Drus v. Microsoft Corporation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT ASHLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-72-DLB-CJS
MARINA DRUS 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	MEMORANDUM ORDER
MICROSOFT CORPORATION 	DEFENDANT
* * * 	* * * 	* * * 	* * *
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Marina Drus’s “Objection to Magistrate
Judge’s Order Denying Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Restrict Public Access / Re-Seal
Affected Materials.” 	(Doc. # 40). 	Because Plaintiff has failed to show that Magistrate
Judge Smith’s Order (Doc. # 39) is clearly erroneous or contrary to law, her Objection is
overruled.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marina Drus alleges that Defendant Microsoft Corporation wrongfully
discharged her because of her disability. (Doc. # 1-3). The Court has previously provided
a fulsome recitation of the facts, and it refrains from repeating itself here. (See Doc. # 28
at 1-3). However, a brief discussion of the procedural history is instructive.
On February 20, 2026, Magistrate Judge Smith denied Plaintiff’s prior Motion for
Leave to File Documents Under Seal (Doc. # 16) and denied her Consolidated Motion to
Proceed Under a Pseudonym and Maintain Complaint Under Seal (Doc. # 20). 	(Doc. #
27). Shortly after Judge Smith issued her Order (Doc. # 27), this Court granted Microsoft’s
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Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings. 1 	(Doc. # 28). 	Roughly one month
after this Order, Plaintiff filed an Emergency Motion to Restrict Public Access (the
“Emergency Motion”). 	(Doc. # 33). 	Through her Emergency Motion, Plaintiff asked the
Court to: (1) restrict public access to her Consolidated Motion (Doc. # 20) and the
attachments unsealed pursuant to Judge Smith’s Order (Doc. # 27); (2) permit Plaintiff to
file redacted versions of those materials removing identity-linked disability information;
and (3) permit Plaintiff to proceed using initials or a pseudonym for future filings. (Doc. #
33 at 8).
After receiving briefing from the parties, Judge Smith denied Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion. (Doc. # 39). With respect to Plaintiff’s request to re-seal portions of the docket,
Judge Smith concluded that Plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption that items in the
public record should not be sealed. (Id. at 3). Specifically, Judge Smith found that Plaintiff
had failed to provide “the detailed analysis required by the case law to justify sealing any
documents.” 	(Id. at 4 (citing Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825
F.3d 299, 305-06 (6th Cir. 2016))). 	Turning to Plaintiff’s request to proceed under a
pseudonym, Judge Smith similarly held that Plaintiff failed to establish privacy interests
that overcame the substantial public interest in open courts. (Id. at 5). Moreover, Judge
Smith noted that, as she explained in an earlier Order (Doc. # 27), Plaintiff had waived
her right to proceed under a pseudonym by repeatedly disclosing her name in the public
record. 	(Doc. # 33 at 5). 	Judge Smith also denied Plaintiff’s alternative request to
proceed using initials, finding it “conclusory and unsupported by citation to legal authority.”
1 	Despite being represented by counsel in this case, Plaintiff filed a pro se Motion to Alter
the Court’s Order compelling arbitration. (Doc. # 31). Five days later, her attorney filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the same Order on Plaintiff’s behalf. 	(Doc. # 32). 	The Court ultimately
denied both Motions. (Docs. # 34 and 41).
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(Id. at 6). 	Fourteen days later, Plaintiff filed the instant Objection (Doc. # 40), which is
ripe for the Court’s review.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a district judge may designate a magistrate
judge “to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court,” with the
exception of certain dispositive motions. Parties may object to a magistrate judge’s order
on a non-dispositive matter. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 	However, magistrate judges “have
broad discretion over discovery and non-dispositive matters.” Cooperrider v. Perry, No.
3:22-cv-16-GFVT-EBA, 2026 WL 988479, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 2026) (citation omitted).
A district court may reconsider a magistrate judge’s decision on a pretrial, non-
dispositive matter, where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.” 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 	“This
standard requires the District Court to review findings of fact for clear error and to review
matters of law de novo.” 	Bisig v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 219 (6th Cir.
