Lawson v. Godderz et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ANGELIINA LAWSON,
Plaintiff.
v.
ERIC GODDERZ, TAYLOR WINE, JOHN
BRYANT, RHONDA MASON, KEVEN
O’GRADY, THOMAS DROEGE,
JOHNATHAN DAVID BRENT LAWSON,
BREANNE HENDRICKS POE, ANDREW
BOLTON, AMANDA MIRANDA, HEATHER
DUNZ, ANDREA DUNSETH, RANDY
WILLNAUER, JIM MORROW, JEANNE
ROBINSON, MACK CURRY, AMANDA
MACKEY, MORROW WILLNAUER
CHURCH, LLC, JOLENE ZIRKLE, KELLY
JOHNSON, STEVEN CROSSLAND, STACY
JEFFRESS, TINA MILLER, RYAN
KRIEGHAUSER, TED MCDONALD,
CHARLES MILLER, MCDONALD LAW
GROUP, PA, THE LAW OFFICE OF
BREANNE H. POE, THE BOLTON LAW
FIRM, LLC, DOE DEFENDANTS 1–10,
Defendants.
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Case No. 6:25-cv-01179-JWB-TJJ
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
FOR DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
NOTICE
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and
recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), Plaintiff may file
a written objection to this report and recommendation. A party must file any objections within the
fourteen-day period if that party wants to have appellate review of the proposed findings of fact,
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conclusions of law, or recommended disposition. If no objections are timely filed, no appellate
review will be allowed by any court.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Relevant Background Based Upon Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff initiated this action on August 15, 2025, with the filing of her 76-page Complaint
(ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s Complaint names twenty-four Defendants. Her claims are brought
pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 42 U.S.C. 1983,
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Kansas State law. On August 20,
2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to add additional facts and four more Defendants.1
Plaintiff alleges the Defendants, “a mix of private actors, judicial officers, attorneys, court-
appointed professionals, public officials, and affiliated business entities formed an association-in-
fact enterprise to unlawfully strip her of custody, retaliate for protected ADA activity, conceal
abuse, and divert financial resources, all while insulating themselves from accountability through
procedural manipulation, suppression of evidence, and coordinated misconduct.”2 Plaintiff alleges
Defendants created such a scheme to engineer the unlawful removal of her custodial rights. The
factual allegations are all related to a child custody proceeding ongoing in Kansas State court (the
“State Court Case”). Plaintiff claims as a result of Defendants’ actions she has suffered injury to
her business and property interests. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, declaratory and injunctive
relief, restoration of parental rights, and referral for a criminal investigation.
1 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 12) does not include all of the claims against Defendants
contained in the Complaint. Plaintiff states the purpose of the Amended Complaint is to add and clarify
facts and bring claims against four additional Defendants. The Court presumes Plaintiff intended to
supplement rather than to replace her Complaint with her Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Court
analyzes the allegations contained in both her Complaint and Amended Complaint together. Any
reference to “Complaint” throughout this Report and Recommendation also encompasses Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint.
2 Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1, p. 7.
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The Defendants in this action are judicial officers involved in Plaintiff’s State Court Case:
Judge Eric Godderz, Judge Taylor Wine, Judge John Bryant, Judge Rhonda Mason, Judge Keven
O’Grady, and Judge Charles Droedge (“Judicial Defendants”). Plaintiff also names as Defendants
her ex-husband, Johnathan David Brent Lawson, and several Defendants that were involved to
some extent in her underlying State Court Case: Breanna Hendricks Poe, Andrew Bolton, Amanda
Miranda, Heather Dunz, Andrea Dunseth, Randy Wilnauer, Jim Morrow, Jeanne Robinson, Mack
Curry, Amanda Mackey, Jolene Zirkle, Kelly E. Johnson, Steven Crossland, Stacy Jeffress, Tina
Miller, Ted McDonald (“Individually Named Defendants”). Relatedly, Plaintiff brings her claims
against the law firms of various attorneys involved in her State Court Case, including Morrow,
Willnauer, Church, LLC, The Bolton Law Firm, LLC, The Law Office of Breanna Poe, McDonald
Law Group, PA. Finally, Plaintiff brings her claims against the United States Attorney for the
District of Kansas Ryan Krieghauser.
