McCoy v. Kansas Department of Children and Families et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
LATAWNYA MCCOY,
Plaintiff,
v.
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES,
Defendants.
Case No. 26-1050-DDC-RES
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on two Motions filed in this lawsuit.1 On March 21,
2026, a motion entitled “Motion for Magistrate Rachel Schwartz to Recuse Herself from this Case
and All Other Cases Regarding this Plaintiff” was filed. ECF No. 7 (the “First Motion to Recuse”).
The First Motion to Recuse is signed on behalf of “LaTawnya Cowan Plaintiff Pro Se.” Id. at 2.
One day later, on March 22, 2026, a second recusal motion was filed, this time titled as “Motion
to Recuse Magistrate Judge Rachel E. Schwartz for Conflict of Interest, Retaliation, and
Misconduct.” ECF No. 8 (the “Second Motion to Recuse”). This Second Motion to Recuse also
is signed and filed on behalf of “LaTawnya Cowan Plaintiff, Pro Se.” Id. at 3. As reflected in the
case caption above, the named pro se Plaintiff in this lawsuit is LaTawyna McCoy.
For the reasons discussed below, both Motions are denied.
1 The Court liberally construes a pro se party’s filings and holds them to a less
stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers, but the Court does not assume the role of the pro
se party’s advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As listed in the Complaint, the name of the only Plaintiff in this litigation is “LaTawnya
McCoy,” not LaTawnya Cowan. ECF No. 1 at 1. The Civil Cover Sheet additionally lists the
name of the Plaintiff as “LaTawnya McCoy[,]” and it is signed on behalf of “LaTawnya McCoy.”
ECF No. 2.
On March 6, 2026, the Court entered a Notice and Order to Show Cause explaining to
Plaintiff that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a) requires every lawsuit to be “prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest.” ECF No. 5 at 1-2. For the reasons explained in that
Order, the Court has significant concerns as to whether named Plaintiff LaTawnya McCoy was
proceeding in the name of the real party in interest. Id. at 1-3. The Court directed Plaintiff to show
cause in writing on or before April 3, 2026, as to whether LaTawnya McCoy is the Plaintiff’s legal
name, consistent with Rule 17(a). Id. at 2-4. To date, Plaintiff has not responded to that order,
although the time has not expired for her to do so.
Since that time, multiple motions have been filed in this lawsuit by LaTawnya Cowan,
including the Motions at issue in this Order. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 6-12. Adding additional
confusion, the movant in the First Motion to Recuse lists the case caption as: “Cowan (McCoy) v.
Kansas Department for Children and Families.” ECF No. 7 at 1. But again, that Motion is signed
as LaTawnya Cowan. Id. at 2. The Motions do not explain whether Ms. McCoy and Ms. Cowan
are the same person or otherwise address why Ms. Cowan is filing motions in a case in which she
is not a named party.
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LaTawnya Cowan is a frequent plaintiff in this District2 and nationwide.3 The Court
references these other cases because the Court has previously explained, for example, the standards
applicable to motions seeking recusal of a judge. See, e.g., Cowan v. Kan. Dep’t of Child. & Fams.,
No. 25-4131-DDC-RES, ECF No. 15 at 2-7 (D. Kan. Feb. 18, 2026) (denying Ms. Cowan’s motion
for recusal of the undersigned). Ms. Cowan additionally has been warned by other judges in the
District of her obligations to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and that she risks the
imposition of sanctions, including filing restrictions, if she continues her practice of filing
repetitive motions for relief. See, e.g., Cowan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 26-1030-HLT-
RES, ECF No. 31 at 3-6 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2026).