2019) (quoting EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99 (3d. Cir. 2017)). A factual
finding is clearly erroneous if, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Relatedly, an
order is “contrary to the law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case
law, or rules of procedure.” Bisig, 940 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation omitted).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff takes issue with “several portions” of Judge Smith’s Order. 	(Doc. # 40).
As relief, she asks the Court to set aside the Order and grant the relief she sought in her
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Emergency Motion to Seal (Doc. # 33) by: (1) restricting public access to her Consolidated
Motion (Doc. # 20) and all attachments that remain unsealed pursuant to the Court’s
February 20, 2026 Order; (2) permitting Plaintiff to file redacted versions of those
materials removing identity-linked disability information while maintaining unredacted
versions under seal; and (3) permitting Plaintiff to proceed using initials or a pseudonym
for future filings.2 	(Doc. # 40 at 2). 	Plaintiff divides her Objection into eight substantive
subheadings. 	(Id. at 2-11). 	In light of substantive overlap, however, the Court will
consolidate these subheadings into five arguments and address each in turn.
A. 	Judge Smith’s Consideration of Plaintiff’s Alternative Request for
Partial Pseudonymity
Plaintiff argues that Judge Smith’s Order incorrectly concluded that “Plaintiff’s
alternative request [for partial pseudonymity] was ‘conclusory and unsupported by citation
to legal authority.’” (Doc. # 40 at 2 (quoting Doc. # 39 at 6)). Rather, Plaintiff notes that
her Reply included a section titled “Courts Have Granted Pseudonym or Partial-Name
Relief in Analogous Cases.” 	(Id. at 3). 	This section included a citation to Doe v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 694 F. Supp. 3d 1040 (M.D.
Tenn. 2023). 	Therefore, Plaintiff claims that “[t]he finding that the partial-name request
was unsupported by citation is therefore erroneous.” (Doc. # 40 at 3-4).
The Court disagrees that Judge Smith’s characterization was clearly erroneous.
Plaintiff rightly points out that her Reply contained a section titled “Courts Have Granted
Pseudonym or Partial-Name Relief in Analogous Cases.” 	(Id. at 3 (citing Doc. # 36 at
2 	Plaintiff also asks, in the alternative, that the Court grant “the narrower relief proposed in
Doc. 36: partial-name or initials-based protection for future filings, together with targeted
redactions or restrictions sufficient to prevent continued public association of Plaintiff’s full name
with identity-linked disability information.” (Id.).
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10)). 	However, this two-paragraph section cites only one case: Doe v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville. 	(Doc. # 36 at 10). 	And Doe v. Metropolitan Government of
Nashville did not concern partial pseudonymity. Rather, in that case, the court allowed a
plaintiff to proceed entirely under a pseudonym. 	694 F. Supp. 3d at 1046 (“Plaintiff’s
motion (Docket No. 3) is therefore GRANTED and Plaintiff shall be permitted to proceed
pseudonymously in this action.”). Although Plaintiff’s Reply suggested that “Courts Have
Granted Pseudonym or Partial-Name Relief in Analogous Cases,” she did not identify a
single case in which a court granted the kind of partial-name relief that is the subject of
her alternative request. (Doc. # 36 at 10-11). Rather, she simply stated that “courts have”
granted such relief. 3 	Therefore, Plaintiff’s alternative request was not supported by
citation to applicable legal authority. 4
B. 	Judge Smith’s Treatment of Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion (Doc. # 33)
Where a party seeks to seal or otherwise avoid the disclosure of judicial records,
she must overcome the “‘strong presumption in favor of openness’ as to court records.”
Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710
F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983)). This requires a party to identify (1) a compelling interest
in sealing the records that (2) outweighs the public’s interest in accessing the records and
(3) make a request that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Kondash v. Kia Motors
Am., Inc., 767 F. App’x 635, 637 (6th Cir. 2019). The proponent of sealing must “analyze
3 	Relatedly, Plaintiff argues that Judge Smith erred by failing to separately address her
alternative request for partial pseudonymity. (Doc. # 40 at 9-10). However, as discussed above,
Judge Smith did address this request—she simply deemed it conclusory and without support.
(Doc. # 39 at 5-6).
