when the petitioner “alleges adequate
and valid grounds to support it,” the issuance of a writ of sequestration will be legal
even if those grounds “are later disproved.” Rocket Indus., Inc. v. S. Tire & Supply,
Inc., 706 F.2d 561, 563 (5th Cir. 1983).
Additionally, under Louisiana law, writs of sequestration may issue upon ex
parte application, without notice to the debtor or an opportunity for the debtor to be
heard. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that this proceeding does not
violate the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of due process, in part because Louisiana
law provides procedures whereby the debtor may seek to dissolve the writ or “regain
possession by filing his own bond.” Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604–07
(1974). The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides the mechanism by which a
debtor may seek dissolution of a writ of sequestration. Article 3506 explains that the
“defendant by contradictory motion may obtain the dissolution of a writ of attachment
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or of sequestration, unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was
issued.” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3506. Accordingly, when a defendant files a motion
to dissolve a writ of attachment, the plaintiff is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to
prove the grounds upon which the writ was issued. Pearl River Navigation, Inc. v.
Imperial Petroleum, Inc., No. 07-9616, 2008 WL 2743756, at *2 (E.D. La. July 9, 2008)
(Africk, J.) (“Once defendant has moved for dissolution, ‘[t]he plaintiff . . . is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing in order to meet its statutory burden of proof before a writ
of sequestration may be dissolved, and a trial court commits legal error if it dissolves
such a writ ex parte.’”). Further, when a court dissolves a writ of sequestration that
was wrongfully issued, the court has discretion to award damages and attorney’s fees.
La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3506. Presumably, however, the plaintiff must make the
requisite showing for the writ of sequestration prior to its issuance because “the
remedy is a harsh one,” and therefore, “the pleading requirements for a writ of
sequestration are strictly construed.” Grantt Guillory, 110 So. 3d at 189.
In this case, Plaintiff claims privileges over specified interests and properties
of Defendants pursuant to LOWLA, La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4861 et seq., an act whose
purpose is “to protect those . . . who contribute labor, services, and equipment to the
drilling of wells from the default of those who engage them.” Guichard Drilling Co. v.
Alpine Energy Servs., Inc., 94-1275 (La. 7/3/95), 657 So. 2d 1307, 1312 (citations
omitted). Based on this purpose, the legislature decided to place “the risk of the
contractor’s insolvency or failure to pay on those with an interest in the lease.” Id. at
1312–13. Moreover, “[i]t is well settled under the Oil Well Lien Act that the privilege
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created by La. R.S. 9:4861 attaches to all property listed in the statute, regardless of
ownership, and requires no contractual relationship between the supplier of labor,
service, or equipment and the owner of the lease or equipment.” Id. at 1312 (citations
omitted).
Property subject to the privilege created by LOWLA includes, but is not limited
to, the following:
(1) The operating interest under which the operations giving rise to the
claimant’s privilege are conducted together with the interest of the
lessee of such interest in a:
(a) Well, building, tank, leasehold pipeline, and other construction or
facility on the well site.
(b) Movable on a well site that is used in operations, other than a
movable that is only transiently on the well site for repair,
testing, or other temporary use.
(c) Tract of land, servitude, and lease described in R.S. 9:4861(12)(c)
covering the well site of the operating interest.
La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4863(A)(1). Additionally, the LOWLA privilege attaches to any
“[d]rilling or other rig located at the well site” when that rig is owned by the operator
or 	contractor 	in 	privity 	with 	the 	claimant; 	the 	“interest 	of 	the 	operator 	and
participating lessee in hydrocarbons produced from the operating interest and the
interest of a non-participating lessee in hydrocarbons produced from that part of his
operating interest subject to the privilege”; and the “proceeds received by, and the
obligations owed to, a lessee from the disposition of hydrocarbons subject to the
privilege.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4863(A)(2)–(4).
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LOWLA provides for the enforcement of a lien, or privilege, through a writ of
sequestration. La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4871. The privilege under LOWLA is created as a
matter of law, but privilege holders must take certain steps to preserve the privilege
and make it effective as to third parties. See La. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:4864, 9:4865.