On March 21, 2026, Ms. Cowan filed her First Motion to Recuse. Ms. Cowan alleges:
2 See Cowan v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, No. 26-1065-EFM-RES, ECF No. 1 (D.
Kan. Mar. 14, 2026); Cowan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 26-1030-HLT-RES, ECF No. 1
(D. Kan. Feb. 6, 2026); Cowan v. Kan. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., No. 25-4131-DDC-RES, ECF
No. 1 (D. Kan. Dec. 29, 2025); Cowan v. Kan. Dep’t for Child. & Fams., No. 25-4128-DDC-RES,
ECF No. 1 (D. Kan. Dec. 22, 2025); Cowan v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., No. 25-4039-
HLT-RES, ECF No. 1 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2025); Cowan v. KVC Behav. Healthcare, Inc., No. 25-
4035-DDC-RES, ECF No. 1 (D. Kan. Apr. 3, 2025); Cowan v. State of Kan., No. 20-1243-JWB-
GEB, ECF No. 1 (D. Kan. Sept. 10, 2020). In many instances, the Court has continued to use full
citations to Plaintiff’s cases after first reference to avoid confusion because many of these cases
involve the same or similar defendants.
3 See Cowan v. Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 26-0095-BJC-BLM, ECF No. 1 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 6, 2026); Cowan v. State of Mo. Soc. Servs. & Rehab. Servs. for the Blind, No. 25-4084-
SRB, ECF No. 1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 4, 2025); Cowan v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., No. 25-
0339-JFB-PRSE, ECF No. 1 (D. Neb. May 12, 2025); Cowan v. San Diego Cnty., No. 25-0342-
AGS-JLB, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2025); Cowan v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 25-2100-BAS-BJW, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2025); Cowan v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 25-0967-AGS-JLB, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025); Cowan v. U.S. Dep’t
of Agriculture, No. 25-1081-RDM, ECF No. 1 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2025); Cowan v. San Diego Cnty.,
No. 25-0697-AGS-JLB, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2025); Cowan v. Wucher, No. 25-4039-
MDH, ECF No. 1 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2025); Cowan v. State of Neb., No. 25-0163-JMG-PRSE,
ECF No. 1 (D. Neb. Mar. 3, 2025); Cowan v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 25-0236-RWS, ECF
No. 1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 26, 2025) (transferred to the Western District of Missouri); Cowan v. State
of Colo., No. 25-0816-LTB-RTG, ECF No. 1 (D. Colo. Mar. 13, 2025); Cowan v. Colo. Springs
Hous. Auth., No. 25-0676-LTB-RTG, ECF No. 1 (D. Colo. Mar. 3, 2025).
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PLAINTIFF AND HER CAREGIVERS HAVE FILED A FORMAL
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT HARASSMENT AND
DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT AGAINST MAGISTRATE
RACHEL SCHWARTZ FOR HER ABUSIVE HOSTILE AND
DISCRIMINATORY BEHAVIOR TOWARDS THE PLAINTIFF
WHO IS A VULNERABLE DISABLED ADULT ADJUDICATED
MENTALLY AND JUDICIALLY INCOMPETENT THAT HAS A
GUARDIAN ITEM AND HAS EXPERIENCED ONGOING
HARASSMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS BY THIS
MAGISTRATE INCLUDING ABUSING HER AUTHORITY TO
IMPEDE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATIONS FROM THE US DISTRICT COURT AND
ITS CLERK'S OFFICE, ABUSING COURT ORDERS TO
INFLICT INTENTIONAL EMOTIONAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM SLANDER AND COMMIT LIBEL
AGAINST THE CLIENT COMMITTING ABUSIVE PROCESS
AND SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, ILLEGALLY DEPRIVING
THE CLIENT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE BECAUSE THE COURT
WEBSITE INFORMS ARE NOT ACCESSIBLE AND SHE
SUBMITS DOCUMENTS IN THE FORMAT WHICH IS
ACCESSIBLE TO HER AFTER PROVIDING MEDICAL
DOCUMENTATION TO THE COURT ON SEVERAL
OCCASIONS THAT SHE CANNOT USE THE STANDARD
WEBSITE AND FORMS. ABUSING HER POSITION WITH THE
COURT TO KEEP THE PLAINTIFF FROM HAVING HER
CASES HEARD BY A ACTUAL FEDERAL JUDGE WHEN THE
PLAINTIFF NEVER consented to having her cases heard by the
magistrate and actually filled out a form to have them heard by a
federal judge.
Because of the conflict of interest and the ongoing judicial
misconduct harassment and discrimination complaint filed by the
plaintiff against the Magistrate shorts in this case plaintiff emotions
the court for the magistrate to recuse herself immediately and have
no contact with the plaintiff regarding this case or any other case.