4 	Further, the Court finds that partial pseudonymity is unwarranted in this case for the same
reasons that full pseudonymity is inappropriate. See infra § III.E.
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in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal
citations.” Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305-06 (citing Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 297 F.3d
544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002)).
In her Emergency Motion, Plaintiff identified her previous Consolidated Motion
(Doc. # 20) and an attachment thereto (Doc. # 20-2) as the filings she wished to seal.
(Doc. # 33 at 8). Her Emergency Motion asked the Court to “restrict public access” to her
Consolidated Motion and its attachments and permit her to file redacted versions of those
documents, 	removing 	identity-linked 	disability 	information. 	(Id.). 	This 	relief 	was
necessary, Plaintiff alleged, because “[a]fter the Court’s order and the resulting public
access to the materials at issue, Plaintiff’s name became broadly linked online with
disability-related litigation information from this case.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff claimed that “the
affected filings disclose identity-linked medical and disability information in judicial records
that are now being indexed and republished in a manner that magnifies the harm from
disclosure.” 	(Id. at 2-3). 	This public exposure, Plaintiff continued, directly caused
“reputational damage and career harm,” which prevented her from obtaining employment.
(Id. at 4-5). 	Judge Smith, after considering these arguments, determined that Plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that sealing of any record filings was appropriate. (Doc. # 39 at 4).
Specifically, Judge Smith found that Plaintiff “only broadly reference[d]” the filings at issue
and failed to provide “the detailed analysis required by the case law to justify sealing any
documents.” (Id. (citing Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305-06)).
Now, Plaintiff objects and maintains that her Emergency Motion “did more than
make a broad reference” to prior filings. 	(Doc. # 40 at 4). 	Plaintiff insists that her
Emergency Motion “identified the asserted compelling interests, including career harm,
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documented PTSD-related harm, financial harm, and the risk of continued public search-
engine association between Plaintiff’s full name and sensitive disability information.” (Id.).
And Plaintiff states that her Emergency Motion “did identify the affected filings, the
asserted harm, and narrower forms of relief.” 	(Id.). 	So, she asks the Court to “review
whether the Order’s characterization of [the Emergency Motion (Doc. # 33)] as only a
broad reference accurately reflects the record.” (Id.).
Again, the Court cannot find that Judge Smith’s “characterization” of Plaintiff’s
Emergency Motion was clearly erroneous. As the proponent of sealing, Plaintiff bore “the
burden of showing that ‘disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury[.]’” Shane
Grp., 825 F.3d at 307 (quoting In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001)).
“And, ‘in delineating the injury to be prevented, specificity is essential.’” 	Id. (quoting
Cendant, 260 F.3d at 194). The Sixth Circuit has observed that such specificity requires
the proponent of sealing to analyze in detail, “document by document, the propriety of
secrecy” and provide legal justifications for nondisclosure. Id. at 305-06. True, Plaintiff’s
Emergency Motion did identify the filings at issue. 	But it did not go through each
document in detail, on a “line-by-line basis” and identify the specific disability-related
information that warrants sealing. Id. at 308.
Judge Smith recognized that the Emergency Motion explains how an increase in
search indexing has affected Plaintiff, generally. (Doc. # 39 at 4). Nevertheless, Judge
Smith concluded that Plaintiff failed to conduct the requisite examination of each
document she proposed to seal, identifying the specific disability-related information at
issue and explaining the need for secrecy. (Id.). Looking to Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion,
the Court agrees with Judge Smith. Although Plaintiff asked the Court to permit her leave
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to redact “identity-linked disability information” from her Consolidated Motion and its
accompanying attachment, she did not identify what this information was, where it
occurred in the Consolidated Motion, or why each instance warranted sealing. 	(Doc. #
33 at 8). 	Instead, Plaintiff offered a generalized explanation for why the Consolidated
Motion and attachments, as a whole, must be sealed. 	Thus, she failed to provide the
sufficiently detailed analysis required by law. See Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 305-06.