Specifically, the claimant must (1) file a statement of privilege in the mortgage
records of the parish(es) adjacent to the offshore mineral lease within 180 days of last
performing services at the well site; (2) institute an action to enforce the privilege
within one year of the date when the statement of privilege was filed; and (3) file a
notice of lis pendens in the mortgage records of the appropriate parish(es) within
thirty days of instituting the action. La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4865.
DISCUSSION
Defendants in this matter filed separate motions to vacate and dissolve the
writs of sequestration, as did Intervenor-Defendant and operator on the leases, Talos
QN Exploration LLC. Because Defendants make identical arguments, with only one
exception,2 the Court has consolidated the motions for consideration.
A. Defendants’ Argument That Consolidated Complaint Fails to Allege
Applicability of Louisiana Law
To support their motions to vacate and dissolve the writs of sequestration,
Defendants first argue that in the consolidated complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege,
much less establish, that Louisiana law would apply as surrogate federal law to these
oil leases on the Outer Continental Shelf. More specifically, Defendants appear to
2 TEO argues that Plaintiff did not name TEO as a defendant within a year of filing its statements of
privilege, and that therefore, Plaintiff’s LOWLA privilege as to TEO’s working interest in the lease
was not properly preserved.
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challenge the contention that “Louisiana is the ‘adjacent’ state under OCSLA” (Rec.
Docs. 73-1, at 10; 74-1, at 10). At the very least, Defendants claim that Plaintiff did
not allege sufficient facts or conduct the necessary analysis in the consolidated
complaint to make this showing and that this alleged deficiency invalidates the writs
of sequestration that this Court issued. Defendants conclude this section of their
memoranda with the following conclusory statement: “Because Atlantic has not and
cannot substantiate its cursory assertion of adjacency (the threshold issue for
whether LOWLA applies at all), the Writs of Sequestration must be dissolved.” Id.
Defendants do not directly dispute or deny that Louisiana is the coastal state
adjacent to the oil leases for the purposes of OCSLA. Instead, they simply allege that
Plaintiffs failed to plead adjacency sufficiently. However, in the verified consolidated
complaint, Plaintiff alleged that for both of the leases at issue (the Gunflint Lease
and the Katmai Lease), Plaintiff filed its statements of privilege (i.e., lien affidavits)
into the mortgage records “of the Louisiana parishes adjacent” to the offshore leases.
(Rec. Doc. 50, at ¶¶ 16, 22 (emphasis added)). Further, Plaintiff stated that it also
recorded notices of lis pendens “in the mortgage records of the Louisiana parishes
adjacent” to the two leases, which is a required step to preserve the LOWLA privileges
against third persons. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 25. The Court finds that both of these statements
constitute allegations that Louisiana is the coastal state adjacent to the Gunflint and
Katmai Leases.
Defendants cite no authority, and the Court has not been able to find any, to
support their proposition that in order to later protect the plaintiff’s LOWLA privilege
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through a writ of sequestration, a plaintiff must allege adjacency by fully analyzing
the four factors that the Fifth Circuit outlined in Snyder Oil Corp. v. Samedan Oil
Corp. in the complaint. Snyder Oil Corp. v. Samedan Oil Corp., 208 F.3d 521, 524
(5th Cir. 2000). The Court does not believe that LOWLA or OCSLA requires plaintiffs
to plead with that level of particularity. Moreover, in its opposition to Defendants’
motions to vacate and dissolve the writs of sequestration, Plaintiff cites specific
evidence to demonstrate that Louisiana is the adjacent state to both leases for OCSLA
purposes. 	First, 	Intervenor-Defendant 	Talos 	QN 	Exploration 	LLC 	previously
conceded that Louisiana is the adjacent state to the Katmai Lease in Fieldwood’s
bankruptcy proceeding. In its opposition to Atlantic’s motion to dismiss the adversary
proceeding, 	QuarterNorth 	Energy 	LLC, 	now 	Talos 	QN 	Exploration 	LLC,
unequivocally stated that “the Debtors agree that GC-40 [the Katmai Lease] is
‘adjacent to’ Louisiana.” Fieldwood Energy LLC v. Atlantic Maritime Servs. LLC, No.