After careful review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes
none of Plaintiff’s purported claims are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Therefore, the Court recommends dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I. Applicable Legal Standards
When a party seeks to proceed without the prepayment of fees, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires
the court to screen the party’s complaint. The court must dismiss the complaint if it determines
the action (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.3 The purpose of § 1915(e)
is to “discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits
3 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of
the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.”4
This Court reviews the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint under the same standards as
those used when considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).5 Plaintiff “must
allege sufficient facts to state a claim which is plausible—more than merely conceivable—on its
face.”6 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must provide a “short and plain statement
of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Additionally, the complaint must state
more than “labels and conclusions” and “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief beyond the speculative level.”7 Plaintiff proceeds pro se, thus her pleadings must be
construed liberally.8 However, she still bears the burden to allege “sufficient facts on which a
recognized legal claim could be based,”9 and the Court cannot “take on the responsibility of serving
as her attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.”10
“Apart from the court’s obligation to screen IFP complaints for merit, the court has an
independent obligation to determine if subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”11 “[F]ederal courts are
courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction” and “may only hear cases when empowered to do so
4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
5 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2007).
6 Fisher v. Lynch, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1260 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
7 Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 545.
8 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
9 Id.
10 Mays v. Wyandotte Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2010 WL 6032763, at *2 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Garrett v.
Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)).
11 Martinez v. Pickering, No. 21-4083-JAR-ADM, 2021 WL 12146947, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 2021),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-4083-JAR-ADM, 2022 WL 21778539 (D. Kan. Feb. 28,
2022) (citing Gad v. Kan. State Univ., 787 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 2015)).
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by the Constitution and by act of Congress.”12 Within the meaning of § 1915(e), a complaint is
frivolous “if its subject matter is outside the jurisdiction of the court.”13
II. Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
a. Plaintiff’s Claims for Equitable Relief
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges during the course of Plaintiff’s State Court Case involving
the custody of her son, Defendants conspired against her to “strip her of custody, retaliate for ADA
activity, conceal abuse, and divert financial resources” and violated her constitutional and statutory
rights.14 Plaintiff states this Court has jurisdiction over her claims for equitable relief, because she
does not seek to overturn any state court judgment related to her custody dispute, but instead
“challenges extrinsic fraud, retaliation, and systemic racketeering that occurred outside the normal
judicial process.”15 However, in Plaintiff’s prayer for relief she asks this Court to “restore
Plaintiff’s custodial and parental rights with respect to D.L., and enjoin further deprivation of such
rights in retaliation for protected activity.”16 Despite Plaintiff’s statements to the contrary, in
seeking such relief Plaintiff clearly is attempting to have this Court modify the State court’s child
custody orders, while couching her claims as a conspiracy and RICO violations. Due to the relief
sought by Plaintiff the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief
pursuant to the principles of Younger abstention.
“Younger abstention dictates that federal courts not interfere with state court proceedings
by granting equitable relief—such as injunctions of important state proceedings or declaratory
judgments regarding constitutional issues in those proceedings—when such relief could
12 Gad, 787 F.3d at 1035.
13 Oltremari by McDaniel v. Kan. Social & Rehabilitative Serv., 871 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (D. Kan. 1994).
14 Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1, p. 7.
15 Id. at p. 10.
16 Id. at p. 75.
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adequately be sought before the state court.”17 There are three factors that dictate whether Younger
abstention applies: “(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2)
the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and
(3) the state proceedings ‘involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state
law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies.’”18
In 2013, the Supreme Court in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, limited Younger’s
application to the following three types of state court proceedings: (1) ongoing state criminal
prosecutions; (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions; and (3)
“civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability
to perform their judicial functions.”19 These three categories are the “exceptional” circumstances
to which Younger applies.20 The “exceptional circumstances” requiring abstention under
Younger’s third civil proceedings category are present only when “the relief requested from the
federal court would enjoin or otherwise interfere with such proceedings.”21 Since the Sprint
opinion, the Tenth Circuit has affirmed cases applying Younger to child custody cases.22 And,
17 Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999)).