C. 	Judge Smith’s Treatment of Plaintiff’s Reply
Next, Plaintiff objects to Judge Smith’s statement, in a footnote, that portions of
Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of her Consolidated Motion were “either overly repetitive or []
beyond the scope of her requests to restrict public access and to proceed via a
pseudonym.” (Doc. # 40 at 4-5 (citing Doc. # 39 at 2 n.3)). Acknowledging that her Reply
exceeded the length permitted by the Local Rules, Plaintiff states that “[t]he arguments
and authority at issue appeared within the first fifteen pages of the Reply[.]” 	(Id. at 5).
Plaintiff contends that her Reply “addressed distinct components of the relief sought [in
her Consolidated Motion]” and “respectfully submits that the generalized footnote does
not provide enough explanation for meaningful Rule 72(a) review.” (Id.). So, she “asks
the District Judge to review the portions of the Reply that supplied the analysis the Order
found lacking, particularly the arguments and authority within the first fifteen pages.” (Id.).
But Plaintiff fails to direct the Court to the “portions of the Reply” that she believes
went unaddressed. 	(Id.). 	With this objection, Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to
reexamine 	the 	Emergency 	Motion 	independently 	of 	Judge 	Smith’s 	Order 	without
identifying specific points of contention. This kind of “objection” is impermissibly vague.
See Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 654, 653 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The filing of vague, general, or
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conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is
tantamount to a complete failure to object.”) (citation omitted). 	Nevertheless, out of an
abundance of caution, the Court will discuss some of the arguments Plaintiff raised in the
first fifteen pages of her Reply.
First, Plaintiff argued that she is suffering a harm that is “concrete, direct, traceable,
and causally linked.” (Doc. # 36 at 1). The Court will address this argument in connection
with Plaintiff’s objection that she suffered harm beyond general embarrassment. 	See
infra, § III.E. Plaintiff also argued that “ADA claims should permit privacy protection where
disclosure causes harm.” (Id. at 13-14). This policy argument collapses into the Court’s
treatment of Plaintiff’s objection that she suffered harm that warrants nondisclosure.
Because these arguments are addressed below, the Court will not discuss them here.
Second, Plaintiff’s Reply argues that “Microsoft’s conduct in these proceedings has
caused concrete harm and demonstrates why arbitration is not a viable forum.” 5 	(Id. at
14-15). 	Plaintiff argues that “[t]he issues presented in this case—public disclosure,
employment harm, and the forum question—are not separate matters. 	They form a
single, interconnected chain of harm.” 	(Id. at 15). 	She continues that the public
association of her identity with this litigation “is the direct cause of her inability to secure
employment” and that this inability has “worsened Plaintiff’s condition, as documented by
her 	treating 	therapist.” 	(Id.). 	And 	Plaintiff 	blames 	“Microsoft’s 	posture 	in 	these
proceedings[,]” 	including 	its 	attempt 	to 	“force 	Plaintiff 	into 	closed 	arbitration,” 	for
exacerbating her condition. (Id.).
5 	This argument appeared on pages 14 through 17 of Plaintiff’s Reply. The Court will only
consider the argument presented on pages 14 and 15. See L.R. 7.1(d) (“Replies may not exceed
15 pages without leave of Court.”).
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Perhaps due to the fact that this section bleeds onto pages beyond the remit of
Plaintiff’s Reply, the Court is unable to grasp the point of this argument. 	The Court
appreciates Plaintiff’s assertion that the “issues presented in this case” are interrelated.
(Doc. # 36 at 15). 	However, that sheds little light on the propriety of sealing Plaintiff’s
Consolidated Motion or allowing pseudonymity. 	And although Plaintiff takes umbrage
with “Microsoft’s posture” and its characterization of her motions, she does not claim that
Microsoft has violated any ethical or procedural rule. 	(Id.). 	Additionally, that Microsoft
sought to compel arbitration, distressing as it may be, does not entitle Plaintiff to the relief
she sought in her Emergency Motion. On the contrary, Microsoft was within its rights to
seek 	arbitration, 	and 	the 	Court 	ultimately 	granted 	Microsoft’s 	Motion 	to 	Compel
Arbitration. (Doc. # 28; see also Doc. # 41 (denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider)).
