Emrit v. Obama et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
RONALD SATISH EMRIT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 26-1060-HLT-ADM
)
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit (“Emrit”) brings suit against former President Barack
Hussein Obama, Michelle Obama, former President Joe Biden, Jill Biden, Hunter Biden, Supreme
Court Justice Ketanji Brown-Jackson, Former Prince of the Windsors Andrew (lnu), and British
Prime Minister Keir Starmer (collectively, “defendants”). (ECF 1.) When Emrit filed his
complaint, he also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF 3.) As
discussed in further detail below, the court recommends that the presiding district judge deny
Emrit’s motion to proceed IFP and further recommends that the court dismiss Emrit’s complaint.
I. THE COURT RECOMMENDS DENYING THE MOTION TO PROCEED IFP.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 allows courts to authorize commencing a civil action “without
prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that . . . the person
is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” Proceeding IFP “in a civil case is a privilege,
not a right—fundamental or otherwise.” White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998).
The decision to grant or deny IFP status under § 1915 lies within “the sound discretion of the
district court.” Engberg v. Wyoming, 265 F.3d 1109, 1122 (10th Cir. 2001). Although the court
finds that Emrit is likely unable to pay the required filing fee based on the financial affidavit he
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provided in support of his motion, the undersigned nevertheless recommends that the court
exercise its discretion and deny Emrit’s motion to proceed IFP for the reasons discussed below.
First, Emrit is a well-documented serial pro se filer who, since approximately 2013, has
used his IFP status to file hundreds of frivolous lawsuits all over the country. In this latest round
of cases, Emrit has filed at least 11 other actions against these same defendants in other federal
district courts alleging the same claims as in this case:
1. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 3:2026-cv-03083 (C.D. Ill.) (filed Mar. 11, 2026).
2. Emrit v. Obama et al., No 1:2026-cv-00393, (N.D.N.Y.) (filed Mar. 12, 2026)
3. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 6:26-cv-00067 (E.D. Okla.) (filed Mar. 10, 2026)
4. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 5:26-cv-00154 (E.D.N.C.) (filed March 12, 2026)
5. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 2:26-cv-00207 (D. Utah) (filed Mar. 13, 2026)
6. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 1:26-cv-11216 (D. Mass.) (filed Mar. 10, 2026)
7. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 3:26-cv-03010 (D.S.D.) (filed Mar. 9, 2026)
8. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 3:26-cv-00106 (E.D. Tenn.) (filed Mar. 10, 2026)
9. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 1:26-cv-00065 (D.N.D.) (filed Mar. 9, 2026)
10. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 26-cv-00136 (N.D. Okla.) (filed Mar. 10, 2026)
11. Emrit v. Obama et al., No. 3:26-cv-00110 (D. Alaska) (filed Mar. 10, 2026)
The district judge presiding over Emrit’s case in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
Illinois has already issued an order denying Emrit’s IFP motion and dismissing the complaint with
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as frivolous. Emrit v. Obama, No. 26-cv-3083, 2026
WL 690452, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2026) (dismissing complaint with prejudice because
plaintiff’s allegations “make no rational argument in law or facts to support his claim for relief”).
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Second, the court has serious questions about the propriety of venue and whether this court
has personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants in this case. Emrit’s complaint contains no
allegations supporting venue in the District of Kansas. Under the federal venue statutes, a civil
action may only be brought in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants
are residents of the State in which the district is located,” or in “a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part
of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(2). Emrit’s
complaint contains no allegation that any defendant resides in the State of Kansas, nor does it
allege any connection between the District of Kansas and the events and parties named in the
complaint that would satisfy the venue requirements of federal law. And, although a case may be
transferred to cure a lack of venue (in lieu of dismissal) if the transfer is in the interest of justice,
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), the court finds no cause to conclude that a transfer is in the interest of justice
given that Emrit has filed the same complaint in at least 11 other districts, and the complaint has
been dismissed by at least one of those district courts. It therefore appears that venue is improper
in this action based on the face of the complaint as well as Emrit’s filing of nearly identical
complaints in 11 other venues. See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006)
(where the defense of improper venue is “obvious from the face of the complaint and no further
factual record is required to be developed,” the court may, sua sponte, dismiss the case).
