USA v. Kendrick et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 16-163
TROY KENDRICK 	SECTION: “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendant 	Troy 	Kendrick’s 	Motion 	for
Compassionate Release (Doc. 475). For the following reasons, the Motion is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
In September 2018, 	a jury found Defendant Troy Kendrick guilty of
conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute a quantity of
cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and
846 and being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 327 months in prison. Defendant
appealed, challenging the Court’s denial of a motion to suppress a Title III
wiretap, the sufficiency of the evidence of his drug conviction, his sentencing
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enhancements, and the effectiveness of his counsel. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
his convictions and sentence.
Subsequently, Defendant moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, 	arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing 	to fully
investigate and properly litigate a motion to suppress a Title III wiretap of his
phone and the evidence that resulted from that wiretap. The Court denied his
Motion, holding that Defendant failed to show that his counsel was ineffective
in investigating and arguing the Motion to Suppress or that more thorough
investigation 	or 	better 	argument 	would 	have 	changed 	its 	outcome. 	His
subsequent Rule 59 Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s denial was also
denied. The Fifth Circuit denied his request for a certificate of appealability.
Defendant then moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(6) 	for 	relief 	from 	the 	Court’s 	May 	2019 	ruling 	at 	his 	sentencing
classifying Defendant as an armed career criminal pursuant to the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). The Court held that the motion was a second
or successive § 2255 motion and therefore the court did not have jurisdiction to
consider it until certified as provided in § 2244 by the Fifth Circuit. The Court
also found the motion untimely.
Now, Defendant moves for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) on several grounds, including family circumstances, disparity
in sentencing, and rehabilitation.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The 	district 	court’s 	jurisdiction 	to 	correct 	or 	modify 	a 	defendant’s
sentence is limited to those specific circumstances enumerated by Congress in
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18 U.S.C. § 3582.”1 Section 3582(c), as amended by the First Step Act, states
in relevant part that:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been
imposed except that—(1) in any case—(A) the court, upon motion
of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the
defendant 	after 	the 	defendant 	has 	fully 	exhausted 	all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons
to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days
from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s
facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment
(and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or
without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the
original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it
finds that—
(i) 	extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction; or
(ii) 	the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at
least 	30 	years 	in 	prison, 	pursuant 	to 	a 	sentence
imposed 	under 	section 	3559(c), 	for 	the 	offense 	or
offenses 	for 	which 	the 	defendant 	is 	currently
imprisoned, and a determination has been made by
the 	Director 	of 	the 	Bureau 	of 	Prisons 	that 	the
defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other
person or the community, as provided under section
3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]
The statute does not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Rather,
the Sentencing Commission was directed by Congress to promulgate policy
statements 	describing 	what 	should 	be 	considered 	an 	extraordinary 	or
1 United States v. Garcia, 606 F.3d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 2010).
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compelling 	reason 	for 	sentence 	modification. 	On 	November 	1, 	2023, 	the
Sentencing Commission issued an amended policy statement applicable to
motions filed by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons and motions filed by the
defendant, which sets forth circumstances that are considered “extraordinary
and 	compelling.”2 	These 	include 	the 	defendant’s 	health, 	age, 	family
circumstances, 	whether 	the 	defendant 	was 	a 	victim 	of 	abuse 	while
incarcerated, whether he is serving an unusually long sentence, and “other
reasons.”3 “Other reasons” are defined as those that are “similar in gravity” to
the reasons described in the policy statement.4
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendant shows that he has satisfied the administrative exhaustion
requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A), and this Court will therefore consider his
request on its merits. He asserts several different reasons for which this Court
should grant him compassionate release. This Court will consider each in turn.
A. Family Circumstances
First, 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	his 	family 	circumstance 	warrants
compassionate release. Specifically, he alleges that he is the only available
caretaker for his mother, who requires daily assistance with transportation,
household tasks, and medication management.
The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement states that, provided a
defendant is not a danger to the community, extraordinary and compelling
reasons for release exist when a defendant shows “[t]he incapacitation of the
2 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (amended Nov. 1, 2023).
3 Id.
4 Id.
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defendant’s parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver
for the parent.”5 “For guidance on what constitutes ‘incapacitation,’ courts look
to 	the 	[Bureau 	of 	Prison 	(‘BOP’)]’s 	non-binding 	Program 	Statement 	for
processing compassionate release requests.”6 In analogous circumstances, the
BOP considers a person 	“incapacitated” if he or she has “[s]uffered a serious
injury, or a debilitating physical illness” resulting in complete disability,
meaning that the person “cannot carry on any self-care and is totally confined
to a bed or chair;” or has a “severe cognitive deficit” affecting the person’s
“mental capacity or function.”7
Defendant alleges that his mother is a cancer survivor and recently
underwent a cervical fusion surgery. He contends that she plans to relocate
from Texas to Louisiana soon, and he is the only available caregiver to assist
her in Louisiana. He asserts that he has one brother who is a full-time parent
to eight children in Texas and another brother who cannot provide consistent
assistance to his mother because of “personal struggles.” Defendant supports
these allegations with an affidavit from his mother in which she asserts that
she needs significant help performing daily living tasks and struggles with
mobility, transportation, and managing her medical needs. She also contends
that she will have less access to resources and care options when she moves
from Texas to Louisiana and that Defendant is the only “realistic and available
family member” who can provide care.