Next, Plaintiff’s Reply argued that “Microsoft’s arguments disregard the governing
disability framework.” 	(Doc. # 36 at 11-13). 	Plaintiff claims that Microsoft’s Response
(Doc. # 35) “treat[ed] Plaintiff’s periods of ordinary functioning as dispositive evidence
against disability” and “departed from the very framework that governs ADA analysis.”
(Id. at 11). This appears to conflate the merits of Plaintiff’s ADA claim with the standard
governing motions to seal or proceed under a pseudonym. Plaintiff asserts that Microsoft
misinterprets the “governing disability standard” by deeming Plaintiff’s “periods of ordinary
functioning as dispositive evidence against disability.” 	(Id.). 	Instead, she argues that
“[t]he correct ADA inquiry is how limiting the disability is when symptoms are present.”
(Id. at 13). 	However, whether Plaintiff is “disabled”—as that term is used in the ADA—
has nothing to do with Plaintiff’s request to seal documents or proceed under a
pseudonym.
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Finally, Plaintiff’s Reply claimed that “Plaintiff’s case is distinguishable” from the
cases cited by Microsoft—namely, Ransbottom v. Ashton, Doe v. Kentucky Community
& Technical College System, and Doe v. Carson. (Id. at 8).
1. 	Ransbottom v. Ashton
With respect to Ransbottom, Plaintiff argues that her case is distinct in two
respects. 	First, she claims that, unlike the Ransbottom movant, she has established
“concrete consequences beyond emotional distress” including “documented employment
disruption, financial deterioration, risk of housing loss, and medical records showing
escalated symptoms and exhausted treatment options.” (Id. at 9). Second, Plaintiff states
that Microsoft’s application of Ransbottom “creates a circular barrier” which “effectively
forecloses” plaintiffs from bringing ADA cases involving mental health disabilities. (Id.).
In Ransbottom, a court in the Middle District of Tennessee denied a plaintiff’s
motion to proceed pseudonymously. 2021 WL 2651188, at *8. In reaching this decision,
the Ransbottom court considered the four Porter factors, as well as several additional
factors. 	Id. at *4-5. 	Among these additional factors was the “risk of psychological and
other harm to the plaintiff.” Id. at *6. The court concluded that psychological harm could,
in certain circumstances, be the type of injury that might justify permitting a plaintiff to
proceed under a pseudonym. Id. However, the court found that the plaintiff in that case
failed to establish that proceeding under her own name would inflict a harm that
outweighed the public’s interest in open courts. 	Id. at *7. 	Although the Ransbottom
plaintiff provided declarations from herself and her treating psychiatrist, the court found
that this factor offered “very little, if any, support to her request to proceed under a
pseudonym.” 	Id. at *8. 	Specifically, the Ransbottom court highlighted the fact that the
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psychiatrist’s declaration did not identify a specific diagnosis, offer a connection between
the plaintiff’s therapy and her allegations, or identify specific harm that would result from
disclosure of her name. 	Id. at *7. 	Further, the court noted that the declaration did not
state how long the plaintiff had been under the declarant’s care, or the relative severity of
her symptoms. 	Id. 	And the Ransbottom court concluded that a plaintiff seeking to
proceed under a pseudonym to avoid psychological distress must show that proceeding
publicly would cause her to “decompensate psychologically to a point which she could
not . . . pursue the current legal process and would suffer severe risk to her safety and to
her survival.” 	Id. at *6 (quoting Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(internal quotation omitted)). 	Because the plaintiff did not show that she would suffer
such harm, the Ransbottom court denied her motion to proceed under a pseudonym. Id.
at *7.
Here, Plaintiff claims that her case is different because she identified concrete
harms beyond mere “emotional trauma.” (Doc. # 36 at 9). For the reasons discussed in
§ III.E, many of these proffered injuries—Plaintiff’s inability to find employment, increased
debt, the specter of homelessness—bear a speculative connection to the fact that
Plaintiff’s name is associated with this case. 	And this kind of “reputational harm” or
damage to one’s marketability and commercial welfare do not constitute compelling
reasons for nondisclosure. See Kiwewa v. Brennan, No. 1:15-cv-815, 2018 WL 3611990,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2018). Plaintiff did submit a note from her therapist opining that
the public disclosure of Plaintiff’s name in connection with this litigation has led to “acute
psychological distress.”6 (Doc. # 20-1 at 1). This note contains much of the information
6 	It is worth noting that this letter, which contains specific information about Plaintiff’s mental
health history, remains under seal.