18 Id. (quoting Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1999)).
19 Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013).
20 Id.
21 Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 672 (10th Cir. 2020).
22 See Thompson v. Romeo, 728 F. App’x 796, 798 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (holding that district
court properly applied Younger abstention to dismiss claims arising from allegedly unconstitutional
orders entered in ongoing state-court divorce and child-custody proceeding); Alfaro v. Cnty. v. Arapahoe,
766 F. App’x 657, 661 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (holding that district court properly applied
Younger abstention to dismiss claims arising from allegedly unconstitutional orders entered in ongoing
state court divorce and child-custody proceeding to the extent the state court proceedings were ongoing).
See also Escalante v. Escalante, No. 23-CV-2176-KHV-TJJ, 2023 WL 11872503, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 30,
2023); Blanchard v. Woltman, No. 24-2290-JWB, 2025 WL 949037, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2025)
(finding Younger abstention applies to federal claims deriving from state court child custody
proceedings); Zesiger v. Zesiger, No. 25-4055-DDC-RES, 2025 WL 1837375, at *2 (D. Kan. July 3,
2025) (finding to the extent state court proceedings were ongoing Younger abstention likely applies to
federal claims deriving from state court divorce proceedings).
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because Plaintiff’s requested relief would “enjoin or otherwise interfere with” the State Court
Case, this presents an “exceptional circumstance.”23 Therefore, the Court now analyzes whether
Younger abstention is appropriate in this matter.
First, a review of the docket in Plaintiff’s state court proceedings show that her case is on
appeal and ongoing.24 Therefore, the first Younger factor is met.
Second, the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the
Complaint. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that state law prevents her from presenting
her federal claims in the state court proceedings.25 However, Plaintiff merely states that her
constitutional right and statutory rights under the ADA have been violated or otherwise ignored.
Plaintiff does not provide any authority or arguments that would support a conclusion the state
court could not entertain the constitutional or statutory claims arising from her State Court Case.
In fact, state courts have been found adequate forums for federal constitutional and statutory
claims.26 To the extent Plaintiff has already raised her constitutional and statutory concerns in the
state court, “that court’s decisions are not ‘inadequate’ for Younger purposes simply because the
court did not rule in her favor.”27 Therefore, the second Younger factor is met.
23 See Elna Sefcovic, LLC, 953 F.3d at 672; Culbertson v. Billam, et al., No. 25-4049-JAR-TJJ, 2025 WL
1368846, at *3 (D. Kan. May 12, 2025).
24 See Burnett v. Reno Cnty. Comm'n, No. 18-3160-SAC, 2019 WL 1000882, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 1,
2019) (finding state court case ongoing when on appeal). Plaintiff does not provide her pending state
court case number, and there appear to be two Kansas State Court domestic relations cases related to her
divorce and custody of D.L. Both are on appeal at the Kansas Court of Appeals. See In the Matter of the
Marriage of Johnathan David Lawson v. Angeliina Lynn Lawson, 2020-DM-000131, Anderson County,
Kansas (Notice of Appeal filed January 13, 2026); In the Matter of the Marriage of Angeliina Lynn
Lawson v. Jonathan David Brent Lawson, LV-2025-DM-000861, Leavenworth County, Kansas (Notice
of Appeal filed December 19, 2025).
25 See Morkel v. Davis, 513 Fed. App’x 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2013).
26 Id. (finding state court adequate forum for raising constitutional claims); D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No.
497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding state court adequate forum for raising ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims).
27 Morkel, 513 Fed. App’x at 728.
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Third, the State Court Case involves important state interests. Plaintiff’s allegations arise
from a child custody matter, the resolution of which presents an important state interest.28 The
law in the Tenth Circuit is clear that issues of familial relations and issues of child custody are
“especially delicate subject[s] of state policy.”29 Therefore, the third Younger factor is met.