PLENTY OF HAS RECEIVED VERIFICATION FROM THE
10TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS THAT HER
COMPLAINTS AGAINST THIS MAGISTRATE WERE
ACCEPTED AND ARE BEING INVESTIGATED ANY ORDERS
MADE ON THIS CASE BY THE MAGISTRATE WERE MADE
IN RETALIATION FOR THAT COMPLAINT AND AS A MEANS
OF HARASSING THIS VULNERABLE DISABLED ADULT
THEY SHOULD BE VACATED AND THE FEDERAL JUDGE
APPOINTED ON THIS CASE SHOULD REVIEW THEM AND
MAKE APPROPRIATE ORDERS WHICH ARE COMPLYING
WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND
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REGULATIONS TO PROTECT LITIGANTS WITH PHYSICAL
AND COGNITIVE DISABILITIES WHO WERE ADJUDICATED
MENTALLY AND JUDICIALLY INCOMPETENT.
ECF No. 7 at 1-2 (language and capitalization in original).
The next day, March 22, 2026, the Second Motion to Recuse was filed. ECF No. 8. The
Second Motion does not explain why another motion seeking the same relief was filed. The
Second Motion alleges that “Plaintiff and her caretaker have filed a judicial-misconduct complaint
against Magistrate Judge Rachel E. Schwartz alleging harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and
misuse of judicial authority.” Id. at 2. She alleges that recusal is required pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 144 and 455(a) and (b)(1), Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges,
and the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. Id. at 1-2. She alleges that “Magistrate Judge
Schwartz has retaliated against her for filing the misconduct complaint by repeatedly ordering
Plaintiff to complete forms she is medically incapable of completing, despite: • adjudicated
incompetency findings from multiple courts; • physician letters verifying disability; • ADA and
Rehabilitation Act accommodation requests.” Id. at 2. And she alleges that “these actions
constitute discrimination and retaliation in violation of:• ADA Title II (42 U.S.C. § 12132) •
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794) • Judicial Conduct and Disability Act (28
U.S.C. §§ 351-364).” Id. at 2-3.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motions to Recuse and Standing to Seek Recusal
The Court denies Ms. Cowan’s First Motion to Recuse and Second Motion to Recuse
because the Court is without information to conclude that the movant is the same person as the
named Plaintiff, LaTawnya McCoy. These Motions do not explain why the named Plaintiff,
LaTawnya McCoy, is entitled to any relief sought in the Motions. And if Ms. McCoy and Ms.
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Cowan are not the same person, the Motions also do not explain why Ms. Cowan would have
standing to seek recusal.
Moreover, even if the Court were to construe Ms. Cowan’s Motions as somehow filed on
behalf of Plaintiff LaTawnya McCoy, there is no record establishing that LaTawnya McCoy is the
name of any real party in interest pursuant to Rule 17(a). Because the Court cannot determine that
the person filing these Motions is a party to this case or would otherwise have standing to move to
recuse, the Court denies both Motions on this basis.
B. Discussion of the Motions to Recuse
The Court also denies the request to recuse on the merits. Despite the Court’s serious Rule
17 concerns, the Court nonetheless rules on the two Motions to Recuse due to the nature of the
relief sought and the seriousness of the allegations made by Ms. Cowan. For the reasons explained
below, the Court denies the First Motion to Recuse as moot and denies the Second Motion to
Recuse on the merits.
1. Legal Standard
Two statutes govern judicial recusal, 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. See Strader v. Butler &
Assocs., P.A., No. 20-3001-SAC, 2020 WL 430215, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2020). Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455, a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned” or if “he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a) and (b)(1). “Subsection (a), thus, addresses ‘the appearance of impartiality,’ and
subsection (b)(1) addresses ‘actual partiality.’” Snyder v. Acord Corp., 811 F. App’x 447, 470 (10th
Cir. 2020) (citing Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 1053 (10th Cir. 2019)). “Section 455(a) has a
broader reach than subsection (b) and the standard is not subjective, but rather objective.” Davis
v. United States, No. 23-3191-JWL, 2023 WL 6294281, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 2023). “The test
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under § 455(a) is not whether the judge believes he or she is capable of impartiality, but rather
whether a reasonable person might question the judge’s impartiality.” Burke, 935 F.3d at 1054.