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that the Ransbottom court found lacking: identification of a mental health condition,
specified symptoms, and the duration of care.
However, Ransbottom does not bind this Court. And the Court’s ultimate decision
on whether pseudonymity is warranted does not hinge on a single factor. Plaintiff herself
maintains that a significant cause of her symptoms is her inability to obtain employment
and the concomitant financial difficulties. 	(See Doc. # 36 at 6-7 (stating that “[t]hese
cascading consequences have materially exacerbated Plaintiff’s medical condition, as
confirmed by her treating professionals”)). But the Court is not convinced that Plaintiff’s
inability to find employment is due to her public involvement in this case. 	Rather, as
Plaintiff recognizes, the gaps in her employment history shoulder much of the blame in
this regard. (Doc. # 36 at 4).
2. 	Doe v. Kentucky Community & Technical College System
In Doe v. Kentucky CTCS, this Court denied a plaintiff’s request to proceed under
a pseudonym. 	No. 7:20-cv-6-DLB, 2020 WL 998809, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 2, 2020). 	In
that case, a plaintiff sued his former employer and wished to remain anonymous partly
due to fears that he would “suffer reputational harm which [would] impact both his
professional and personal life.” Id. at *3. But he failed to provide sufficient evidence that
he would actually suffer such harm. Id. And the Court reiterated that the mere potential
for “the [p]laintiff to be ridiculed, embarrassed, or stigmatized as a result of a lawsuit, or
to be scrutinized by future employers is not sufficient to require the use of pseudonyms.”
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). After all, the plaintiff had “chosen to sue his
former employer, knowing that such a choice may open him up to public scrutiny.” 	Id.
(citing D.E. v. Doe, 834 F.3d 723, 728 (6th Cir. 2016)). Taking these facts together, the
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plaintiff’s privacy interests did not outweigh the presumption of openness in judicial
proceedings.
Plaintiff argues that Kentucky CTCS is distinguishable because, unlike the plaintiff
in that case, her fears of employer scrutiny are supported by concrete evidence of “failed
hiring 	processes, 	sudden 	rejections 	after 	interviews 	advanced 	to 	later 	stages,
documented communications from recruiters and hiring panels questioning her resume
gaps and short term contracts,” and financial distress. 	(Doc. # 36 at 10). 	The Court is
unconvinced. Even crediting Plaintiff’s assertion that many employers search applicants’
names prior to proceeding with the hiring process, the Court is unable to conclude that
search results connected to this litigation are the cause of Plaintiff’s inability to find
employment. Rather, as Plaintiff herself acknowledges, gaps in her resume—which have
nothing to do with the publicity of this lawsuit—are largely responsible for her difficult job
search. 	(Doc. # 33 at 4 (arguing that her termination from Microsoft, coupled with a
difficult economic climate, resulted in employment gaps which made it significantly harder
for Plaintiff to secure new work)). 	Moreover, much like the Kentucky CTCS plaintiff,
Plaintiff must have known that, by choosing to sue her former employer, she would open
herself up to public scrutiny. 2020 WL 998809, at *3. That is a bedrock principle of our
open judicial system.7
D. 	Plaintiff’s Withdrawal of Her Request to Seal
Plaintiff also objects to the Order’s conclusion that she waived her right to proceed
pseudonymously by voluntarily and repeatedly disclosing her name in the public record.
7 	Plaintiff’s Reply also argues that Microsoft’s reliance on Doe v. Carson, No. 19-1566, 2020
WL 2611189 (6th Cir. May 6, 2020) is misplaced and that her situation is distinguishable. (Doc.
# 36 at 10). The applicability of Doe v. Carson will be addressed in § III.E.
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(Doc. # 40 at 5 (citing Doc. # 39 at 5)). In her Reply in support of her Consolidated Motion,
Plaintiff withdrew her request to seal the Complaint and “clarifie[d] that she seeks only the
narrow remedy of pseudonymity[.]” (Doc. # 23 at 1). But Judge Smith found that Plaintiff
“has ‘waived any right to proceed pseudonymously 	by voluntarily and repeatedly
disclosing her name in the public record.’” 	(Doc. # 40 at 5 (quoting Boardman v. Ohio
State Univ., No. 2:23-cv-3566, 2024 WL 1462771, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2024))).