However, a court may decline to abstain under Younger when extraordinary circumstances
are present, including when the underlying state court action was: (1) a criminal prosecution
commenced in bad faith or to harass, (2) based on a flagrantly and patently unconstitutional statute,
or (3) related to any other such extraordinary circumstance creating a threat of “irreparable injury”
both great and immediate.30 “[I]t is the plaintiff’s ‘heavy burden’ to overcome the bar of Younger
abstention by setting forth more than mere allegations of bad faith or harassment.”31
Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to show any of these three circumstances exist in
this case. First, Plaintiff’s underlying State Court Case concerns a domestic relations matter, not a
criminal prosecution, so the first exception is inapplicable. Next, Plaintiff does not allege the action
is based on a flagrantly and patently unconstitutional statute. Instead, her allegations are all based
on the alleged actions of the Defendants, so the second exception is inapplicable. Finally, nothing
in Plaintiff’s Complaint rises to the level necessary to show a threat of “irreparable injury” to
Plaintiff that is “both great and immediate.”32 In Younger, the Supreme Court noted in order to
28 Fisher, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 1267 (“it is well established that the State of Kansas maintains a significant
interest in child custody matters”).
29 Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1393 (10th Cir. 1996).
30 Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
53–54 (1971)).
31 See Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational and Pro. Licensing of Dept. of Com. of State of Utah, 240 F.3d 871,
876 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Phelps, 122 F.3d at 889).
32 Cheatham v. Thompson, No. 21-3195-SAC, 2021 WL 4206332, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 2021)
(“Generally, a threat of irreparable injury occurs alongside a bad-faith prosecution or where there are a
series of repeated prosecutions” and “the threat to the [individual’s] federally protected rights must be one
that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution”); Hambright v. Kansas,
No. 21-3045-SAC, 2021 WL 1821801, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2021) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 46)
(“irreparable injury” must be “both great and immediate”).
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show irreparable injury, “the threat to plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot
be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.”33 Although Plaintiff’s State
Court Case is not a criminal prosecution, the same principal applies. The pending state court action
may resolve any alleged violation of Plaintiff’s protected rights, so the third exception is
inapplicable.34 Thus, no exception to Younger abstention applies to this action. Therefore, this
Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief, and the
undersigned recommends their dismissal.
b. Plaintiff’s Claims for Monetary Damages
i. Plaintiff’s Civil RICO Claims (Counts I & II)
Plaintiff alleges violations under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961–68. Plaintiff asserts her claims
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count I) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count II). RICO is a federal
criminal statute which targets criminal activity and racketeering and creates enhanced punishments
for the same. Under some circumstances, there may be a civil cause of action under RICO.35
RICO vests a private citizen with substantive rights to avoid injury to her “business or property”
by a pattern of racketeering activity, and it explicitly creates a federal cause of action to vindicate
those federal rights.36 The elements of a civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) are: “(1)
investment in, control of, or conduct of (2) an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity.”37 An “enterprise” is defined to include “any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
33 Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
34 Weitzel, 240 F.3d at 876 (finding third Younger exception did not apply when state court proceedings
could resolve claims brought in federal court).
35 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
36 Id.
37 Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006).
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not a legal entity.”38 Racketeering activity is frequently described as a “predicate act” or “predicate
acts” which consist of the federal and state crimes identified in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
Plaintiff alleges between approximately 2019 through the present Defendants have
engaged in predicate acts including, but not limited to: mail fraud, wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud,
obstruction of justice, tampering with evidence, witness tampering and retaliation, money
laundering, custodial interference, and ADA retaliation.39 The Court has reviewed each of the
alleged predicate acts Plaintiff sets forth for each Defendant and fails to find any alleged predicate
act that rises to the level necessary to set forth a RICO claim. Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff
sets forth what she believes to be the predicate act or acts of each Defendant. However, what
Plaintiff alleges to be predicate acts are no more than generalized allegations. Plaintiff provides
few facts to support such allegations and largely makes conclusory statements concerning what
she believes to be predicate or criminal acts.