20-03476, Rec. Doc. 36, at ¶ 58 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 25, 2021). Therefore, Talos QN
Exploration is judicially estopped from arguing otherwise in this proceeding.
On the other hand, Talos QN Exploration, for one, has not previously conceded
that the Gunflint Lease (MC-498) is adjacent to Louisiana. Regardless, though, the
evidence points to this conclusion. In Snyder Oil Corp. v. Samedan Oil Corp., the
Fifth Circuit explained the four types of evidence a court should consider in making
an adjacency determination: “(1) geographic proximity; (2) which coast federal
agencies consider the subject platform to be ‘off of’; (3) prior court determinations;
and (4) projected boundaries.” Snyder Oil Corp., 208 F.3d at 524. Here, both
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Bankruptcy Judge Marvin Isgur and Plaintiff have established that the Gunflint
Lease is in closer geographic proximity to Louisiana than to Mississippi or Alabama;
specifically, the offshore lease is located 59 miles from Louisiana, while it is 146 miles
from Mississippi and 151 miles from the Alabama coast. Therefore, the first factor
weighs in favor of Plaintiff’s position.
Further, 	the 	Gunflint 	Unit 	Agreement 	and 	the 	Bureau 	of 	Safety 	and
Environmental Enforcement’s Certification-Determination both identify this lease as
being “offshore Louisiana,” suggesting that factor two also supports the finding that
Louisiana is the state adjacent to the Gunflint Lease. (Rec. Doc. 83-1, at 30, 31).
Third, Plaintiff indicates that courts have not made prior determinations regarding
the adjacent state to the Gunflint Lease. However, Plaintiff identifies cases in which
courts have concluded that OCS blocks even farther east than the Gunflint Lease are
adjacent to Louisiana. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in
the Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 148 F. Supp. 3d 563, 565 (E.D. La. 2015) (finding
that the Macondo well, which was northeast of the Gunflint lease, was adjacent to
Louisiana). Finally, the Minerals Management Service administrative map places
the Gunflint Lease within the projected boundaries of Louisiana, and the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) has adopted this map. Based on this evidence,
three of the four factors weigh in favor of finding that Louisiana is the adjacent state
to the Gunflint Lease for purposes of OCSLA, and therefore, the Court concludes that
Louisiana is the adjacent state to both leases at issue in this case. Accordingly,
Louisiana law would apply to these leases as surrogate federal law under OCSLA.
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B. Defendants’ Argument That Plaintiff Failed to Preserve LOWLA
Privileges
Next, Defendants maintain that even if Louisiana law, and hence LOWLA, do
apply, Plaintiff cannot enforce its LOWLA privileges because it failed to preserve
them. In the statements of privilege Plaintiff filed in the Louisiana parishes adjacent
to the two leases, Plaintiff stated that the “privilege is claimed upon the operating
interest of Fieldwood Energy LLC.” (See, e.g., Rec. Doc. 50-1, at 3). Because Plaintiff
referred specifically to “the operating interest of Fieldwood Energy,” Defendants
contend that Plaintiff cannot seek to enforce its privileges against Defendants
Ecopetrol, TEO, Ridgewood, and ILX, who are the other working interest owners in
the two leases. Defendants fail to note, however, that the statements of privilege also
identify the wells to which the privileges extend. In the section of the statements of
privilege entitled “Description of the Operating Interest Upon Which the Privilege is
Claimed, or of the Well with Respect to Which the Operations Giving Rise to
Claimant’s Privilege were Performed,” Plaintiff wrote, “[t]he privilege is claimed upon
the operating interest of Fieldwood Energy LLC . . . and Well #1 [or Well #4,
depending on the lease].” See, e.g., id.