Indeed, following removal to this Court, Plaintiff filed several documents identifying herself
by name on the public record (See, e.g., Docs. # 13, 15, 16, 19, 21, 23). Plaintiff, however,
objects that these filings occurred “while protective relief remained pending” and argues
that “this circumstance should not be treated as a knowing forfeiture of all identity-
protection remedies.” (Doc. # 40 at 6).
The Court disagrees. 	Plaintiff initially filed her Complaint in Boyd County Circuit
Court under her own name. (Doc. # 1-3). True, several weeks after initiating the action,
she moved to seal the Complaint in state court. (Doc. # 1-6). But this does not explain
her failure to seek pseudonymous relief from the start. Even after this case was removed
to this Court on August 5, 2025, Plaintiff did not seek to proceed under a pseudonym until
October 1, 2025, when she filed her Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. 	(Doc. # 16).
During the intervening period, Plaintiff continued to file documents in the public record
with her full name. 	(See Docs. # 13 and 15). 	While the Court appreciates Plaintiff’s
argument that her public association with this case increased following the Court’s Order
on February 20, 2026, the Court disagrees that this “changed the practical harm” she
experienced. 	(Doc. # 40 at 6-7). 	Plaintiff acknowledges that her name was publicly
associated with this case long before the Court’s Order. 	(See Doc. # 36 at 3 (alleging
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that Plaintiff’s name was publicly associated with this lawsuit on November 16, 2025)).
Moreover, Plaintiff could have filed under a pseudonym while her request for “protective
relief remained pending.” (Doc. # 40 at 6). Indeed, in Boardman, the Southern District of
Ohio found that a plaintiff waived his right to pursue pseudonymity by submitting filings in
his full name “even after moving to proceed pseudonymously.” 2024 WL 1462771, at *3.
Here, Plaintiff has never made any filings under a pseudonym, she submitted briefing and
motions in her full name prior to seeking pseudonymity (Docs. # 13 and 15), and she
continued to file in her full name after seeking pseudonymity (Docs. # 16, 19, 20, 21, 23).
Accordingly, Judge Smith’s determination that Plaintiff waived her right to proceed
pseudonymously was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
E. 	Harm Suffered Beyond General Embarrassment
Plaintiff objects to Judge Smith’s conclusion that the prosecution of this case would
not require Plaintiff to publicly disclose information of the utmost intimacy. (Doc. # 40 at
7). 	Rather, Plaintiff contends that she has shown “more than embarrassment or
humiliation” and that these more tangible injuries warrant the Court’s review. (Id. at 8).
In general, parties have no right to proceed under a pseudonym. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 10(a). 	However, in “exceptional case[s]” parties may litigate under a fictitious name.
Carson, 2020 WL 2611189, at *2 (quoting Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir.
1992) (per curiam)). 	This is appropriate only if the reviewing court determines that “a
plaintiff’s privacy interests substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial
proceedings[.]” Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004). Several considerations
bear 	on 	this 	determination, 	including: 	(1) 	whether 	the 	plaintiff 	is 	challenging 	a
governmental activity, (2) whether the plaintiff will be forced to “disclose information ‘of
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the utmost intimacy,’” (3) whether information disclosed during the litigation may lead to
criminal prosecution of the plaintiff, and (4) whether the plaintiff is a child. 	Id. (quoting
Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1981)).
As 	Judge 	Smith 	observed, 	the 	only 	factor 	which 	even 	arguably 	favors
pseudonymity is the second. 	(Doc. # 39 at 5). 	But, ordinarily, “concerns about stigma
and scrutiny from prospective employers do not involve information ‘of the utmost
intimacy;’ rather, they constitute the type of concerns harbored by other similarly situated
litigants who file lawsuits under their real names.” Carson, 2020 WL 2611189, at *2; see
also Koe v. Univ. Hosp. Sys., Inc., No. 22-3952, 2024 WL 1048184, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar.