Likewise, the complaint makes no allegations supporting personal jurisdiction over
defendants. A court considering whether it has personal jurisdiction over a defendant must
determine “(1) whether the applicable statute potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service
of process on the defendant and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due
process.” Klein v. Cornelius, 786 F.3d 1310, 1317 (10th Cir. 2015). The Federal Tort Claims Act,
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which Emrit asserts in his complaint, does not authorize nationwide service of process. Service is
therefore governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A), which requires the court “to
apply the law of the state in which the district court sits.” Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine
Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008). “[T]he Kansas long-arm statute is construed
liberally so as to allow jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by due process.” OMI Holdings,
Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 1998). The court therefore
analyzes whether personal jurisdiction over defendants is appropriate under the Due Process
Clause. See id.
Due process requires that a defendant “purposefully established minimum contacts within
the forum State” and that asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant “comport[s] with ‘fair
play and substantial justice.’” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (quoting
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). A court may have general personal
jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. See Old Republic Ins.
Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 903-04 (10th Cir. 2017). General personal jurisdiction—
exercising jurisdiction for all purposes—is appropriate where a defendant’s “affiliations with the
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 317). A court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant
“only if the cause of action relates to the party’s contacts with the forum state.” Old Republic, 877
F.3d at 904. Central to the specific personal jurisdiction analysis is whether the defendant
“purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum state,” and whether “the plaintiff’s
injuries [arose] out of [the] defendant’s forum-related activities.” Id. (second alteration in
original). Here, Emrit’s complaint does not allege that any defendant has continuous and
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systematic affiliations with the state of Kansas or that any defendant has intentionally directed
relevant activities at Kansas residents. Indeed, the complaint is completely devoid of any mention
of Kansas but for the case caption. Accordingly, there appears to be no basis for this court to
exercise general or specific personal jurisdiction over defendants.
All of these considerations lead the court to conclude that there is no valid reason for the
court to exercise its discretion to grant IFP status in this case. Nothing in Emrit’s complaint
suggests that personal jurisdiction and venue are somehow more viable and proper in this court
than in the at least 11 other courts where he has filed nearly identical lawsuits. As such, there is
no reason to grant him leave to proceed IFP so that he can simultaneously pursue multiple similar
lawsuits in courts all over the country. Indeed, other courts have told Emrit that “[a] plaintiff
cannot simultaneously litigate the same case in two different courts,” Emrit v. Combs, No. 24-cv-
007, 2024 WL 1511952, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No.
4:24-CV-7-AW-MAF, 2024 WL 1585933 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2024), and that it is “clearly
improper and an abuse of the judicial process to pursue identical claims in multiple jurisdictions,”
Emrit v. Devos, No. 20-cv-34, 2020 WL 1669872, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1668050 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2020), aff'd sub nom. Emrit v.
Sec’y, United States Dep’t of Educ., 829 F. App’x 474 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Emrit v. Universal
Music Grp., No. 19-cv-5984, 2019 WL 6251365, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6251192 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2019) (dismissing case under
the “first-to-file rule” and noting that Emrit filed his case in the Western District of Washington
within a week of initiating the “same lawsuit by filing the same complaint, naming the same
Defendants, in both the Central District of California and the Middle District of Florida”).
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For all of these reasons, the undersigned recommends that the court deny Emrit’s motion
to proceed IFP and that Emrit be ordered to pay the required filing fee within fourteen days of an
order adopting this report. The court further recommends that, if Emrit does not pay the required
filing fee within fourteen days, this case be dismissed without prejudice.
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT RECOMMENDS DISMISSING EMRIT’S
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
In the event the presiding district judge, in her discretion, allows Emrit to proceed IFP, the
undersigned recommends that the court proceed to dismiss Emrit’s complaint. The court may
dismiss an IFP plaintiff’s complaint if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The purpose of
§ 1915(e)(2) is to “discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon,
baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate.” Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 1157,
1161 (10th Cir. 2012).
In addition, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). “[F]ederal courts are courts of limited
subject-matter jurisdiction,” and they “may only hear cases when empowered to do so by the
Constitution and by act of Congress.” Gad v. Kan. State Univ., 787 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir.
