USA v. Peralta

6:25-cr-10080Ksd11 déc. 2025

Texte intégral

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-10080-JWB
RUBEN FRANCO PERALTA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s motions to dismiss. (Docs. 25, 26.) 	The
motions are fully briefed and ripe for decision. 	(Docs. 25, 26, 31, 32, 34.) 	The motions are
DENIED for the reasons stated herein.
I. 	Facts and Procedural History
Ruben Franco Peralta is charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) which prohibits
possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. (Doc. 1.) He was indicted on August 5, 2025. (Id.)
On May 3, 2025, Defendant was allegedly illegally present in the United States and possessed a
firearm. (Id.) The indictment contains no other facts.
On October 20, 2025, Defendant filed two motions to dismiss. (Docs. 25, 26.) The first
seeks dismissal of the indictment because Congress allegedly exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause when it enacted § 922(g)(5) and the second seeks dismissal by arguing the
indictment violates Defendant’s Second Amendment rights. For the reasons explained below, the
court denies both motions.
II. 	Standard
An indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential
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facts constituting the offense charged.” 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). 	An indictment is subject to
dismissal for “failure to state an offense.” 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). 	“An indictment is
sufficient if it (1) contains the essential elements of the offense intended to be charged, (2)
sufficiently apprises the accused of what he must be prepared to defend against, and (3) enables
the accused to plead a judgment under the indictment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for
the same offense.” United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1304 (10th Cir. 1991).
III. 	Analysis
A. 	Commerce Clause
Defendant acknowledges his motion is squarely foreclosed by binding Tenth Circuit case
law. (Doc. 25 at 2.) See United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 635 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Because
Mr. Patton's bulletproof vest moved across state lines at some point in its existence, Congress may
regulate it under Scarborough, even though it does not fall within any of the three categories the
Court now recognizes for Commerce Clause authority.”) 	The issue is presented for appeal
preservation. 	Recognizing the Tenth Circuit authority, the court denies Defendant’s motion to
dismiss on Commerce Clause grounds. (Doc. 25.)
B. 	Second Amendment
Defendant argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to him because of
his rights under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 26.) The only
trouble for Mr. Peralta is that he has no Second Amendment rights. To prevail on an as applied
challenge Defendant must show that the Second Amendment applies to his conduct, at which time
the government then has the burden to show that the regulation is consistent with the nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S.
1, 17 (2023). This standard requires only a “historical analogue” between the modern regulation
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and historical regulations, not a “historical twin.” 	United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 701
(2024).
This court has opined on this issue before and does not feel compelled to add to Westlaw’s
already boundless library of digital ink. 	See United States v. Ortiz-Moreno, No. 24-CR-10079-
JWB, 2025 WL 1135437 (D. Kan. Apr. 17, 2025). What the court explained in Ortiz-Moreno is
true here too. Mr. Peralta is attempting to invoke the protections of a constitutional right to which
he has no claim. The Second Amendment reads “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.
Const. amend. II (emphasis added). As far as this court is concerned, illegal aliens are not part of
“the people” included in the Second Amendment’s protections because they are not “law-abiding
responsible citizens” who are “members of the political community.” 	Ortiz-Moreno, 2025 WL
1135437 at *2 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580, 634 (2008)).
Defendant’s arguments to the contrary do not alter this conclusion. Defendant claims that
his work as a cowboy in Kansas, his family life, and his popular music gig in Kansas place him
“among the people of the United States.” (Doc. 26 at 6.) These activities do not suffice to make
an illegal alien a member of “the political community” of the United States. See Heller, 554 U.S.
at 580. 	Whatever the reach of the “the political community,” taking it to include allegedly
criminal, illegally present noncitizens would render Heller’s language meaningless. Accordingly,
this court will not consider a person in the shoes of Mr. Peralta, no matter his activities in the
United States, to be covered by the Second Amendment’s sweep.
IV. 	Conclusion
As a result of the foregoing, Defendant’s motions to dismiss are denied. (Docs. 25, 26.)
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IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 11th day of December, 2025.
s/ John W. Broomes
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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