8, 2024) (affirming denial of a motion to proceed under pseudonym where the plaintiff
argued that litigating in his full name would require him to disclose intimate information
about his mental health). Plaintiff argues that, unlike the plaintiffs in Carson and Koe, she
has identified “specific harm from disclosure” that bolsters her privacy interest. 	(Doc. #
40 at 7-8). She identifies “credit-card debt that grew from approximately $40,000 to more
than $50,000 during the period of public association . . . near-foreclosure on Plaintiff’s
home; and clinical documentation of worsening PTSD, including psychiatric medication
increased to maximum dosage[.]” (Id. at 8).
Plaintiff also claims that “online search indexing” has linked her name to this
litigation and the “disability-related information” involved. (Doc. # 33 at 6-7). And in her
Reply, Plaintiff recounts three interview experiences shortly after the Court’s Order in
which she did not receive a job offer, despite being “told she performed well.” (Doc. # 36
at 6-7). 	She speculates that this was due to employers discovering publicly available
information related to this case. (Id. at 7). But this kind of speculative effect on Plaintiff’s
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employability does not overcome the presumption against sealing. See Shane Grp., 825
F.3d at 307; Kiwewa, 2018 WL 3611990, at *2 (“Accepting as true plaintiff’s claim that
information in the case record is harmful to his reputation and his ability to obtain
employment, reputational harm does not outweigh the public’s right to know about the
court proceedings and filings.”).
But Plaintiff does not even allege that public disclosure of her Consolidated Motion
and 	associated 	attachments 	is 	the 	sole 	reason 	she 	cannot 	obtain 	employment.
Elsewhere in her briefing, Plaintiff blames her inability to find employment on gaps in her
resume that came after her termination from Microsoft in July of 2024. (Doc. # 36 at 4).
But these gaps were not caused by Plaintiff’s public association with this case—rather,
they were caused by her termination from Microsoft. 	(Doc. # 33 at 4 (“The Microsoft
termination 	occurred 	during 	a 	difficult 	economic 	climate, 	which 	compounded 	the
employment gap it created and made it significantly harder for Plaintiff to secure new
work.”)). 	Further, although Plaintiff claims that her association with this litigation has
increased following the Court’s Order, she acknowledges that prospective employers
have been able to associate her identity with this case as far back as November of 2025.
(See Doc. # 36 at 3 (noting that a November 16, 2025 Google search for “Marina Drus”
returned “lawsuit-related results appearing lower on the page alongside academic
publications and professional content”)). 	If prospective employers have long been able
to connect Plaintiff’s identity to this litigation, the Court finds it tenuous that a mere
increase in search results bears the blame for Plaintiff’s struggle to obtain employment.
Relatedly, the financial harms Plaintiff identifies—increased credit card debt, missed
mortgage payments, the prospect of homelessness—are downstream from her inability
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to obtain employment. 	(Doc. # 36 at 7). 	Moreover, as Judge Smith noted, even if the
Court were to grant Plaintiff leave to proceed under a fictitious name, “it would be
impossible for her to proceed anonymously in this action” because her name also appears
on the Boyd Circuit Court docket in connection with this case. (Doc. # 27 at 3 (citing Drus
v. Microsoft Corp., No. 25-CI-509)).
True, unlike the plaintiffs in Carson and Koe, Plaintiff has alleged specific medical
harm in the form of worsening PTSD symptoms. See supra § III.C.1. However, even if
the Court finds that the second Porter factor tips in Plaintiff’s favor, it is unconvinced that
Plaintiff has carried her burden of establishing that her privacy interests “substantially
outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings.” 	Porter, 370 F.3d at 560
(emphasis added). 	None of the other Porter factors suggest that pseudonymity is
appropriate. 	Plaintiff does not challenge governmental activity, prosecution of this case
will not risk exposing her to criminal prosecution, and she is not a child. 	Considering
these facts and weighing them against the strong presumption in favor of open courts,
Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden and establish entitlement to pseudonymity.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. # 40) to
Judge Smith’s June 25, 2026 Order (Doc. # 39) is overruled.
This 14th day of October, 2026.
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