2015) (quotation omitted). To proceed in federal court, a plaintiff has the burden to establish
subject-matter jurisdiction, which is ordinarily accomplished through diversity jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1332 or federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction
exists where the parties have complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal-question jurisdiction exists where claims arise under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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To determine whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court looks to the face of the complaint. Penteco Corp. v. Union Gas Sys., Inc., 929 F.2d 1519,
1521 (10th Cir. 1991). Although the court liberally construes a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings, it does
not assume the role of his advocate, and it may not “supply additional factual allegations to round
out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” McCoy v. Kansas,
No. 16-2129-JAR, 2016 WL 3549100, at *2 (D. Kan. June 30, 2016) (citations omitted); see also
Tatten v. City & Cty. of Denver, 730 F. App’x 620, 624 (10th Cir. 2018).
In screening Emrit’s complaint, the court finds that it does not establish this court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction. The complaint does not allege the citizenship of any of the parties, so there is
no basis for diversity jurisdiction.1 Emrit’s complaint appears to rest on federal question
jurisdiction. ECF 1, at 3 (“Therefore, a federal question is presented by the implication of the
black-letter law of the aforementioned federal statutes in addition to the discussion of
Constitutional Law provisions.”).). But none of Emrit’s four claims—defamation, public
nuisance, industrial espionage, and tortious interference with business relations/contracts—are
based on federal questions. Although Emrit’s complaint alleges that his tortious interference claim
arises under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) (see ECF 1, at 4), the FTCA does not apply
here because no claims are asserted against the United States, nor does the complaint allege any
act or omission by an employee of the United States government. Regardless, the FTCA expressly
1 The complaint states that “the amount in controversy does not exceeds [sic] $75,000 (i.e.
$0 is less than $75,00), [so] this court does not have jurisdiction based on the amount in
controversy.” (ECF 1, at 3.) This statement, however, contradicts Emrit’s prayer for relief, which
states that he “is seeking punitive, compensatory, treble, actual, presumed, and special damages in
the amount of $500,000,000,000.” (ECF 1, at 5.) Regardless, because the complaint does not
allege the citizenship of any of the parties, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction alleged in the
complaint.
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excludes claims for interference with contract rights and other intentional torts (e.g., libel, slander)
from its waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Thus, the court recommends that
Emrit’s complaint be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Brodzki v. Clear
Channel Commc’ns, 459 F. App’x 717, 718 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction where complaint seeking damages for defamation failed to state a claim
of a constitutional violation for federal question jurisdiction and failed to establish defendant’s
citizenship for diversity jurisdiction).
Emrit also does not appear to have standing because he does not link the alleged facts in
his complaint to any harm he suffered. For example, in support of his defamation claim, he alleges
that Former President Obama “is defaming the current president by appearing in interviews and
podcasts when most former presidents try to stay out of the spotlight based on a sense of
professional courtesy” and, in support of his public nuisance claim, Emrit alleges that Obama “has
become a public nuisance by trying to remain relevant to the modern-day political conversation.”
(ECF 1, at 4.) As for Emrit’s other two claims, the complaint does not allege that any of the named
defendants committed the alleged acts of industrial espionage and tortious interference. Rather,
Emrit alleges that “companies which feature” Obama on their channel’s interviews and podcasts
“are committing the tort of industrial espionage” and “committing the tortious interference with
business relations/contacts under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).” (ECF 1, at 4.) But Emrit
does not name any such “companies” as defendants. Regardless, Emrit’s complaint does not
contain any factual allegations to establish how any defendant’s actions have wronged him or
otherwise allege any cognizable injury to himself caused by defendants’ alleged actions. In short,
Emrit’s complaints are mere “generalized grievance[s]” that are “insufficient to confer standing.”
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013).
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For the reasons discussed above, the court recommends that, even if the presiding district
judge grants Emrit leave to proceed IFP, the court should nevertheless dismiss Emrit’s complaint.
* * * * *
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), and D. Kan. Rule 72.1.4(b),
the court informs Emrit that he may file specific written objections to this report and
recommendation within fourteen days after being served with a copy. If Emrit fails to file
objections within the fourteen-day time period, no appellate review of the factual and legal
determinations in this recommendation will be allowed by any court. See In re Key Energy Res.
Inc., 230 F.3d 1197, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2000).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Emrit’s motion to proceed IFP be denied
and that Emrit be ordered to pay the required filing fee within fourteen days of an order adopting
this report.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, if Emrit does not pay the required filing fee
within fourteen days, this case be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the assigned district judge dismiss Emrit’s
complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk’s office shall mail a copy of this Report and
Recommendation to Emrit via regular mail and certified mail, return receipt requested.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated March 20, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Angel D. Mitchell
Angel D. Mitchell
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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