Further, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not actually set forth any criminal or racketeering
activity. What Plaintiff alleges to be predicate acts or racketeering activity appear to be grievances
she had with the actors involved in her State court child custody case, and not actual indictable
activity. For example, Plaintiff claims Defendant Andrea Dunsworth’s predicate act was wire
fraud because she “transmitted a false and misleading therapy progress report via interstate email
to GAL Andrew Bolton.”40 Similarly, Plaintiff claims Defendant Tina Miller’s predicate act was
mail fraud because “she failed to mail Plaintiff a copy of a court order regarding ADA
accommodations . . . .”41 Though Plaintiff labels such actions as predicate acts, the facts pled do
not support these assertions. None of the actions contained in the Complaint regarding any
38 18 U.S.C. 1961(4).
39 Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1, p. 64–65.
40 Id. at p. 27.
41 Id. at p. 33.
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Defendant are sufficient to show any Defendant engaged in racketeering activity, despite
Plaintiff’s conclusory statements to the contrary.
Additionally, several of Plaintiff’s alleged predicate acts are not those enumerated in 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1), and do not constitute “racketeering activity” as defined by the statute. Again,
most of what Plaintiff alleges to be predicate acts are complaints with the way her underlying State
Court Case was handled. For example, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Kelly Johnson’s predicate act
was violating the ADA because she “did not have knowledge of ADA, did not have the fee
schedules for the CART services, [and] did not understand the technology to be qualified as an
ADA coordinator.”42 And Defendant Judge Charles Droedge’s alleged predicate act was violating
the ADA by refusing “to authorize ADA-compliant redaction and privacy accommodations after
formal requests.”43 Such actions do not fit within the definition of “racketeering” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1). Simply stated, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a valid RICO claim. The Complaint
merely consists of conclusory allegations and references to “racketeering,” and fails to allege facts
showing that each Defendant’s conduct satisfied each element of a RICO claim.
In Count II, Plaintiff also brings a RICO conspiracy claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1962(d).
However, a “RICO conspiracy claim under Section 1962(d) must be dismissed when plaintiff does
not state a claim for violations under Sections 1962(a) through (c).”44 As discussed above, Plaintiff
fails to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and therefore cannot sustain a claim under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d). The undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s claims contained in Counts I and II be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
ii. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims (Count III)
42 Id. at p. 30.
43 Id. at p. 20.
44 Burdett v. Harrah's Kansas Casino Corp., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1122 (D. Kan. 2003).
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Plaintiff’s Complaint is largely dedicated to allegations related to her RICO claims and
does not make specific allegations related to her § 1983 claims. However, in Count III of her
Complaint, Plaintiff raises a § 1983 claim alleging violations of her due process and equal
protection rights, as well as First Amendment retaliation. The only allegations Plaintiff makes
directly concerning her § 1983 claims are that “Defendants, through the Enterprise acting under
color of state law deprived Plaintiff of her rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom
from retaliation for protected petitioning activity.”45
To state a § 1983 claim a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the U.S. Constitution or laws of the United States (2) that was caused by a
person while acting under color of state law.46 There are no facts pled supportive of a constitutional
violation by any Defendant. Further, Plaintiff makes these allegations as to those involved in the
“Family Court Enterprise,” and claims the “Enterprise” acted under color of state law. However,
most of the Defendants alleged to be part of the “Family Court Enterprise” are private actors, and
Plaintiff has failed to make any allegations suggesting their activity is “fairly attributable to the
state.”47 Therefore, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s claims contained in Count III be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
45 Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1, p. 67.
46 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155–57 (1978).
47 Weaver v. Boyles, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342 (D. Kan. 2001), aff’d, 26 F. App’x 908 (10th Cir. 2002).