Furthermore, it is well established that a LOWLA privilege extends to the
entire lease, including the interests of non-operators who hold working interests in
the lease. Guichard, 657 So. 2d at 1312 (“Also, it has been uniformly held that the
privilege is not restricted to proceeds of the well actually drilled but rather exists on
the entire lease as a whole.” (citing JHJ Ltd. I v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 806 F.2d 82,
82 (5th Cir. 1986)); Patricia H. Chicoine, Lien on LOWLA; It’s a Privilege: Recent
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Revisions to the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act, 57 La. L. Rev. 1133, 1145–46 (1997)
(contrasting 	LOWLA 	with 	Texas’s 	mineral 	lien, 	which 	attaches 	only 	to 	the
contracting lease owner’s interest, and explaining that under LOWLA, “the interests
of the operator and both participating and non-participating lessees are attached”).
LOWLA specifically outlines the information a statement of privilege must
contain. Relevant here, the statement of privilege must include a “description of the
operating interest upon which the privilege is claimed, or of the well with respect to
which the operations giving rise to the claimant’s privilege were performed.” La. Stat.
Ann. 	§ 	9:4868(A)(5) 	(emphasis 	added). 	In 	this 	case, 	Plaintiff 	included 	both 	a
description of the operating interest and of the wells where Plaintiff performed
services giving rise to the LOWLA privileges, in addition to providing the lease
numbers and the names of the fields where the leases are located. Further, Plaintiff’s
statements of privilege assert that the privileges are claimed over Fieldwood’s
operating interest and the specific wells, so the description is conjunctive, not
disjunctive. Therefore, Plaintiff complied with the statutory requirement. Further,
the statute explicitly provides that
A statement of privilege is not invalid if it fails to contain all of the
information required by Subsection A of this Section, but fairly apprises
the recipient or person against whom the privilege is asserted of the
privilege claimed and of the operating interest, hydrocarbons, or other
property upon which the privilege is claimed.
La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4868(E). By referring to the specific wells and leases for which
Plaintiff provided goods and services, Plaintiff fairly apprised Defendants of the
existence of the privileges.
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Under the public records doctrine, Louisiana law mandates that interests in
property, such as LOWLA privileges, must be recorded to have effect against third
persons.3 Here, Defendants are third persons because they were not in contractual
privity with Atlantic Maritime for the services performed. It is well established that
the “primary purpose of the public records doctrine is the protection of third persons
from unrecorded interests.” Ely Edwards Enters., Inc. v. Pontchartrain Park CDC
Real Est. Holdings, LLC, 2021-0623 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/13/22), 338 So. 3d 50, 53
(emphasis added) (citing Cimarex Energy Co. v. Mauboules, 2009-1170, p. 18 (La.
4/9/10), 40 So. 3d 931, 943). Plaintiff complied with the statutory requirements in
recording its LOWLA privileges, and therefore, these privileges had effect against
third persons. In this case, Defendants had both actual and constructive knowledge
of Plaintiff’s LOWLA privileges,4 and Plaintiff specifically indicated which wells on
which leases the privileges extended to. Therefore, the Court rejects Defendants’
argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve its privileges.
TEO makes a separate argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve its LOWLA
privilege against TEO’s working interest in the Gunflint Lease because Plaintiff did
not institute an action against TEO within a year of filing the statements of privilege.
Plaintiff has established that it filed statements of privilege for the Gunflint Lease
3 Plaintiff’s counsel pointed out in oral argument that recordation is required only as to third persons
because a privilege does not have to be recorded or preserved to affect a party with whom the
LOWLA claimant is in contractual privity. In other words, Plaintiff would not have needed to record
the privilege for it to have effect against Fieldwood; the entire purpose of recordation is to provide
notice to third persons.
4 Defendants had constructive knowledge under Louisiana’s public records doctrine because Plaintiff’s
statements of privilege were filed into the mortgage records of the parishes adjacent to the offshore
leases. Additionally, Defendants conceded that they had actual knowledge of the work Plaintiff did on
the leases when they acknowledged that they paid Fieldwood their proportionate shares of the cost.
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(MC-948) in Orleans, St. Tammany, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes on July
16, 2020. Plaintiff also alleges that it filed its first amended complaint naming TEO
as a defendant on July 14, 2021, which would be timely. TEO disputes this filing date,
however, because the Clerk’s Office marked the July 14th filing as deficient—in part
because Plaintiff had not sought leave of court to file the amended complaint—and
required Plaintiff to refile it within seven days. Plaintiff moved for leave of court on
July 16, and the Court granted leave to file the amended complaint on July 20.