5 Id.
6 United States v. White, No. CR 16-40, 2021 WL 1721016, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 30,
2021). 7 Federal Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement § 5050.50 at 10, https://www.bop.gov/
policy/progstat/5050_050_EN.pdf.
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The medical records presented by Defendant do not, however, bear out
these allegations. The records reveal that Defendant’s mother is 58 years old
and currently cancer-free. She underwent a C2-T2 cervical spinal fusion on
December 16, 2024 after a fall. At her follow-up appointment on April 1, 2025,
she indicated that she is doing well, although she reported some remaining
muscle pain and stiffness. Her cervical x-ray showed good alignment and no
hardware malfunction. She is prescribed muscle relaxers and pain medication.
Her doctor noted that she continues to increase activity as tolerated. Defendant
has not presented any medical evidence that supports the allegation that she
needs assistance performing daily tasks, and there is certainly no evidence that
she is completely disabled or confined to a bed or chair. He also has not
presented any evidence explaining who previously served as his mother’s
caretaker, including after her December 2024 fall, fusion surgery, and recovery
during the past ten months. Finally, beyond his mother’s affidavit, Defendant
has not presented any evidence showing that his brothers are not available and
capable of assisting in his mother’s care. “When there are other adults who can
care for an ailing family member, courts have denied compassionate release.”8
“Generally, the defendant has the burden to show circumstances meeting the
test for compassionate release.”9 Defendant has not carried his burden to show
that his mother is incapacitated or that he is the only available caregiver.
Accordingly, 	Defendant 	has 	not 	shown 	that 	his 	family 	circumstances
constitute a compelling and extraordinary reason for release.
8 United States v. Sims, No. CR H-21-513-1, 2024 WL 4266760, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
23, 2024).
9 United States v. Crandle, No. CR 10-35-SDD-RLB, 2020 WL 2188865, at *3 (M.D.
La. May 6, 2020).
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B. Sentencing Disparity
Next, Defendant asserts two arguments regarding his sentence and
contends 	that 	these 	issues 	should 	be 	equitable 	considerations 	for
compassionate release. First, he alleges “a sentencing disparity grounded in a
categorical 	mismatch 	that 	already 	existed 	at 	the 	time 	of 	sentencing.”
Essentially, Defendant argues that the predicate offenses establishing his
career 	offender 	status 	should 	not 	have 	served 	as 	“controlled 	substances
offenses” because the relevant state statutes were categorically broader than
the 	equivalent 	federal 	statutes 	because 	of 	their 	inclusion 	of 	hemp 	and
ioflupane. Second, he argues that he should not have received an enhancement
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because: (1) two of his prior
drug offenses should not have been counted separately because they were part
of the same course of conduct; (2) a jury is required to make the determination
that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions for
ACCA purposes; and (3) the qualifying conviction occurred when Defendant
was very young.10
These arguments unequivocally challenge “the fact or duration of a
prisoner’s confinement under Chapter 153.”11 “In Chapter 153 of Title 28,
Congress 	provided 	specific 	avenues 	for 	post-conviction 	relief 	that 	permit
prisoners to challenge the legality of their confinement in federal court,” such
as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2244, 2254, and 2255.12 “The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that by codifying these specific provisions, Congress required
10 Most of these arguments were already raised in Defendant’s Rule 60 Motion (Doc.
457), and this Court held that the motion was a second and successive § 2255 motion (Doc.
464). 11 United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 187 (5th Cir. 2023).
12 Id. at 186–87.
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prisoners to bring their legality-of-custody challenges under Chapter 153 and
prohibited prisoners from bringing such claims under other, more-general
statutes.”13 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit has expressly ruled that “a prisoner
cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge the legality or duration of his sentence; such
arguments can, and hence must, be raised under Chapter 153.”14 Because
Defendant’s claims would have been cognizable under § 2255, they may not be
raised in a request for compassionate release. Further, “[a] defendant is
generally permitted only one motion under § 2255 and may not file successive
motions without first obtaining this Court’s authorization.”15 Accordingly,
these arguments fail.
C. Rehabilitation
Finally, 	Defendant 	seeks 	compassionate 	release 	in 	light 	of 	his
rehabilitative efforts in prison. While the Court finds these efforts admirable,
his rehabilitation alone is not sufficiently “extraordinary or compelling” to
warrant 	compassionate 	release.16 	Indeed, 	in 	advising 	the 	Sentencing
Commission 	to 	define 	“extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons,” 	Congress
provided just one restriction: “Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not
be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.”17 “[R]ehabilitation is
expected, not extraordinary.”18 Accordingly, Defendant has failed to show
grounds for compassionate release.
13 Id. at 187.
14 Id.
15 United States v. Hernandes, 708 F.3d 680, 681 (5th Cir. 2013).
16 See United States v. Hughes, No. 4:18-CR-46(25), 2022 WL 2483720, at *4 (E.D.
Tex. July 6, 2022) (and cases cited therein).
17 28 U.S.C. § 994.
18 United States v. Carrera, No. 3:14-CR-0367-B-40, 2023 WL 1070609, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 27, 2023).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 5th day of November, 2025.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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