The Tenth Circuit applies four different tests to determine whether a private person is subject to liability
as a state actor: the nexus test, the symbiotic relationship test, the joint action test, and the public function
test. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995). None of Plaintiff’s
pleadings acknowledge any of these tests, and regardless of which is applied, Plaintiff fails to show state
action on behalf of the private actor Defendants.
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iii. Plaintiff’s ADA Claims (Count IV)
Plaintiff also does not make specific allegations related to her ADA claims. Upon review
of the Complaint, the undersigned finds it does not on its face state a plausible claim for
discrimination under Title II of the ADA. First, the Court notes that individually named
defendants in their individual capacities are not subject to liability under the ADA, and most of
the Defendants in this case are subject to dismissal as to Plaintiff’s ADA claims on that basis
alone.48 Further, a claim under Title II of the ADA can only be brought against a public entity.49
Plaintiff never alleges any facts about any Defendant that could support an inference that any
Defendant is a public entity. To the extent any Defendant could be a public entity as defined by
Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff’s generic allegations still fail to state a claim, and her claims should
be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”50
To state a claim under Title II, Plaintiff must show: (1) she is a qualified individual with a
disability, (2) she was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by
reason of her disability.51
Plaintiff’s only allegations regarding her ADA claims are that Defendants “denied Plaintiff
the benefit of services, programs, or activities of a public entity by reason of disability and
48 See Wilson v. Hous. Auth. of Silver Lake, Kansas, No. 19-cv-4026-HLT-ADM, 2019 WL 2943054, at
*2 (D. Kan. May 30, 2019).
49 McNeal v. Henry, No. 17-CV-04008-DDC-KGS, 2017 WL 2345625, at *4 (D. Kan. May 30, 2017).
50 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
51 Est. of Beauford v. Mesa Cnty., Colorado, 35 F.4th 1248, 1275 (10th Cir. 2022).
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retaliated against her for asserting ADA rights.”52 The only facts alleged regarding Plaintiff’s
assertion of her ADA rights are that she requested ADA accommodations from various actors for
her disability which were allegedly denied or ignored. Most of her allegations generally concern
her disapproval or disagreement as to how her ADA accommodation requests were handled.
Plaintiff does not plead any facts regarding her disability to show that she is a qualified
individual, and does not make any allegations to show she was excluded from any services on the
basis of her disability. In fact, based on the allegations contained in the Complaint, Plaintiff
appears to have been an active participant in all aspects of her State Court Case. Finally, there are
no nonconclusory allegations contained in the Complaint to suggest any of Defendants’ actions
were taken because of Plaintiff’s disability. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under
Title II of the ADA, and Count IV should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
iv. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims (Count V)
Plaintiff’s remaining theories of recovery against Defendants are based on Kansas state
law. They include interference with parental custody, identity theft and fraudulent use of public
records, child endangerment, and civil conspiracy. The undersigned recommends that this Court
decline to exercise jurisdiction over such claims.
When the Court has original jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 authorizes supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims. Supplemental jurisdiction “is exercised on a discretionary basis,
keeping in mind considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants.”53
But “[w]hen all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to
exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”54 Indeed, courts routinely decline to
52 Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1, p. 68.
53 Bauchman for Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 549 (10th Cir. 1997).
54 Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Exum v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1138–39 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the district has discretion
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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims when federal claims do not survive
screening, as is recommended here.
Accordingly, finding no federal claims should survive screening, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
• Plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief should be dismissed as the Court lacks jurisdiction
over them pursuant to the principles of Younger abstention.
• Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), or (d), and
Counts I and II should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
• Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Count III
should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
• Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any Defendant under the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Count IV should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
• Because the undersigned recommends no federal claims survived screening, the
undersigned also recommends the Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims contained in Count V.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the District Judge dismiss without
prejudice all of Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants, as set forth in the Complaint, under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because she fails to state claims upon which relief may be granted. The
to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it has dismissed all claims
over which it had original jurisdiction). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if “the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).
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undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims.
A copy of this Report and Recommendation shall be mailed to Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated March 12, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas.
Teresa J. James
U. S. Magistrate Judge
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