Therefore, the amended complaint was not officially filed into the record until July
21, 2021.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has established that an action to enforce a
LOWLA privilege is by definition an in rem action, and because such an action on the
privilege is “effective against the whole of the property,” any action on the lien serves
“to preserve the lien as to the whole of the property.” Guichard, 657 So. 2d at 1318.
In other words, because Atlantic took the necessary steps to preserve its LOWLA
privileges as to the Gunflint Lease—i.e., filing statements of privilege and instituting
an in rem action to enforce the privileges against Ecopetrol within a year of
recordation—it is irrelevant that Plaintiff did not name TEO as a defendant until
later.
C. Defendants’ Argument That the Writs of Sequestration Are
Incompatible with Governing Federal Law
Next, Defendants argue that the writs of sequestration issued by the Court are
incompatible with controlling federal law because the writs require a transfer of the
federal lease interests, which Defendants claim must be approved by the Secretary of
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the Interior through the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). This is
simply not the case. As explained in the Court’s previous Order and Reasons granting
Plaintiff’s motions for writs of sequestration (Rec. Doc. 55), a writ of sequestration is
a conservatory mechanism that operates to preserve the status quo. Grantt Guillory,
110 So. 3d at 189. In other words, a writ of sequestration maintains the current
ownership of the property in dispute and simply seeks to preserve the property
pending 	the 	outcome 	of 	the 	litigation; 	it 	does 	not 	transfer 	ownership 	of 	the
sequestered property interest. Express Supply & Steel, LLC v. Cox Operating, LLC,
No. 23-154, 2023 WL 172045, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023) (Vance, J.). Because a
writ of sequestration does not transfer ownership of the sequestered property, the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior is not required. For these reasons, the Court
rejects Defendants’ argument that the writs of sequestration are incompatible with
governing federal law.
D. Defendants’ Argument That Plaintiff’s Privileges Were Extinguished by
Commingling
Fourth, Defendants urge the Court to vacate and dissolve the writs of
sequestration because they claim that Plaintiff’s privileges over the hydrocarbons and
their proceeds have become extinguished due to commingling. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 	Section 	9:4869 	explains 	the 	way 	in 	which 	LOWLA 	privileges 	over
hydrocarbons and their proceeds may be extinguished. First, the “privilege over
hydrocarbons is extinguished when the hydrocarbons have become so commingled
with, processed with, or transformed into other hydrocarbons or substances not
subject to the privilege as to no longer be reasonably identifiable.” La. Stat. Ann.
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§ 9:4869(A)(2). Additionally, the LOWLA “privilege over the proceeds from the
disposition of hydrocarbons attributable to an interest of the lessee is extinguished
when the proceeds have become so commingled with other funds not subject to the
privilege as to no longer be reasonably identifiable.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4869(A)(3).
Defendants claim that the hydrocarbons and proceeds over which Atlantic
Maritime’s 	privileges 	extend 	have 	become 	so 	commingled 	with 	Talos 	QN
Exploration’s hydrocarbons and proceeds as to extinguish the privileges. Plaintiff
responds 	by 	saying first 	that 	Defendants 	have 	the 	burden 	to 	prove 	that 	the
hydrocarbons and proceeds have become commingled to the point that they are no
longer reasonably identifiable. More significantly, however, Plaintiff points out that
the LOWLA privilege does not extend to the hydrocarbons themselves, but instead to
the WIOs’ interests in those hydrocarbons. The statute reads in part, “the privilege
given by R.S. 9:4862 is established over . . . (3) The interest of the operator and
participating lessee in hydrocarbons produced from the operating interest and the
interest of a non-participating lessee in hydrocarbons produced from that part of his
operating interest subject to the privilege.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4863(A)(3). Stated
another way, the statute entitles Plaintiff to a privilege over each working interest
owner’s proportional share of the hydrocarbons and proceeds, which means that
Plaintiff’s privilege would extend to Ecopetrol’s, TEO’s, Ridgewood’s, and ILX’s
interests in the “hydrocarbons produced from that part of [their] operating interest
subject to the privilege,” but it would not extend to Talos QN’s interest, which it
purchased from Fieldwood as part of the bankruptcy proceedings.