“To be entitled to recusal under § 144, the moving party must submit an affidavit showing,
among other things, bias and prejudice.” Burleson v. Sprint Pcs Grp., 123 F. App’x 957, 959 (10th
Cir. 2005). The affidavit must identify the “facts of time, place, persons, occasions, and
circumstances” that would support recusal. Id. at 960.
The party moving to disqualify a judge generally bears the burden of proof. See Topeka
Housing. Auth. v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 1245, 1248 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating the party seeking
disqualification bears a “heavy burden of showing the requisite judicial bias or misconduct”).
“Relevant facts must support the moving party’s belief that the judge is biased.” Burke, 935 F.3d
at 1054. However, “a judge has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse
as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.” Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir.
1995). “We have emphasized that § 455 must not be so broadly construed that it becomes, in
effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of
personal bias or prejudice.” United States v. Woodmore, 135 F.4th 861, 874 (10th Cir. 2025)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
2. First Motion to Recuse, ECF No. 7
The First Motion to Recuse was filed on March 21, 2026. ECF No. 7. Without waiting for
the Court to rule on that Motion, a Second Motion to Recuse was filed one day later. ECF No. 8.
Because both Motions seek the same relief and the First Motion makes arguments that overlap
with those made in the Second Motion, the Court denies the First Motion as moot.
3. Second Motion to Recuse, ECF No. 8
In the Second Motion to Recuse, Ms. Cowan alleges three bases for why the undersigned
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must recuse: 28 U.S.C. § 455; 28 U.S.C. § 144; and Canons 1, 2 and 3 of the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges. Ms. Cowan recently filed a similar motion for recusal in a different case in
this District. See Cowan v. Kan. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., No. 25-4131-DDC-RES, ECF No. 10
(D. Kan. Feb. 2, 2026). The undersigned denied that motion on February 18, 2026, which was
before Ms. Cowan filed the Motions to Reuse in this case. Id. at ECF No. 15. Despite this ruling,
Ms. Cowan raises many of the same arguments in the Second Motion to Recuse without addressing
or distinguishing this previous order denying recusal, and she fails to establish any new or different
reasons for recusal. The Court therefore denies the Second Motion to Recuse on the merits.
a. 28 U.S.C. § 455
Ms. Cowan has not met her burden of demonstrating that recusal is warranted pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 455. None of the allegations contained in Ms. Cowan’s Second Motion rise to a level
to establish bias or impartiality. See Burke, 935 F.3d at 1054 (“Relevant facts must support the
moving party’s belief that the judge is biased.”).
Ms. Cowan argues that the undersigned has “retaliated against her for filing the misconduct
complaint by repeatedly ordering Plaintiff to complete forms she is medically incapable of
completing, despite: • adjudicated incompetency findings from multiple courts; • physician letters
verifying disability; • ADA and Rehabilitation Act accommodation requests.” ECF No. 8 at 2.
The Court addresses each of these serious allegations.
First, as reflected by the docket in this specific lawsuit, named Plaintiff LaTawnya McCoy
has not provided the Court with any verifiable evidence of any incompetency findings from any
court about her specifically. She states that these decisions exist without providing documentation,
or even case names or case numbers. Similarly, she has not provided any physician letters
verifying any disabilities or any other additional information—besides summarily stating so— that
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she is medically incapable of completing any forms. Even as it relates to Ms. Cowan, the Court
has not received any such verifiable information.4
Second, Ms. Cowan filed her request for reasonable accommodations in this lawsuit after
she filed her First Motion to Recuse and on the same day as her Second Motion to Recuse. See
ECF No. 11. Ms. Cowan cannot base her recusal motion on a failure to provide reasonable
accommodations when she had yet to request those accommodations and the Court had yet to rule
on any such requests. Additionally, Ms. Cowan’s Motion does not explain what specific requests
for accommodation were denied in this case—or in any other case—by the undersigned. As
reflected on the docket, the District’s Clerk’s Office, not the undersigned, directed Plaintiff to
correct deficiencies in her filings via a March 4, 2026 communication. In another case in this
District, Ms. Cowan filed a request for accommodations, which was denied by a different judge.