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Moreover, LOWLA addresses specifically the privilege that is granted over a
non-operator’s 	interest—either 	a 	“non-participating 	lessee” 	or 	a 	“participating
lessee”—in hydrocarbons and proceeds. LOWLA defines a “non-participating lessee”
as a “lessee who is neither an operator nor a participating lessee.” La. Stat. Ann.
§ 9:4861(9). A “participating lessee,” on the other hand,
is a lessee who is not the operator, but who is personally bound by
contract to the operator to pay or reimburse the operator for any part of
the obligation secured by the privilege or for any part of the price of the
contract of the contractor from whom the operations giving rise to the
claimant’s privilege emanate.
La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4861(8). Based on Defendants’ pleadings, the WIOs’ obligations to
the operator were governed by Unit Operating Agreements, under which they were
contractually obligated to reimburse the operator, formerly Fieldwood, for their
proportionate shares of the costs of Atlantic Maritime’s services. Under these facts,
Defendants would be participating lessees, which means that Plaintiff’s privilege over
their interests would not be limited at all by the statute. In slight contrast, a non-
participating lessee’s interest is still subject to the LOWLA privilege, but the LOWLA
privilege would be limited to “the unit boundaries,” meaning that the privilege would
“not extend to the non-participating lessee’s interest in other units in which the lease
may participate or in other wells that may be located on the lease.” Patricia H.
Chicoine, Lien on LOWLA; It’s a Privilege: Recent Revisions to the Louisiana Oil Well
Lien Act, 57 La. L. Rev. 1133, 1141 (1997).
In sum, Plaintiff’s LOWLA privileges, when properly preserved, extended not
only to the operator’s interest in the leases, but also to those interests held by both
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participating and non-participating lessees. This is because the sole purpose of
LOWLA is to protect contractors, laborers, and employees by creating privileges that
extend beyond the interest of the operator who contracted with them to the entire
lease that was benefitted by their work.
E. Defendants’ Argument That the Writs Are Overly Broad
As 	their 	penultimate 	argument, 	Defendants 	claim 	that 	the 	writs 	of
sequestration are “overly broad, vague, and impossible to implement or enforce” (Rec.
Doc. 73-1, at 19), and they proceed to give four examples to illustrate this point. To
summarize the arguments, some of which have already been made, Defendants claim
that it is not possible to enforce the LOWLA privileges and writs of sequestration in
a way that does not affect the Debtor’s successor’s (Talos QN’s) interest in the leases.
Then, Defendants reiterate that the hydrocarbons and proceeds have become too
commingled as to be reasonably identifiable, and that consequently, the LOWLA
privileges have been extinguished.
Third, Defendants claim that the writs “are overly broad—and inconsistent
with LOWLA—because they direct the U.S. Marshal to seize ‘[a]ny rig owned by [the
WIO Defendants] located at the well site[.]’” Id. at 20. The Court agrees with
Defendants on this point. The 1995 revision of LOWLA restricted the privilege over
“[d]rilling or other rig[s]” to those “owned by the operator or by a contractor from
whom 	the 	activities 	giving 	rise 	to 	the 	privilege 	emanate.” 	La. 	Stat. 	Ann.
§ 9:4863(A)(2). The writs the Court issued, on the other hand, ordered any rig owned
by one of the Defendants (Ecopetrol, TEO, Ridgewood, or ILX) to be sequestered. (Rec.
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Docs. 57, at 1; 58, at 1; 60, at 1; 61, at 1). This point is moot, however, because in their
motions, Defendants explain that there are no rigs located at the well sites to be
sequestered. Finally, Defendants claim that the writs are overly broad “because they
are not limited to the value of Atlantic’s claim.” Id. This argument appears plausible.
However, the writs of sequestration merely preserve the property pending litigation,
and Plaintiff will not be permitted to recover more than the amounts to which it has
a valid claim.
Defendants focus heavily on the argument that the hydrocarbons and proceeds
therefrom have become too commingled as to be reasonably identifiable, and that
hence, 	Plaintiff’s 	LOWLA 	privileges 	have 	been 	extinguished. 	However, 	in 	the
alternative, Defendants ask the Court to release any sequestered property in excess
of Atlantic’s claims. Suggesting that the sequestered property could be divided based
on value severely undercuts Defendants’ argument that the property has become too
commingled. 	The 	Court 	appreciates 	Defendants’ 	concern 	that 	the 	sequestered
property’s value may surpass the value of Plaintiff’s claims, but Defendants should
be reassured that in no case will Plaintiff’s recovery exceed any legitimate claims
Plaintiff is ultimately determined to have.
F. Defendants’ Argument That Writs of Sequestration Require Security
Lastly, Defendants claim that the writs of sequestration are invalid because
Plaintiff did not provide the required security. Generally, the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure provides that an “applicant for a writ of sequestration shall furnish
security for an amount determined by the court to be sufficient to protect the
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defendant against any damage resulting from a wrongful issuance, unless security is
dispensed with by law.” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3574. In this case, security is
dispensed with by law because LOWLA explicitly states that under the statute, a
“claimant may enforce his privilege by a writ of sequestration, without the necessity
of furnishing security.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4871. Therefore, Defendants’ argument to
the contrary is meritless.
G. Defendants’ Request for Alternative Relief
Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court release the sequestered
property whose value exceeds Plaintiff’s claims. Under Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 3505, when “the value of the property seized under a writ of
attachment or of sequestration exceeds what is reasonably necessary to satisfy the
plaintiff’s claim, the defendant by contradictory motion may obtain the release of the
excess.” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3505. The Court finds two issues with this argument.
First, Defendants claim that “[t]here is no question that the value of the
property 	seized 	under 	the 	Writ 	of 	Sequestration 	‘exceeds 	what 	is 	reasonably
necessary to satisfy’ Atlantic’s claim.” (E.g., Rec. Doc. 73-1, at 22). In the next
paragraph, however, Defendants state that the proceeds on production from the two
wells at issue “would overwhelm the principal amount of Atlantic’s claim . . . within
a matter of months.” (Rec. Doc. 73-1, at 23). It is unclear to the Court whether the
currently sequestered property’s value exceeds the value of Plaintiff’s claims or
whether it will do so in the next several months. Defendants would need to clarify
their position before the Court could act on this alternative request.
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Second, under LOWLA, Plaintiff is statutorily entitled not only to the amounts
of the obligations owed, but also to interest due on these amounts, the “cost of
preparing and filing the statement of privilege and notice of pendency of action,” and
reasonable attorney fees “not to exceed ten percent.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4862(B).
Because of this statutory entitlement, the Court would first need to calculate the full
value of Plaintiff’s claims (including interest and costs) before the Court could release
what Defendants claim is excess sequestered property.
The Court is sympathetic to Defendants’ claim that they previously paid
Fieldwood their proportionate shares for Atlantic Maritime’s drilling services and
that if Atlantic were to prevail in this case, they would have to pay for these services
twice.5 However, the situation in the instant case is precisely the problem that the
Louisiana Legislature sought to solve when it enacted LOWLA, which is intended to
provide “broad and far reaching protection to providers of labor . . . in conjunction
with the drilling of oil wells.” Guichard, 657 So. 2d at 1311. The Court previously
found 	that 	Plaintiff 	had 	fulfilled 	all 	statutory 	requirements 	for 	the 	writs 	of
sequestration to issue, and the Court affirms that finding today.
5 During oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that under Talos QN’s joint operating agreements
with Defendants, Talos QN, as operator on the two leases, has indemnity obligations to Defendants.
Defendants did not deny this allegation, so the Court must assume that Defendants themselves would
not have to pay for Atlantic Maritime’s services twice.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Vacate and Dissolve
Writs of Sequestration or, Alternatively, for Release of Excess Seizure (Rec. Docs. 73,
74, 75, 77, 80) are DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 6th day of February, 2026.
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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