See, e.g., Cowan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 26-1030-HLT-RES, ECF No. 16 (D. Kan.
Mar. 4, 2026) (the then-presiding District Judge denied Ms. Cowan’s requests for
accommodations). Ms. Cowan also has had similar requests denied in other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Cowan v. Colo. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 26-872-RTG, ECF No. 7 (D. Colo. Mar. 24, 2026)
(denying a motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem and requests for reasonable
accommodations).
Third, Ms. Cowan has not identified what form she is medically incapable of completing.
4 For example, in ECF No. 9, Ms. Cowan states that she was appointed a guardian ad
litem in a Shawnee County Family Court Case No. 199JC00400. Id. at 1. Based on the date of
that proceeding and Ms. Cowan’s stated age, ECF No. 12 at 5, Ms. Cowan would have been a
minor, which likely required the appointment of a guardian ad litem. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-
2205(a) (“Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall appoint an attorney to serve as guardian ad
litem for a child who is the subject of proceedings under this code.”). Being appointed a guardian
as a minor does not establish the incompetency of that individual as an adult.
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Again, Ms. Cowan is a prolific filer in federal courts across the country. She has repeatedly filed
routine documents in cases, including complaints, amended complaints, and motions, including
motions to proceed in forma pauperis.5 She has not identified why she is now medically incapable
of completing any specific form and when her request for an accommodation to complete that form
was denied.
Fourth, with regard to the retaliation argument, Ms. Cowan does not state when she filed
any misconduct complaint and what specific conduct occurred after the filing of that complaint
that purportedly constitutes retaliation. To the extent she is referring generally to unfavorable
rulings, she does not explain what ruling occurred after her filing that would require recusal. Even
if she had identified unfavorable rulings, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid
basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). While
Ms. Cowan has been reminded of her obligations to comply with all applicable Court orders, rules
and procedures, these are requirements for all parties proceeding in federal courts, regardless of
whether they are represented by counsel or proceeding pro se.6 Ms. Cowan has pointed to no facts
in the record supporting her belief that the undersigned has engaged in any behavior that constitutes
5 The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s March 4, 2026, Motion to Proceed
in Forma Pauperis because the Motion did not contain the statutorily required affidavit regarding
her inability to pay fees. See generally ECF No. 4. Similarly, the Court recommended Plaintiff
file an amended complaint not because of an inability to fill out a form, but to ensure Plaintiff’s
case was not dismissed for failure to comply with federal rules. See generally ECF No. 5. The
Court often provides courtesy copies of the District’s model forms to pro se parties to assist them
in filing documents compliant with federal statutes and rules. See, e.g., id. at 4.
6 “Any party appearing on his or her own behalf without an attorney is expected to
read and be familiar with the Rules of Practice and Procedure of this court; the relevant Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, of Criminal Procedure, or the Bankruptcy Rules; and the pertinent
Federal Rules of Evidence; and to proceed in accordance with them.” D. Kan. Rule 83.5.4(f); see
also Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (pro se litigants must “follow the same
rules of procedure that govern other litigants”).
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“harassment, discrimination, retaliation, and misuse of judicial authority” meriting recusal. ECF
No. 8 at 2.
Finally, Ms. Cowan’s judicial misconduct complaint is not a basis for recusal. As the Tenth
Circuit stated in upholding a district court judge’s decision not to recuse after the plaintiff filed a
judicial misconduct complaint:
[Petitioner] thinks that the minute she filed the misconduct
complaint against [the district court judge], he became obligated to
step down from any case involving her, but this is not correct. She
has not cited any rule or decision supporting the sweeping idea that
a judge must automatically disqualify herself from a lawsuit simply
because a disgruntled litigant currently alleges (or has previously
alleged) judicial misconduct. Indeed, if that were the rule, litigants
displeased with Judge A’s adverse rulings could easily manipulate
the system by filing a misconduct complaint, thereby disqualifying
Judge A from hearing the case, in the hopes that the case would then
be assigned to Judge B who might be more sympathetic to their
cause.
Smith v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 455 F. App’x 841, 844 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Mann, 229 F.3d
657, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Waterman v. Tippie, No. 21-3097-SAC, 2021 WL 4589028,
at *1-3 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 2021) (denying a motion to recuse where the pro se plaintiff alleged
“prejudice and retaliation” after the filing of a judicial misconduct complaint when the plaintiff’s
“claims of revenge and retaliation are based on nothing other than adverse rulings.”); Sump v.
Fingerhut, Inc., No. 01-4104-DES, 2002 WL 1602423, at *2 (D. Kan. July 19, 2002) (stating a
“party cannot force recusal merely by filing a complaint or a law suit against a judge.”); O’Connor
v. Lafayette City Council, No. 19-01066-WJM-KLM, 2019 WL 6215444, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 21,
2019) (citing cases and stating “Plaintiffs seek my recusal on the basis of their filing of a judicial
misconduct complaint against me. . . . This is not a permissible ground for recusal.”).
The same is true here, and Ms. Cowan does not cite to any contrary authority that the mere
filing of a judicial complaint requires recusal. In sum, Ms. Cowan makes boilerplate accusations
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without pointing to any specific facts or statements to support her allegations that the undersigned
has harassed, discriminated, retaliated against her or misused judicial authority. Ms. Cowan’s
assertions of bias are not supported by the record and appear to be based solely on adverse judicial
rulings at most.7
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Ms. Cowan has not met her burden to
show recusal is warranted and, accordingly, the Second Motion to Recuse is denied. See Davis,
2023 WL 6294281, at *2 (“Petitioner’s motion to disqualify does not allege any personal bias or
prejudice by the undersigned, nor does it explain why a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant
facts, would harbor doubts about the undersigned’s impartiality. Petitioner has not articulated any
action by the undersigned that could lead to the appearance of bias. Because the undersigned has
a duty to sit and hear this case where there is no legitimate reason for recusal or disqualification,
the motion to disqualify will be denied.”).
b. 28 U.S.C. § 144
Regarding Ms. Cowan’s allegations that recusal is warranted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144,
Ms. Cowan’s Second Motion to Recuse is not notarized or otherwise sworn under penalty of
perjury, so the Court cannot construe it as an affidavit. See generally ECF No. 8; see also Davis,
2023 WL 6294281, at *1 (“Without an affidavit showing bias or prejudice and proper identification
of events indicating a personal and extrajudicial bias, Petitioner does not support a request for
7 In her First Motion to Recuse, Ms. Cowan alleges the undersigned is abusing her
position with the Court to keep her case from being heard by a District Judge when she never
consented to a Magistrate Judge making rulings in her case. See ECF No. 7 at 1. But as explained
to Ms. Cowan by the District Judge in another case, Magistrate Judges are directly assigned to
conduct certain pretrial matters in this District. See Cowan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No.
26-1030-HLT-RES, ECF No. 31 at n.2 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2026); see also D. Kan. Rule 72.1.1
(explaining the statutory authority of magistrate judges); D. Kan. Rule 72.1.2 (listing the
assignment of matters to magistrate judges in the District).
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recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144.”). Even if it were an affidavit, the Court would reach the same
conclusions for the reasons stated above. See Burleson, 123 F. App’x at 960 (denying a motion
pursuant to § 144 because the movant “has not shown that the district court’s rulings were
unreasonable or incorrect, let alone that they demonstrated bias.”).
c. Judicial Canons
Finally, Ms. Cowan cites to three parts of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges as
additional bases for why the undersigned must recuse. Ms. Cowan does not explain why recusal
would be warranted under any of these Canons, particularly when the Court has not found recusal
warranted under either 28 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455. Ms. Cowan has not supported her
bare assertions that the undersigned’s conduct somehow violates these Canons. Accordingly, Ms.
Cowan’s request for recusal based on these Canons is also denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Ms. Cowan’s First Motion to Recuse, ECF No. 7,
is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ms. Cowan’s Second Motion to Recuse, ECF No. 8,
is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 31, 2026, at Topeka, Kansas.
/s/ Rachel E. Schwartz
Rachel E. Schwartz
United States Magistrate Judge
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